With the increasing economic and military-strategic importance of the South China Sea (SCM), the problem of delineating its water area and determining the ownership of the islands of the two archipelagos located in it - the Paracel and Spratly-has become of great practical importance. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei are contesting the PRC's holding of its legally undocumented "maritime border" at a distance of some 50-100 kilometers from their coasts.

With the entry into force of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the question of the methodology for determining the 200-mile exclusive economic zone of each of the above-mentioned States has become acute, which has not yet been resolved. Referring to the provisions of the Convention, the PRC in 1996 declared the extension of its special rights to the vast expanses of the sea. Thus, its claims "crashed" 120 kilometers into the Indonesian economic zone, involving Jakarta in the lawsuit. Hanoi claims that the Convention is the legal basis for defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Vietnam and declares its sovereignty not only over all the Spratly Islands, but also over the Paracel Archipelago, which has been effectively controlled by the PRC since 1974. The Vietnamese exploration for oil and gas in the Spratly Islands has repeatedly provoked the Chinese Foreign Ministry to protest and declare that China is ready to defend its rights here by force.

And in this situation, the countries of the region have something to argue about. An important complicating factor was the discovery of industrial reserves of oil, natural gas, phosphates, and other minerals in the South China Sea. According to Chinese estimates, the potential reserves of oil lying on the shelf are 29.1 billion tons, gas-5.8 trillion cubic meters. Rich marine bioresources, especially seafood, are in great demand in East Asia. Finally, the South China Sea is crossed by the most important seaworthy lines connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans. During the Cold War, this strategic factor played a role in the decision to actively use the Vietnamese Cam Ranh base by the Soviet Navy. The practical implementation of Russia's current interest in the economic use of the sea is cooperation with Vietnam in the framework of the Vietsovpetro joint venture, which conducts oil production on the continental shelf of Vietnam.

Due to the ambiguity of the issue of sovereignty over certain areas of the South China Sea, the "volcano" of the international conflict already began to try its hand in 1974 and 1988, when the Chinese used weapons against Vietnam, which has the most long-standing and large-scale contradictions with the PRC on the issue of "sea borders". And who knows how the last armed incident would have ended if the Vietnamese ships had not then had the opportunity to hide "under the wing" of the Soviet armada in Cam Ranh. It should be noted that the process of overall improvement of Sino-Vietnamese relations in the 1990s forces the parties to exercise restraint. Without strong Soviet patronage, Hanoi can only watch with concern the increasing number of expeditions by Chinese exploration and scientific vessels to the Vietnamese continental shelf. It is noteworthy that the conflict between Beijing and Taipei did not prevent them from signing an agreement on cooperation in oil exploration in the South China Sea on May 1, 1998, and in February 1999 sending a joint expedition to conduct deep-sea drilling in the area where American companies were engaged in oil exploration with the knowledge of the Saigon administration from 1968 until the end of the

The real threat of armed conflict between the PRC and the Philippines was hardly averted in 1995, when Manila accused the Chinese of allegedly building "military facilities" on Mischief Island, which lies 200 kilometers from the large island of the Philippine archipelago of Palawan and, therefore, according to Manila, is located in the territory of the Philippines. within the exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines*.

The Philippine leadership calls on its ASEAN partners not to be deceived by China's assurances that it seeks peace with its neighbors and is ready to resolve disputes with them on a friendly basis. The ASEAN Summit in Hanoi (December 1998) reacted cautiously to the warnings of Philippine President Joseph Estrada about "secret actions by Beijing that can lead to dangerous military incidents" and to the proposal to take comprehensive measures in connection with the "strengthening of the Chinese military presence in the Spratly region". The Forum limited itself to a vague call to resolve disputes related to the South China Sea through peaceful means.

* For more information, see Asia and Africa Today, 1999, N5.

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It can be assumed that the choice of such a line by ASEAN leaders is directly related to the consequences of the heavy blow inflicted on Asian countries by the financial crisis, which temporarily sidelined the military-strategic problems of the Southeast Asian region. The ASEAN capitals cannot ignore the fact that China has provided all possible assistance to its trading partners in overcoming the crisis trends. Confidently becoming a global trading power, China has refrained from devaluing the yuan, which could have dealt an irreparable blow to the economies of its southern neighbors. Moreover, China provided direct financial assistance to the victims of the crisis-contributing 4.5 billion US dollars to the IMF's target program to save the affected Southeast Asian countries, and also announced the provision of 200 thousand dollars to the ASEAN Fund.

The United States has to take into account the need to maintain traditional cooperation with the ASEAN countries, on the one hand, and develop relations with the PRC, on the other. The U.S. Department of Defense's report on the U.S. security Strategy in East Asia and the Pacific, dated November 23, 1998, emphasizes the importance of strengthening allied relations with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, as well as forming a strategic partnership with China. Official Washington avoids disclosing its plans in the event of a crisis situation as a result of the escalation of the dispute over the South China Sea islands and does not take any position on the legal side of counter-claims to sovereignty over them. However, he does not object to the penetration of American private oil companies in the South China Sea. They, in turn, are readily invited by the main participants in the dispute, who believe that their presence can serve as a deterrent.

At the diplomatic level, the United States shows interest in maintaining peace in the South China Sea, opposes the use of force or the threat of its use to resolve counter-claims of the parties to the dispute, calls for restraint and avoiding actions that could destabilize the situation in the South China Sea, and supports the settlement of existing problems here, taking into account the interests of At the same time, Washington emphasizes that ensuring freedom of navigation meets the fundamental interests of the United States, and the unhindered movement of all ships and aircraft in the South China Sea is necessary for the well-being and prosperity of the entire Asia-Pacific region.

At the same time, American officials acknowledge that the United States is ready to be a guarantor of stability and play a deterrent role in the South China Sea. According to one of the official documents, they "would take with serious concern any claims of a maritime nature or restrictions on navigation in the South China Sea that would run counter to international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea." In the summer of 1995, when relations between Manila and Beijing were strained, the United States, following the provisions of the mutual defense treaty with the Philippines, expressed concern about the growing tension in the South China Sea and the actions of "certain countries", and also unequivocally expressed support for the principle of freedom of navigation in this area. In order not to be unfounded, the Americans conducted joint military exercises with the Filipinos on the island of Palawan and in the waters surrounding it. However, as the General Accounting Office of the US Congress pointed out in its report "Conflicts in the South China Sea" in November 1995, it is difficult for the Clinton administration to find a clear solution to the question of how to respond to possible future inappropriate actions of the PRC in connection with such conflicts and how much attention should be paid to such events in relations with China in general. So, during the January 1999 talks between Orlando Mercado and the Pentagon leadership in Washington, judging by the statements of a representative of this department to the press, the United States refused to support the Philippines in the dispute with China over the Spratly Islands and spoke out for its peaceful solution.

The lack of real prospects for resolving the dispute in the South China Sea by collective efforts based on the norms of international law, the stalling of attempts to reconcile mutual interests on a bilateral basis, and the desire of interested countries to gain a foothold in the disputed islands in this regard leads the problem to a dead end and creates prerequisites for destabilization of the situation in the region. One of the scenarios of such a development of events in the ASEAN countries is associated with the expected appearance of a sufficiently powerful navy in China at the beginning of the next century, capable of conducting combat operations in the Spratly region - at a considerable distance from the main bases of the PRC. In this regard, in particular, the press of the Southeast Asian countries is full of speculations about the reasons for the appearance of the unfinished aircraft carrier Varyag sold by Ukraine off the coast of China.

Observers in Southeast Asia do not rule out that Washington's increasing criticism of Beijing's approach to human rights issues, Tibet, the hype surrounding the" theft " of American technologies, the tightening of the conditions for China's accession to the World Trade Organization, as well as the desire of the Americans to include Taiwan in their plans to create a theater of operations missile defense may find a logical continuation in adjusting the US position on the South China Sea. While Beijing diplomatically argues that the United States should play the role of an" active participant " in events in the East Asian region, less ornate speeches are beginning to sound in Washington. So, a member of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dana Rohrabacher, who visited the Philippines in December 1998 to get acquainted with the situation around Mischief Island, accused China of "aggressive behavior" that could disrupt stability in the region. He said that " the Spratly Islands can determine the balance of power between the democratic states of the world and the communist dictatorship that is China, "and assured Manila that the US government will provide assistance to" democratic-minded Filipinos if they are subjected to provocative actions " by the PRC.

The years are gradually healing the "Vietnam syndrome" that has held the United States back from its humiliating defeat in Vietnam. However, today it is impossible to predict with a high degree of reliability what Washington's policy in this region will be in the 21st century.

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