The article provides statistics and geography of pirate attacks in recent years, features of the actions of modern pirates, and measures taken by coastal states to curb pirate activity. Keywords: pirate attacks, ship robbery, South China Sea, ship and cargo security, local maritime banditry.

The surge in pirate activity off the coast of Somalia, which culminated in the seizure of the Ukrainian ship Faina with tanks, multiple launch rocket guns and mountains of explosives and ammunition on board, attracted the attention of the entire world community. Meanwhile, piracy in the Gulf of Aden is only a part of this global scourge. According to official data, several hundred pirate attacks are committed annually in ^the world1. And their number is growing inexorably.

At the same time, a number of patterns are observed:

1. Pirate attacks have long been concentrated in a single region in Southeast Asia, in the seas surrounding Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, South China, Singapore, Thailand, Kampuchea, and the Philippines.

2. The displacement of sea vessels is growing, so every successful ship robbery causes more and more damage to ship owners, cargo carriers, insurance companies.

3. The nature of the robbery has changed: if earlier pirates took everything of value that could be carried away, leaving the ship and crew intact, now more and more often the ship with cargo and crew simply disappears, as if dissolving in fog.

4. Attempts to arm the ship's crew or put special guards on it often end badly. Well-informed and armed gangs attack unexpectedly, the battle begins, often take hostages and offer to surrender under the threat of their execution or sinking the ship. Pirates have become more violent, informed, and technically equipped.

5. The decline in attacks in 2005 and in the first half of 2006 (127 attacks) is partly due to the natural disaster that occurred between 2004 and 2005, a tsunami that killed more than 300,000 people in countries where pirates are particularly active. Significant damage was caused to ports, infrastructure, and tourist sites.

6.The information provided by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) on the annual number of pirate attacks is hardly true. The newspaper "Di Welt" believes that the number of attacks is underestimated by 2-

Khodov Leonid Grigoryevich, Professor of the International University (Moscow).

3 times because owners of small and medium-sized vessels are afraid to officially declare attacks, fearing revenge from pirates ². This also applies in part to owners of larger ships and cargo in countries where trade and transport businesses have to deal with mafia-like vertical structures. Pirate ships are the lower part of such structures, the upper floors of which are port and customs services that supply information, internal affairs agencies, port and border guards that are not in the right place at the right time, a network of dealers, keepers and sellers of loot taken during pirate raids, courts and lawyers.

The second reason for hiding the facts of pirate attacks by their victims is the unwillingness to bring information to insurance companies. The British insurance monopoly Lloyd's, which insures a significant part of sea transportation, and other insurance companies, as soon as they learn about the robbery of the ship, will immediately increase the insurance premium from the carrier. The question is which is more profitable, or better to say, which is more unprofitable for the carrier: a single loss of cargo or a significant increase in insurance premiums for a long time.

Only the declared losses of shipping and insurance companies from piracy amount to about 8 billion annually. euro or $ 10 billion. USA ³.

International maritime navigation provides ample opportunities for modern pirates. Due to the growth of the global economy and increasing globalization, the world trade turnover and the number of ships carrying cargo is growing. In 2000, the world merchant fleet numbered approximately 38,500 ships, in 2003 - 39,000, in 2005-40,000, and in 2006 the number of vessels exceeded 41,500.⁴

The value of transported goods has increased, as the share of finished products in them is growing and the share of raw materials, fuel and agricultural goods is decreasing. But the raw materials and fuel themselves have risen immeasurably. At a time when a barrel of oil was worth less than $ 3 per barrel. it was hardly worth attacking a medium tanker. Today, when the price of a single barrel is ten times higher, robbing an average tanker with 25,000 tons of oil on board can bring huge profits to pirates.

The German Academy of Foreign Trade and International Maritime Transport in Bremen has a map of the world with figures showing the number of pirate attacks on ships in different parts of the world. Piracy is rampant in the Gulf of Guinea, in the Atlantic, and off the coast of Somalia as ships leave the Red Sea for the Indian Ocean, in the Persian Gulf, off the coasts of South India and Ceylon, and one attack in 2005 was even off the coast of Portugal. However, more than half of all pirate acts are committed off the coast of Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Southern China, up to Taiwan.

A particularly dangerous place on the world's sea routes is the "eye of the needle", the so-called strait between the Moluccas Peninsula and the Indonesian island of Java opposite Singapore. The Strait connects the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean, 50,000 ships pass through it annually and 1/3 of the world's trade is carried out, including half of the world's crude oil transportation. The narrowest point in the strait - only 2 km - near Singapore is created as if specifically for attacking ships.

Ships often move in a solid column, like cars on a highway during rush hours, and yet attacks are quite frequent.

The captain of a chemical tanker describes his encounter with pirates as follows::

On a dark, moonless night around 3 o'clock, more than a dozen masked men with automatic weapons clambered over the side of the ship as it emerged from the Moluccas Strait. They smashed the windows in the control room and, holding pistols to the temples of those on duty at the helm and control panel, found out where the rest of the crew was. They herded the crew into the forecastle, tied them up, and stationed their men in the control room. The captain, fearing that the pirates would break the ship on the rocks, asked to be allowed to operate the ship. He was refused. When he was finally brought to the control room at gunpoint, he was struck by how expertly one of the attackers steered the ship through the narrow, tangled channels between the islands, turning off the main route.

Then it all ended very quickly. After taking all the money and documents on the ship, as well as all the most valuable assets of the crew, the pirates dismantled all valuable electronic and navigation equipment, took expensive tools and spare parts, and loaded the loot into a fast boat that came up, left the ship.

Such a robbery is called shallow in local nautical circles. More and more often there are thorough or complete privateer actions. The ship is captured and taken to the deserted steep banks, where it is covered with mangroves and is not visible from a helicopter. Such seizures are carried out with container ships, tankers and vessels carrying individual cargo. The ship is unloaded, the loot disappears without a trace, the crew is destroyed or held hostage if the pirates believe that they can get a good ransom for them. A well-known and qualified captain working in a reputable shipping company can bring the kidnappers up to 120 thousand dollars. a ransom note.

As for the ship, if it is of interest in its qualities, it is repainted, perhaps the superstructures are slightly changed, new numbers are knocked out on the machines and mechanisms, and it is sent to sail the world's oceans under a new name and flag.

Amateur pirate gangs-teams of small speedboats-can't handle such prey. They are limited to attacking small and medium-sized ships of local merchants plying along the coast, between islands and neighboring countries of Southeast Asia, sometimes attacking local passenger ships, ferries and robbing those on board. Such local maritime banditry has a negative impact on medium-sized businesses in the region's countries. But the business itself is often outside the law, as these ships sometimes carry contraband goods and illegal immigrants traveling from country to country in search of earnings and returning home with earnings. Here, in essence, it is difficult to separate piracy from the criminal maritime business. In any case, the coast guard and military boats periodically catch small sea robbers and hand them over to the justice authorities, and show trials are held, sometimes ending with the death penalty in China.

Another thing is about a dozen and a half criminal communities that have the fastest and most technically equipped small-tonnage fleet, armed and trained pirate teams, transshipment depots, trading and shipping companies, and banks in different countries. A significant portion of these communities are controlled by Chinese "triads" from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau. They have extensive connections within the multi-million-strong Chinese diaspora living in Southeast Asian countries.

It is these communities that get a fair share of 10 billion rubles. the amount of US dollars collected annually by pirates from world trade and shipping. These maritime criminal organizations are known in Southeast Asia in the same way as major international industrial and banking monopolies.

The activities of these organizations are of increasing concern to global cargo carriers, shipowners and insurance companies. Lloyd's Insurance Monopoly declared the Moluccas Strait a high-risk area in 2005 and insures ships and cargo passing through the Strait past Singapore, Malaysia and South Vietnam on the same terms as ships going to Iraq.

The need to ensure the safety of ships and cargo generates demand for security services, and demand generates supply. In Singapore and Malaysia, firms have sprung up like mushrooms after rain, offering armed security teams for passing ships.

The most famous of the new security firms in Singapore is BARS, which launched an advertising campaign under the slogan: "Know that you are not alone at sea." The company has hired experienced former soldiers and officers who served in the Marine Corps and in the Navy of Malaysia, Taiwan, Australia, and is proud of the first successes. In the fall of 2005, a BARS security team armed with small arms escorted a cargo ship carrying 12,000 tons of non-ferrous metal cable worth more than $ 10 million. After the ship left the Moluccas Strait, a boat with armed pirates on board went to it, but noticing a large guard on the ship, changed course and disappeared.

Individual successes of private security firms in principle do not change the situation for two reasons:

First, the authorities in Malaysia and Singapore, where security firms are required to be registered, do not allow them to have heavy small arms, while pirates are armed with heavy machine guns, automatic cannons, rocket-propelled grenades and rockets;

Second, hiring security teams is not a cheap treat. It costs approximately US $ 100,000 to escort a ship from the strait entrance to a port in Indonesia, Kampuchea, Vietnam or the Philippines. This amount significantly increases the cost of transportation of goods, which can make the shipping company uncompetitive.

The only solution to the problem is to organize an effective fight against pirates by the armed forces of coastal states. The PRC copes with this brilliantly. However, Chinese territorial waters do not need special protection from pirates, because in the conditions of a long-term confrontation between the PRC and Taiwan, a significant military fleet is concentrated off the east coast of China. It is opposed by Taiwanese and American warships. An alien ship will not pass unnoticed there.

In 2005, there were 4 pirate attacks on merchant ships in international waters south of Taiwan, probably because both sides are in no hurry to take action near the location of ships of the opposing fleet. The further south, the worse the situation. At the latitude of the southern tip of Hainan Island, the Sino-Vietnamese border, there were several attacks, also in international waters.

In general, pirates are afraid to attack Chinese ships in the South China Sea, because when receiving a timely signal, the Coast Guard of the PRC

it sends out speedboats and helicopter gunships. In the South China Sea, there are no lost islands with lush tropical vegetation, grottoes, shelters and numerous channels. The small number of pirate attacks in the South China Sea, unfortunately, is offset by the activities of the "triads", an indestructible criminal community that coordinates its activities from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.

Further south, off the coast of Vietnam, there were 10 attacks. The Vietnamese Border Guard Service is not yet effective enough in the fight against pirates.

The way out of this situation is to coordinate the actions of the army and navy of the coastal states. The first steps in this direction have been taken, and an agreement on combating piracy between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia has been signed. Each of the countries has pledged to protect a certain section of the sea route. Unfortunately, the agreement did not include Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam and Kampuchea. Malaysia and Singapore are committed to implementing the agreements and improved the protection of the sea route between 2005 and 2006. The weak point of sea trade routes remains the Indonesian territorial waters. In them and in the shelters on numerous islands, pirates feel at home.

A naval officer from the island of Sumatra told the newspaper Di Welt: "The Indonesian Navy is poorly funded, poorly equipped and completely unmotivated. The government pays salaries irregularly, and ships cannot go to sea because there is no money for fuel. Pirates have faster ships, more money, and better infrastructure than we do. We don't have a chance. " ⁵

1. International Marine Bureau. London, 2006, Sep.

2. Die Welt. 2006. 5 Aug.

3. BerichtDAY, Bremen. 2006. N 6.

4. International Marine Bureau. London, 2006 Sep.

5. Die Welt. 2005. 5 Aug.

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