ARAB SPRING AND THE ARAB LEAGUE: BETWEEN BAGHDAD AND CAIRO*

With the onset of the Arab Spring of 2011 and the subsequent series of socio-political upheavals, forces in the Arab East have been reconfigured: Egypt under Hosni Mubarak, which played a decisive role in Middle East politics, has plunged into a prolonged political crisis with no end in sight; another influential country in the region, Syria, has entered a phase of civil war with unpredictable consequences. So far, the exodus has continued, with Saudi Arabia and Qatar taking a prominent role in the vanguard of the Arab world, and the resurgence of Iraq after a devastating intervention by NATO troops. The League of Arab States (LAS) is no exception, where over the past two years the absolute Egyptian dominance has suffered losses, and other Arab states - especially those that managed to develop "immunity" to the events of the Arab Spring-have gradually begun to come to the forefront.

Keywords: Arab Spring, Arab League, Iraq, Egypt, Azzam, Nasser, Fertile Crescent, Nuri al-Maliki.

Iraq's rise has been impressive since the then shadow Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki took over as Prime Minister in 2006, and especially after the 2010 parliamentary elections, when the State of Law Coalition he led came in second place, well ahead of the Iraqi National Alliance, which guaranteed al-Maliki an extended term in office. . The country managed to preserve its territorial integrity, get rid of the presence of coalition troops, and also start implementing its own foreign policy, which is increasingly met with disapproval from the United States and the Gulf states. An example of this is the recent visit of Nouri al-Maliki to Moscow1, during which a number of defense agreements were signed, Iraq's position on Syria and Bahrain was discussed, as well as the confrontation that emerged in the spring between Iraq and the countries of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Persian Gulf (GCC) for the right to host the Arab League summit in Baghdad 2. It should be noted that Iraq, after two years of diplomatic battles3, still managed to get a symbolic Arab summit to be held in the Iraqi capital. This fact is particularly important in view of the fact that for the first time in the history of Arab leaders ' summits, an ethnic Kurd presided over them4. At the same time, Iraq managed to achieve a rather soft resolution at the end of the Arab League summit in Baghdad regarding Syria, which it supports, despite pressure from the Arab Six countries.

* The research was carried out within the framework of the HSE Basic Research Program in 2013.

1 October 8-10, 2012

2 Was held on March 29, 2012.

3 Initially, the next Arab League summit in Baghdad was scheduled for March 2011, but due to the events of the Arab Spring, it was postponed first to May 2011, and then to March 2012.

4 Jalal al-Talabani, an ethnic Kurd, as president of the host country of Iraq, presided over the Arab Heads of State summit according to protocol.

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All this is evidence of the revival of Iraqi diplomacy and Baghdad's ambitions for the seemingly lost role of one of the most influential countries in the Middle East and the Arab League. On the other hand, Egypt, even in a state of "permanent revolution" [Isaev, 2011 (2)], is not going to give up its monopoly control over the League. In view of this, it is not without interest to consider the Iraqi-Egyptian confrontation over the dominant role in the Arab League in the first years of operation of this oldest international regional organization.

The struggle between Iraq and Egypt has become an integral part of the Arab League since its creation in 1945 and has brought a kind of balance of power, a spirit of rivalry and competition. This situation was predetermined by a number of both objective and subjective reasons. Historically, Cairo and Baghdad were the centers of the oldest pre-Islamic civilizations, and later the Arab-Muslim world. Iraq, like Egypt, was in colonial dependence on Britain, simultaneously developing its political system. During the First World War, Egypt experienced an increase in cultural nationalism based on the pre-Islamic era, which came into conflict with the ideas of the Islamic reform movements that were gaining momentum in the early twentieth century. Such sentiments in the land of the Pharaohs had a significant impact on the development of Egyptian nationalism, making it very limited and contradicting Arab nationalism, which was actively developing in Syria at that time. After the end of the First World War, Egyptian nationalists focused primarily on the Nile Valley and Sudan, as well as on issues of separation from Britain and the possibility of conducting an independent domestic and foreign policy.

Unlike Egypt, Iraq initially took an active part in the development of the ideas of Arab nationalism, which originated in Syria and Lebanon. Even before the First World War, Baghdad joined the Arab nationalist movement, thus confirming the need for the Arab states to achieve autonomy, and after unification - an Arab Federation. Moreover, Iraq, as a semi-independent State, managed to become the center of Arab nationalism as early as the 1920s. This was largely due to the idea of the so-called "Fertile Crescent"actively lobbied in the Iraqi political elite [Isaev, 2011(1)], which united Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Palestine into one state.

Thus, in the first half of the twentieth century, two different types of cultural nationalism developed in parallel in Cairo and Baghdad. The former had its roots in the era of the Pharaohs and considered a clearly defined territory as a zone of its own influence. The second drew inspiration from the Arab-Muslim era of the Abbasid Caliphate (whose territory was not clearly defined by ideologists), which was closer and more understandable for the population. It would be a mistake to assume that there were no supporters of Arab nationalism in Egypt. These include Nahhaspasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister who proposed joining the Arab Nationalist Movement as early as 1936, or Azzam Pasha, later the first Secretary General of the League of Arab States, who actively defended the ideas of Arab unity. However, they were a minority at that time and were unable to realize their intentions [The Arab League..., 1956, p. 144].

After the establishment of the Arab League in 1945, the confrontation between Iraq and Egypt began to gain momentum. Thus, the pro-Egyptian policy of the Arab League, aimed at non-cooperation with the West until the interests of Arab countries are realized, has divided Cairo and Baghdad on different sides of the barricades. Being obsessed with the idea of implementing the Fertile Crescent project even after the creation of the Arab League, the then

5 The English expression "Fertile Crescent" was coined by the archaeologist James Henry Brasted in his book" Ancient Records of Egypt"in 1906. In political usage, it refers to the idea of uniting the Arab Middle East from Basra to Beersheba.

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Table 1

Distribution of forces in the League of Arab States from 1945 to 1963

Year

Egypt

Neutral States

Iraq

1945

Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon

-

Transjordan

1950

Saudi Arabia, Yemen

Lebanon

Jordan, Syria

1955

Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, Syria

Lebanon, Libya

-

1958

Yemen, Syria

Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco

Morocco, Saudi Arabia

1960

Yemen, Syria, Sudan, Morocco

Tunisia, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Jordan

--

1963

Algeria, Kuwait, Yemen

Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan

Syria, Lebanon

Source: [Macdonald, 1965, p. 75].

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Saeed did not betray his principles and constantly sought support from Britain, which he saw as the main partner and ally in asserting his interests in the region. The contradictions between the two countries did not stop even after the anti-monarchical coup in Iraq in 1958, when King Faisal II was overthrown. Despite the fact that a few days after the coup, the government of General Abdel Kerim Qassem concluded a joint defense agreement with Nasser, already in 1959-1961, Republican Iraq boycotted meetings of the Arab League Councils, largely because of the League's position on Iraq's unsuccessful annexation of Kuwait in 1961.

To get a more complete picture of the Iraqi-Egyptian confrontation in the League of Arab States, we will turn to the balance of power in this organization from the moment of its creation in 1945 to the end of the Iraqi boycott of the Arab League Councils in 1963 (Table 1). We should immediately note that such blocs formed during the first two decades of the League's functioning They were informal and rarely depended on certain military conventions, reflecting in most cases the positions of States on key issues of the time.

Thus, North African countries, as a rule, took a neutral position in the League, trying not to join either the Egyptian or the Iraqi camp. At that time, the Maghreb countries certainly had a lot of complaints about the policy pursued by G. A. Nasser, but this did not mean that they automatically went over to the side of Iraq, largely due to the ambiguous position of General Qasem, who interpreted the League's Charter in his own way.

Before the 1958 revolution in Iraq, Saudi Arabia was traditionally an ally of Egypt. This was primarily due to the traditionally conflicting relations between the al-Saud dynasty and the Hashemites who ruled in Jordan and Iraq. Saudi King Abdulaziz has never hidden his concerns about the Hashemite project of uniting Arab countries, disguised in the concept of a "Fertile Crescent", which the Kingdom of Iraq actively promoted. After the 1958 Iraqi coup, Saudi Arabia sided with Iraq in solidarity with the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy. However, the highly controversial policy of the Qassem government and the subsequent attempt to annex Kuwait by Iraq once again alienated Baghdad from Riyadh, forcing the latter to occupy it-

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a minesweeping position between Iraq and Egypt. Saudi neutrality was further strengthened after 1962, due to Nasser's support for anti-regime sentiment in Saudi society, as well as Republicans in Yemen.6
Lebanon's position in 1945-1963 could be described as neutral. This was primarily due to two factors: the predominantly Christian population of the country and the rejection of Nasser's policy regarding Egyptian leadership in the Arab Nationalist Movement. In this context, official Beirut followed a balanced foreign policy line aimed at non-confrontation with either Cairo or Baghdad. In turn, Iraq and Egypt considered Lebanon as a mediator in resolving disputes with each other, as can be seen from the mediation efforts of Lebanese President Kamil Nimr Shamoun to resolve the diplomatic conflict between Cairo and Baghdad in the context of the latter's signing of the Baghdad Pact in 1955.7

Syria was perhaps the only Arab State willing to sacrifice its sovereignty in the name of achieving Arab unity. Such aspirations of Damascus were largely fueled by Iraq and in particular its Prime Minister Nouri al-Said, who harbored the idea of creating an Arab federation that would include Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. At the same time, at the initial stage, it was supposed to unite Syria, Lebanon and Jordan into a single state, which Iraq would later join. In 1955, Damascus was forced to go over to Egypt in protest against the signing of the Baghdad Pact between Iraq and Turkey. And in 1958, Egypt and Syria merged into a single state - the United Arab Republic (UAR) - which lasted until 1961, so it is not surprising that until the early 1960s, Syria was on the side of Egypt. However, after the collapse of the UAR, caused by Egypt's claim to a leading role in the federation, and the subsequent deterioration of relations between Damascus and Cairo, Syria again chose to take a pro-Iraqi position in the Arab League.

The only Arab League founding State that did not change its foreign policy preferences during the period under review was Yemen. The Yemeni leadership has consistently supported Egypt in its confrontation with Iraq. Only once did Yemen abstain from voting in the Arab League Council in 1950 to expel Jordan from the League because of its annexation of Western Palestine, and it did not take sides: neither Egypt, which insisted on sanctions against Amman, nor Iraq, which supported Jordan's King Abdullah I.

The latter situation should be considered in more detail. In fact, the Arab League Council's discussion of the Jordanian issue in 1950 was the first serious clash between the two leaders of the Arab world - Iraq and Egypt. After the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-1949, King Abdullah I of Jordan decided to annex Western Palestine, which caused indignation on the part of most Arab League member states, especially Egypt. In 1950. The League's Council met three times to discuss the Jordanian issue under the Iraqi presidency. On May 15, 1950, the Arab League Political Committee decided that the Jordanian annexation of Western Palestine was contrary to the Arab League Council resolution of April 13, 1950, which maintained an independent Palestinian authority.

6 In September 1962, an anti-monarchist coup took place in Yemen under the leadership of Abdullah al-Salal and with the support of the Egyptian special services, which resulted in the abolition of the Hamid al-Din dynasty and the proclamation of the Yemeni Arab Republic. Saudi Arabia supported the monarchical regime of King Ahmed Yahya Hamid al-Din (Dawisha, 1975, p. 47-64). Hamiduddin dynasty of imams (since 1918 - kings) North Yemen, who ruled from 1891-1962. A branch of the Qasimids.

7 The Baghdad Pact is a treaty concluded in Baghdad on February 24, 1955 between Iraq and Turkey, which was later joined by the United Kingdom, Pakistan and Iran. He initiated the creation of a military group, The Central Treaty Organization, which existed until 1979.

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the status of all Palestinian territories [Minutes of L. C., 1950, p. 284]. Based on this decision of the Political Committee, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon insisted on the adoption by the Arab League Council of a resolution expelling Jordan from the League for violating its charter. However, representatives of Yemen and Iraq, which was then chairing the Arab League Council, 8 requested that consideration of this issue be postponed, justifying this by holding consultations with their Governments, and therefore the Political Committee decided to schedule a meeting of the League Council for June 12, 1950 [Minutes of L. C., 1950, p. 285].

The Arab League Council meeting on June 12, 1950, began with the Secretary-General reading out a telegram from the Jordanian Foreign Ministry stating that the delegation of the Hashemite Kingdom would not participate in the Council's work. In addition, the telegram emphasized that Jordan's decision to annex Western Palestine was based on the resolution of April 24, 1950, adopted by the Jordanian Parliament and aimed at unifying the two banks of the Jordan River (Khalil, 1962, p.54). The Council decided to postpone consideration of this issue in order to reach a compromise solution. At the same time, Iraq and Lebanon assumed mediation functions [Minutes of L. C., 1950, p. 293]. In the end, the efforts of Beirut and Baghdad made it possible to reach a compromise and adopt a draft resolution that satisfied all Arab League member States and secured Jordan's status as the guardian State of the Palestinian territories it annexed until the final settlement of the Palestinian question. This decision was made possible to a greater extent thanks to the efforts of Iraq, which managed to convince the members of the Arab League's Political Committee.

Another stumbling block between Cairo and Baghdad was the participation in the work of the Arab League secretariat. In accordance with the LAS Charter, its secretariat includes, in addition to the Secretary-General, his advisers (mushrifin), who are appointed by the Secretary-General and approved by the League's Council. As a rule, there were six advisors: on political, military, economic, cultural, social and health issues.

At the same time, the most important posts in political and military affairs invariably went to the Egyptians. The only exception was the first political adviser to the Secretary - General of the Arab League, Ahmed Shukayri, a Palestinian who held this post from 1951 to 1957, after which he was replaced by the Egyptian Mohammed Abd al-Munim Mustafa (1958-1960). The post of military adviser was held alternately by Egyptians: General Mohammed Ibrahim (1954-1958), General- Lieutenant Ali Ali-Amer (1961-1964).

In 1964, of the four advisers to the LAS Secretary-General, three were Egyptians: Ahmed al-Dardini Ismail, Said Nawfal, and Lieutenant General Mohammed Fawzi. Only the post of economic adviser was given to an Iraqi, Aref Taher (Macdonald, 1965, p. 126).

In general, the representation of Egypt in the Arab League caused a lot of complaints from other member States, especially from Iraq. The wide participation of Egyptians in the work of the League's secretariat contrasted strongly with the "underrepresentation" of other States - Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen - and the absence of representatives from North Africa and Kuwait in the first decades of the Arab League's existence (Table 2).

As can be seen, by the mid-1960s, the Egyptian representation in the League's secretariat exceeded the norm by more than 2 times, which gave Cairo an advantage in its role as a leader.

8 In accordance with Article 18 of the LAS Charter, a State could be excluded from the League only with the unanimous approval of the Member States, with the exception of the country in respect of which the matter was being considered.

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Table 2

Representation of the LAS member States in the Secretariat in 1964

A country

Number of secretariat staff

Share of the total number of employees of the secretariat (in %)

Share of the population of a Member State in the total population of the LAS member States (in %)

Egypt

92

61.3

28.6

Iraq

9

6

7

Syria

11

7.4

5.3

Palestine

10

6.7

-

Lebanon

12

8

1.8

Jordan

6

4

1.8

Sudan

6

4

13.1

Saudi Arabia

2

1.3

7.1

Saudi Arabia

Yemen

2

1.3

4.7

in total

150

100

69.4*

Source: [Macdonald, 1965, p. 128].

* 69.4% shows the share of the population of the States represented in the table in the total population of all LAS member States that were members of this organization by 1964.

the conflict with Baghdad for a dominant role in the region. Moreover, key positions in the secretariat belonged to Egypt. Thus, in 1960, the heads of five Arab League departments (including the political department) were Egyptians. The Iraqis headed the financial and economic block (economic, financial and oil departments), two departments each were reserved for Syrians and Palestinians, and one worked under the chairmanship of a Sudanese.

However, the position of the first Secretary General of the Arab League, Egyptian Azzam Pasha, was particularly opposed by Iraq. Despite the fact that before taking office, the new head of the League must swear an oath of loyalty primarily to the interests of the Arab League, Azzam Pasha openly demonstrated his credo: "First, an Egyptian. Secondly, the Arab. Third, a Muslim" (Al-Sakit, 1974, p. 139). During one of his speeches, Azzam Pasha stated that "every person has duties to his country as a citizen, duties to the Arab nation, but, above all, the duties of a person in relation to his country" [Al-Sakit, 1974, p.156].

Such behavior of the first Secretary General of the Arab League caused criticism from the League's member States. Following Jordan, dissatisfied with the behavior of Azzam Pasha, Iraq also entered into a confrontation with the head of the Arab League. The formal reason was Baghdad's dissatisfaction with the terms of funding the Arab League for Palestinian volunteers. However, the real reason was Azzam Pasha's criticism of the Iraqi "Fertile Crescent"plan. So, in May 1949, the head of the Arab League's press service, Assad Daher, stated that " the implementation of the plan ("Fertile Crescent" - L. I.) will inevitably sow discord among the Arabs. It will destroy their influence and create a sense of hatred, which seems to be most destructive for the League" [The League of Arab States, 1949, p. 641].

The reaction from official Baghdad was not long in coming. Iraqi Foreign Minister Fadil al-Jamali issued a statement the same month saying that " Azzam Pasha behaves like an independent head of state, putting himself above Arab foreign ministers by making statements."

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and negotiating in accordance with his own political preferences, without coordinating them with the representatives of the Arab States that hired him" [Khalil, 1962, p.377].

Pressure from Iraq and other Arab League member states forced Azzam Pasha to take a more restrained position, but it was too late. Baghdad was ready to go all the way with the League's General Secretary, and it succeeded. After the July 1952 revolution in Egypt and the rise to power of the Republicans, the Revolutionary council no longer saw Azzam Pasha as a conduit for its interests. Adding fuel to the fire was pressure from Nuri al-Said, who constantly demanded that the new Egyptian leadership recall Azzam Pasha. This led to the fact that on September 9, 1952, Salah Salem, a member of the Egyptian Revolutionary Council, went to Azzam Pasha's home and informed him of the decision of the country's leadership to suspend his powers as Secretary General of the Arab League [Azzam, 1977, pp. 325-327].

The confrontation between Egypt and Iraq reached its most acute phase after the latter signed the Baghdad Pact in 1955. Nuri al-Said needed this agreement to resurrect the Fertile Crescent project [Love, 1969, p. 196]. It was assumed that the accession of Jordan, Syria, and then Lebanon to the pact would allow them to unite into a single state and jointly resist Egyptian dominance in the region. It is no coincidence that article 5 of the Baghdad Pact stated that "it is open for accession by any member State of the Arab League" [Al-Ahram, 1955, p. 1]. This primarily applied to Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

Nuri al-Said saw that the dominant role in the Arab League was being transferred to Egypt, and tried to revive the idea of a" Fertile Crescent", arguing that" Iraq does not support the dictatorship of Nasser in the Arab League " [Iraq, Egypt and the Arab League, 1955, p. 149]. In turn, H. A. Nasser feared that in the context of the implementation of the "Fertile Crescent" project, the road to which the Baghdad Pact opened, Egypt would remain in Arab isolation, being in a state of war with Israel. All this predetermined a serious struggle between the two Arab powers — Iraq and Egypt, each of which was headed at that time by a charismatic leader - Nuri al-Said and GA Nasser, respectively.

Iraq saw Great Britain as its ally in the Baghdad Pact. It was London's support that was supposed to provide Nuri al-Said with the support necessary to realize his nationalist aspirations, especially after the collapse of the royal regime of Farouk I loyal to Britain in Egypt. Justifying the need for other Arab League member States to join the Baghdad Pact, Nuri al-Said first of all focused on the support of this initiative from London, which he considered a conductor of Arab interests in the region. At meetings of the Arab League Council, the Iraqi delegation repeatedly promoted Nuri al-Said's idea that the Arabs today have two enemies: "Zionism in the West and communism in the East" [Memoirs of Informed Arab Responsible, 1978, p. 5].

Nasser countered the statements of Nuri al-Said, taking the only correct position. He began to play on the West's ties with Israel, leaving Iraq alone. Nasser increasingly emphasized that the West is on the side of Israel, and all sorts of associations with Western countries (including Great Britain) are impossible until the interests of Arab countries are taken into account. Immediately after the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes to Baghdad to sign the pact in January 1955, H. A. Nasser initiated the convening of the Arab League summit in Cairo on January 22, 1955. Speaking at the opening of the summit, Nasser said that by signing the Baghdad Pact, "Iraq became an ally of Israel's allies" [Iraq, Egypt and the Arab League, 1955, p. 148]. This contrasted Iraq with the League, which denounced Baghdad's participation in military agreements with non-Arab States as violating the foundations of the 1950 Arab League Collective Security Pact.

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After that, the Iraqi Government, in cooperation with London, made a final attempt to join the Arab States to the Pact, especially Jordan. The fact is that the Jordanian government did not adhere to a tough position on the Pact, and its accession, according to Nuri al-Said, could provoke a "domino effect" - the example of Amman would be followed by Damascus, and then Beirut.

Almost simultaneously with Nasser's visit to the Middle East in December 1955, the British Government sent Field Marshal Gerald Templer to Amman to persuade Jordan's King Hussein bin Talal to join the Baghdad Pact. However, Himmler was unable to resist G. A. Nasser's propaganda and returned to his homeland with nothing [Churchill, 1959, p. 223]. In order to finally dispel King Hussein bin Talal's doubts about joining the pact, Nasser managed to convince Riyadh and Damascus of the need to replace British subsidies to the Hashemite kingdom with financial injections from Saudi Arabia and Damascus, which significantly reduced London's influence on Amman.

All this led to the fact that not a single Arab State followed the example of Iraq and did not join the Baghdad Pact. After the anti-monarchist coup in Iraq (1958), Nuri al-Said was killed, and in March 1959 the country withdrew from the Baghdad Pact. However, by that time, Nasser had already completely monopolized the Arab League, turning it, in fact, into one of the departments of the Egyptian foreign Ministry.

Despite a number of contradictions and often a powerful confrontation between Cairo and Baghdad, the above-mentioned difficulties did not interfere with the normal functioning of the Arab League. So, in 1955-1956, when the controversy over Iraqi membership in the Baghdad Pact threatened the existence of the entire League, Iraq took the initiative to create a joint Arab army, controlled by the Arab League, to protect Palestinian citizens. In April 1956, while in isolation, the Iraqi delegation addressed the Arab League Council with a proposal to apply the 1950 Arab League Collective Security Pact after the Israeli aggression against Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

In 1956, after the Egyptian Government nationalized the Suez Canal, Iraq declared its support for Nasser's policy, and after attacks by Israel, it declared the application of the 1950 Arab League Collective Security Pact to Israel in the event of a further development of the conflict. In August 1959, during the period of Iraq's boycott of Arab League councils, Iraqi experts repeatedly met with Arab experts from other countries to discuss the Palestinian question. And General Qasem issued a statement that his country supports the Arab League and "actively promotes the development of cultural, economic and political ties with all Arab countries" [Macdonald, 1965, p. 82].

All this shows that the Iraqi-Egyptian confrontation only brought a spirit of rivalry and competition to the work of the Arab League, the absence of which, in my opinion, is felt at the present time and may lead to the loss of this organization's actual influence on the processes taking place in the region.

list of literature

Isasv L. M. League of Arab States - history of creation // East (Oriens). 2011(1). № 3.

Isasv L. M. "Permanent revolution": the Arab world in search of stability // Inviolable reserve. 2011(2). No. 5.

Al-Ahram. January 13, 1955.

Al-Sakit M.A.W. Al-Amin al-'Aam Lc-Jammi'at al-Dowal al-Arabiyyah // Dar al-Fikr al-Araby. Cairo, 1974.

Azzam A.R. The Memoirs of Abdcl-Rahman Azzam // Al-Ahram Commercial Press. Cairo, 1977.

Churchill R.S. The Rise and Fall of Sir Anthony Eden. N.Y., 1959.

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Dawisha A.I. Intervention in Yemen: An Analysis of Egyptian Perceptions and Politics // Middle East Journal. 1975, 29(1).

Iraq, Egypt and the Arab League // The World Today. Vol. 11. № 4. 1955.

Khalil M. The Arab States and the Arab League. A Documentary Record. Vol. 1, 2 // International Affairs. Beirut, 1962.

The Arab League: A Reassessment // Middle East Journal. 1956. № 10.

The League of Arab States // International Organizations. 1949. № 4.

Love K. Suez: The Twice-Fought War. New York - Toronto, 1969.

Macdonald R.W. The League of Arab States: A Study of the Dynamics of Regional Organization. New Jersey, 1965.

Memoirs of Informed Arab Responsible II Al-Ahram. February 16, 1978.

Minutes of the League Council. 12th Ordinary Session, 7th meeting. June 12, 1950.

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