n the seventies of the last century, under the wise leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese economy opened up to the world, and since then, China has grown in unprecedented strength, accumulated wealth and military power, maintaining friendly relations and cooperating with most states. This continued until recently, when Beijing appeared to change course, antagonizing its neighbors and arousing suspicion in far-flung countries. For example, in December 2009, at the UN climate Change Conference, the Chinese struggled to resist the adoption of a compromise resolution, which angered European countries and the United States. Then, after the sale of American weapons to Taiwan in January 2010, the Chinese government suspended serious security dialogue with the United States for the first time and imposed unprecedented sanctions on companies with ties to Taiwan (although it is not clear whether these measures caused significant damage). In July 2012 Beijing has protested angrily against plans by the United States and South Korea to hold joint naval exercises in the Yellow Sea. And in September 2010, he harshly criticized Japan for detaining the captain of a Chinese fishing schooner that crashed into a Japanese coast Guard vessel in disputed waters. To make matters worse, Beijing has expressed extreme hostility to democratic countries and imposed economic sanctions on Norway after the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to pro-democracy activist Liu Xiaobo. In just a few months, China will win-

Robert Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College and a professor at the John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University. Author of the book "Chinese Security Policy: Structure, Power, and Politics". Published in Foreign Affairs Magazine, N5, 2012. © Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

I rushed to completely lose everything that I had gained during the long years of my "peaceful ascent".

Many analysts interpreted China's belligerent actions as a sign of growing self-confidence. In an article for The Washington Post, John Pomfret noted that Beijing is showing a " new triumphalist attitude." His logic was that China was on the rise, and the newfound strength had convinced the nation's leaders that they could influence what was happening in Asia more than ever before. And in 2010, the Obama administration initiated a new foreign policy course, the essence of which is to turn to Asia, strengthen defense alliances with various countries in the region and increase the presence of American naval forces in the corresponding waters. The diplomatic element of the new strategy became clear in 2011, when Defense Secretary Leon Panetta assured allies alarmed by China's rise that "the United States is going to stay in the Pacific for a long time." A year later, he promised that the United States would " build up its military capabilities in this vital region." Concerned that a self-confident China is becoming a destabilizing force, the White House decided to debunk speculation about its own weakness by increasing the American presence.

However, unfortunately, this course was dictated by a deeply erroneous interpretation of the motives of the Chinese leadership. Beijing's tough diplomacy stemmed not from confidence in its own power (China's leaders are well aware that the Chinese military is still significantly inferior to the American one), but from a deep and painful awareness of its own vulnerability after years of financial crisis and public unrest. Faced with these challenges, and realizing that they can no longer count on continued impressive economic growth, China's leaders decided to strengthen their legitimacy among the broad masses and appease the nationalist public with symbolic power gestures.

One has only to look at China's behavior in this light, and the dangers of the "Asian turn" become obvious. The new US policy will only increase the sense of vulnerability, which is completely unnecessary, since it feeds China's aggressiveness, undermines stability in the region and reduces the opportunities for cooperation between Beijing and Washington. Instead of overestimating China's strength and moving away from a policy of diplomatic engagement, the United States should recognize China's underlying weakness and stop belittling its own strengths. A proper Chinese policy should

not to exploit Beijing's anxieties, but to reassure them, but to protect American interests.

THE PAPER TIGER ROARS

The decision to turn its policy toward Asia was based on the premise that an emboldened China challenges Washington's interests and undermines stability in the region, meaning that its growing military power allows Beijing to conduct aggressive diplomacy and makes it more attractive than in the past. In a speech to the US Congress in March 2010, Admiral Robert Willard, then head of the Armed Forces ' Pacific Command, argued that China's recent military attacks were "quite dramatic." But the United States is overestimating China's military capabilities. Although the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) it made a breakthrough after 1979, when it looked extremely unconvincing in the short war with Vietnam, and its capabilities remain limited. Over the past 10 years, the PLA has not deployed new ships or aircraft that would significantly increase its ability to undermine US naval superiority. The main tool for countering the US Navy and deterring the intervention of the United States in Asian conflicts remains a fleet of diesel submarines, which have been in service since the mid-1990s.

Despite all the talk of modernizing the Navy, the PLA has just begun construction of a new-generation cruise missile destroyer, but it is no match for the American Aegis-class cruisers. The US Army has 11 aircraft carriers, and Beijing only launched its first ship in August 2011 - an old and relatively small ship purchased in Russia. China is developing anti-ship ballistic missiles capable of hitting American aircraft carriers, but has not yet mastered the technology needed to deploy these weapons. And, according to the Pentagon's own 2011 report, less than 30% of the PLA's naval, air and air defense forces can be considered modern, and only 55% of the submarine fleet. In short, the PLA is still unable to counter US naval dominance or disrupt the balance of power in the region.

In the past few years, the PRC has had to think not only about the shortcomings of its military equipment. In late 2008, when China's leaders acknowledged that their country was vulnerable to financial shocks rocking the global economy, Beijing panicked, fearing a sharp rebound.

rising unemployment, and hastily allocated a stimulus package of 4 trillion yuan (about $ 570 billion). But this only worsened the situation, causing short-term destabilization and long-term structural distortions.

As a result, in 2009-2010. China has experienced the biggest economic shake-up since Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward in the 1960s. Inflation rose more than 10-fold, and in February 2010, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao acknowledged that its acceleration caused by the stimulus package could " undermine the stability of society." In 2009, housing prices in major cities exceeded the average monthly income of the middle class by 20-30% - a difference significantly larger than the World Bank predicted. Meanwhile, in an attempt to reduce the volume of loans issued, the Central Bank of China has repeatedly increased the amount of mandatory capital reserves for banks. Nevertheless, inflation continued to rise like a comp. According to a June 2010 survey, about 60% of Chinese consider prices " unacceptably high." Since last year, vegetables have risen in price by about 25%, garlic-by 10 times, and tea-by 20%.

High inflation has begun to affect living standards, unemployment has increased, and inequality has worsened: in 2009, urban employment was the lowest since 1980. The government was particularly concerned that unemployed college graduates would become a source of unrest. More than 7 million graduates were unemployed in 2009, so the government invested $ 42 billion in the project. RMB (about $ 6 billion) in the employment of rural residents. In May 2010, even the state - run People's Daily newspaper found the situation troubling, publishing an editorial titled" The income gap is getting too dangerous." The article presents statistics from the World Bank, according to which the income inequality index of Chinese citizens is one of the highest in the world. Reflecting the concern of the country's leadership about the prospect of mass discontent and anti-government protests, the newspaper warned that inequality could "create a very negative attitude towards the rich" and "the alarm bell is already ringing." The authors continued: "Beijing cannot and should not ignore this."

Unemployment and inequality have created the unrest that Beijing feared. According to Chinese government statistics, the number of "mass demonstrations" - that is, illegal protests by five or more people who violate public order-has increased from 120,000 in 2008 to over 180,000 in 2010. In 2009, during the rebellion in Shishu (Provin-

(Hubei) police were confronted by 70 thousand people. The state-run research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences described the incident as "the most serious street riot" since 1949. Sociologists of the Academy argued that the increase in crime, violence and riots in 2009 was due to unemployment among the rural population and the emergence of a large number of idle marginal elements. And in 2010 Guo Bingsheng, senior editor of the official Xinhua news Agency, warned that China was entering a period of "intense social conflict" and "the task of maintaining stability will be very difficult and difficult to achieve." Faced with a growing wave of popular protests and a real crisis of legitimacy, Beijing has found it the only sensible tactic to indulge towering nationalists eager to see China project hard power in the world.

RED DAWN

The Chinese Communist Party has long nurtured nationalism to maintain its legitimacy, but in recent decades the public has focused more on the success of economic development than on politics. But when the global financial crisis hit in 2008, Beijing could no longer rely on economic growth. Meanwhile, nationalism was on the rise. Although senior party officials understood the weaknesses of the national economy, many Chinese still believed that the financial crisis was the culmination of China's rise to great power. In 2008 and 2009, when the US was in recession, the Chinese economy grew by 10% a year. Trumpeting the success of the NO-AK, the fight against piracy, the space program and the testing of modern military aircraft, the Chinese leadership is trying to convince the public that China is catching up with the United States, and therefore should pursue a more confident foreign policy.

After the announcement of the sale of US weapons to Taiwan in January 2010, Chinese opinion leaders and Internet users began to demand sanctions against the relevant US companies. Admiral Yang Yi, former director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the PLA National Defense University, called for "showing the American government that when you harm others, you harm yourself." Similarly, Major General Luo Yuan, Deputy Secretary General of the Chinese Military Science Society, argued that it was time to "settle scores" with Washington. Some Chinese Internet users on the People's Daily and QQ-po websites-

a popular instant messaging program-quickly picked up the call, demanding to cut off diplomatic ties with the United States and start exporting weapons to Iran, North Korea and Pakistan.

In September 2010, the most frequent search query on the Chinese Internet was a dispute between Beijing and Tokyo over the detention of the captain of a fishing schooner. The incident angered the Chinese public, and Internet portals were flooded with demands for the Japanese side to release the captain immediately and without any preconditions. Feng Zhaokui, chief specialist for Japan at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said:: "The time has passed when China could be bullied." Despite the state's attempts to calm the activists, calls for protests circulated on the Internet, igniting spontaneous demonstrations not only in front of the Japanese embassy, but also in front of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The rise of nationalist sentiment and the growth of economic and political problems that plague the population forced the country's leadership, concerned about the party's position in society and fearing popular unrest, to appease the nationalists with harsh rhetoric and diplomacy. The result is Beijing's uncompromising position in 2009-2010, which turned against it not only neighboring countries, but also states around the world. This new diplomacy has raised alarm bells in East Asia in the context of China's rise, which in turn has led the United States to strongly focus on maintaining the balance of power.

END OF INTERACTION

Some aspects of President Barack Obama's Asia strategy draw on the policies of previous administrations. Since 1997, when a submarine from Europe was first moved to Guam, Washington has devoted more resources to this region. The Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations deployed all types of major naval and air systems to Guam and Japan, worked with Singapore to establish an aircraft carrier base at Changi Port, and increased defense cooperation with Japan and the Philippines. The Bush administration allocated an additional aircraft carrier to the Pacific theater of operations, and in 2005, the U.S. Navy approved a new carrier. The Pentagon announced the deployment of 60% of all American submarines in Asia. Despite the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, funding for the Pacific theater of operations remained high.

This was an effective response to the strengthening of China. But after China took an uncompromising stance in 2009 and 2010, Washington had to prove to its East Asian allies that it was trustworthy. These countries doubted that the United States, mired in the deepest crisis since the Great Depression, would be able to stand up to an outwardly more confident and capable China. Mostly to overcome these fears, the United States has taken it upon itself to prove that it can maintain the balance of power in the region.

The Obama administration's interpretation of the Asian turn suggested a doubling of efforts compared to those made by previous governments. Washington has expanded joint naval exercises with Japan to prepare for the defense of disputed islands, signed new arms sales agreements to the Philippines, and most recently, in April 2012, agreed to send Marines to Australia. The White House also restored defense cooperation with Indonesia and New Zealand.

The targeted policy demonstrated to the allies Washington's commitment to maintaining stability in the region.

But the current administration has abandoned its previous policy of engaging with Beijing in favor of costly initiatives that are clearly out of proportion to the threats posed by China. As for the disputes over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, past administrations have managed to deter regional powers from aggressive actions by making it clear that the United States is interested in preserving freedom of navigation. However, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has drawn the United States into these legally complex disputes. In July 2010, in Hanoi, after extensive consultations with all but China, the contenders for the disputed islands, Clinton announced that the United States supports the negotiating positions of the Philippines and Vietnam. This decision is all the more puzzling because these territories are not of great economic value (except for fishing), and they do not have mineral reserves. Their strategic importance is also small, as they are too small to support military operations.

The United States has also unnecessarily challenged Beijing by starting to build up its military presence in mainland East Asia. Realizing that the South Korean army did not need increased U.S. support to deal with the threat posed by North Korea, the Bush administration withdrew 40% of its troops from South Korea.

The deployment of troops between Seoul and the demilitarized zone separating the North and South has also reduced the scope and frequency of joint military exercises with the South Korean military. The Obama administration reversed this trend. Over the past three years, the United States has conducted the largest military exercises with South Korea since the Korean War, and the US military contingent in the south of the peninsula has expanded. Washington and Seoul have signed numerous new defense agreements, and the Pentagon has announced plans to modernize its units and weapons on the Korean Peninsula, even though South Korea's military capabilities have grown significantly compared to those of the poorly functioning North Korean regime.

At the same time, the US has increased its presence in Indochina. Since the early 1990s, U.S. administrations have resisted Vietnam's desire to deepen defense ties. Washington knew that if it wanted to cooperate with Beijing, it would have to recognize that China had much more significant strategic interests in the region than the United States. But in 2010, Hillary Clinton and then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited Hanoi (Clinton twice). The Secretary of State called for a strategic partnership, in late 2010, for the first time since the end of the Vietnam War, the United States conducted joint naval exercises with the Vietnamese Navy, and in 2011, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation. The United States has also stepped up its engagement with Cambodia, which in 2010 joined a program of bilateral water-based military exercises called CARAT conducted in the region. In the same year, Clinton urged Phnom Penh not to be "too dependent" on China.

Finally, the Obama administration is focusing on the maritime coalition in the South China Sea. In addition to U.S. ties with the Philippines and Vietnam, Japan has signed strategic partnership agreements with the two countries, thereby expanding regional military cooperation. This year, Australian, Japanese and South Korean combat units participated for the first time in the annual US-Philippine exercise called "Balikatan" (which means "shoulder to shoulder").

PACIFYING THE CAR

Even if the United States, in response to China's nationalist diplomacy, had limited itself to improving military ties with its maritime allies in the region, Beijing would not have been satisfied. But such measures are necessary for the security of the United States, taken away from the Chinese

borders and continue the line of previous administrations. When Washington became directly involved in disputes over China's sovereign rights and began to build up its military presence on its land borders, Beijing quite naturally regarded such a departure from its previous policy as unprovoked and expansionist actions that threaten the security of the PRC. As might be expected of a great Power facing a deteriorating strategic environment, China has expressed its opposition to the Asian pivot policy, not just through the aggressive rhetoric it has resorted to before.

As a result, China has given up trying to use its influence on North Korea to persuade it to shut down its nuclear program. Since 2011, Beijing has significantly increased food aid to Pyongyang, imported significantly more minerals from North Korea, and invested heavily in its mining industry, infrastructure, and industrial production. China also stopped supporting the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear program, forcing Washington to hold bilateral talks with Pyongyang. Meanwhile, North Korea continues to improve its nuclear capabilities.

The PLA is also exerting pressure on China's neighbors, who are increasing military cooperation with the United States. In the spring of 2011, tensions between Beijing and Hanoi intensified after Chinese patrol ships detained Vietnamese seismic survey boats in disputed waters, and several Chinese army officers spoke out in favor of using force against the Vietnamese Navy. A clash between China and the Philippines earlier this year over the disputed Scarborough Reef indicates that Beijing will try to punish countries that hope for the United States ' help in solving territorial problems. China sent combat-ready patrol ships to the reef. After the Philippines withdrew its ships, the Chinese settled in the disputed territory. This year, Chinese state-owned oil companies announced their intention to drill exploration wells in disputed waters. Other contenders have been operating in these waters for many years, and now the PLA has formed a new military garrison tasked with protecting the country's territorial claims in the South China Sea. Since then, China has continued to build up its presence on disputed islands and in disputed waters.

Thus, the Obama administration's Asian pivot has only increased tensions and made the region more prone to conflict. Military aircraft and warships now cut through the air and sea-

The United States is at risk of being drawn into a standoff over land that has no strategic or economic significance.

The policy of an Asian pivot will be further hampered by growing nationalism not only in China, but also in Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Consider what happened in September, when anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan forced Tokyo to buy back the island chain it claims along with Beijing (known in China as the Diaoyu Islands, and in Japan as the Senkaku Islands). After Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara, an ardent anti-China activist, expressed interest in buying the islands - a move that would certainly provoke Beijing - the government, instead of simply blocking the deal, purchased them itself. Like the Spratly Islands, the archipelago has little strategic or economic significance. Nevertheless, Japan's decision was a challenge to the PRC and provoked anti-Japanese protests. Cases of vandalism against Japanese enterprises and state property have been recorded. A surge of nationalist sentiment has strained relations between Beijing and Tokyo. At least 14 Chinese surveillance ships escorted hundreds of Chinese fishing trawlers to the archipelago, where they entered waters that Japan considers its territorial waters.

Meanwhile, China has challenged U.S. interests outside East Asia by ending cooperation where the two powers managed to establish it in the years leading up to Washington's declaration of an Asian pivot as a priority. If in 2006-2010. China voted in favor of five UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran, then in 2012. Beijing has threatened to veto such sanctions. After the United States, European countries and Japan agreed to an embargo on the purchase of Iranian oil in January 2012, Beijing signed new contracts with Tehran. In addition, Beijing blocked Washington's attempts to stop the bloodshed in Syria, thwarting its initiatives at the UN and siding with Moscow, which supports Damascus.

Washington's growing activity on China's periphery has led Beijing to conclude that the United States has abandoned strategic engagement, a cornerstone of American policy toward China since the end of the Cold War. Unlike previous administrations, under Obama, the White House stopped considering China's legitimate security interests in its border regions,

including those that are not vital to US security. By threatening Beijing and challenging its claims to purely symbolic territories, Washington has led Chinese leaders to believe that only a belligerent policy can guarantee security for a rising China. This is the irony and paradox of the Asian turn: the strategy designed to contain Beijing has provoked it to aggressive actions and undermined its faith in the principle of cooperation.

It has already damaged the interests of the United States, and the costs will only grow. If Washington continues on this path, China's resistance will inevitably increase, hampering bilateral cooperation on important issues, from trade to global economic stability. A series of conflicts in the region will be a real prospect, as China will resist increasing the American presence on its borders. China and the United States ' security partners will become increasingly tense over unimportant territories.

This can be avoided. Washington is able to respond to Beijing's tough diplomacy with policies that would help maintain order in the region and minimize the likelihood of conflict between the two powers. Over the next few years, the United States needs to rethink its strategy in Asia in a way that does not contradict the course of previous administrations. It should be recognized that the military buildup in continental East Asia is not very important for the security of the United States, and therefore it is necessary to avoid getting involved in complex territorial conflicts in this region. As the U.S. Navy continues to dominate the seas of Asia, the United States can reassure its allies of its determination to counterbalance Chinese influence, while at the same time quietly sidestepping dangerous territorial disputes by reducing its presence on China's land borders. As China grows stronger, U.S. national security interests will be better served by a policy of deterrence rather than alarmism.

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