The article presents a comparative study of the philosophical strategies of modern deconstruction and one of the directions of Buddhist philosophy - madhyamika-prasangika. The author reveals the similarities and differences in the positions of Zh. Derrida and Nagarjuna as the most significant figures in these schools of philosophy. The general approaches are strategic criticism of language, the strategy of dismantling binary oppositions, the strategy of philosophical negativism and avoiding positive theses, and the strategy of self-deconstruction. Also revealed are the divergences of these two "philosophies at the limit".

Key words: deconstruction, Buddhist philosophy, ontology, madhyamika-prasangika, Derrida, Nagarjuna.

In 1974, a group of intellectuals associated with the magazine "Tel Quel" made a trip to China, which left R. Barth and Yu. Kristeva's impression of breaking into the familiar semiotic field: "It seems to me that one of the main functions - if not the most important - of the Chinese Revolution today is to introduce a gap ('there are others') in our universalizing concepts of man and history," Kristeva wrote [Cit. by: Gasparov, 1995, p. 64]. However, at the level of philosophy, Western and Eastern philosophies are not always so alien to each other.

Comparative comparison of Western and Eastern philosophy is primarily about identifying similarities as a basis for demonstrating universal positions and laying the foundations for mutual understanding. But in the case of philosophical deconstruction and Madhyamika as a branch of Buddhist philosophy, we are primarily talking about the commonality of ontological thinking strategies.

STRATEGIC LANGUAGE CRITICISM

A common strategy for deconstruction and madhyamika philosophy is to critique the language of philosophy. This strategy is important not only because it reveals the possibility of philosophizing in general (after all, philosophy functions primarily in the discursive space), but also because it raises the question of self-deconstruction (after all, deconstructors also use language and produce a discourse that can be considered philosophical). Fundamentally, the criticism of the language of philosophy for both discourses is not so much a meaningful burden (when they try to prove something or build their own language system), as it is a strategy for unfolding the philosophical discourse.

In the case of Derrida's philosophy, we find ourselves in a kind of critical-hermeneutical circle: when philosophers criticize metaphysical terms, they are doomed by them.-

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the whole metaphysics must be repeated over and over again: "Because... these concepts are not simple elements or atoms, but are included in a certain syntactic connection and in a certain system, so any particular borrowing leads to the entire metaphysics" [Derrida, 2000(2), p. 450]. However, we cannot completely discard these concepts: it is not a matter of replacing some words with other, "non-metaphysical" ones, but of deconstructing the logocentrism that underlies any metaphysics. Therefore, Derrida believes that in order "... to shake metaphysics, there is no point (italics Derrida - SM) to do without the concepts of metaphysics; we do not have such a language (such syntax and vocabulary) that would be alien to this story " [Derrida, 2000(2), p. 448].

In" Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Humanities, " Derrida identifies two ways in which one can critique metaphysical concepts: to engage in a systematic and rigorous examination of the history of these concepts, or to preserve, by pointing out the limitations everywhere, all the previous concepts as tools that may still be useful. In this case, metaphysical concepts seem to be under the sign of deletion, that is, they do not have any absolute meaning: "From now on, these tools are no longer given any dignity of truth, any strict meaning; on occasion, they can be abandoned if other tools suddenly appear." more convenient" [Derrida, 2000(2), pp. 453-454]. This instrumentalism applied in the field of philosophy forms an anti-metaphysical methodology, where it is supposed to be possible "to distance the method from the truth (italics by Derrida - S. M.), to distance the tools from the method and from the objective meanings that this method is aimed at revealing" [Derrida, 2000(2), p. 454].

The strategies of deconstruction and madhyamika are identical in this case, because for Buddhism, both philosophy and language act as a tool, a method (irua), and not as an extraterrestrial absolute truth (paramartha-satya). Since language is based on constructive thinking based on differences and dichotomies, it cannot express a non-dual reality, whereas philosophy, which is a discursive practice, thus obviously cannot claim absolute truth. But the approach to truth is made by indirect means that realize relative truth, and philosophy is just such a means, through cutting off false views, preparing the mind for yogic practice.

Derrida criticizes the traditional view of the sign. It demonstrates that the signifier and the signified in the sign do not coincide; the signified is never present, never present in the signifier, moreover, there is always a time gap between them: the signifier always precedes the signified. Therefore, the sign does not mean anything, or rather, it does not have a stable meaning, it is always postponed to the future and depends on the game of signifiers, on the context.

Madhyamika philosophers also oppose Buddhist essentialism from the point of view of criticizing the theory of language, demonstrating the conventionality of words and the absence of their "inner essence", essential properties (svalakshana). For example, Nagarjuna, the main representative of Madhyamika philosophy, denies both the identity and the difference between the sign and the signified:

"If both the sign and the signified were identical, then what is the sign is the same as the signified. If such an identity were possible, then saying the word "fire" would burn the mouth, but this does not happen. Further. Here [in this world], the use of words is established in all ways due to the difference between the doer and the deed, so they are both non-identical. Therefore, the notation is one thing, and the signified is another; there must be a difference. But due to the absence of a causal relationship between these two, this is not possible. The denoted exists only together with the notation" ("Mula-madhyamaka karika", introductory stanzas) [Androsov, 2006, p.224].

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If Derrida talks about the contextuality of meaning ("the context cannot be analyzed exhaustively; the context is open because 'it moves' [ça vieni], because there is always something to appear [il y a de l'avenir]. We must accept the concept of an unsaturated context and take into account both the context itself and its open structure, its non-closure, if we are going to make decisions and put them on the line - or give them away as collateral-without knowing, without being sure that it will be justified, that there will be a victory, etc. " [Derrida, Ferraris, 2001, p. 13]), then the commentator Nagarjuna Chandrakirti says that "any meaning of their [words] is acquired in the process of interdependence (paraspara peksa siddhih), where the meaning of one word depends on the network already used before" (Eckel, 1978, p. 335).

Thus, both Derrida and the Madhyamika philosophers deconstruct the concept of the sign, which is built on the opposition of the signifier and the signified by showing their interdependence. This lays the foundation for the deconstruction of any ontology, since they are based on a strict binary opposition, where one element claims the completeness of the ontological presence, and the other embodies the absence. Buddhist voidness and the différence of deconstructivism demonstrate a double gesture of difference-the identification of cause and effect, sign and referent, etc., which eliminates the possibility of any hierarchy and essentialism.

Nagarjuna speaks of dependent origination both on the ontological level and in relation to discourse. "If the designation and the signified were strictly established, then the concepts of "termination" and others would also be strictly established. But this is unacceptable. Why is that? Because then the notation and the signified would be established either as identity or as non-identity. But these two judgments are unacceptable" ("Mula-madhyamaka karika", introductory stanzas) [Androsov, 2006, p. 224]. We encounter this state of affairs both in deconstruction and in general in post-structuralist concepts of the sign, starting with the concept of the" floating signifier " by J. Lacan.

One of the principal points of possible divergence between deconstruction and Madhyamika philosophy is the" object " of deconstruction. In both cases, language is involved in deconstructivist practices, and it is the conceptual apparatus of traditional philosophy that is subject to deconstruction. But for Derrida, "non-textual reality does not exist at all" [Derrida, 2000(1), p. 313], so all the work is contained in language, while for Madhyamika it is precisely this position of reducing the world to what makes it possible to see language in it that needs deconstruction. This is reflected primarily in the fact that philosophy for Buddhism is only a temporary means on the path to truth, but not in any case a topos of truth. Therefore, reality as it is is comprehensible primarily by yogic intuition, and not by linguistic logical chains.

At the same time, it should be noted that deconstructing a language does not in any way imply abandoning it. Nagarjuna, with his deconstructivist dialectic, shows that the concepts of metaphysics are empty, but they are quite usable. Emptiness here means understanding the interdependent, non-self-existent nature of the existence of these concepts.

Language represents reality, the floating signifier glides on the surface, being empty of the transcendent signified. However, as in the case of a floating signifier, language emptiness is not meaningless, since it is effective (including to demonstrate its own emptiness with the help of language arguments). As V. G. Lysenko notes, " effective language practice within the limits of empirical reality is not only not canceled by emptiness, but, on the contrary, is possible only if it is allowed. Language fulfills its communicative function precisely because words themselves are empty and are filled with content depending on the communicative situation" [Lysenko, 2011, p. 824].

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Nagarjuna's treatment of the transcendental true reality as inextricably linked to the existence of samsara brings us back to the deconstructivist critique of teleology, in which the transcendental goal is the ultimate organizing principle. For Nagarjuna, language is the embodiment of samsara, and it conceals, by means of the constructs that underlie it, the true reality. But since "samsara is nirvana", "there is no reliance on the ordinary meaning (vyavahara)". / Not to comprehend the highest (absolute) meaning | / Without gaining absolute meaning | It is impossible to achieve the cessation of the series of births (nirvana)" (Mula-madhyamaka karika, XXIV, 10) [Androsov, 2006, p.414].

STRATEGY FOR DISMANTLING BINARY OPPOSITIONS

One of the leading philosophical strategies for Derrida is the explication of binary oppositions that are traditional for Western metaphysical thinking, for example: speech / writing, masculine / feminine, true / false, transcendental / empirical, signified / signified, and overcoming them. At the same time, metaphysics gives the status of superiority to the first (left) term over the second (right) term, which is considered "as a complication, negation, manifestation or collapse of the first" (Culler, 1982, p.93). From Derrida's point of view, such hierarchical oppositions are the essence of logocentrism, which he deconstructs. Deconstruction seeks to undermine oppositions by equalizing them in rights and viewing them as the effect of a fundamental distinction. As Derrida points out, " deconstructing the opposition means first upsetting the hierarchy at a certain point. To neglect this phase of reversal is to lose sight of the conflicting and subordinating structure of the opposition" [Derrida, 2007(2), p. 50].

The goal here is not just to change the positions of oppositions, but to destroy any centralization in the whole, to cancel the opposition. For this purpose, a deconstructive term is introduced (for example, dissemination, scattering) or one of the elements of the opposition is deconstructed (for example, an arch-letter), which makes a shift that destroys the self-closure of the opposition and leads to semantic drift.

This deconstruction of oppositions is associated not so much with the depravity of binarism as with the rigid schematism underlying metaphysical philosophizing. Therefore, the resulting figure, the deconstructivist tetrapharmacon, cannot be considered as adding another level (n+1) that removes contradictions, as, for example, in dialectics. "Dissemination shifts (italics by Derrida - S. M.) the troika of ontology at the angle of a certain bend... The openness of the square, the addition of a four (not a cross and not a closed square), an excess or lack that removes dissemination from polysemy "[Derrida, 2007(1), pp. 36-37].

In Madhyamika, it is precisely binarism that is criticized as the basis of constructive thinking, which introduces artificial separation where the natural is interconnected. Buddhist philosophy generally promotes the understanding of non-duality as the basis for seeing reality as it is. The duality of subject and object, Self and others, even samsara and nirvana is illusory, and it is this duality that makes us differentiate our feelings and desires in relation to oppositions, but in reality we cannot separate them. Therefore, in order to foster an adequate ethical position in Buddhist philosophy, especially in Chittamatra and Madhyamika, efforts are being made to realize the emptiness of any ideas about duality in the context of developing universal compassion.

Nagarjuna's" deconstructivist formula "is the" tetralemma " (catuşkoti). Nagarjuna's critique of dogmatic constructions in the Mula-madhyamaka karika follows a path similar to the analysis of the antinomies of pure reason in Kant's transcendental dialectic, with the only difference being that there are not two alternatives (A and non-A),

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a four (A, no-A, A and no-A, neither A nor no-A). In this sense, Nagarjuna goes even further than Derrida, who, thinking in the context of the Western tradition, aims to shake triadicity (which in turn prevails over unity and binarity) and sees the quaternary, the tetrapharmacon, as a hacking tool. For Nagarjuna, the antinomian nature of the tetralemma is, more radically, a means of suppressing any attempts to build philosophical and dogmatic judgments. That is, we can say that Derrida denotes the intersection of roads and goes along all roads (in opposite directions) at the same time, and Nagarjuna shows the dead end of all four paths as the impossibility of any additional loophole for a logically thinking mind.

THE STRATEGY OF PHILOSOPHICAL NEGATIVISM AND AVOIDING POSITIVE THESES

In the" margins "of the" Letter and Distinction " text, Derrida states:"...You must first use the "negative method": the choice of a certain word is primarily a set - of course, structural - of exceptions. To find out why they say "structure", you need to know why there is a desire to no longer say eidos, "essence", "form" ... and so on. You need to understand why each of these words has found its own insufficiency and why the concept of structure still borrows some hidden meaning from them, allowing them to nest in the language. to myself" [Derrida, 2000(2), p. 47].

This strategy serves to liberate terms from the yoke of metaphysics. Derrida compares this strategy to apophatic theology: "It has already been necessary to point out that distinction is not, does not exist, is not being-present (on), whatever the latter may be; and we must therefore point out everything that this distinction is not, in other words, everything; and, consequently, emphasize that distinction does not have either no existence, no entity. It does not depend on any category of being, whether present or absent" [Derrida, 1999, p. 173].

However, this similarity with apophatic theology is not complete. What is the difference between negative philosophy like madhyamika and deconstruction and apophaticism? Paradoxically, compared to the deconstruction and philosophy of Madhyamika-prasangika, apophatic theology turns out to be "affirming", because, despite the prohibition of positive statements, it always implies One (even if there is One under the veil of silence) about which these statements are impossible, and in this sense God is like a black hole that is not visible, since it absorbs light, but bends the surrounding space. Deconstruction and madhyamika, on the other hand, undermine the very possibility of such an exclusive ontological place, be it the metaphysics of total presence or the metaphysics of total absence.

In the Madhyamik discourse, negation plays a leading role. Nagarjuna already begins the opening stanzas of the Mula-Madhyamaka Karika with the negation: "There is no cessation, no arising, no annihilation, no eternity, no uniqueness, no multiplicity, no arrival, no departure" (Androsov, 2006, p.220). For Nagarjuna, this negativity is a logical method of overcoming attachment to the existence of separate entities and concepts such as Self, causality, etc. In the auto-commentary Akutobhaya, he explains that the erroneous perception of the existence of separate isolated objects and entities should be corrected by understanding their interdependent or interdependent origin (pratityasamutpa;da), and then the true state of affairs appears as "the absence of cessation and emergence, annihilation and eternity, uniqueness and multiplicity, arrival and departure" [Androsov, 2006, p. 220].

The absence of cessation, as Nagarjuna explains, comes first here in order to avoid nihilistic conclusions, it presupposes an internal correlation with the absence of occurrence, since everything that has arisen separately from the point of view of the individual is considered to be non-existent.

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erroneous perception ceases. "If there is no cessation, then one cannot affirm the existence of a self-existing object of thought (svabhva), and if there is no arising, then the existence of a self-existing one (svabhva). unprovable, for how can there be a non-arising?" The negation of this creates a positive field of meaning in madhyamika. As Nagarjuna puts it, " It is certain that ever, anywhere | And any existences may arise | From ourselves, from another existence, | From both existences or without reason" (Mula-madhyamaka Karika, I, 1) [Androsov, 2006, p. 228].

Thus voidness is established (sūnyatā). phenomena from independent independent, from the causes and conditions of being. The emptiness of self-existence does not indicate a vacuum or a substantial emptiness, but a complex network of causal interweavings established by the doctrine of dependent origination (pratitya-samutpada).

The most effective strategy of philosophizing, which brings deconstruction and madhyamika closer together, is to avoid tethyism, i.e., from putting forward theses. In the case of deconstruction, we are dealing with avoiding "one of the main goals of what is called "deconstruction" in the texts is precisely the delimitation of ontology, and first of all-this third person of the present indicative mood: S est P" [Derrida, 1992, p.56]. This deliberate strategy arises not from the fear of being caught at your word, but from an understanding of the fundamental ambiguity and relativity of language and meaning, which makes it illusory to try to grasp meaning in a simple statement.

But as a side effect of this strategy, we are confronted, in fact, with the invulnerability of the positions of madhyamika and deconstruction: "If any thesis was put forward by me, | Then this mistake would also be mine. / However, I do not put forward a thesis | And that is why I am not mistaken" (Vigraha-Vyavartani, 29) [Androsov, 2000, p. 311]. Thus, the task of madhyamika is not to defend any position, but to sober up the mind, because if the mind has grasped the emptiness of everything, then it no longer needs any polemic, which is essential only at the level of relative truth: "Understand, if all existences are empty, completely peaceful and pure in nature, then is a thesis really necessary? Is it necessary to take into account the feature of the thesis? And is it really necessary to pay attention to the error caused by the assumption of a particular thesis? "(Vigraha-Vyavartani, 29) [Androsov, 2000, p. 311].

SELF-CONSTRUCTION STRATEGY

Derrida starts self-construction through the concepts of "double writing", "double gesture"," double game","double science". In a double game, the deconstructor acts as a double agent who pretends to obey the rules (reason, philosophy, language), while simultaneously setting up a trap, turning these rules against them1. As noted by V. According to Descombes, "Derrida himself considers himself to be playing a double game, bad in his intentions, but perfect in his strikes" [Descombes, 2000, p. 136].

A simple critique of reason does not interrupt the "sleep of reason", since such a denial is a new level of affirmation: by criticizing the unreasonableness of reason, we strengthen rationality. Therefore, the deconstructivist does not just need to strike while pretending to be an accomplice, but a whole simulation network is needed: "If a traitor pretends to kill a tyrant, then the crime is not committed; but if he pretends to kill a tyrant, then the crime is not committed.-

1 Following Derrida's analogy with language ("is it even possible to pretend to speak a particular language?"), one might ask: is it even possible to pretend to play by the rules of reason without being reasonable [Derrida, 2000(2), p. 138]? That is, a successful strategy requires a simulacrum of the mind that is "smarter than the mind itself", go with the mind to the end and a little further.

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if he pretends that he is pretending, then he really kills, and behind the comedian there is a murderer " [Decomb, 2000, p. 134].

A double game is possible only because language is fundamentally dual: "Philosophical language belongs to the system of language (s). Because of this non-speculative relationship, a certain ambiguity is always introduced into philosophical language. Since it is innate and inseparable, it is necessary, perhaps, for philosophy to accept this ambiguity, to think about it and in it, to accept the duality and difference in speculation, in the very purity of philosophical meaning " [Derrida, 2000(2), p. 173]. At the same time, it is not only dual (at the level of irreducible meanings, semantic and rhetorical [de Man, 1999], etc.), but also hides its duality, hiding behind, apparently, one meaning - "common sense", which sees the good only in the good, believes the true to be completely true, etc. It is precisely on this duality that Derrida builds a double science: the duality, ambiguity of the text allows us to see its double behind metaphysical discourse, which is different, but inseparable from the first.

At the same time, for Derrida, a double game is also a double gesture, when the same gesture produces two opposite actions, which itself undermines the dominance of logocentrism based on logic. Such a double gesture, for example, he demonstrates in the case of the scene of writing in Freud, where in order to write, it is necessary to simultaneously erase (displace) what is written [Derrida, 2000(2), pp. 354-364]. And Derrida applies a similar erasure-displacement to the very scene of writing in Freud, turning against him his own metaphors of writing, as if crossing out the obvious conclusions from his text.

Derrida himself insisted that writing doesn't really want to say anything, and that's how it differs from speech. This is how writing forms the fabric of the text, allowing us to resist logocentrism: "To risk saying nothing-not wanting to say anything-is to enter into a game, and above all into a game of differentiation, which makes it so that no word, no concept, no important thesis claims to be summed up and organized on the basis of theological content." the presence of the center, the movement of differences and their placement in the text "[Derrida, 2007(2), pp. 22-23]. As V. Descombes notes, " the deconstruction strategy (italics by Descombes - S. M.) is a trick that allows you to speak just at the very moment when "in the end" there is nothing to say, since the absolute discourse is perfect " [Descombes, 2000, pp. 133-134].

Tempted by the hacking power of deconstruction, the reader often wonders if deconstruction cannot be deconstructed. Is the discourse of deconstruction itself free from the elements of logocentrism that it finds in the philosophical tradition? The same question naturally arises in relation to madhyamika discourse 2: an example is given of a person who, when saying "shut up!", simultaneously prohibits speech, but speaks himself. In deconstruction, however, we find ourselves in the situation of criticizing metaphysics as a field of activity of reason by means of reason itself. In this situation, Nagarjuna and Derrida have different strategies for avoiding the impact of the "auto-construction". Nagarjuna's thesis of voidness is also empty of self-existence, but it is not devoid of the dimension of truth, just as ghosts (or, for the modern reader, movie characters) may argue, but they will be empty of self - existence. Morpheus from The Matrix speaks of the illusory nature of reality, but he is no less illusory.

The problem with madhyamika critics is that they perceive this philosophy as a thesis about attributing the property of voidness to everything real. However, the point is that emptiness is not a property: "Emptiness is not a quality or a universal

2 It is interesting that these philosophies are not only trying to reverse-engineer, but also cross-deconstruct each other (Loy, 1987; Shi (Xiong-Yuan Hsu), 2010).

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a property of an entity, because in this case its foundation would not be empty, and it would be possible to have fixed beliefs about it (drsti). In reality, it is just a medicine, a means to avoid any fixed beliefs... This is not a position in the full sense of the word, but simply a deviation from any views and mental constructions" (Chandrakirti, Prasannapada, 12) [Large Sutra..., 1975, p. 144, n. 4].

This leads to the fact that the madhyamik and his opponent find themselves at different levels of discourse: for the opponent, the discourse has a certain ("self-existing") meaning, and for the madhyamik, the discourse is empty of self-existence (which does not prevent it from being meaningful in its own way). The opponent makes a seemingly fair accusation: "Your utterance, being without self-existence, cannot deny self-existence." (Vigraha-Vyavartani, 1) [Androsov, 2000, p. 302]. To which Nagarjuna replies: "My utterance, due to its interdependent origin, is devoid of self-essence, but due to its lack of self-essence, it is empty and reliable" (Vigraha-Vyavartani, 22) [Androsov, 2000, p.304]. Thus, the conditionality, dependence of any utterance already indicates its emptiness, and thus proves the content of Nagarjuna's utterance. It is significant that, despite the emptiness of the discourse, Nagarjuna applies to it the characteristics of "true" (for Magyamiki) and "wrong" (for the opponent), i.e. emptiness does not mean that the statements are meaningless.

As Tsai Tsung-chi points out, Derrida and Madhyamiki have different ways of self-deconstruction: "While Derrida presents it as an arbitrary displacement, they [Madhyamiki] treat it as a clearly directed operation leading to ultimate rest, if you will, beyond language and conceptuality" (Cai, 1993,p. 4). p. 192].

In both cases, there is a critical rethinking of not only the philosophical tradition, but also the very foundations of philosophizing, which can be called the existence of philosophy at the limit, or, in a certain sense, non-philosophy [Cai, 1993, p.194-195]. However, the" limit " of philosophy is different here. In Derrida's case, there is no question of the "end of philosophy", no matter how it looks from the outside. In an interview, Derrida says bluntly:: "I am not one of those who say that the philosophy is finished. Even when I talk about closing logocentrism and closing metaphysics, I distinguish between closing and ending: I believe that the conclusion that philosophy has reached its end, has outlived its usefulness, is very dangerous, and I would refrain from it" [Mortley, 1991, p. 106]. Derrida emphasizes: "I try to stay close to the boundaries of philosophical discourse. I say "borders" and not "deaths", because I do not believe in what is commonly called the death of philosophy today "[Derrida, 2007(2), p. 14]. Indeed, his texts are not at all non-philosophical or meaningless, if we accept his position that meaning should not be dogmatic and logical.

In the case of Nagarjuna, however, as is true of all Buddhism in general, philosophy is always only a means to understand reality, a means that must be discarded at a certain point, since it is nothing more than a relative truth and cannot serve to see reality as it is, which is possible only with the help of a certain amount of knowledge. through intuitive insight.

list of literature

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Androsov, V. P., Nagarjuna's Teaching about Sredinnost', Issled. and translated from Skt. Mula-madhyamaka karika); translated from Tib." Interpretation of the Root Stanzas on the Middle Ground, [called] Fearless [refutation of dogmatic views]" ("Mula-madhyamaka-vritti Akutobhaya"). Moscow: East Lit., 2006.

Gasparov B. In search of the "other". French and East European semiotics at the turn of the 1970s / / New Literary Review. 1995. N 14.

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Descombes V. Modern French Philosophy, Moscow: Vse Mir Publ., 2000.
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Derrida Zh. Distinguishing features // Derrida J. Voice and phenomenon. St. Petersburg: Aleteya Publ., 1999.

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Man P. de. Allegories of Reading: the figurative language of Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust. Yekaterinburg: Ural State University Publ., 1999.

Cai Zong-qi. Dеrrida and Madhyamika Buddhism: From Linguistic Deconstruction to Criticism of Ontothеologiеs // International Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. XXXIII. No. 2. Issue No. 130 (June 1993).

Culler J. On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism. Ithaca New York: Cornell University Press, 1982.

Derrida J., Ferraris M. A Taste for the Secret. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001.

Eckel M. D. Bhavaviveka and the Early Madhyamika Theories of Language // Philosophy East and West. 1978. N28.

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Loy D. The Cloture of Deconstruction: A Mahāyāna Critique of Dеrrida // International Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. XXVII. No. I. Issue No. 105 (March 1987).

Mortley R. French Philosophers in Conversation: Levinas, Schneider, Serres, Irigaray, Le Doeuff, Derrida. London New York: Routledge, 1991.

Shi Ruyuan (Chien-Yuan Hsu). The Deconstructionist. Interpretation of Nāgārjuna's. Catuskoti // Satyab-hisamaya: A Buddhist Studies Quarterly = N54. 2010 September, 25 (http://еnlight.lib.ntu.еdu.tw/ FULLTEXT/JR-BM054/bm054137877.pdf).

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