Bruce S. Secularization: In Defence of an Unfashionable Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. - 243 p.

Ten years after the publication of his program work, "God is Dead: Secularization in the West," Steve Bruce returned to the topic of secularization, including in order to answer the objections that were raised against his theory. Actually, the polemical aspect of the work is of the greatest interest, since the theoretical part is not much different from what was presented in the book "God is Dead". This is still the same time-tested scheme that describes the movement from the Protestant Reformation through industrial capitalism to the secular state and liberal democracy, within which, in fact, "secularization in the West" takes place (the very process of secularization, if we try to describe it as briefly as possible, is that " ... individualism, diversity diversity and egalitarianism in the context of liberal democracy undermine the authority of religious beliefs... the social significance of religion declines, and it becomes a personal matter of the believer " 18).

However, it makes some sense to repeat what we have learned, since most of the objections to Bruce's theory of secularization are based on a misunderstanding or misinterpretation of this theory. For example, Bruce has to explain once again that "we never thought to discover some unchanging law of social development that applies to all societies; the paradigm of secularization is an attempt to explain some common features of the recent past of modern liberal democracies"19. Therefore, it is impossible to refute the theory of secularization by referring, for example, to the Islamic revolution in Iran: even if the political regime of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was secular, then Iranian society itself was anything but an industrial liberal democracy.

The same goes for "upgrading". For example, the theory of" multiple modernities", which opposes the theory of secularization, is based on the strange notion that "modernity" is what exists now (and therefore-since we see quite religious societies existing "here

18. Bruce S. God is Dead: Secularization in the West. Oxford, 2002. P. 30.

19. Bruce S. Secularization. Oxford, 2011. P. 3.

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and now" - modernization does not necessarily lead to secularization). Similarly, societies that are deeply archaic, such as those in Egypt or India, are often considered" modernized " on the basis of external signs (for example, in connection with positive reviews from Western government agencies and public organizations). So Bruce has to explain once again that "modern"does not mean" existing now"; the term implies certain characteristics, and some existing societies are completely modern, and some are not... "modernity" is not just a moment in time. " 20
Another inappropriate objection to the theory of secularization is that even in completely secular countries (such as the Netherlands or the Czech Republic), despite the apparent decline of traditional faiths, a significant percentage of the population continues to believe that "something" (a higher power, God, spirits, karma, etc.) exists. However, the theory of secularization does not imply that all members of a modernized secular society must necessarily become atheists. This theory speaks, firstly, of a decline in the social role of religion (when, as far as public life is concerned, religious rules and norms are completely replaced by purely technical procedures and criteria), and, secondly, of a decrease, so to speak, in the "intensity of religious life" at the level of individual believers (when on the one hand, too intense expression of religious feelings seems strange and causes misunderstanding among others, and on the other hand, believers, even if they remain such, spend less time, energy and resources on actions and activities that have a sacred meaning).

Bruce goes on to emphasize that secularization, while irreversible, is not uniform. A certain "deceleration" of the secularization process (which sometimes even creates the illusion that it has been reversed) occurs because, as secularization increases, opposition to it also increases, and various religious groups that were previously small and passive attract new supporters and become more active, as a threat to their traditional religious identity increases. their way of life and beliefs becomes more explicit and distinct (as J. V. Stalin used to say on quite a few occasions).

20. Ibid. P. 26.

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on another occasion, the class struggle becomes more acute as progress is made in building socialism). According to Bruce, this is just the case for the" Christian right "in the United States:" The combination of American culture becoming more liberal and conservative Protestants experiencing an increase in self-awareness was the basis for the rise of the "Christian right". " 21 On the other hand, Bruce shows that resource mobilization did not lead the right not a single more or less significant victory on the legislative level, and "they have failed even more in their attempts to reverse changes in the life preferences of ordinary Americans: after 1978, the percentage of mothers working outside the home full-time increased; divorce became more common; "life in sin" - so commonplace that the phrase itself has fallen out of use; women have become more involved in public life... homosexuality is so accepted by society that popular TV shows show gays and lesbians as positive characters. " 22 In other words, the trend towards secularization has persisted, despite all the attempts of the Christian right to expand it.

On the same general basis, Bruce responds to the critique of secularization theory by proponents of the "American exceptionalism" thesis. If the United States is exceptional in one way, it is that the process of secularization there is relatively slow (Bruce gives many explanations for this fact, such as: huge (compared to European countries) emigrant communities, for which religion in some cases is the most important element of self-identification; the lack of strict (such as in the United States of America) integration of religious Centralisation, which allows religious communities to create an "independent" educational system, etc.). Undoubtedly, the US remains more religious than Europe, but it is much less religious than it was 50 (or even more so 100) years ago. "First, there is clear evidence that Christianity in the United States is losing power, prestige, and popularity. Second, there is clear evidence that Christianity itself is becoming increasingly secular. Third, despite a certain influence of" right-wing Christians " in public life, they have not achieved any significant success in trying to reverse the trend that religion is becoming increasingly marginal

21. Bruce S. Op. cit. P. 169.

22. Ibid. P. 170.

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with regard to the functioning of the social system"23. Finally, Bruce responds to the criticism of the proponents of the "supply theory", according to which the greater the pluralism in religious life (i.e., the greater the religious "supply"), the greater the religious "demand", and vice versa (accordingly, from this point of view, secular Europe is now experiencing an abnormal situation caused by the abolition of pre-existing religious monopolies, after which, when religious pluralism becomes commonplace, as in the United States, the situation will change to the exact opposite). According to Bruce, proponents of this theory (in particular, R. Stark and R. Finke) manipulate statistical data: for example, "Land and his colleagues analyzed data for 700 counties and for a subset of counties that included the 150 cities that Finke and Stark studied; in all cases, they came to the opposite results... Land's team's conclusion: "It is religious monopoly, not pluralism, that fuels religious expansion... in addition, it is fueled by ethnic homogeneity " ... " 24. However, in addition to refuting "supply theory" based on new statistical research, Bruce draws attention to fairly obvious and well-known facts: "In the Western world, as a rule, the most homogeneous Catholic and Orthodox societies (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Ireland) are more religious than the more pluralistic Protestant ones (Britain, for example). Even if we take countries that are very similar in many ways, we will see that the more pluralism there is, the less religiosity there is."25
In connection with all this, I have only one question for the author. Bruce makes a very interesting observation, according to which the decline of Puritanism in the United States followed the growth of well-being of the population ("As long as they remained poor, their Puritanism helped them to come to terms with their poverty. Television was unacceptable because it carried Satanic messages - but most fundamentalists couldn't buy a television anyway... However, as TV sets became more accessible, attitudes towards television changed. Fashion items and personal jewelry were considered sinful, but things became different when Pentecostals were able to buy them. " 26 The last one-

23. Ibid. P. 158.

24. Ibid. P. 145.

25. Ibid. P. 146.

26. Ibid. P. 162.

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but, for the average citizen of modern Western (already post-industrial) society, who is quite well-fed, works a little and at a "dust-free" job, and is a qualified consumer, who is charged only and exclusively with consumption, religion (like any other "big narrative") should be indifferent (and even cause hostility, as something that hinders consumption). And as long as the average Western citizen can lead such a life, the process of secularization will undoubtedly continue. But what if - in the light of the ongoing economic crisis - liberal democracy is replaced by authoritarian regimes, social guarantees are abolished everywhere, the material well-being of the Western consumer disappears like smoke, and he finds himself in the role of a modest farmer, fisherman or worker, lost in the hostile world around him and without hope of help from the state - in these new conditions, will there be a return of religion? If in the course of an economic catastrophe there is a radical archaization of social relations, if most of the factors that caused secularization disappear, then won't the trend itself also disappear?

It is clear that my question is purely speculative. As for practical needs, i.e. describing Western (and partly Russian) society as it is "here and now", Steve Bruce's book will be very useful to any researcher, even those who do not accept the paradigm of secularization.

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