The anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan, or the second Afghan War , is also the first war of a new type. The point is not even that it used new types of weapons, but that it was the first transnational war, i.e. a war that completely absorbed everything that we said about transnationalism before. And we said that transnationalism defines a situation in which national borders lose their meaning, when the movement of capital and the actions of any subjects of international relations cease to be limited by national borders. We said that this is a good thing rather than a bad thing; that the globalization of the international financial and economic system is, firstly, natural and objective, and secondly, it is also not bad, since it helps to develop the world economy faster.

We thought less about the impact of globalization processes on the military-political sphere, on what war might become. And now the war has become what it has become. This was the first war when the enemy struck not from the outside, but from the outside and from the inside at the same time, and from the inside more strongly than from the outside.

The tragedy in American cities was not just brought in from outside, it was not just the Afghan Taliban who attacked the United States. What happened in America could not have happened if the American system of ensuring internal security had not failed as it did. It is not our goal to blame Americans for their idle complacency. The task is to identify a common problem for the United States and the Russian Federation. Neither the Americans nor the Russians are really prepared for external and internal hostile forces to converge to strike. What was a tragic revelation for America may turn out to be the same for Russia - after all, the Russian Federation copies the political system of the United States. We don't talk about it often, but we do. Along with the advantages of the American system, it is easy to adopt

(c) 2003

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its flaws. What happened in America is a lesson for all states that have large non-ethnic communities. Apparently, the political system should be built with the understanding that if it is not possible to develop a correct policy towards non - ethnic communities, there may be dangers-complex dangers that can come simultaneously from within and from outside.

After the events of September 11, 2001, the American system of foreign policy priorities accelerated shifts, which are expressed in the fact that as the source of potential danger shifts to the heart of Eurasia, deep into the mainland, the military and political priorities of the United States begin to change-taking into account the need to respond to a challenge coming not from Europe, but from Previously, we analyzed Asian security and European security separately. Europe has always been the number one region in terms of American security. This was understandable, because for half a century there was a confrontation between the blocks and they were directly in contact. In Europe, they were waiting for a possible war with a hypothetical enemy.

Now the situation is different. Europe is beginning to resemble a "logistics support" zone. Americans are waiting for danger from another region. The source of the expected danger has shifted to the east. Europe does not lose its importance for the United States, but this value is changing: from now on, it is not a "front line", but an important, but still a "logistics support" zone.

Hence, there are many changes in American foreign policy. Some point to its "tightening" in relation to the admission of new NATO members. I believe it's the opposite. The Americans show remarkable indifference to their admission to NATO. Now they don't care whether to accept weak or non-weak members, trained or untrained. Because NATO in its old form, as a cohesive military alliance, is less and less able to provide assistance to the United States in the event that threats actually arise from Central Asia. That's why Washington changed its position. The old "narrow" and cohesive union is not so necessary. Let NATO be broader, and less cohesive. Her tasks are now changing. It is not unity in the old, military-allied sense that is important. It is important that" in the rear", in Europe, there is a peaceful, non-hostile, integrated space that is permeable to American influence. That's enough.

Hence the new American policy towards Russia. If Russia wants to cooperate more closely with NATO, let it cooperate. If Russia wants to be spoken to more carefully, please let us talk. Dialogue with Moscow now serves American interests. This is a different logic of building the US policy in Eurasia.

What is surprising is not that such a logic appeared, but that it appeared almost by accident: in this sense, it was facilitated by terrorists. It is interesting that this strange logic was reached not by the Democrats, who always seemed to show more sympathy for Russia, but by the Republicans, who are a conservative and tough party in their foreign policy aspirations. A paradox that needs further analysis. Yet it expresses a real trend.

The next question concerns the reasons for what is happening. Indeed, Europe remains a relatively calm region. What do Europeans talk about among themselves? They quarrel and make up over visa regimes, economic relations, and the delegation of powers to integration bodies from national ones. This is the agenda of today's Europe. It, of course, creates contradictions and pores. But none of them is associated with military danger. It is not surprising that the US began to think about the military danger from a new geopolitical point of view.

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Why are Americans paying more attention to Central Asia? In many ways, for example,because of the painful issue of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Previously, we discussed this issue primarily at the bilateral level with the Americans and defended the nuclear monopoly of a narrow group of powers. It was not desirable to have many nuclear powers. Now the situation has changed. The nuclear nonproliferation regime has suffered a major setback. Two new semi - legal nuclear powers-India and Pakistan-have emerged, and a conflict between them is now taking on a nuclear dimension. What difference does it make to neighboring states, such as ours, whether the Indo - Pakistani nuclear conflict will be more or less large-scale? Our countries are too close to these powers, and even a small nuclear conflict is a terrible danger for our countries. But a nuclear conflict in the center of Eurasia is also a huge problem for the United States.

Another important factor that has influenced American foreign policy logic is the idea of the fight against drugs. In Central Eurasia, a powerful, second (after Latin American) base for drug production has been formed. The military operation in Afghanistan was largely dictated by the desire to destroy this base, since the flow of drug money generated corruption in the international financial system and the US banking system. There were huge flows of uncontrolled drug money, the movement of which was difficult or impossible to trace, just as it was impossible to trace the movement of oil money 20 years ago. And just as oil money at that time created huge hidden and semi - hidden transnational "oil" financial and economic empires, new drug money began to create the same thing. Corrupt transnational financial systems against nation-states and, in particular, against the American state - this is the conflict that covers the second Afghan war and the fight against terrorism.

Oil money somewhere formed structures in the United States that looked like national components of the local economy and local society. But they remained outside of state and public control. This money and these empires were not loyal to the American idea and American patriotism. Their ideology was truly transnational in the sense that transnationalism overcomes patriotism. Such transnationalization undermines the state idea and knocks out the levers of financial influence and management from the hands of the state, which leads to a decrease in its political control. Transnationalization, which seems to begin in the financial sphere, soon turns into transnationalization in the security sphere. This means that ensuring the interests of individual states may become less important in reality than realizing the interests of the transnational layer of corrupt financiers. This was known for a long time. The only shock of the moment is that the most powerful country in the world suddenly found itself in the position of being deceived, which was very angry about this.

And finally, the last thing that strongly affects Americans is China. There are no signs of a major clash between the PRC and the United States, they have learned to quarrel and make up remarkably well, the Chinese criticize the Americans, they criticize the Chinese, but economic relations are developing between them, trade is booming, and the American middle class is wearing cheap, high-quality clothes made in China. Nevertheless, in American forecasts and assessments, China is considered as the country that poses the most serious challenge to US leadership in the XXI century.

What happened after the events of September 11, 2001? Without this situation, the Americans would not have rushed to Central Asia and would not have begun to acquire bases there,

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to implement China's traditional deterrence. It all happened by accident. But by coming to Central Asia by accident, the Americans will use this new opportunity in their long-term policy toward China. I think we can say that there is a Eurasianization of American foreign policy. The word "Eurasia" in the American political lexicon has always had a negative connotation: Eurasia is something that leads civilization away from the main European and Euro - Atlantic path of development. Now it turns out that Americans are increasingly speaking positively or neutrally about Eurasia. This is a fun, but also revealing innovation.

What does all this mean for Russia?

First. It is incorrect to talk about losses due to the fact that the Americans acquired bases. Could we have lost something that we didn't already have? We began to lose the Central Asian countries not after the Americans entered them, but after we no longer had the resources to maintain the old formula of relations with them.

Second. I think that over the past six months we have seen a completely unique situation, unprecedented in our history, when a foreign country that has long been our opponent-the United States-has solved our most important foreign policy task for us: it has eliminated the hotbed of military threat to our country. The situation is really quite strange. For their own money, with the help of their soldiers, the Americans destroyed the Taliban regime. Who suffered from the Taliban before? Russia is bigger than the United States, of course. So my attitude to the American appearance in Central Asia is peculiar - they did it, let them continue to do it. I think that what has happened is much more significant for China's foreign policy and for the overall regional situation. Because after the second Afghan War, the Americans became a Central Asian power for the first time in their history. Who would have thought of such a thing even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when we said that the Americans do not want to invest in this region, they do not see great prospects in it. And suddenly we see an American military presence. This means that today no major regional military-political issue can be resolved without taking into account the position, and not only the interests of the United States. In any other case, a decision on regional military issues will be considered un-American. This is a new alignment, and a different logic for making decisions to resolve the local situation.

I think China is particularly concerned about this issue. If you look at how Chinese diplomacy has been built over the past 10 years, you will see that it has been built on the exact opposite idea: to create a "zone free of American influence"in Central Asia. Cooperation between the countries of the region under the auspices of China and Russia is the security formula that China seemed to want. Now America is a Central Asian player. An unexpected alignment of prospects for regional cooperation is emerging. We have the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Five years ago, it was considered by the Chinese as the nucleus from which the core of the regional security system grows. We argued with the Chinese, did not agree, and the Central Asian countries supported us in not making the SCO a military-political structure. It should deal with the economy. The Chinese said: let her do the economy, but only first. In the end, the Chinese forced Moscow to agree to sign a major treaty with China two years ago, and soon the SCO became an organization, not just a forum.

How will it develop?

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The SCO can remain as it is. But then it should deal with economic issues, because if it goes beyond the economic agenda, then the Americans will think that this is directed against them. This is the first option.

The second option is that the SCO becomes a political and military organization after all. The question arises: how can it be so, ignoring what is happening in Afghanistan? Now a new player has emerged - Pakistan. Is it possible to turn the SCO into a military grouping, ignoring Islamabad, which is becoming the most important player (even if it is a weak player)? If Pakistan's nuclear weapons fall into the hands of Islamic terrorists, it will be bad for everyone. So something must be done about Pakistan. But as soon as you say "Pakistan," the question arises, " What about India?" It will never accept the fact that Pakistan was accepted somewhere and India was not accepted. It turns out that in military and political terms, the "Central Asia" region has expanded and now includes India. These countries cannot now be considered in isolation from each other. Not only do you need to take into account the opinion of Americans, you also need to act with an eye to South Asia. And only taking into account all these factors can some formula for creating an organization of military-political cooperation be obtained.

And finally, the third option. It consists in building not a regional security system, but something that L. I. Brezhnev proposed in 1969, but then his proposal was not taken seriously, and now the Japanese are also proposing it (which was not expected of them, since they criticized this idea 20 years ago!) - Return to the idea of collective security in Asia. Indeed, the ASEAN Regional Security Forum has been in existence for ten years. If you link it up with the SCO, you will get a kind of pan-Asian security system, even if it is weak and loose at first, but still some kind of pan-Asian security system.

The last and most important thing is the domestic political aspect of Russian-American relations for the United States and it is also for the Russian Federation. The thing is, I don't think Moscow is quite sure yet how serious the US administration is about improving relations with Russia. The answers to these questions are still unclear; maybe they seriously want to build allied relations with Russia; maybe now they are acting on a short-term basis - they just needed to, and then in six months they will forget. But we must say the same about ourselves. The situation in Russia in connection with Russia's relations with the West is quite controversial, and we know that there is a fairly large circle of people who disagree with the current course. Our press does not discuss these issues very actively and in not particularly clear forms. It is not clear whether people don't talk about them much or quietly, because they are not interested in them much, or because the new domestic political situation in the Russian Federation provides fewer opportunities for expressing disagreement both on the "left" and "right". Because the criticism of Putin's policy in relations with the United States is conducted from opposite sides.

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