L. L. FITUNI

Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences

I. O. ABRAMOVA

Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Institute of Africa, Russian Academy of Sciences

Keywords: Islamic State, ISIL, terrorism, radical Islam, global governance, Muslim diasporas, migration

The fight against international terrorism in recent years has largely focused on one apparently major front - the fight against the ISIL group, which also calls itself the Islamic State (IS). In the middle of the second decade of this century, ISIL/ISIL has managed to spread its influence over vast territories in Asia ^. hold at least a significant part of them, despite the efforts of military coalitions that have brought together more than 60 States^. In this regard, the question becomes fundamentally important: what reserves allow an enemy that is incomparably worse armed, professionally less trained, less financially secure, using the methods of the wild Middle Ages, such as IG/ISIL, to continue resistance?

The answer to this question is not so much complicated as unnecessarily sharp and unpleasant in its outwardly frightening political correctness and inconsistency with the attitudes of the "civilized world" and the stereotypes of the democratic narrative.

If we use the terminology and logic of the classical English political economy of D. Ricardo, the answer boils down to the following: today there is a "consumer demand" for the "market supply" of the IG/ISIL in the form of the implementation of the social request of some elites and significant masses of the population both in the East and in the West. Such a request is more noticeable in Eastern societies, but it is also visibly present in the West, and in the latter-not only among the Muslim diaspora. In the eyes of the citizens of Russia, as well as the majority of people on the planet (but, unfortunately, not all), the phenomenon of IS / ISIL is subject to complete eradication, since it poses a threat to the physical existence and civilized development of entire peoples.

Three key questions come to the fore when considering the global challenge of ISIS/ISIL. The first of them concerns the actual terrorist threat posed by the group, and requires an answer to the question of the sources and limits of its power and influence. The second concerns the consequences of the impact of the "IG/ISIL project" on the countries of the Middle East and Africa that are in the zone of its direct action or "remote influence". The third question concerns the impact of ISIL/ISIL on non-Eastern societies, first of all-

The article was prepared with the financial support of the Russian State Scientific Foundation. Project No. 16-07-00009 "The phenomenon of the Islamic State in the context of the development of modern Eastern society".

go to Europe and, what is especially important for us, to Russia and its neighboring CIS countries.

In our opinion, all three issues at their core have a single primary basis - minimizing the threat posed not only by ISIL itself, but also by its "reserve army". Unfortunately, as will be shown below, there are forces on the planet that are using political maneuvers to capitalize on both the use of the military threat of ISIS/ISIL and the existence of a"reserve army".

"WEST IS WEST, EAST IS EAST"

Earlier in the magazine, we have already written that ISIS in the Arab world and "Eurojihadism" outside of it were largely negative by-products of the natural growth of political consciousness, self-esteem and self-identification of a part of the Muslim population in the Arab countries and Muslim diasporas of Europe, respectively. The Arab Spring gave an additional boost to the growth of all three of the above-mentioned "self - ..." trends³. She, like the ignorant heroes of a European movie, released into the complex modern world of computer science and political technologies the jinn-destroyers who were imprisoned in the ancient vessels of Muslim societies and were restrained for the time being by age-old seals with outlandish writing-prohibitions.

Once outside, destructive forces broke the fragile secular structures of Arab societies, plunged them into political chaos and civil conflict, brought down already weak economies, which further aggravated social problems and pushed the masses to search for quick and straightforward pseudo-solutions. Finding solutions through religious revival was one of them. The radicalization of large masses of the Muslim population resulted from the fact that moderate religious leaders did not live up to (in general, groundless) hopes for solving the socio-economic problems of society after the fall of authoritarian and corrupt regimes in Arab countries.

The degree of radicalization of the population after the revolutionary upheavals in the Muslim world was very different. This is indirectly confirmed by the survey data of a number of Western sociological structures, primarily the American Pew Research Center. If we take the level of support for the ideas of ISIS/ISIL by Muslims in Africa and the Middle East as a conditional guideline, it varies quite significantly from country to country. At the same time, it is quite high in some places (see Fig.).

Figure 1. Potential reserve of ISIL in some countries of Africa, the Middle East and Asia (% of the population, according to surveys, who had a positive attitude to the ideas of ISIL, 2014/2015).

Note: "0" means a value of less than one percent.

Источник: http://metrocosm.com/support-isis-muslim-world-perceptions-vs-reality/

Ideologically and economically, those who share the ideas of ISIL and consider the actions of this terrorist group to be a natural and natural "response to the oppression of Muslims" can be considered as a strategic reserve of ISIL / ISIL. It is from the ranks of this part of the population that the militants of the group are recruited, financial support and donations are received. They rely on it to create support infrastructure, channels for transporting weapons, people, documents, temporary shelters, etc.

In the East, the contradiction between the desire to receive here and now the benefits and fruits of European prosperity, on the one hand, and the unwillingness of the absolute majority of the population to accept the inevitable "costs" of a liberal and democratic society - all that traditional consciousness considers injustice, lack of culture, promiscuity and perversions-has created a powerful cognitive dissonance at the level of the entire society and even entire civilizational areas. It was he who was the root cause of the failure and horrific consequences of most of the color revolutions and the "Arab Springs".

The phenomenon of IS/ISIL in its current form of a terrorist group-the caliphate-is nothing short of an extreme manifestation.-

This is the result of a significant cognitive dissonance carried by politicians, political strategists (including those who hold holy orders) and field commanders in the realities of not only specific Eastern societies in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Somalia, but also in the Muslim diasporas of Europe, America, and the Asia-Pacific region.

Although it is now widely accepted, even in the West, that ISIL was technically the product of the Second American war against Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the ISIL/ISIL phenomenon should not be viewed solely as a factor in Middle Eastern politics or as a purely regional geopolitical project of Washington.

The active involvement of a number of countries in anti-terrorist operations in Syria and Iraq has led to the spread of ISIL terrorist attacks in Europe. The consequences of the expansion of IS / ISIL have caused an acute migration crisis in the EU. This, in turn, contributed to the aggravation of latent social contradictions within European society and, according to a number of politicians and researchers, put on the agenda the question of the very possibility of preserving the European Union in its current form.

It is difficult to say definitively whether this was originally intended, but today the IG/ISIL factor has gone beyond the purely terrorist threat. As a tough tool of social engineering, the IG incentive is necessary both for those elements of the ruling elites of the West who have taken a course to "dilute" the national component of civil society in countries that have historically developed as nation-states (in contrast, for example, to those that have developed as settlement and resettlement colonies), and for other parts of European elites, which, on the contrary, resists any (including natural) processes of ethnic and civilizational transformation of "fatherlands".

If we accept this message and consider the process itself manageable, we can understand the inexplicable persistence of some European leaders, who are ready to lose their own political positions, but at the same time continue the policy of encouraging inocivilizational immigration, on the one hand, and the harsh rejection of foreigners, bordering on xenophobia, on the other. In other words, the "IG/ISIL phenomenon" has evolved over time into one of the tools of global governance.

RESERVE ARMY MANPOWER

ISIL considers the entire Muslim population of the EU (both those who have already settled there and new arrivals) regardless of his political sympathies, as a strategic reserve in Europe. The strategy and tactics of active and passive use of European Muslims for the tasks of the Caliphate are developed and implemented. For this purpose, both traditional channels (mosques, sermons, religious circles and literature) and modern ones (information technologies, social networks, charitable and educational organizations, NGOs, cultural associations, trade unions and associations, etc.) are used. The goal is to create a consolidated multi-million-strong community that can effectively influence European politicians and public organizations. moods.

Estimates of the number of Muslims in Europe vary depending on the methodology of counting and determining who exactly is considered a Muslim. Political and ideological considerations, political correctness, and the unwillingness of politicians to appear in an unfavorable light have a significant impact on the final published indicators. If we rely on official and semi-official data from the European Union and national sources, it turns out that from almost half a billion inhabitants of Western and Central Europe (28 EU member states plus Norway and Switzerland)-Muslims from 15 to 20 million. However, if we focus on the figures reported by Muslim associations, this figure may be about 25 million.

As our field research has shown, Muslim associations in Europe tend to be based on the total size of the community, which is formed around a prayer house, mosque, or group of communities. It is clear that, with rare exceptions, documents about the presence of citizenship or residence rights are not asked from worshippers, although community leaders and ordinary members may be well aware of the absence of such documents from a co-religionist who offers prayer on a nearby mat. In other words, data from mosques will inevitably be higher than from official government sources, since they will be based on actual attendance by worshippers, without political or legal adjustments. However, it should not be written off that in some EU countries a larger community can claim more significant state support4.

Before the European migration crisis of 2015-2016. It was estimated that by 2030, about 10% of the EU's population would be Muslim. The man-made migration crisis of 2015-2016 made significant adjustments to these forecasts. It is quite obvious that in all EU member states, the forecast indicators will have to be increased. According to IG/ISIL propaganda publications dating back to 2014-2015, the ideological leaders assumed that soon every PJ would be released.-

every resident of Europe (it is not clear whether the whole or only the EU) will practice Islam.

Today, according to absolute indicators, Russia has the largest number of Muslim citizens among all the countries of the European continent. According to available estimates, their number in 2015, according to various estimates, fluctuated between 17 and 21.5 million people (i.e., it was about 12-15% of all Russians). They are mostly indigenous people of the country. The number of Muslims in the Russian Federation is growing faster than the number of representatives of other faiths. The increase in followers of Islam is supported by steady immigration to Russia from Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan. The influx of migrants may decrease significantly by 2030, but it is likely that it will not stop completely.

Of the EU countries, Belgium and France are the most "Muslim". They have the largest share of Muslim citizens (namely citizens, not residents!). as part of their permanent population (according to conservative estimates and without taking into account non - naturalized migrants-between 6 and 8%). They are followed by Denmark, Great Britain, Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria (4-5%). Among non-EU members, Switzerland also belongs to the same category of Western European countries. A significant, though significantly smaller percentage, share of the total population is made up of Muslims in Spain and Italy, and of non-EU members-in Norway (between 2 and 3%).

The fastest growing number of followers of Islam is in Sweden, Belgium, Austria, Great Britain, Norway, France and Italy. Most Central European countries have small Muslim communities (0.3% or less of the population). Given the current level of immigration and the higher birth rate within these Muslim communities, even according to official data, more than 30 million followers of Islam may live in the EU countries by 2030 (without taking into account the possible entry of Balkan countries with Muslim populations into the EU). The permanent or long-term Muslim population in many EU countries exceeds the number of Muslim citizens by two or more times.

Table

Ratio of Muslims to ISIS fighters

Note: the figure for Russia may contain a significant error, as it often includes any Russian-speakers, including immigrants from the former republics of the USSR and/or so-called Muslim "refugees" who resettled in the post-Soviet years under various quotas and programs in Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and EU countries and are not currently citizens Russian Federation.

Source: http://metrocosm.com/foreign-isis-fighters

RESOURCE MANEUVERING

How well is / ISIL able to maneuver its "reserve army" and use its resources?

The most straightforward and uncomplicated way to do this is to attract the reserve army's resources to replenish the ranks of militants fighting on the side of the IG/ISIL in the Middle East, and use the so-called "sleeper cells" and "lone wolves" to commit terrorist acts outside the region, primarily in Europe.

Studies have shown that economic factors are not decisive for the successful maneuver of the human resources of the "reserve army". For them to spill over into the ranks of active ISIL fighters, it is not necessary that they live in poverty or simply remain in a state of disrepair.-

favorable economic conditions. Statistics show that the number of fighters who went to fight in the ranks of the group from a particular country positively correlates with the level of its GDP per capita and the human development index (HDI). Many foreign ISIS fighters come from countries with high levels of economic development, low income inequality, and well-developed political institutions.

Other factors affecting the number of foreign fighters recruited by ISIL include the number of Muslims in the country and the degree of ethnic homogeneity of the latter. As a rule, the ranks of IS/ISIL fighters are replenished mainly by immigrants from those EU countries that are ethnically and linguistically more homogeneous, and where assimilation of immigrants is more difficult. All this shows that the flow of foreign fighters to ISIL is dictated not so much by economic or political conditions in the country, but by the mentality and difficulties of assimilation in Western countries, which is confirmed by the data in the table.

Speaking of the" reserve army " of ISIS, it is necessary to recognize that many people from former Soviet republics, including Russia, are also becoming militants. This year, Gulmurod Halimov, also known as al-Tajiki, became the group's new military leader. He replaced Tarkhan Batirashvili, nicknamed Abu Umar al-Shishani, who was previously killed in anti-terrorist operations.⁵ A native of Georgia, Tarkhan Batirashvili (his father is a Georgian Christian, his mother is a local Chechen), also known as Umar the Chechen, was killed, according to the Pentagon, as a result of an airstrike carried out on March 4 near the Syrian city of Al-Shaddadi. According to other sources, it was destroyed in July during fighting near the Iraqi city of Al-Shirkat. Gulmurod Halimov, a former commander of the Tajik OMON, apparently also spent a long time in the ISIS reserve and was only transferred to the front line in April last year. In Tajikistan, he was accused of treason and put on the wanted list, and a year ago he was included in the US sanctions list6.

The use of the "reserve army" in ISIL's peripheral theaters of operations, which currently include Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and some African countries, is associated with the use of the "sleeper cells" and "lone wolves"resource. The latter include those representatives of the "reserve army" who are not currently active, are not united in any specific organization, and do not represent any specific grouping with a name or structure. A "sleeping" cell is considered an autonomous group of individuals who adhere to a radical ideology, who have certain plans, but do not take active actions until a signal from the center or from a higher unit.

It is known, for example, that "sleeper cells" were created in Morocco on the instructions of the IG in order to prepare and implement further terrorist attacks. This, in particular, was told by the Director of the Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations (CBSR) of Morocco ⁷ Abdelhak Hiyam. He noted that there was a "qualitative change" in the IS strategy towards Morocco. It consists in the fact that people who adhere to Islamist ideology, or supporters of the Islamic State, are instructed to stay in the Kingdom and create "sleeper cells" to carry out large-scale operations. As an example, he cited one of the operations that resulted in the arrest of a Chadian citizen, an IS supporter, in Tangier, who planned a series of terrorist attacks in a number of the Kingdom's largest cities, in particular, in Rabat, including "large-scale terrorist attacks against diplomatic institutions of Western countries and tourist sites." The targets of the criminal were supposed to be the embassy of one of the major foreign powers in Rabat, a hotel, a casino, and a foreign cultural center in Tangier.⁸

"Sleeper cells", according to media reports, planned and carried out major terrorist attacks in Brussels and Paris in 2016. "Lone Wolves" were responsible for no less resonant terrorist attacks in the south and west of France, as well as in Germany. In fairness, it should be noted that in recent months, the tactic of declaring almost all terrorist or simply high-profile acts of violence as "ISIL operations"has been adopted. The group is all the more likely to "take responsibility" in cases where the main suspect or accused is a citizen of one of the Arab countries or a migrant of Arab origin, and sometimes just Muslims.

Thus, Director of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies Yerlan Karin believes that the group that carried out the terrorist attack in Aktobe in 2016* is not directly behind any international terrorist organization. He wrote: "I see that many people interpret the statement of the Interior Minister incorrectly, saying that the group in Aktobe is an ISIL cell in Kazakhstan.

* June 5, 2016 in the city of Aktobe (ex. Aktyubinsk) in Kazakhstan, a group of terrorists carried out armed attacks on a military unit and 2 weapons stores, killing 5 people, and about 40 needed medical assistance. The Kazakh authorities are inclined to believe that these terrorist acts were committed by takfirists, possibly not directly connected with ISIL. However, the group's propaganda attributes "merit" to the fighters of the caliphate, referring to the fact that the Emir of " vi-

so. Moreover, the official statements did not mention the group affiliation of the attackers in Aktobe... My personal opinion is that the group that carried out the terrorist attack in Aktobe is not directly behind any international terrorist organization, and the members of this group in Aktobe were not members of any international terrorist organization. " ⁹

However, further the author, in our opinion, contrary to what has been said, notes that experts call groups such as the one that operated in Aktobe "sleeping cells". Such radical cells are periodically fueled by various propaganda materials, which, in particular, are published by the IG/ISIL.

As you know, this organization is very active in information activities, almost daily publishing various appeals, video and audio clips on social networks. From 2013 to 2016 alone, 5 so-called official ISIL videos were distributed with the participation of people from Kazakhstan, which contained specific calls for attacks. In addition, dozens of amateur photos and videos of militants from Central Asian countries are circulating on social networks, not to mention their numerous accounts. Two weeks before the events in Aktobe, an audio message was distributed in social networks calling for the implementation of terrorist attacks. E. Karin also stressed that five days before the events in Aktobe, the US State Department announced the risk of organizing terrorist acts on the territory of European countries, which indicates a general increase in the terrorist ^threat10. In any case, in his opinion, the main terrorist threat today mostly comes from such "sleeping cells" or "lone wolves", whose attacks are very difficult to prevent.

Russian officials and specialists professionally involved in ensuring anti-terrorist security have repeatedly pointed out the danger of spreading the ideas of ISIL among citizens of Russia and other CIS countries. Data were provided on the number of our compatriots who joined the terrorists and went abroad to join the ranks of ISIL (see Table). It was noted that it was not only about the actual "cannon fodder", i.e. those who sought to join the armed formations, but about those who hoped to integrate into the non-military component of the IG. The latter can be roughly divided into three large groups: applicants for privileged/highly paid positions in the structures of the Islamic State (technically trained specialists, including doctors, engineers, chemists, computer scientists, etc.); women and girls who dream of realizing their ideals about the fate and happiness of a Muslim woman; people of low qualifications and mass professions disoriented by propaganda, unemployed people who want to find a steady income, start a family, and join a peaceful Muslim life. Such dreams are far from reality.

Despite its large size and relative social weight, the "reserve army" of ISIS remains rather amorphous and weakly consolidated. The possibilities of its real use by ISIL are severely limited both by the unwillingness of many of its elements to follow external target designations, and by the vigilant attention of the special services. At the same time, it remains the object of special attention of radical Islamists, and the processes of its internal development can still present many surprises.

* * *

This analysis suggests that the" reserve army " of ISIS in Europe will continue in the foreseeable future. Perhaps, in one form or another, it will be passed on "by inheritance" to the next construct, just as ISIL received many elements and resources of Al-Qaeda at its disposal. The importance of the foreign cultural and civilizational component of European societies, which includes the "reserve army", will grow over time. This will be facilitated by both demographic and socio-political trends in the development of European societies. The "reserve army" can still absorb the ideas of radical Islam for a long time and generate jihadi fighters.

A military victory over IS / ISIL is unlikely to end the turbulence in the Middle East and near the southern borders of the CIS countries. The severity of unresolved problems, the richly sown seeds of violence, and the ease with which terrorist acts are carried out will continue to be felt for a long time to come. This does not mean that Russia and its allies should not seek to create a broad anti-terrorist front that ideally includes our geostrategic "rival partners" in the West. The effective functioning of such a united front could significantly reduce the level of armed violence in the region and localize the remaining pockets of IS/ISIL resistance.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that ISIL and more generally is a terrorist threat (along with the repeated syndrome of "threats from the East").

Lajata Sinai " Abu-Muhammad al-Adnani had recently sent out a mass appeal via the Internet to his followers around the world (not specifically in Aktobe or Kazakhstan) calling for active violent actions on the eve and during the holy month of Ramadan, which served as a signal to "sleeper cells" and "lone wolves".

it is actively used as a tool for consolidation and global management. In this sense, even if the threats emanating from the actual structure called IG/ISIL disappear, it cannot be ruled out that a new managed entity that creates threats to national security will not appear in its place in the area of the "soft underbelly" of Russia.

^{Fituni L. L.} 1 Aggressive Non - State Actors-a New threat to Africa's Development // Scientific Notes of the Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 2015. N 1. pp. 14-20. (Fituni L. L. 2015. Aggressive Non - State Actors-a New Threat to Africa's Development // Journal of the Institute for African Studies. N 1) (in Russian)

² Remarks by General John Allen, then Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. Doha, Qatar, June 3, 2015 - http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2015/06/0-2015-us-islamic-world-forum/060315brookingsdoha.pdf

^{Fituni L. L.} 3, Abramova I. O. Non-state and quasi-state actors of the Greater Middle East and the problem of "Eurojihadism": the European face of the Extremist threat / / Asia and Africa Today. 2015. N 11. С. 2-11. (Fituni L.L., Abramova I.O. 2015. Non- and Quasi-State Actors of the Great Middle East and the Phenomenon of Eurojihadism // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 11) (in Russian)

^{Abramova I. O.} 4, Fituni L. L. Archive of field research. 2008-2016. Досье 8-24. (Abramova I.O., Fituni L.L. Archives of Field Studies. 2008-2016. Archive files 8-24) (in Russian)

⁵ Non-specialists sometimes get the wrong idea that numerous al-Shishani are relatives, members of a certain family of prominent military leaders. In fact, the word "al-shishani" in Arabic means "Chechen" and is part of the name of the nickname, indicating the country (ethnic group) of origin of the militant.

⁶ http://ecrats.org/ru/situation/status/6263

⁷ The CBSR was established in March 2015 to combat various types of crime and threats of terrorism. It reports to the Main Directorate for Control over National Territory , one of the key intelligence agencies of the kingdom.

⁸ http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/3313668

⁹ http://www.zakon.kz/4799985-e.karin.html

¹⁰ Ibidem.

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