The April revolution of 1960 led to a change of power in the South for the first time since the split of Korea as a result of a mass uprising. It has had a great impact not only on South Korea, but also on North Korea. The article examines the change in the political situation in South Korea as a result of the April Revolution, its impact on the DPRK's policy towards the South and the unification of the Korean Peninsula, and the role of the USSR in correcting Pyongyang's position towards the unification of the country.

Keywords, confederation, neutralization of Korea, student movement, South Korea, military coup, Kim Il Sung, Lee Seung Man, Jang Myung, Park Jung hee.

The Korean issue was one of the main topics of discussion at the Geneva Meeting, which took place in April 1954, immediately after the Korean War (1950-1953), and ended without any specific agreement. After that, in the second half of the 1950s. North Korea has put forward proposals to South Korea for peaceful unification of the country, but the government of Lee Seung Man rejected them, insisting on an armed " campaign to the North." The April Revolution that took place in the South in 1960 had a major impact on both the South and the North. It played a crucial role in the overthrow of the Lisynman government, which did not allow free discussion of issues of peaceful unification. And after the April Revolution in the South, the basis for a free and comprehensive discussion of unification problems was created, and the movement for intensifying contacts with the North expanded.

NORTH KOREA'S RESPONSE TO THE APRIL 1960 REVOLUTION

The April 1960 revolution in South Korea, which was sparked by public discontent with the government of Lee Seung Man, was one of the most massive protest movements in the country's history. The immediate cause of the April Revolution

The reason was the falsification of the results of the presidential election held on March 15, 1960, in which President Lee Seung-man and his entourage were implicated. Already on the day of the presidential election, a spontaneous mass demonstration against the holding of these elections took place in Masan. The demonstration was violently suppressed by the police, resulting in deaths and injuries. One of the victims was 17-year-old schoolboy Kim Ju-er, whose body was found in the port of Masan on the morning of April 11, prompting a new major demonstration. Mass demonstrations were then held across the country.

On April 19, 1960, mass protests were held in Seoul and other major South Korean cities. In response, Lee Seung Man's government declared a state of emergency in Seoul, Busan, Gwangju, Daegu, Daejeon, Jeonju, Cheonju and Incheon. Police opened fire on demonstrators, killing 115 people and injuring 727 others. This day was later called "Bloody Tuesday" (Seo Joon Seok, 2005, pp. 176-177). After these events, Lee Seung Man's government found itself in a quandary. On April 25, 258 university professors issued a statement demanding an investigation into the bloody events of April 19 and the cancellation of the presidential election results. On the morning of April 26, Lee Seung Man was forced to make a statement about his readiness to give up power if the people so requested. On April 28, he left the country with the help of the Americans, flying to Hawaii. This was the end of Lee Seung Man's 12-year rule.

On April 26, an emergency meeting of the National Assembly of South Korea was held, at which decisions were made on the resignation of Lee Seung Man from the post of president, the invalidity of the March 15 elections, the appointment of new elections and the creation of an interim government. The National Assembly decided that from April 26, 1960, the executive power of the President was transferred to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ho Chung ¹ [Pravda, 27.04.1960]. It is significant that Lee Seung Man appointed his confidant Ho Jong as Foreign Minister only a day before he announced his resignation. Then Ho Jong appointed old officials of the pro-Seungman direction to the main posts in the government. Therefore, even though Lee Seung Man was exiled from the country, his people actually continued to hold power. They refused to implement reforms that reflected the demands of the April Revolution. The interim Government of Ho Chong ruled the country until August 1960, when the Cabinet of Ministers headed by Chang Myung began to work.

The April revolution had a huge impact not only on South Korea, but also on North Korea. At first, the North Korean leadership did not expect that mass demonstrations in the South would lead to the overthrow of Lee Seung Man. But after the Masan demonstration on April 11, 1960, the leadership of the North began to attach more serious importance to mass demonstrations in the South. In Pyongyang, they began to hope that the protest movement in the South would develop rapidly, since the demonstrators put forward not only economic, but also political demands [WUA RF, op. 16, p.85, d. 6, l. 148]. North Korean leaders concluded that the April Revolution was "the result of 15 years of American colonial rule" [AVPRF, op. 16, p. 85, d. 6, l. 162]. Therefore, immediately after Lee Seung-man's resignation, on the same day, April 26, the head of the International Department of the WPK ² Central Committee, Park Yong-guk, on behalf of the Central Committee, gathered the ambassadors of socialist countries and asked them to support the DPRK in its demand for the immediate withdrawal of American troops and non-interference of Americans in the internal affairs of The North's leadership hoped that if strong pressure was exerted on the Americans in the international arena, they would be forced to withdraw their troops from Korea [WUA RF, op. 16, p. 85, d. 6,

¹ During the Japanese occupation, Ho Jong actively assisted Lee Seung Man, who was in America at the time. After the establishment of the Republic of Korea, Ho Jong supported Lee Seung Man while holding important government posts (Minister of Railways, Mayor of Seoul, etc.).

² Central Committee of the Workers ' Party of Korea.

L. 162]. Apparently, the North Korean leadership was counting on further aggravation of the situation in the South and hoped that without American intervention in the internal affairs of the South, after the departure of Lee Seung Man, a base for peaceful unification of the country would be created. Influenced by such expectations, April 27, 1960 North Korea made an official proposal to hold a joint meeting of political parties and public organizations of the South and North "in order to overcome instability in the South by the Koreans themselves, without any outside interference "[Nodong sinmun, 28.04.1960; Han Monica, 2001, p. 214].

After reviewing the changing political situation in the South, North Korean leaders concluded that it has become more favorable for North Korea. Based on this analysis, a number of measures were taken to strengthen its influence in the South.

First, North Korea encouraged the creation of new progressive parties and organizations in the South [WUA RF, op. 16 p. 85, d. 7, l. 3] and actively sought to establish ties with the leaders of already existing progressive political movements. The foundations of such a policy were first formulated in the mid-1950s. This is evidenced by the recording of a conversation (February 28, 1956) between V. M. Molotov and the Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK Choi Yong-gon, who headed the North Korean delegation to the XX Congress of the CPSU. During the conversation, Choi Yong Gun informed Molotov about North Korea's policy towards the South, and Molotov fully agreed with her. This policy was as follows: "The search for legal ways to establish contacts with the Democratic and Progressive Parties of South Korea; the creation of an illegal party and the deployment of work in the South "in the conditions of the existing terrorist regime there" " [WUA of the Russian Federation, op. 12, p. 68, d. 3, l. 9]. In the second half of the 1950s, the North's leadership did maintain contacts with the Progressive Party, but apparently these contacts were interrupted by the execution of its leader Cho Bong-am in 1959 on charges of"spying for the North"³. Due to the lack of materials, it is difficult to say whether an illegal Communist party was actually established in South Korea. But there is an assumption that in the second half of the 1950s, the Workers ' Party of Korea sent a significant number of workers to the southern part of the peninsula and expanded illegal activities there [Yu Yong-gu, 1993, p. 107]. As a result, at the beginning of the April Revolution, there were 1000-1200 members of the WPK in South Korea [WUA RF, op. 16, p.85, d. 7, l. 3].

Thus, since the mid-1950s. North Korea gradually expanded its work in the South, and after the April Revolution, it further intensified its efforts in this direction. Just after the revolution in the South, the activity of progressive politicians, who were previously repressed by the government of Lee Seung Man, sharply increased. At the same time, various progressive parties and public organizations emerged. As a result, North Korean workers were able to establish contacts with leaders of some South Korean parties, such as the Socialist and Social-Mass Parties. This is evidenced by a recording of a conversation between Kim Il Sung and the Soviet Ambassador to Pyongyang, A.M. Puzanov, dated June 13, 1960. According to Kim Il Sung, at that time, North Korea maintained good relations with the leadership of the above-mentioned South Korean parties and a certain part of their leaders was influenced by the WPK. In addition, Kim Il Sung reported that his people were in a number of leading state positions in South Korea, which only Kim Il Sung and his party deputies knew about, and even the members of the Presidium of the WPK Central Committee did not know about it [WUA RF, op. 16, p. 85, d. 7, l. 4].

Second, North Korea has made efforts to ensure that South Korean progressive parties and organizations are not dispersed. Therefore, although in their programs

³ An indirect confirmation of the existence of contacts between the Northerners and this party can be found in Kim Il Sung's statement about the execution of Cho Bong Am, made by him during the April Revolution of 1960: "We also made a mistake here, we should have kept Cho Bong Am" [WUA RF, op. 16, p. 85, d. 6, l. 158 (April 21, 1960)]. We do not have any documents that shed light on the DPRK's contacts with the Democratic Party. But, most likely, Pyongyang could not have had any connections with it.

There were some undesirable provisions for North Korea (anti-communist slogans, calls to cooperate with the UN, etc.), the North Korean leadership did not seek their removal [WUA RF, op.16, p. 85, d. 6, l. 206]. This certain "tolerance" of Pyongyang towards unacceptable slogans was explained by the calculations of the North's leadership that the more progressive-minded parties and organizations there are in South Korea, the easier it will be for the WPK to work among the broad strata of the South's population [WUA RF, op. 16, p. 85, d. 6, l. 185]. At the same time, the DPRK leadership paid more attention to preserving its party forces in the South than to any active actions. It was positively assessed that the party forces in the South did not take the initiative to hold demonstrations, although they actively supported the demands directed against the government of Lee Seung Man. The leaders of the DPRK believed that thanks to such tactics, it was possible to preserve the northern party cadres that were available in the South. Therefore, "the WPK Central Committee refrained from putting forward left-wing revolutionary slogans, considering them premature, and when the slogan of creating a people's revolutionary republic was put forward locally, the WPK Central Committee recommended (to its activists in the South. - Ed.) to remove such a slogan " [WUA RF, op. 16, p. 85, d. 7, l. 3].

Third, a communist university was established in North Korea. Due to the change in the South Korean political situation, Kim Il Sung assumed that "after some time, we will still be able to establish contacts between the North and South of Korea (postal exchange, mutual visits of representatives of political parties and organizations, and over time-partial movement of the population)." For this reason, he believed that it is necessary to persevere and carefully prepare for establishing contacts between the two Koreas, including training political cadres. It was for this purpose that immediately after the April Revolution in North Korea, a komvuz was created, where natives of South Korea who were demobilized from the army, who numbered up to 100 thousand people in the North, were trained [WUA of the Russian Federation, op. 16, p. 85, d. 6, l. 185]. The main reason for choosing South Koreans was that they had more information about the South and could have a greater impact on the situation there.

Fourth, the Office of South Korean Affairs was expanded within the WPK Central Committee to better understand the situation in the South, improve the management of WPK Central Committee activities aimed at achieving peaceful unification of the motherland, and strengthen propaganda in the South. This Department consisted of three departments: the South Korea Relations Department, which had existed before; the Culture Department, which was mainly responsible for agitation and propaganda against South Korea; and the Foreign Affairs Department, which was to establish relations with political and public organizations, as well as public figures and individuals in South Korea through the Internet. other countries. Lee Hye-sun, a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the WPK, was appointed head of the Department of South Korean Affairs [WUA RF, op. 16, i.85, d. 8, l. 149-150]. The expanded Directorate sought to establish contacts with South Korean figures, and worked to create an underground party in the South.

Finally, in order to strengthen its influence in the South, the WPK Central Committee set the main task-the further economic development of the DPRK. The leadership of North Korea considered the causes of the April revolution in the South not only political, but also economic factors, i.e. the decline of the South Korean economy and the low standard of living of the population [WUA RF, op. 16, p.85, d. 6, l. 148-149]. To increase its influence on the South Korean population, the DPRK government began to pay more serious attention to increasing the pace of economic development in the North. Referring to the fact that the South Korean press, even right-wing newspapers, reported on the economic development of the DPRK, the North's leadership set a goal to actively develop the economy and build socialism at a faster pace [WUA RF, op. 17, p.89, d. 5, l. 99-100, 129]. It believed that " North Korea should instill in the population of South Korea the confidence that South Korea can be turned into a zone with an independent economy without any outside help, but only

when relying on North Korea. In this case, even the nationalists will go over to our side" [WUA RF, op. 17, p. 89, d. 5, l. 129]. This had an impact on the development of the First seven-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the DPRK (1961-1967). Immediately after April 19, 1960, when mass demonstrations in the South unfolded in full force, the North Korean leadership, as a priority of the Seven-Year Plan, set the task of improving the material standard of living of the DPRK's population, primarily providing them with food and clothing, and raising agricultural production. Pyongyang believed that in order for the DPRK to become an attractive force for southerners, high rates of development of the country were necessary [WUA of the Russian Federation, on. 16, p. 85, d. 6, l. 157 (conversation between Kim Il Sung and Puzanov on April 21, 1960)].

Thus, after the 1960 revolution, North Korea took measures to strengthen its influence in the South, taking advantage of the unstable political situation and the growing popularity of progressive forces in South Korea. The North Korean leadership tried to demonstrate to the South Korean people a stable political and economic situation in the North and win their trust. However, it was not in a hurry. The necessary measures were carefully and consistently carried out and the base in the South was strengthened. The North Korean leadership believed that the most important thing was to preserve its party forces in South Korea. It seems that this policy reflected the past experience of North Korea. Due to a general strike initiated by the South Korean Workers ' Party led by Park Hong-yong in the fall of 1946, most Communists in the South were arrested, after which the activity of the left forces there sharply weakened. During the Korean War, North Korea lost almost all workers in South Korea. After that, it took a lot of effort and time to rebuild its political base in the South in the mid-and second half of the 1950s. Given these circumstances, the North Korean leadership believed that maintaining its presence in South Korea was more important than active actions.

NORTH KOREA'S PROPOSAL FOR A CONFEDERATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH AND THE ROLE OF THE USSR

After the April revolution, given the new political situation in the South, the DPRK leadership proposed an intermediate step towards achieving the unification of the country - the creation of a confederation of South and North Korea. This proposal was put forward by Kim Il Sung on August 14, 1960, at a solemn meeting dedicated to the 15th anniversary of the liberation of Korea.

According to this plan, there were three options, three different formulas of rapprochement on the way to unification: the first option provided for holding free all-Korean elections. This proposal has previously been repeatedly put forward by the leadership of the DPRK, but has been constantly rejected by the government of South Korea. Given that the South's government could not allow all-Korean elections due to fears of a possible increase in communist sentiment in South Korea, Pyongyang suggested the second option. It called for the creation of a confederation and the establishment of a Supreme National Committee consisting of representatives of the Governments of the South and North, which would coordinate the economic and cultural development of the South and North. North Korea believed that a confederate system could ensure contacts between the South and the North and eliminate mutual distrust. And after the creation of this committee, as the leadership of the DPRK believed, it would be possible to hold all-Korean elections and carry out peaceful unification. However, given that South Korea was not ready to accept even a confederate system, North Korea proposed a third option - the creation of an Economic Committee consisting of representatives of the business circles of North and South Korea, which would organize the exchange of goods between the South and the North, establish mutual cooperation and help in economic construction. North

Korea was ready to postpone the discussion of political issues for a while. After all, first of all, according to Pyongyang's position, it was necessary to save the South Korean people from hunger and poverty, actively develop cultural exchange in parallel with economic exchange for the sake of free multilateral exchange and unification in the future [Central Yearbook of Korea, 1960, pp. 101-102].

Thus, North Korea's new proposal for unification of the country presented relatively flexible options that took into account the real political situation and real opportunities for establishing dialogue and exchange in the difficult conditions of the early 1960s. In contrast to the situation in Germany, the country's split was cemented by a brutal three-year war, resulting in deep distrust between the two Koreas. Therefore, in such circumstances, cautious, transitional measures were necessary to restore confidence.

The DPRK's proposal to create a confederation was influenced not only by the change in the political situation in the South after the April Revolution, but also by the recommendations of the Soviet Union. To make sure of this, it is necessary to consider the position of the USSR regarding the unification policy of North Korea since the late 1950s.

The Soviet leadership, through its ambassador to the DPRK, A. M. Puzanov, repeatedly advised the North Korean authorities to reconsider the course of unification through free all-Korean elections and think about new approaches that would better correspond to the real situation. It considered that it was not possible to hold free Korean-wide elections. Two separate States with different economic and political systems have existed on Korean territory for several years; in this situation, it is unlikely that both Koreas will agree to hold elections on a mutually agreed date. Obviously, the DPRK would only want to hold a general election if it is confident of winning the election, and the government of Lee Seung Man would also want to hold one if it is confident of winning [WUA of the Russian Federation, op. 15, p. 81, d. 7, l. 80-81]. Therefore, the USSR wanted North Korea to recognize the existence of two states on the peninsula with different social, economic and political systems [WUA RF, op. 14, p. 75, d. 6, l. 41] and choose a different solution to the issue of peaceful unification of the country [WUA RF, op. 15, p. 81, d. 7, l. 81].

Such soviets of the USSR in the late 1950s were based on its policy of peaceful coexistence. As you know, on the basis of this course, on July 27, 1957, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR, O. Grotewohl, put forward a proposal for the unification of Germany through a confederation [Izvestiya, 28.07.1957]. The USSR considered that a confederation was also more suitable for Korea. Although the USSR had not yet explicitly recommended this to the North Korean leadership, it advised that a more realistic unification option should be envisaged instead of holding all-Korean elections, expecting that it would itself come to the option of unification through confederation. ⁴

The USSR believed that in order to create a confederation, first of all, it was necessary for North Korea to recognize the existence of two states on the peninsula, as the GDR did with respect to Germany. Therefore, the USSR intended to emphasize the existence of two states on the Korean Peninsula in official publications. For the first time, he did this in a Statement of the Government of the USSR in connection with the statements of the Government of the DPRK of February 5 and the Government of the People's Republic of China of February 7, 1958 on the withdrawal of Chinese troops from North Korea. In the text of the Soviet government's Statement, the expression "both Korean states" was used in relation to South and North Korea [WUA RF, op. 14, p. 75, d. 6, l. 41]. However, after a preliminary review of this text, Kim Il Sung requested:

⁴ This approach of the Soviet Union is evident from the document " The Korean Question (reference)", prepared on January 2, 1959 by the head of the Far Eastern Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, M. V. Zimyanin. For more information, see: [WUA RF, op. 15, p. 82, d. 14, l. 5].

Soviet Ambassador A.M. Puzanov "in the sentence ... both Korean states should be replaced with the word governments, or both parts of Korea — South and North " [WUA RF, op. 14, p. 75, d. 6, l. 45]. In the end, in the published text of the Statement, the words "both Korean states" were replaced by the words "both governments" [WUA RF, op. 14, p. 75, d. 6, l. 45].

The divergence of the positions of the USSR and the DPRK was revealed during a conversation between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK Nam Il and the Soviet Ambassador A.M. Puzanov on February 20, 1958. When Nam Il drew attention to the words "both Korean states" in the above-mentioned text of the Statement, Puzanov explained that " there are actually two states on the territory of Korea with different social, economic and the political system", and recalled that "the leadership of the DPRK to a certain extent recognized this in the Regulations on elections to the Supreme People's Assembly, holding elections of delegates in the territory where the power of the DPRK extends." Responding to this, Nam Il acknowledged that " there are indeed two states on the territory of Korea. The party leadership and the government understand this correctly." However, he was concerned about whether this would be "correctly understood by the Korean population" [WUA RF, op. 14, p. 75, d. 6, l. 41]. From Nam Il's words, it followed that the North Korean leadership recognized that there were two states on the Korean Peninsula, but they were afraid that if the government officially recognized this fact, there might be a misunderstanding of this from the public opinion of the DPRK. Moreover, after the Korean split, Kim Il Sung repeatedly sharply criticized people who insisted that there were two states on Korean territory [Kim Il Sung, 1956, p. 356]. In such a situation, if the North Korean leadership suddenly officially recognizes "both Korean states", as the USSR advised, it will contradict the position that it has defended until then. In addition, it was in the late 1950s that the Soviet-Chinese confrontation began. North Korea, which was opposed to the Soviet Union's policy of peaceful coexistence, quickly drew closer to China on this basis. The Soviet Union's recommendations to recognize the existence of two States on Korean territory stemmed precisely from its policy of peaceful coexistence.

Disagreements between the DPRK and the USSR regarding the existence of two states in Korea continued. Despite the fact that the USSR knew that North Korea was against recognizing the existence of two states in Korea, on November 4, 1958, in the First Committee of the XIII Session of the UN General Assembly, the representative of the USSR to the UN, V. A. Zorin, made a speech in which he mentioned that there are two states on the Korean Peninsula [Sbornik..., 1958, p. 85]. In 1959, the USSR directly advised the leadership of the DPRK to put forward a new proposal for peaceful unification, following the example of the GDR. This is evidenced by the recording of a conversation between the NAM Ira and A.M. Puzanov on April 27, 1959. Emphasizing the unreality of holding general elections in the South and North, Puzanov noted:"...In this regard, isn't it advisable to think about other options for resolving the issue of peaceful unification of the country? Why shouldn't the GDR's example come up with proposals for the creation of an All-Korean Committee or commission, or under another name, a body that would gradually prepare the conditions for the unification of the country?" [WUA of the Russian Federation, op. 15, p. 81, d. 7, l. 81]. Thus, the USSR repeatedly advised the leadership of the North to consider a new option of unification through the creation of a confederation with the South. However, North Korea still supported the idea of holding a general election.

The dramatic change in the political situation in the South after the April revolution required the North Korean leadership to reconsider its approach to unifying the country. Kim Il Sung unofficially visited Moscow on June 13-18, 1960. On June 15, in an interview with the head of the Far Eastern Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry, I. I. Tugarinov, Kim Il Sung still supported the holding of general elections [WUA RF, op. 16, p. 85, d. 7, l. 6]. A day after that, on June 17, Kim Il Sung Sen had a more than five-hour conversation with N. S. Khrushchev. It is clear from the materials of the WUA of the Russian Federation that Kim Il Sung had a conversation with N. S. Khrushchev on June 17, 1960, but nothing is said about its content [WUA of the Russian Federation, op. 16, p. 85, d. 7, l. 9].

However, in my opinion, it was this meeting that influenced Kim Il Sung to agree to confederation as a new version of unification. Thus, after returning from Moscow, in a conversation with A.M. Puzanov on July 24, 1960, Kim Il Sung outlined his plan for creating a confederation, prepared by him for a report dedicated to the 15th anniversary of the liberation of Korea [WUA RF, op. 16, p.85, d. 7, l. 22]. After Kim Il-sung's speech with the proposal for confederation, the GDR Ambassador to the DPRK Kurt Schneidewind, in an interview with Puzanov on August 25, 1960, noted that " Kim Il-sung's last report on the 15th anniversary of the liberation of Korea quite clearly sets out the program of unification of the country, which had not happened before. Apparently, the Ambassador noted, Kim Il Sung's speech took into account the advice of the USSR leadership... (emphasis added. - Author)". In response, Puzanov said that " the question of creating a confederation of North and South Korea was indeed the subject of discussion between Comrade N. S. Khrushchev and Comrade Stalin. Kim Il Sung during their meeting in June this year in Moscow " [WUA of the Russian Federation, op. 16, p. 85, d. 7, l. 79-80]. Thus, it can be concluded that Kim Il Sung decided to put forward a proposal for the creation of a confederation after returning from Moscow, and that it was the conversation with N. S. Khrushchev in Moscow that influenced this decision.

The USSR definitely influenced the DPRK leadership to come up with the idea of creating a confederation in Korea. However, the content of the proposal put forward by Kim Il Sung on August 14, 1960, differed from the position of the USSR. Since the late 1950s, the USSR assumed that this confederation would take the form of a union of two states. However, the confederation proposed by Kim Il Sung in August 1960 was conceived only as a temporary, intermediate state formation necessary to facilitate the joint preparation of general elections with the South, which were still considered the most acceptable means for all to unite Korea [Vanin, 2002, pp. 319-320]. This confederation was also different from the one described by Kim Il Sung ^{in 1980.5}

Why, in 1960, did Kim Il Sung propose a confederation that would only be temporary and interim? If he was proposing a real confederation, it would mean that he accepted the existence of two states in Korea. However, as already noted, if the North Korean leadership recognized the existence of two states, it would contradict its position, which it has held so far. Moreover, it would mean that North Korea supports the Soviet Union's policy of peaceful coexistence. Therefore, the North Korean leadership adopted the idea of a temporary and intermediate confederation, which did not contradict its previous position on unification and at the same time seemed to follow the Soviets of the USSR.

The Soviet Union officially declared its support for the new proposals of the DPRK, i.e. confederation, at the XV session of the UN General Assembly. Speaking about "peaceful coexistence - the only reasonable way to develop international relations in our time", in his speech on September 23, 1960, Khrushchev said:: "Just as the proposal of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to create a confederation of two German states is reasonable, the proposal of the Government of the DPRK to create a confederation of North and South Korea is reasonable. This is the only way to put a good start on the peaceful unification of these states" [Izvestia, 14.09.1960]. Thus, the Soviet government officially supported North Korea's proposal to create a confederation. However, it seems that the USSR did not fully share the DPRK's point of view. Thus, the Statement of the Soviet government of December 7, 1960, although it spoke of "full support for the new proposals of the DPRK" [Izvestia, 14.09.1960], however, it was noted at the same time: "If we proceed from a sober assessment of the situation, we cannot ignore the fact that there are essentially two states on the Korean Peninsula

⁵ In 1980, confederation was proposed as a form of real unification of the North and South, their coexistence within a single state, as the most important stage on the way to their complete merger [Vanin, 2002, p.320].

with different political and economic systems" [Izvestiya, 14.09.1960]. The Statement shows that the USSR still believed that there were two states on the Korean Peninsula. In my opinion, although the government of the Soviet Union did not fully agree with the DPRK's proposal, it officially supported it in order to demonstrate the solidarity of the socialist camp, and also in order to keep North Korea, which was gradually moving to the Chinese side in the then difficult political situation caused by the confrontation between the USSR and the PRC.

POLICY OF THE DPRK AND THE USSR REGARDING THE INTENSIFICATION OF DISCUSSIONS ON THE UNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY IN THE SOUTH

Thanks to the April revolution, South Korean society took a step towards democratization and the abolition of the doctrine of an armed "march to the North". Gradually, the discussion of issues of peaceful unification of the country became more active. However, after the division of the peninsula, the so-called red complex, i.e. the widespread anti-communist sentiments in the society, had a great influence on South Korean society. Therefore, before the July 29, 1960, elections, issues of peaceful unification were not discussed so actively.

The media coverage of the idea of Korean unification through neutralization, which Kim Yong Joon ⁶ and Kim Sam Gyu ⁷ insisted on, played a major role in activating the unification movement in South Korea. Their idea was for the surrounding powers to conclude a treaty among themselves, according to which Korea should not be drawn into any military conflicts. Thus, according to this idea, the unification of Korea could be achieved by regulating the interests of the surrounding powers. In addition, U.S. Senator D. Mansfield's proposal to solve the problem of the unity of the Korean nation by neutralizing it, following the example of Austria (October 1960), also influenced the discussion on unification issues. This idea has become increasingly popular. As a result, all progressive parties, with the exception of the Socialist Party, joined this plan of unification of the country at the end of 1960. A significant part of the intelligentsia supported this idea.

The increased discussion of unification issues in South Korea based on the idea of neutralization played a significant role in reorienting the struggle of students for the unification of the country. While in the first half of 1960 the student movement, the main force of the April Revolution, focused mainly on the overthrow of the dictatorship of Lee Seung-man and the fight against corruption of his supporters, in the second half of 1960 and in the beginning of 1961 it focused on the struggle for the unification of the country. A turning point was the organization of the National Unity League (LNE) at Seoul National University on November 1, 1960. The LNE proposed to hold a meeting of Prime Minister Chang Myung with the leaders of the United States and the USSR to discuss the unification of Korea and to start immediate negotiations between the South and the North. This proposal caused a great response in South Korea. Following the creation of the LNE, more and more different organizations, groups and movements began to appear in favor of unification. A proposal to hold talks between students of the South and the North in Panmunjom8, put forward by the National Unity League on May 3, 1961, caused a great response in South Korean society.

⁶ Kim Yong-joon went to the United States in 1917 and was active in the Korean independence movement there. He served as executive member and Chairman of the Foreign Department of the United Korean American Assembly. After the split of Korea, he came up with the idea of unifying Korea by neutralizing it.

⁷ During the Japanese colonization, Kim Sam-gyu participated in the socialist movement, and after the creation of Korea, he worked as the editor-in-chief of the Tona Ilbo newspaper. After the establishment of the Republic of Korea, he repeatedly published articles on the unification of the country, but was forced to emigrate to Japan under pressure from the Lee Seung Man regime. In Japan, he continued to advocate the unification of Korea through neutralization.

⁸ Panmunjom point where the parties to the Korean Armistice Agreement were negotiating.

The response to the students ' proposal varied from different sections of South Korean society: students and the Central Committee for Self-Unification of the Nation ⁹ supported the proposal, while the right and conservatives sharply criticized it. Jang Myung's government even threatened to punish the students.

The call to hold talks between representatives of students from the South and the North in Panmunjom caused a great response not only in the South, but also in the North. The DPRK immediately responded to this proposal. On May 4, 1961, representatives of North Korean parties issued a decision to fully facilitate negotiations between students of the South and the North, and the Minister of Internal Affairs of the DPRK promised to ensure the safety of students if such a meeting takes place [Nodong sinmun, 05.05.1961]. At the University named after him. On May 6, 1961, Kim Il Sung established the preparatory committee for organizing inter-Korean student talks, which included about 500 representatives of the Korean Students ' Committee, the Democratic Youth Union of Korea and various universities of the DPRK, and began concrete work on the preparation of this meeting. Thus, North Korea welcomed the proposal of the South Korean students and saw it not only as a first step towards the unification of the country, but also as an opportunity to strengthen its influence in the South.

Among North Korea's response to the offer of South Korean students, the formation of the Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Motherland should be mentioned in particular. It was established on May 13, 1961 in the presence of representatives of political parties and public organizations of the DPRK [WUA RF, op. 17, p. 89, d. 5, l. 165]. The leadership of this committee includes people from South Korea-well-known politicians and public figures. The Committee was created primarily to exert maximum influence in the South, where at that time the movement for unification of the country and for rapprochement with the North was at its peak. The chairman of this committee, Hong Myung-hee, was one of Korea's most famous writers and a fighter for independence during Japanese colonization. It seems that the North Korean leadership was counting on the fact that the appointment of such a respected figure as Hong Myung-hee to the post of chairman of the committee would help win the sympathy and trust of the South Korean population. Prominent historical scholar Baek Nam Un, who previously served as Chairman of the New People's Party and Vice-Chairman of the Working People's Party of South Korea, was elected Vice-chairman of the committee.¹⁰ Pyongyang also planned to use the Committee to expand cooperation with the South. However, three days after the establishment of the Committee, on May 16, 1961, a military coup took place in South Korea, and the political situation deteriorated sharply. For this reason, the Committee focused only on seeking dialogue with the South.

The leaders of the DPRK believed that the population of the South would positively assess the situation in the North if Pyongyang provided powerful and comprehensive economic assistance to Seoul [WUA RF, op. 17, p. 89, d. 5, l. 129]. That is why the intensification of discussions in the South on the problems of unification of the country prompted Pyongyang to pay even more serious attention to the development of its national economy. This point of view of the DPRK leadership is well illustrated by the "Proposals for the implementation of economic and cultural cooperation between the South and the North and the independent development of the national economy in South Korea", which were adopted at the VIII session of the second convocation of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK in November 1960. North Korea has made it clear that if South Korea wishes, North Korea will be willing to build a number of factories and a hydroelectric power plant in the South. Despite the fact that the name said

⁹ The Central Committee for the Independent Unification of the Nation was formed in September 1960 to coordinate this movement. It included representatives of various progressive parties and public organizations.

¹⁰ In addition to them, the leadership of the Committee for the Peaceful Unification of the Motherland included other South Koreans, such as Lee Geuk-no, Lee Man-gyu, Park Si-hyun, and others.

"cooperation between the South and the North", in fact, the entire content of the "Proposals" focused on North Korea's unilateral assistance to the South [Hong Seok Ryul, 2000, p. 128].

The strengthening of progressive tendencies in South Korea after the April Revolution provided an opportunity for the Soviet Union to change its policy towards the South. The Soviet leadership's assessment was based on the DPRK leadership's analysis of the causes and nature of the April Revolution and assumed that the achievements of the USSR, the DPRK, and other socialist countries had a beneficial effect on the South Korean population, especially on young people [WUA RF, op. 17, p.89, d. 5, l. 11]. When the Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK, A. M. Puzanov, spoke with Kim Il Sung on January 4, 1961, he asked him whether the Soviet representatives in international organizations should not exert the necessary influence on the representatives of South Korea in these organizations. Kim Il Sung responded that the boycott policy against South Korean representatives should continue for some time. He believed that in South Korea there was a current for establishing relations with the USSR, and in a year or six months this trend will manifest itself more clearly. Therefore, Kim Il Sung recommended to the Soviet ambassador that the USSR should pursue a different policy towards South Korean representatives in international organizations when this trend becomes stronger [WUA of the Russian Federation, op. 17, p. 89, d. 5, l. 11]. It is possible that if a military coup had not been carried out in South Korea, the Soviet Union's policy towards South Korea would have changed in the first half of the 1960s.

MILITARY COUP OF 1961 IN SOUTH KOREA AND THE DECLINE IN DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS OF UNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY

During the seven months of Prime Minister Jang Myung's ^rule, discontent over unresolved economic problems has increased, and tensions between progressive and conservative forces have gradually escalated, especially over diametrically opposed views on unification. Skilfully exploiting the unstable situation in the country, a group of military personnel led by Park Chung-hee took power on May 16, 1961. The new military leadership had a negative attitude towards the student movement that supported rapprochement with North Korea. This position coincided with the opinion of South Korean conservatives and Washington.

May 17, 1961 Park Jung-hee gave the order to identify Communist supporters. Declaring them "North Korean spies", the new leader of the country even called the date of their "complete defeat". The military leadership began to conduct large-scale arrests of progressive figures ¹². As a result, the South Korean movement for peaceful unification of the country was paralyzed. Many of the progressives were arrested, while others had to continue their struggle for unification underground. Thus, the rise of Park Jong-hee and his group to power undermined the democratic movement in South Korea and disrupted the rapprochement between the two parts of the Korean peninsula. Due to the military coup, students ' attempts to find a mutually acceptable solution to the unification problem were suppressed. Park Jong-hee put aside the issue of unification of the peninsula and focused entirely on solving economic problems. It is for this reason that the unification movement has become increasingly difficult.

In the current situation, the North Korean leadership has taken measures to strengthen the country's defense capability. To do this, it was necessary to spend part of the funds intended for economic development on defense and strengthening security [WUA of the Russian Federation, op. 17, p. 89, d. 5, l. 178]. Therefore, after the military coup in the South, the leadership of the North

¹¹ The Jang Myung Government, formed on 1 October 1960, lasted until 16 May 1961.

¹² With reference to the Korean Central Telegraph Agency and reports from Seoul, Izvestia reported that "in 6 days (until May 21), the new South Korean authorities arrested 18-930 people and referred their cases to military tribunals" [Izvestia, 24.05.1961].

It began to adjust the First seven-year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the DPRK (1961-1967). Thus, the military coup exerted strong pressure on North Korea, forced it to change its policy both in relation to the unification of the country and in the field of economy, and played a crucial role in increasing tensions on the Korean peninsula.

list of literature

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (WUA RF), f. 0102.

Vanin Yu. V. Korea na trudnom puti k reunitseniyu [Korea on the Difficult path to reunification].

Izvestiya. M.

Kim Il Sung. For the post-war restoration of the national economy. Pyongyang, 1956 (in Korean).

Scum sinmun. Pyongyang.

Pravda. M.

Sbornik osnovnykh dokumentov i materialov po Korey za 1958 [Collection of basic documents and materials on Korea for 1958].

Seo Joon Seok. Recent History of Korea (in Korean). Seoul, 2005.

Han Monica. Sevsrokoreyskiy analiz v otnoshenii yuzhnokoreyskoy politiki v period Aprel'skogo massovogo razvitiya (1960 g.) i izmenenie politiki obrazovaniya [North Korean Analysis of South Korean Politics during the April Mass Unrest (1960) and changes in the Unification Policy]. 19 aprelya i otnosheniya mezhdunarodnoy i Severnoy Koreyey (in Korean). Seoul, 2001.

Hong Seok Ryul. Proposals of North Korea to South Korea during the April Revolution and economic cooperation between the South and the North // Logic of the Unification Era. 2000. Spring.

Hong Seok Ryul. The problem of unification and socio-political conflict. 1953-1961 (in Korean). Seoul, 2001.

Central Yearbook of Korea (in Korean). Pyongyang, 1960.

Yoo Yeon-goo. People who went South and North (in Korean). Seoul, 1993.

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