The collapse of the monarchical regime in China in 1911-1912 was a significant event in world history. In Russian historiography in the 1970s and 1980s, issues related to the results of the revolutionary events of 1911, the degree of their predetermination, and the consequences for the future destinies of China were discussed for a long time and actively. In connection with the centenary of the Xinhai Revolution, it seems urgent to revisit these issues.

Keywords: China, monarchy, despotism, traditionalism, Confucianism, Qing Dynasty, opposition, nationalism, revolution.

A significant place in the development of Chinese statehood is occupied by the long history of Chinese monarchical structures, dating back more than 2,300 years, structures that survived to the beginning of the XX century. This story is far from unambiguous, complex, contradictory and many-sided. For a long time, Chinese empires dominated the East Asian region, spreading the influence of Chinese civilization to neighboring countries.

Chinese monarchs, who saw their empires as the "centers of the universe," interacted for centuries with numerous "barbarian" tribes and peoples, who often placed their "barbarian" rulers on the Chinese throne. It should be noted that both the Mongols (the Yuan Empire) who ruled in China, and then the Manchus (the Qing Empire), and the conquered Chinese clearly distinguished between "China proper" and "barbarian" parts of both empires that were not China. The thesis of Sun Yat-sen, proclaimed by him in the Declaration of the United Union on the eve of the Xinhai Revolution, is well known:

"What we now call the Manchus are descended from eastern barbarian tribes... Taking advantage of the turmoil in China, they invaded its borders, destroyed

our Chinese state, seized power and forced us, the Han Chinese, to become their slaves... China should be a state of the Chinese, and it should be ruled by the Chinese... " [Sun Yat-sen, 1985, p. 104].

As modern researchers (in particular, S. V. Dmitriev and S. L. Kuzmin) rightly believe, despite the recognition of the Yuan and Qing dynasties as legitimate by official Confucian historiography, neither the Mongols nor the Manchus were considered Chinese - unlike the ethnic groups that gave rise to the Chinese Huaxia community in ancient times (in the Shang-Yin and Zhou eras) [Dmitriev and Kuzmin, 2012, p. 17, 18]. However, China, as a rule not afraid of external invaders, considering it possible to digest them in its cultural "cauldron", has always been afraid of internal turmoil. And when it did arise, the Chinese changed the "mandate of Heaven", putting a new dynasty on the throne.

The reason for such a long existence of the monarchical regime in China seems to lie in the Confucian-traditionalist foundations that were laid in the foundation of Chinese monarchical structures, becoming their kind of ideological bond and accompanying their development without any fundamental changes in the monarchical foundations themselves (Perelomov, 2009). The dynastic crises that accompanied the history of the Chinese monarchical regime ended only with the appearance of another, new "correct" monarch. In other words, centrifugal tendencies were periodically replaced by centripetal ones, " chaos "was replaced by" order", but without any systemic changes in the Chinese monarchical structures.

However, over the centuries, the social experience of monarchical rule has stimulated the formation of civilizational stereotypes, behavioral foundations of Chinese society, which include ranking norms of behavior in accordance with Confucian principles (the formation of certain forms of social behavioral control), leveling the rights of the individual in relation to the interests of the community (state), hard work and law-abiding Chinese.

An important point that should be emphasized when studying the history of Chinese monarchical regimes is the strengthening of the state principle, purposeful building of the vertical of power in politics, economics and ideology. The trend of authoritarian, autocratic management of a huge mass of people is laid down in the Chinese tradition, which originates from Confucian-Traditionalist foundations. This control was carried out through the translation of power structures, through an extensive and carefully filtered bureaucratic apparatus that played a huge role in the interaction of the center and the periphery, between the emperor and his subjects, between the authorities and the opposition.

China's isolation was broken by the invasion of the West, which marked the beginning of the interaction of two heterogeneous civilizations: Chinese, Confucian-Traditionalist, and Western, dressed in capitalist-modernizing clothes. The invasion of the West meant the forcible inclusion of China in the global socio-economic and cultural process - a kind of globalization, carried out in the form of colonial and semi-colonial statuses. China failed to maintain its autonomous development line. The West imposed on China a new, more dynamic, modern (from the point of view of Europeans) model of development, which China was forced to painfully accept, digesting in the spirit of its traditionalist concepts. However, according to V. V. Malyavin, China was reluctant to adopt the social and economic forms of European Art Nouveau only because of urgent necessity [Malyavin, 2013, p. 107]. A complex process of interaction between traditional Chinese and Western principles began, which was expressed, in particular, not only in the confrontation, but also in the interaction of the principles of Western technicism and Chinese Confucian spirituality, Western analytical rationality and Chinese synthetic rationality, equality and hierarchy, revolutionism and evolutionism (striving for consensus), etc.

This process affected the monarchical regime in China, which was finally abolished in 1912. Naturally, it collapsed as a result of internal processes in the country's political life, but it would be wrong to deny the significant influence of the West on this major event in Chinese history. The world of ancient traditions was crumbling under the pressure of the age of change. The fact is that since the middle of the XIX century. The Qing Empire appeared to be in two dimensions - traditional and Western, capitalist. Moreover, the confrontation between these two principles at the beginning of the XX century became extremely acute - the traditional sinocentric system, i.e., the perception of China as the center of the universe, collapsed due to the collision of the Qing Empire with Western powers.

The Xinhai revolution was inevitable due to the crisis of the Qing monarchical regime and the significant development of centrifugal tendencies in the country's political life. Outwardly, everything seemed to resemble the traditional phase of the dynastic cycle, i.e. the need to renew power and change the dynasty:

1. The defeat of the Qing leaders in the confrontation with the powers, which ended with the signing of the humiliating "Final Protocol" on September 7, 1901, transformed China from a "hegemon country" into a semi-colony. This meant a "loss of face" - a sensitive moment for Chinese national psychology, which especially angered Chinese patriots and Great Han chauvinists. Chinese society increasingly blamed the Manchus, who were at the helm of power and allowed the humiliation of the Middle Empire by Western "barbarians".

2. After the Taiping movement, the ruling dynasty was known to be willing to allow a certain development of Chinese particularism in the Manchu-Chinese community. This led to the formation and development of a new Chinese military-bureaucratic elite, which played a significant role in the overthrow of the Qing.

3. Finally, a significant decline in the Qing intellectual component towards the end of their reign - a surprising pattern that accompanied the decline of almost every dynasty in China. The collapse of the Manchu dynasty was facilitated by the significant weakening of the Qing power vertical at the beginning of the 20th century, especially after the death of Empress Ci Xi and prominent Chinese imperial dignitaries Li Hongzhang and Zhang Zhidong and the active development of Chinese provincial military-bureaucratic enclaves. By undermining the personnel balance between the Manchus and the Chinese in the bureaucratic structure, especially in its power (military) and gubernatorial floors, the Qing themselves seemed to be approaching their collapse, stimulating Chinese nationalism in its anti-Manchu version.

Created in the spring of 1911. The Qing cabinet deepened the conflict with the provincial bureaucracy, which, in fact, found itself in the same camp with the anti-government opposition that had matured by this time, which was increasingly asserting itself by activating the people's "troubles", attempts by radical revolutionaries to overthrow the monarchy and proclaim a republic, and the desire of liberal Shenshi constitutionalists to establish a constitutional-monarchical regime in the country.

However, in 1901-1910. the spontaneous and scattered actions of the peasants and urban plebs, as well as the local uprisings of secret societies, were far from developing into a general Chinese peasant war, which overthrew dynasties in the past, and did not pose a direct threat to the Qing Dynasty. However, the dynasty had a new opponent-nationalist radicals who called China to the anti-Qin " axe " (Sun Yat-sen's Party) and set as their goal the violent overthrow of the foreign (Manchu) dynasty and the revival of China under Chinese rule under the republican regime. A characteristic feature was the desire of the Chinese revolutionaries to combine Western ideology with the postulates of Chinese traditionalism, i.e. to present a new, largely Western, Sinicized form. After all, Sun Yat-sen himself considered himself a disciple of Confucius and the Taiping leader Hong Xiuquan. Sun Yat-sen's dissident Westernism was clothed in Chinese traditionalist garb. In his socio-political and economic concepts, this was manifested in the postulates of priority

interests of the state, on the gradual nature of all transformations while maintaining authoritarian elements in the country's governance. To exaggerate the role of Chinese radicals (Sun Yat-sen and his supporters) in the overthrow of the Qing monarchical regime, which has long been characteristic of Russian historiography (see, for example: [History of China, 1974; New History of China, 1972]), in our opinion, should not be, but in the creation of a united anti-Qing front, they certainly are, played a very active role.

The anti-Qing opposition was heterogeneous. Simultaneously with the radical nationalists, a new political movement opposed to the Qing, the liberal - constitutional movement, which advocated the creation of a constitutional monarchy and tried to change the situation by peaceful means, became an important factor in the political life of China after the Yihetuan disaster. His supporters, and they can not deny their foresight, were afraid of the possibility of a period of "turmoil", i.e., political chaos and anarchy. In 1909-1911. Liberal Shengpi constitutionalists organized four petition campaigns demanding an urgent convocation of the Chinese parliament (Chudodeev, 1966). After the Qing began to attack the prerogatives and revenues of local authorities, disrupting the traditional balance between the center and the periphery, the provincial bureaucracy became increasingly inclined to support the anti-Qing opposition. Thus, a united front of the Chinese against the Manchus was formed, depriving the latter of all support within the country.

The creation of the Manchu Cabinet and the Huguang crisis ¹ showed that it was impossible to reach an agreement with the Manchus on a peaceful division of power. There was only a forceful option to eliminate the Qing (Manchu rulers) from the authorities. A crucial role in this process was played by the "new army" units and the Beiyang generals led by Yuan Shikai. According to O. E. Nepomnin, the Qing Dynasty could no longer oppose the United Front of the Chinese against the Manchus, the "triad" - the army, bureaucracy, and opposition [Nepomnin, 2011, p.104; Nepomnin, 2005, p. 558]. As a result of the pressure of the Chinese armed periphery on the central government, the Qing monarchy was overthrown. The despotic power dressed up in republican clothes, and the deposed six-year-old emperor was dismissed from power (but not executed, as was done with deposed monarchs in England, France and Russia), retaining his "honorary" title, imperial palaces and taking on state maintenance. Later, the Chinese authorities also attempted a soft "re-education" of the former emperor, not resorting to the scenario of a show trial and a harsh sentence, but forcing him to repent in his memoirs "The First Half of My Life"published in 1964. This makes us think once again about the historical roots of the CCP's attempts to force its opponents to go through a process of self-criticism and internal transformation, followed by a declaration of loyalty to the authorities.

So, the success of the Xinhai Revolution was reflected in the overthrow of the monarchical regime in China. The republic was perceived positively by the new Chinese elite, because to a certain extent it weakened the vertical of central power, which turned out to be in the hands of regional centers. But this success, according to the Japanese historian Yuzo Mizoguchi, became possible only after the political and moral betrayal of the Qing by Yuan Shikai and thanks to the persistence of Sun Yat-sen, who was ready to end the monarchy at any cost, without thinking about the negative consequences of transferring power to the same Yuan Shikai [Golovachev, 2012, p. 141].

¹ This crisis was related to the" Huguang loan " of 6 million f. st. issued to China on 20.05.1911 by banking groups in England, France, Germany and the United States for the construction of the Guangzhou-Hanhou and Hankou-Sichuan railways. Negotiations on the loan went on for several years in the face of intense competition between Western powers. Even before the conclusion of the loan agreement to Tsinskos, the government issued a decree on the nationalization of railways. This decree, which meant the de facto transfer of railways to foreign capital, and the agreement on the "Huguang loan" caused a massive anti-government and anti-foreign movement in the country, which resulted in the Wuchang Uprising of 1911.

Yuan Shikai is certainly one of the major political figures in China's new history. This figure was ambiguous. Yuan was a major military and political dignitary who emerged from the crucible of the Qing monarchical regime and played an important role in its overthrow. During the Xinhai Revolution, he was the most influential political force. His assessment with a minus sign, along with positive assessments of Sun Yat-sen, his political opponent and opponent, which has been characteristic of Russian historiography for many years [History of China..., 1974; New History of China, 1972], cannot be considered one hundred percent legitimate and objective. Yuan was a typical representative of his era and social circle, a typical conservative-traditionalist nationalist. It seems that it cannot be ruled out that his attempts to establish an authoritarian-dictatorial regime and even revive the monarchy in his person can also be considered as an attempt to cement the unity of the country, prevent "chaos" and establish "order". However, history, including Chinese history, shows that any violence, including revolutionary violence, leads to dictatorship. It is indisputable that Yuan Shikai wanted to see China as a strong power. He wasn't anyone's puppet. It is characteristic that views on the Yuan Shikai began to change in Chinese historiography as well [Staburova, 2012, p.117].

In the 1970s and 1980s, there was a long debate among Russian historians about the nature and outcome of the revolutionary events in the Xinhai period. Were they a bourgeois [New History of China, 1972, p. 526] or a bourgeois-democratic revolution [Efimov, 1959, p. 126], or just a coup of 1911-1912 that completed another dynastic cycle [Bokshchanin, Nepomnin, Stepugina, 2010, p. 480]? Did they end in victory [Meliksetov, 1976, p. 305-311] or defeat [Tikhvinsky, 1976, p. 189]? There was an opinion that the overthrow of Manchurian rule "did not become a bourgeois revolution" [Bokshchanin, Nepomnin, Stepugina, 2010, p.490]. The question was: was the Xinhai Revolution inevitable? It is characteristic that even today in China there are voices of intellectuals who believe that the revolution of 1911 was unnecessary. If for foreign scientists this question belongs to the sphere of hypothetical reasoning and speculative assumptions, then for China it is a very sensitive problem of the legitimacy of the current government. After all, if the" mistake " was the Xinhai Revolution, and China could develop evolutionarily, then the idea immediately arises that the revolution of 1949 was not historically inevitable.

From my point of view, the significant events of 1911-1912 can be considered a revolution that was bourgeois in nature. After all, the leaders of the anti-Qin movement in one way or another put forward slogans for democratizing the regime, constitutionalism, limiting despotic power, freedom of entrepreneurship, and protecting the internal market - i.e., those ideas that constitute bourgeois ideology and which, if implemented, would objectively contribute to the development of bourgeois relations. However, in the end, the Xinhai Revolution did not bring democracy, rapid economic development, or prosperity to Chinese society. Its social base was limited, because broad strata of the people, primarily the peasantry, remained quite inert to what was happening. This was one of the manifestations of the imbalance of various social processes that make up the necessary set of development of the country in line with modern trends that the capitalist West demonstrated to China. In this regard, we can agree with the opinion of a number of foreign and domestic political scientists about the incomplete nature of the Xinhai Revolution [Arincheva, Golovachev, 2013, p. 259-261]. Although this thesis may raise a number of rhetorical questions. In what way could it be considered complete? After the proclamation, and most importantly, the realization of bourgeois-democratic freedoms of Western constitutionalism? But China, as we know, is not the West...

Was the proclamation of a republican form of government (parliamentary republic) in China "looking ahead"? - a thesis that is proclaimed from time to time in Russian historiography. With this thesis [Nepomnin, 2011, p. 129], it would seem,

it is also easy to agree, especially since the fall of the Qing Dynasty formally renewed only the upper tier of despotic power. But doesn't this approach reflect elements of Eurocentrism? At the same time, it seems to me that such a statement of the question is not entirely legitimate, because it gives an assumed form of answer. But Chinese history has not decided otherwise. The overthrow of the Qing monarchy was a reaction of the Chinese military-bureaucratic regional leaders to the centralized vertical of Qing monarchical power. The overthrow of the Qing was perceived in China as a victory of the national revolution over the non-native Manchu "barbarians".

Attempts to re-establish a monarchical regime in China, even if only in a paraded and demonstrative form (like the revived Japanese monarchy in the Meiji period or monarchical structures in a number of Western European countries) - and such attempts are known to have been made twice - ultimately ended in failure. Monarchy in the Chinese version would mean dictatorship and the end of militaristic "freedom", which the rulers of militaristic cliques could no longer allow. The revival and elimination of the monarchical regime in part of the Chinese territory (in the northeast) was already taking place with the help of external force-first from Japan, then from the USSR.

However, the death of monarchical structures in Chinese political life continued until 1945, and their influence even in the republican era was reflected, for example, in the Bonapartist habits of Chiang Kai-shek or in the authoritarian rule of Mao Zedong. Even the modern Chinese historical consciousness still retains many images of the past, including stories about the former greatness of the imperial and monarchical formations of old China. In other words, the traditions laid down in the period of the existence of Chinese monarchical systems still manifest themselves today in various realities of modern China. It seems that the currently proclaimed idea of social harmony and "kinship with the people", building a middle-class society Xiao Kang, originating in traditional Confucian culture, combined with the concept of scientific development and the course for the great revival of the Chinese nation, is put forward as a national idea for the development of modern Chinese society. Many modern state services of the People's Republic of China, Taiwan (as an integral part of China), as well as some other countries of East and Southeast Asia are direct heirs of the political culture of the imperial era (221 BC-1911-1912).

The overthrow of the Qing monarchy and the transition to a republican form of government were the most important links in China's breakthrough into the modern world. Of course, the Xinhai events of 1911-1912 were complex, contradictory, and far from straightforward. On the one hand, they revived the destructive elements in the country's political life (the collapse of the state, civil wars, the confrontation of militaristic cliques), on the other hand, they marked a serious movement of China towards Westernizing principles and, more importantly, towards the modernization of a huge country. This process continues to this day.

Reflecting on the fate of modern China in connection with the analysis of the Xinhai events, we would like to hope that China has exhausted its time of revolutions, which, as history shows, lead to innumerable victims and catastrophic consequences.

list of literature

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Bokshchanin A. A., Nspomnin O. E., Stspugina T. V. History of China. Ancient, medieval, new age. M., 2010.

Golovachev, V. C., The Unfinished Revolution: A Review of the Ideological Legacy of Sun Yat-sen and His Era, Vostok (Oriens). 2012. № 3.

Dmitriev S. V., Kuzmin S. L. What is China? Sredinnoe gosudarstvo v istoricheskom mythe i real'noi politike [The Middle State in the Historical Myth and Real Politics]. 2012. № 3.

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Perelomov L. S. Confucius and Confucianism from antiquity to the present (V century BC-XXI century). Moscow, 2009.

Izuchenie Xinhai'skoi revolyutsii v Ukhane v kontekste sovremennogo Kitaia [Studying the Xinhai Revolution in Wuhan in the context of Modern China]. XLII scientific conference. Scientific notes of the China Department. Issue 6. Vol. 2. Moscow, 2012.

Sun Yat-sun. Selected works, Moscow, 1985.

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Chudodeev Yu. V. On the eve of the revolution of 1911 in China. Constitutional Movement of the Liberal bourgeois-landowner Opposition, Moscow, 1966.

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