When building international relations in the South Pacific region (SWR) in the XX-XXI centuries, Australia and France pursued largely coinciding geopolitical interests, which determined their intense competition for spheres of influence. In the 2010s, Australia firmly maintained its status as a regional leader in the UTRs, using political and economic leverage over neighboring Oceania countries. France, in turn, maintained key positions in the region, not allowing its territories-New Caledonia, French Polynesia and the islands of Wallis and Futuna-to withdraw from its sovereignty. At the same time, neither Paris nor Canberra missed an opportunity to turn each other's diplomatic blunders to their advantage. Nevertheless, both countries were well aware of the realities of the rapidly changing world order and were aware that in the event of a truly serious threat - whether it was China's claims to a military presence in the South Caucasus or North Korean challenges to the entire Asia-Pacific region, of which the South Caucasus is a part - they would have to act together. This logic has forced Australia and France to build a balanced and thoughtful relationship. The balance of power that developed between Paris and Canberra in the UTR in the early 2010s can be seen as a positive example of mutual cooperation and understanding, as much as possible between states competing for spheres of influence.

Keywords: international relations, South Pacific region, spheres of influence, Australia, France, Oceania countries, geopolitical interests, competition, economy.

The paths of France and Australia crossed many times in the colonial era. Australia - the most delicious part of the Pacific Ocean-was a bone of contention between the British and French empires, for which the division of overseas territories was then the subject of increased attention. It is noteworthy that in 1810, British Australia was almost ceded to France. This did not happen, because the governor of the French colony on the island of Mauritius, Louis Leger (1803-1810) in the Indian Ocean did not obey Napoleon's order to capture the Australian city of Sydney, which at that time belonged to the English crown.

The beginning of Australia's political independence was laid in 1901 with the proclamation of the Union of Australia, which received the status of an English dominion within the Commonwealth of Nations. From that moment on, Australia began to smoothly take over the functions of the United Kingdom in the UTR. Since the status of a dominion allowed the British colonies to be administered through Canberra, in 1906 London moved to New York.-

1 This is the name given to small island developing States and dependent territories in the UTRs, with the exception of Australia and New Zealand.

page 62
He gave the most populous colony, Papua, under the direct jurisdiction of Australia. At the end of the First World War, during which about 300 thousand Australian soldiers took part on the side of Great Britain in battles on the fields of France, Australia joined the League of Nations and received a mandate for the German part of fr. New Guinea, the island of Nauru, which she co-administered with New Zealand, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the northern Solomon Islands Group.

Britain, which failed to restore the power of the Sterling zone after World War II, has shifted its foreign policy to Europe, shifting the entire burden of responsibility for its territories in the South to Australia. From the 1960s to the 1980s, independence was granted to all financially prosperous British South Pacific colonies, and the disadvantaged ones were transferred to Canberra. In 2005, the United Kingdom finally lost its geopolitical interest in Oceania, ending its membership in the last regional organization of which it was a member, the Pacific Community.2 The main activity of the Community is the fight against poverty in the UTRs with the help of international donors. In the 2010s, the Pacific Community consisted of 22 independent states and self-governing territories of Oceania, as well as the remaining four of the six founding countries: Australia, New Zealand, France, and the United States (the Netherlands and the United Kingdom dropped out), which continued to generously finance this organization [South Pacific Community].

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, only the tiny island of Pitcairn in the heart of the Pacific Ocean, where about fifty people lived, remained as part of Great Britain as a tribute to its former power.

Unlike Britain, which left the UTR due to financial difficulties and left a "viceroy" in its place-Australia, France fought for each of its South Pacific possessions to the end, even to the detriment of its own economic interests. However, the reasons why Paris sought to stay in Oceania were not only due to the favorable strategic position of the dependent territories. The military and political presence of France in the Pacific strengthened its sense of its own greatness, although it was not cheap for the French treasury. The firm conviction of the superiority of French culture over Anglo - Saxon did not allow France to observe the expansion of the influence of Anglophones in the Pacific Ocean-Australia, New Zealand and the United States-impartially, forcing it to take all measures to defend the French position in the JUTR.

Moreover, the British concept of" viceroyalty", which was expressed in the gradual transfer of its functions to the JUTR of Australia, with which it maintained close ties, did not work when France tried to rely on the most economically developed possession, New Caledonia, in this matter. Since 1888, New Caledonia has ruled the islands of Wallis and Futuna, but in 1959 this tiny domain voted to come under direct French rule, justifying its decision by saying that Wallis and Futuna are Polynesians, and half of the population of New Caledonia was made up of Melanesian Kanaks, who traditionally were not entitled to rule the Polynesian people. Polynesians also lived in French Polynesia, making up 80% of the local population there. They did not want to submit not only to New Caledonia, but also to France. And in New Caledonia itself, opinions about relations with the mother country were very different. The Kanakas were pro-independence, while other residents, mostly French, were in favor of keeping New Caledonia part of France.

Paris held back the attempts of its possessions to gain independence thanks to skillful ideological propaganda and economic measures. The concept of "brotherhood and equality" was widely used in relations between the metropolis and its territories,

2 Pacific Community. From 1947 to 1997 - South Pacific Commission.

page 63
it excluded the idea of the supposedly subordinate position of the peoples of Oceania among the French. The French Pacific franc, which was introduced as early as 1945, was used as a single currency in the three possessions. Paris has never reduced the volume of subsidies to its South Pacific possessions below 15% of the GDP of New Caledonia, 30% of the GDP of French Polynesia, and 97% of the GDP of the Wallis and Futuna Islands [Pacific Islands Report, 2003-2013]. Thanks to such huge investments, the standard of living in the French territories was always higher than in the neighboring independent countries of Oceania - the former British colonies. Not surprisingly, the extent to which French possessions claimed independence was inversely proportional to the share of French subsidies in their GDP.

Finally, in 1970, the Francophonie was created - an organization that aimed to unite nations on the basis of French culture, the elements of which were not only the French language and common spiritual values, but also political and economic components.3
Despite the competition, rival UTR France and the United Kingdom jointly managed the New Hebrides condominium from 1906 to 1980, until it gained independence under the new name of Vanuatu. Despite the external prosperity of this system, the shadow struggle between Francophones and Anglophones to maintain their influence on the archipelago has been waged throughout its history and continued after it gained independence, but this time between France and the successor of Britain - Australia.

Australia, which at the beginning of the XXI century was firmly among the most successful countries on the planet, gained full independence in foreign and domestic policy in 1944. According to the Westminster Statute of 1932 ratified by the British government, the United Kingdom, weakened by the Second World War, decided to take this step, as it could no longer provide Australia with strategic protection and provide it will receive further economic assistance.

The "sterling zone", which was reeling after the Second World War, could not resist the onslaught of the US dollar, which Australia did not even think to resist. Already in the 1950s, US investment in the Australian economy exceeded that of the British by almost a third. It is symbolic that in 1966 the new national currency of Australia, which replaced the Australian pound, received not the Irobritish name "royal", as it was originally intended, but "dollar". In 1973, the Australian dollar exchange rate was no longer attached to the British currency, but to the American one. A decade later, in 1983, a stronger Australian economy allowed the introduction of a floating exchange rate, making the Australian dollar the sixth most traded currency in the world after the US dollar, Japanese yen, British pound sterling, Swiss franc and Canadian dollar. And in 2013, the International Monetary Fund planned to add the "aussie" (as Australians call not only themselves, but also their dollar) to the list of world reserve currencies [Antonets, 2013].

Australia's economic success has been combined with the expansion of its experience in international relations, focused mainly on the pro-American direction. Back in the middle of the XX century. Canberra has become a staunch ally of Washington on foreign policy issues. The strategic rapprochement between Australia and the United States took shape in the ANZUS 4 military-political bloc. In 1965, Australia sent its troops to participate in the Vietnam War on the side of the United States, which caused the collapse of another bloc created in 1954 at the initiative of Washington - the military-political Organization-

3 In the latter two aspects, however, Francophonie ideologues refused to see the similarity of this organization to the British Commonwealth.

4 Is named after the first letters of the names of the participating countries: Australia, New Zealand, United States on the basis of the" Security Treaty " of 1952.ANZUS actually broke up in 1986 due to the secession of New Zealand, which refused to accept American ships with nuclear weapons on board into its ports.

page 64
The South-East Asia Treaty (SEATO), which included Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The differences between France, which then opposed US aggression in Vietnam, and Australia, which supported the Pentagon's strategic plans, became one of the most serious political disagreements of the time between Paris and Canberra.

Subsequently, France and Australia repeatedly had to resolve controversial issues, the most important of which should be called the conduct by Paris of nuclear tests in French Polynesia from 1960 to 1996, which Canberra actively opposed, as well as the US war against Iraq that began in 2002, which France unequivocally condemned and Australia supported, sending its soldiers to participate in joint operations with the Americans on Iraqi territory. Relations on the first issue improved by 1998 after France signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. On the second issue, the head of the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Peter Hendy, who spoke in Paris in 2003, said: "I do not think that tensions between Australia and France will continue in the future over the controversial issue of the Iraq war" [Hendy, 2003]. And the French side readily supported this opinion.

Paris sought an agreement with Canberra in order to preserve a good neighborhood in the South. The fact is that during the period of decolonization of Oceania, which began in the 1960s and lasted for almost 40 years, Australia was able to consolidate its undisputed leadership in the South Pacific, enlisting the support of the "sheriff in the Pacific" - the United States and its" younger brother " - New Zealand on strategic and general political issues in the region. In the mid-2000s, China was added to these players. But even with the new "friend", Australia has built an effective line of behavior in the South, allowing the Middle Kingdom only to Canberra-regulated economic cooperation with the countries of Oceania and blocking the possibility of a Chinese military and political presence in the region to the best of its ability.

Historically, relations between Australia and Oceania countries were built in a special way. The South Pacific region was perceived by Canberra as a British heritage, which by unwritten law belonged to it, if not entirely, then at least economically. Thus, by the early 2000s, Australia's fourth-largest bank, Westpac, ranked first in terms of operations in Oceania, opening branches on virtually every island. And in Nauru, Kiribati and Tuvalu, the Australian dollar remained the official currency after independence.

To regulate financial flows in Oceania, Australia, together with New Zealand, created the largest regional organization in 1971 - the South Pacific Forum (South Pacific Forum), which since 2000 has changed its name to the Pacific Islands Forum (or Forum, so as not to get confused in abbreviations). In the 2010s, the Forum includes 16 independent island States and Self-Governing Territories, to which Canberra annually sent considerable financial assistance in the amount of 0.3% of its GDP (approximately 2 billion Australian dollars) [AusAID...], considering that only about 8 million people live on the islands of Oceania (5 million of them in Papua New Guinea). And if until the middle of the first decade of the XXI century, France was the second most important donor to the UTR, then after the global economic crisis of 2008, China gradually began to occupy its shaken financial positions. Although China, France and the United States are not members of the Forum, they have been parties to the dialogue since 1989-1990. The parties to the dialogue hold additional meetings with representatives of Oceania countries on a special day following the end of the main meeting, which is held annually under the chairmanship of one of the participating countries (secretly sent by Australia and, to a lesser extent, by New Zealand). It is interesting to note that since 2006 Beijing began to organize its own regular meetings

page 65
summits with the heads of Oceania countries. The Chinese have adopted this tactic from Paris, which held three summits with the heads of Oceania countries in 2003, 2006 and 2009.

According to a number of analysts, during the global financial crisis of 2008-2010, when Australia was forced to reduce its financial injections into the UTRs by a third, it irrevocably lost some of its positions in the region, which were immediately occupied by other donor players. This view was based on an obvious shift in the format of the Forum: in the early 2010s, the annual meetings of members of this fundamental regional organization, where the unspoken leadership belonged to Australia, lost their primary importance. The most important event was the last day before closing, when meetings were held with the parties to the dialogue-first of all with China, which had most successfully survived the years of the global recession. Nevertheless, in the 2010s, Australia still managed to build regional policy through its initiatives through the Forum.

The weakening of France in the JUTR due to the global financial crisis was reflected, among other things, in the fact that after 2009, Paris chose not to spend huge amounts of money on holding summits with the heads of Oceania countries, which turned out to be ineffective in reality.

"Checkbook diplomacy" is not a new approach in relations between Oceanic countries and regional players. Moreover, competition on this sensitive issue led to sharp disagreements between France and Australia in the early 1980s, when Canberra, which continued the British policy of reducing French influence in the UTR, began to officially support the demands of the French possessions for independence. These demands have been shaped and reinforced in large part by Australia's behind-the-scenes "checkbook diplomacy." The main argument of Canberra in favor of the acquisition of independence by the French territories was that the neighboring former British possessions, freed from the power of the mother country, proved the relative success of their existence. The conflict of interest between France and Australia was that it was Australia that was going to "take care" of the newly independent states after the possible withdrawal of France from the UTR, as it did more than once after leaving the region of Great Britain.

The culmination of the crisis period in French-Australian relations on this issue occurred in the mid-1980s. In 1984, Australia expressed "sympathy" for the indigenous peoples of French New Caledonia - the Kanakas, who staged a separatist armed uprising against the European part of the population, and demanded the separation of the "Kanaka country" from the mother country. Canberra's "sympathy" was due to its insistence on achieving independence for New Caledonia and thus pushing France into the South. After all, this property, where a significant French military contingent was stationed, is dangerously close to the coast of Australia and poses a threat to its security. The hope of New Caledonia's successful economic development in the event of independence was provided by the huge nickel reserves (the fourth largest in the world), which, according to rough estimates, would last at least until 2025, and at most until the 2040s. Therefore, Canberra's policy was aimed at separating New Caledonia from France in order to ensure the independence of the country. in order to get rid of an undesirable neighborhood and then include the "vacated" territory in your sphere of influence.

In 1986, Australia seemed to have almost achieved its goal. The civil war between supporters and opponents of independence in New Caledonia continued unabated, and the UN complied with the Kanakas 'demand that the" Kanaka country " be added to the List of Non-Self-Governing Territories. The majority of UN members, including Australia, Japan, China and all the independent states of Oceania, voted in favor; the United States abstained. The Kanakas were jubilant. However, France regarded the UN's actions as interference

page 66
In response, the United States accused Australia's Consul General, John Dauth (1986-1987), of influencing the UN decision, and expelled him from New Caledonia. The Consul General was also charged with the fact that Australian diplomacy convinced not only the Kanakas, but also the European part of the population of New Caledonia that to resolve internal contradictions it would be necessary to act independently, and not rely on the mother country. The example given was New Zealand, which did not involve the former metropolis of Great Britain in resolving the conflict between the British and the indigenous Maori. It is not surprising, therefore, that Canberra's actions were perceived by Paris as a clear intention to undermine France's position in the Pacific. Moreover, this was not Australia's first attempt to acquire New Caledonia: as early as 1945, after the end of World War II, Canberra made a proposal to "buy" this possession from France, believing that Paris needed financial injections much more than it needed to maintain its presence in the Pacific [Spencer, 1988, p. 178].

Paris ' response was to introduce the French Pacific franc in all three South Pacific Territories to replace the US dollar, which was widely adopted when American military bases were stationed on almost all the islands of Oceania, including New Caledonia, during the war years. The seriousness of Paris ' plans was indicated by the fact that the French Pacific franc, which was attached to the US dollar in 1945, was pegged to the French currency as early as 1949 (and since 2002 - to the euro). Thus, despite Canberra's best efforts, its hopes of granting New Caledonia independence were not to be fulfilled.

In 1986, the first Francophonie Summit was held in Paris, which clearly demonstrated France's desire to strengthen its role in the world in general and in the Pacific in particular. Further, in 1988, the situation in New Caledonia returned to normal, thanks to the actions of the new French Prime Minister Michel Rocard, who promised the Kanakas a gradual change in the status of the Territory during a ten-year transition period, at the end of which, in 1998, a general referendum on independence was planned.

Until the mid-1990s, relations between France and Australia remained cool. However, they have improved markedly due to a chain of favorable events. First, in 1995-1996, France and Australia changed their ruling leaders: the new ones-French President Jacques Chirac and Australian Prime Minister John Howard-set themselves the task of establishing mutually beneficial cooperation and smoothing out past contradictions. Secondly, the deadline was approaching for Paris to fulfill its promise to hold a referendum on independence in New Caledonia, which Canberra secretly hoped for a positive result. Third, in 1996, France signed (and in 1998 ratified) the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which was key to the security of not only Australia, but the entire South Pacific community.

Canberra did not fail to use this warming of relations with Paris for its own purposes, taking immediate action to expand its influence in the strategically important French possession-French Polynesia (or Tahiti, after the name of the main island), where the French nuclear test site was located. Ties between Australia and French Polynesia were significantly strengthened after French President Jacques Chirac completed nuclear tests in 1996.Canberra expected that after the end of the Pacific nuclear program, Paris would stop generous funding for French Polynesia and the Australian dollar would be able to fill the empty economic space. Guessing Canberra's intentions, Paris decided to maintain the previous high level of subsidies, motivating them with the need to compensate for the damage caused by nuclear tests [Archives...]. However, Australia still launched a rapid attack on the French Software market-

page 67
by expanding bilateral trade, establishing air transport links, and starting to provide annual grants to Francophone Tahitians to study at their Anglophone universities. Tourism in both directions grew rapidly thanks to the visa waiver agreements reached between France and Australia in 1998 and the beginning of the 21st century. French Polynesia is Australia's fifth largest market in Oceania, after New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and New Caledonia. In 2002, 70% of the gasoline in this French possession came from Australia, which, in turn, bought 40% of black pearls from French Polynesia - its main export item [Pacific Islands Report, 2003-2013].

France, alarmed by the increased activity of Australia on its territory, limited the share of Australian participation in the domestic market of French Polynesia to 12%, introducing appropriate quotas for products supplied from outside the European Union [Pacific Islands Report, 2003-2013]. But this circumstance did not overshadow the growing friendship between Paris and Canberra.

The stabilization of Australian-French relations in the late 1990s was facilitated by the desire of the new Prime Minister of Australia, J. R. R. Tolkien. According to J. Howard, foreign economic policy should be reoriented from Asia to Europe. This desire became even stronger after the Asian economic crisis of 1997-1998. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer visited France in 1996 to confirm the change of course towards "Europeanization". As a sign of improving relations, he also paid a visit to New Caledonia, with which a "Treaty of Understanding on economic cooperation" was signed. In addition, Australia has funded a number of youth training and development programs in French Polynesia and the Wallis and Futuna Estates.

In its friendly displays, Australia went so far as to offer observer status at the New Caledonia Forum in 1999, despite the fact that, thanks to the efforts of French diplomacy, a referendum was held in this possession not on the issue of independence, but only on the issue of expanding autonomy, while the independence referendum was postponed to 2018 In 2004. d. French Polynesia was granted observer status at the Forum. And in 2006, New Caledonia and French Polynesia became candidates for membership in the Forum. In the same year, the French islands of Wallis and Futuna were granted observer status.

Australia has allowed the French territories to participate in the Forum's meetings in an attempt to spread its influence through a proven means - "checkbook diplomacy". However, France, which had been a party to the dialogue at the Forum since 1989, launched a counter-offensive. By using her own "checkbook" through her Forum "agents" - New Caledonia and French Polynesia (often compared to a" Trojan horse " by Oceanic politicians) - she was able to lobby for her own regional interests, thus destroying Australia's plans. As it turned out, France was no less adept at using financial methods to influence the opinions of "its" Forum participants.

However, in manipulating domestic politics in the JUTR, France still lost significantly to Australia. Deep experience in cooperation with island neighbors allowed Canberra to freely intervene in the internal armed conflicts of the independent states of Oceania, which became typical at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries. This behavior of Australia corresponded to the tactics of" new interventionism", which was intensively used by the United States at that time, first in Yugoslavia, and then in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite the fact that such behavior was condemned by part of the international community, France-one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council-supported the deployment of a regional peacekeeping force led by Australia in East Timor in 1999-2000. French President Jacques Chirac also approved Australia's military intervention in Ukraine.

page 68
Solomon Islands in 2003, even though the Prime Minister of Australia, J. R. R. Tolkien, was a member of the Government of the Solomon Islands. Howard rejected his offer of joint participation in peacekeeping operations in Oceania, so as "not to give off a whiff of neo-colonialism" (Downer, 2003).

France's diplomatic response to Australia's offensive actions in the JUTR was immediate. In 2003, Paris held its First Summit with the Heads of State of Oceania in Papeete, the capital of French Polynesia, where Jean-Claude Juncker personally arrived. Chirac, becoming the third French president after Valery Giscard d'Estaing (1979) and Francois Mitterrand (1990), visited this property. By the way, Nicolas Sarkozy, who replaced Chirac, did not honor Tahiti with his visit. Francois Hollande is not in a hurry to get there either. Then Zh. Chirac toured not only the Francophone territories, but also the Anglophone countries of Oceania. According to Zh. Chirac, he would like to see France as one of the main players in ensuring the security and development of the South Caucasus. "Even though competition between states is a thing of the past," he said in an interview with Oceanic media, "today the countries of Oceania should be driven by the spirit of interaction and cooperation" [The Contemporary Pacific, 2005, p. 193-203].

Australia was sympathetic to Zh. Chirac. The early 2000s were characterized by economists as" fat years", and the growth of French revenues to the budgets of Oceania countries was considered by Canberra as a positive factor.

Moreover, Australia offered France cooperation in a number of areas, including military cooperation (but not in connection with the "neo-colonial interventions" in East Timor and the Solomon Islands). In those years, the expansion of bilateral relations on defense and security issues in the region began. The tragic events of September 11, 2001 in New York, as well as explosions in hotels where Australians were vacationing, on the island of Bali in Indonesia, led to the conclusion of agreements between Paris and Canberra on combating terrorism and countering the illegal arms trade in South Africa. In addition, the presence of the French military contingent in Oceania allowed for regular joint exercises of the French and Australian navies. French warships have been entering Australian ports more frequently, and New Caledonia has been participating in joint naval exercises since 2003 [Pacific Islands Report (1)].

In 2003, Australia and France strengthened cooperation in the field of fisheries protection by concluding a "Maritime Cooperation Agreement", which provided for joint measures to prevent illegal fishing in the South Pacific [Pacific Islands Report, 2003-2013].

Shortly before Paris held its Second Summit with the Heads of State of Oceania in 2006, the 1992 agreement between France, Australia and New Zealand (FRANZ) on assistance to Oceanic countries that have survived a natural disaster was extended. Since the beginning of this agreement, the parties have participated in several dozen joint rescue and recovery operations after the devastating cyclones that are common in Niue, Vanuatu, Fiji, the Cook Islands, etc. [Pacific Islands Report].

The second Summit of Oceania Heads of State was held in 2006 under the chairmanship of Jean-Claude Juncker. Chirac in Paris. At the time, the French president spoke of "harmonious cooperation between France, Australia and New Zealand on all issues that arise in the region ... for the benefit of the entire region " [Welcoming speech..., 2006]. The leaders of the Oceania countries, in turn, said that the presence of France in the Pacific Ocean was seen as a guarantee of stability and further development of the South Pacific [Second France-Oceania Summit...].

During the summit, Zh. Chirac outlined his vision for the main direction of regional policy, saying that he would like to "see how the countries of Oceania are integrated into a single bloc" [Pacific Islands Report]. I was referring to economic integration: eight of the 14 independent countries in Oceania do not exist.-

page 69
new currency. After independence, they adopted as their national currency the dollars of Australia (Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu), New Zealand (Cook Islands and Niue) or the United States (Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and Palau). Only six countries have their own currency: Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu, Fiji and the Solomon Islands. Thus, instead of having ten national currencies in circulation in Oceania (including the French Pacific franc) and a corresponding number of currency control bodies, it would be easier for major world powers to deal with a single regulator in the UTRs.

It was this issue that became the main sticking point between Canberra and Paris in the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century. Following the successful introduction of the single euro currency in the European Union, to which the French Pacific franc was no less successfully pegged in 2002, Paris, during the summits in 2003, 2006 and especially in 2009, explicitly hinted to Oceania countries about the possibility of correlating their own exchange rates with the euro, in order to gain direct access to the entire pan-European Third France-Oceania Summit...]. This move of Paris was stopped by Canberra, which back in 2004 announced that the Australian dollar could become the single currency in Oceania. The Aussie was already widely used in Papua New Guinea, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu, which had their own currencies. These four countries formed an economic alliance in 1994 to coordinate trade operations in the region, known as the Melanesian Spearhead Group. Therefore, it would not be difficult to include them in the general Oceanic market.

Against the background of discussions about the possible creation of a single currency in the countries of the Eastern Caribbean, as well as in the Persian Gulf states, Professor T. K. Jayaraman of the University of the South Pacific (Suva, Fiji) in 2004 developed a plan for the transition of members of the "Group of Melanesian Leaders" to Australian dollars [Jayaraman, 2004]. In his opinion, not only for the "Group of Melanesian Leaders", but for all the countries of Oceania, this would be the best way to get rid of a number of difficulties: for example, the need to constantly adjust exchange rates and implement monetary policy, instead of leaving these tasks to the Central Bank of Australia.

To implement this idea, Canberra lobbied the Forum in 2005 for the adoption of the Pacific Plan, which provided for the transition of Oceania countries to a common currency based on the Australian dollar by 2020. Subsequently, the Pacific Plan was revised annually, and a decade later its emphasis shifted to environmental protection, making the task of creating a single currency market in Oceania secondary [Pacific Plan].

However, in the mid-2000s, it was not surprising that Paris insisted on bringing together the heads of Oceania countries and trying to persuade them to create a common economic space by expanding trade with the French possessions, whose currency was pegged in euros [Third France-Oceania Summit...].

The conflict between Paris and Canberra over the transfer of Oceania countries to the single currency was not destined to develop due to the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, which forced France and Australia to pay attention to the problems of their own economies and reduce competition for spheres of influence in the South. Instead, they let China into the region and allowed an ambitious U.S. effort to counter China's "soft power" in Oceania in the 2010s while watching developments unfold.

Having passed a long way of building relations marked by the aggravation of contradictions in the XX century, in the first decades of the XXI century. Australia and France have reached relative agreement on mutually beneficial policies in the South, maintaining strong positions in "their" spheres of influence and vigilantly monitoring each other's diplomatic maneuvers against the backdrop of the growing role of China and the United States in the region.

page 70
list of literature

Other dollars / / Business magazine RBC, 03.2013 // http://magazinc.rbc.ru/2013/02/20/trcnds/ 562949985789523. shtml (accessed on 06.08.2013).

Archives of Jacques Chiraque's Presidency 1995-2007 (Archive materials from the period of Jacques Chirac's presidency, 1995-1997, posted on the official website of the French government before its update and deletion of archives in 2012) / http://www.clyscc.fr/clyscc/clyscc.fr/anglais_archives/speeches_and_documcnts/2007/2007_speeches_and_documcnts.69601.html (accessed: 2008). In the author's archive.

AusAID Pacific (Australia's South Pacific Economic Assistance Program) / / _www.ausaid.gov.au/ countries/pacific/Pagcs/homc. aspx (accessed: 19.08.2013).

A Deeper Look At France's Role In The Pacific. March 29, 2006 // http://archivcs.pircport.org/archivc/2007/ March/03-30-an.htm (accessed: 05.06.2013).

Downer L. Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Media Releases (Archives), 1996-2007 (Archival materials of the period of the tenure of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Australia A. Downer) / http://www. forcignministcr.gov.au/rclcascs/archivc.html (accessed: 19.07.2013).

Hcndy Peter. Australia, Europe and France - Australian Business in Europe (speech). Paris, 19 June 2003, published by Australian Government, Canberra, 2003. In the author's archive.

Jayaraman Т.К. A Single Currency For The Pacific Island Countries: A Stepwise Approach // Asia-Pacific Development Journal, Vol. 11, No. 1, June 2004.

Maclcllan Nic. Australia And The Decolonization Of French Polynesia. Nov. 2, 2012 / http://archivcs.pircport. org/archivc/2012/Novembcr/11-06-an.htm (accessed: 07.07.2013).

Pacific Islands Report (Analytical and news site about Oceania countries, East-West Center, USA // pidp.castwcstccntcr.org/pircport (accessed: 2003-2013)

Pacific Plan / www.pacificplanrcvicw.org/pacific-plan (accessed: 03.04.2013).

Second France-Oceania Summit. June 26, 2006 // http://www.ambafrancc-fj.org/Sccond-Francc-Occania-Summit-Junc (accessed: 01.08.2013).

South Pacific Community (official site of the Pacific Community) / / www.spc.int (accessed: 05.08.2013).

Spencer М., Conncll A.W.J. New Caledonia: Essays in nationalism and independency. University of Queensland Press, L. N.Y., 1988.

The Contemporary Pacific. Vol. 17, No. 1, University of Hawai'i Press (Spring 2005).

Third France-Oceania Summit. Communiqué issued by the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Paris, 5 August 2009 / http://www.ambafrancc-uk.org/Francc-Occania-Summit.html (дата обращения: 15.05.2013).

Welcoming speech by M. Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, on the occasion of the Second France-Oceania Meeting. Paris, June 26, 2006 // http://www.ambafrancc-uk.org/Wclcoming-spccch-by-M-Jacqucs.html (дата обращения: 16.05.2013).

page 71

Permanent link to this publication: