The rapid spread of democracy to a significant part of the world social space after the collapse of bipolarity could not but give rise to its internal diversification. With great difficulty, by the middle of the first decade of the new century, Western intellectual thought took a step towards reconciliation "with itself", legalizing the concept of illiberal democracy put forward in the mid-1980s ^.1 In 2006, the term actually received official recognition from the United States leadership. In his State of the Union address, US President George W. Bush, ritually mentioning the multiplicity of peoples ' paths to freedom, actually recognized for the first time the possibility of special models of democracy for the countries of the Middle East, and therefore for all countries of the non-Western part of the planetary political ^system2.

This formulation of the question seems to be correct, although it is delayed in relation to reality. Indeed, after a decade and a half of democratizing the former socialist camp and the new states that have emerged in its territory, it has become clear that there is no single path for political transformation in the former communist countries. Some of them-Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary-clearly followed the path of repeating the models of the classical democratic system. Others-Bulgaria, Latvia, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Ukraine, and Russia-demonstrate a variety of combinations of classical and non-classical models of democratization. Still others-Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan-generally moved in the direction of "pluralistic authoritarianism" ³, although they formally remained within the procedural version of the democratic system. At the same time, the discrepancy between classical democratic models is all the more obvious, the further the region of their origin is located from the part of the world that is usually called the Euro-Atlantic and Western cultural and political areas.

From an academic point of view, among the main topics to be considered in this context are (1) the relationship between" classical "and" non-Western " models of democracy, their similarities and differences; (2) forms of interaction between the state and society in various civilizational environments; (3) prospects for establishing democracy as the main form of political activity in the modern world.

Discussion of such topics implies a clear understanding of the socio-historical exposition of two types of societies - industrial-capitalist and modernizing traditional, simultaneously exist in the world space. From a methodological point of view, the most effective tool in this sense is the school of political economy of development*.

* Political economy of development - a synthetic analysis of social reality that consistently combines the methods of economics, history, political science and other social disciplines. The "pioneers" of this direction are, in my opinion, such luminaries of world social studies as the French historian and sociologist Fernand Braudel and the British researcher Eric Hobsbawm.

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1

Modern democracy (in its classical liberal form) is a product of the development of the industrial-capitalist mode of production. Embodying the complexity and inconsistency of capitalism as a systemic whole, democracy/political representation is the most perfect form of social organization in industrial and post - industrial society.

The institutionalization of democracy reflects historical milestones in the development of civil society. The latter forms the field in which political representation functions. For our analysis, the macrosociological cross-section of civil society is conceptually important, which in this case appears as an autonomous self-regulating space of public relations, where economic, social and other interests are manifested. Within this sphere of life, which encompasses the totality of interpersonal and intergroup interactions and their institutional embodiments, social interests are formed and articulated.

Civil society is a space in which economic motivations, individualizing and emancipating the individual, have replaced or are irrevocably replacing behavioral patterns determined by pre-industrial forms of life and socio-institutional relations. Civil society forms the natural human hypostasis of the system of political representation-democracy.

It has become a common statement: the institutionalization of democracy is a certain historical duration that has absorbed the experience of several epochs, their ideas, values, worldview guidelines and behavioral norms. The process of development of civil relations, which covered the period of five centuries in the Western European cradle of industrial civilization (the beginning of the XIII-end of the XVIII centuries), was accompanied by the promotion of a set of innovative ideas in various branches of Knowledge. At the same time, the human dimension of democracy, the sovereign individualized personality, was being constituted. The birthplace of modern democracy ⁴ was the historical and geographical region of Western Europe.

The system of political representation summed up a peculiar result of the long-term development of civil relations. In its turn, the emerging civil society acted as a supporting social structure, which embodied the new economic, spiritual, intellectual and political reality of European history. This construction became the alpha and omega of the New European industrial-capitalist civilization. Its genetic characteristics were the spirit of search and innovation, bold social experimentation, the assertion of the ideology of free trade, the principles of individual responsibility and self-worth of the individual.

The formation of prerequisites for the development of civil society by the middle of the 15th century is becoming irreversible in Western Europe, largely due to the cumulative effect of several factors.

First, Christianity contributed to the formation of a sense of regional identity among the inhabitants of Western Europe, belonging to a single "big" civilizational substratum. Belonging to the Christian society played an indirect but important role in the formation of markets, the rapid development of " exchange games "(F. Braudel)⁵, in the awareness of rationally understood interests.

Secondly, the development of civil relations in Western Europe required the modernization of the system of public administration, that is, the institutionalization of an "organic" state that functions on the basis of a balance of interests.-

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of various socio-political forces. "The consolidation of nation-states in Europe (Western - A.V.) at the beginning of Modern times," American authors S. Bowles and G. Gintis believe, " included the destruction of pre-capitalist forms of popular solidarity and promoted the access of various groups to power through a system of political representation, which became a key element in strengthening social positions for all public entities. Control over the State has become the main cause of social conflict. " ⁶ Enforcement of obedience and protection of elite privileges, characteristic of the vast majority of pre-industrial ecumenical civilizations, have lost their effectiveness in Western Europe.

Third, the New European state, like no other, stimulated the development of capitalism, which for the first time significantly separated (made independent) various spheres of social relations - economy, politics, law, culture, science, religious spirituality. In turn, developing capitalism, strengthening the private-property foundations of public life and-through" exchange games " - penetrating into all niches of society, strengthened the economic foundations of political pluralism. Thus, a natural solid foundation for the theory of political representation emerged, which served as a reference point, a destination for the entire subsequent evolution of the Western European socio-political array.

Fourth, the sphere of "functioning" of civil relations was not limited to the cities of Western Europe, which were the springboards of the system of political representation. The processes of transformation of a subject into a citizen also covered vast non-urban areas, which were irreversibly drawn into the maelstrom of industrial economic, political and cultural life.

The spontaneous modernization of the socio-economic structure (first of all, urbanization and industrialization) was reflected, in particular, in the growth of territorial mobility of the population, in the rapid development of industrial centers and urban agglomerations. Cohabitation in these centers of representatives of various socio-professional and age groups, carriers of different beliefs drew mass communities into the processes of production, exchange and distribution. The latter contributed to the formation of public consciousness of the industrial type - understanding of the universal, universal interdependence of the members of the emerging bourgeois bourgeois society.

Ahead of other regions of the world at that time in terms of fundamental development indicators (the progress of material production, the maturity of socio-economic relations, the availability of political institutions and mechanisms for their regulation, the state of scientific research), Western Europe was looking for a new existential paradigm, a new model of interaction between the state and the emerging civil society.

Stability of society and its institutions, achieved by regulating spontaneous processes in the economy, as well as social protection of marginalized segments of the population-these are the main features of this (associated with the name of G. Hegel) model of the relationship between the state and society. In this paradigm, the protective functions of the state (in contrast, for example, to the pre-industrial empires of the East) follow from the strategy of reform and protection of the population ^.7

Understanding of universal interdependence pushed various socio-political forces to coordinate interests, to develop a mechanism for conflict resolution, the normative principles of which would be generally binding. The New European state was called upon to become the guarantor of the balance of society.

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The Russian state is a force that has maintained the stability of the world order formed by the course of history, on the one hand, and is able to neutralize the destructive tendencies for the nation that were present in civil society itself, on the other hand.

The logic and dynamics of economic processes in Western Europe in the second half of the 19th century led to the formation of a "triangle" of social forces. Its peculiar peaks were:

- small owners (associated with both traditional and industrial types of economic activity);

-commercial and industrial entrepreneurs (who were at various stages of class formation);

- the industrial proletariat (significantly expanded after the first industrial revolution of the 1770s and 1830s).

These three social communities, the balance of power between which changed, formed the basis of the configuration of power in Western European society.

The complexity, mobility, and variability of relations between the main socio-political forces, reinforced by the imperative of public peace, determined the coordinating role of the state. It was located on the" surface " of the social triangle - at the intersection of the lines of force that radiated from each of its vertices.

The expansion of the social space of industrial-capitalist development had far-reaching political consequences. Thus, the institutionalization of political representation (so far in a truncated form) has made the ballot box a direct source of power and turned politics into an independent sphere of professional and socially necessary activity.*

The quintessence of this kind of activity was the art of gaining and retaining power by skilfully distributing the material and material results of economic growth among the politically significant classes and socio-professional groups of society. Despite its imperfection, this mechanism made it possible to take into account the interests of various forces, correct miscalculations in the economic course and social policy, and promote groups of "elitists" to leadership positions whose ideas about the required development model corresponded (or rather, did not contradict) the interests of the majority of voters.

The new social realities were legitimized by the concept of the welfare state, which was organically interwoven into the socio-historical and spiritual-cultural contexts of Western Europe. In addition, all the most important socio-political decisions were made after a national discussion, the results of which, as a rule, were summed up by parliamentary elections.

Factors of political and economic origin played an important role in shaping the" classical " trajectory of the development of democracy. Thus, the spiritual and intellectual subsystem of the productive forces, which already had a strong Greco-Roman cultural and political foundation, was complicated, improved, and polished by the Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, and human rights movements. Each of these epochal phenomena marked a new qualitative state of civil society and at the same time fixed a subsequent milestone in the diversification of the public relations system.

* The historical point of reference for this process should probably be considered the administrative revolution of the 1830s-1850s in Western Europe. The meaning and content of this phenomenon was the transformation of public administration into a specialized, socially demanded type of human activity. The administrative revolution became the starting point for the transformation of state functionaries into an independent social force, not subject to the direct influence of disponents of economic power.

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relationships. In turn, the interaction between the elements/subsystems of society accelerated the overall course of development of society, since this process additionally stimulated the release of social and intellectual energy of its members.

The formative development of capitalism (for Great Britain, for example, this is the 1850s) corresponds-with some lag - to the structural and functional separation of the state and civil society, the institutionalization of representative democracy, and the movement for civil and political rights. In the last quarter of the 19th century, the phenomenon of systemic society became part of the political culture of the Western European elite. The ruling groups of the most developed nation-states finally felt and realized the interdependence of the main elements of the social structure (classes, professional groups, etc.), the dynamic balance between which presupposed the existence of mechanisms of compromise - conflict resolution.

The effectiveness of such mechanisms was directly related to the economic potential of the state, its ability to nonviolently find "balance points" of interests of various socio-political forces. The importance of the corrective role of the state in the current industrial-capitalist system is recalled by the statement of one of the prominent politicians of post-war Europe, President of France V. Giscard d'Estaing: "Among the great powers, France is among those who managed their social development the worst: French society evolved chaotically, overcoming numerous obstacles and limitations with revolutionary jerks."

However, the formation of democracy in Western Europe took place in the form of trends that did not immediately become irreversible. For example, in the" cradle " of parliamentarism in Great Britain in 1867, only 8% of the adult population had the right to vote, and by 1911 this number reached only 30%^.9 In addition, the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers of the United Kingdom in the 1830s - 1860s was characterized by an overwhelming predominance of people from the traditional aristocracy, while lawyers and entrepreneurs made up 1/5 and 1/12 of the representatives of the British nobility, respectively.

Finally, an understanding of democracy in its classical, Western-European form involves clarifying the relationship between the market and political representation, and the dialectic of their interaction. It is well known that many prominent Western European scholars question the existence of a direct link between market mechanisms, on the one hand, and representative democracy, on the other. There is no doubt that this kind of dependence exists: market impulses and mechanisms have given a powerful (though not direct) boost to the development of political democracy. However, the diversification of society as a structural and functional whole required effective mechanisms for regulating economic and social processes. The eternal contradiction between possibility and reality in politics was shrewdly noted and aphoristically expressed by the modern Indian economist D. Nayyar: "Concern for efficiency must necessarily be balanced by the political imperative of equality, just as the desire for economic growth must be combined with the obligation of social progress: after all, efficiency and growth are means, but not ends."¹⁰

The state has become both the regulator and intermediary between the market (economy) and democracy (politics) in the West. It is the interventionist state that is a fundamental feature of Western European civilization, contributing to the economic and spiritual and intellectual self-expression of society.

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The strength of the foundation of political representation / democracy in Western Europe is ultimately determined by the presence of a powerful factor of political and economic origin. The main subject of politics as the most widespread social phenomenon has become the middle class - a heterogeneous social community that includes small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, employees, qualified segments of the working class, and the intelligentsia. This part of society, which covers in developed countries from 2/3 (Southern Europe) to 4/5 (the West in its historical sense) of the entire amateur population, acts as a stabilizer of society and a guarantor of the reproduction of political representation. Despite its heterogeneity, the middle class can be considered as a homogeneous entity in the sense that the groups forming it prefer political representation to all other types of power and agree with transformations of an exclusively evolutionary nature (where the latter are dictated by the logic of the development of society and its subsystems).

Apparently, the presence of the middle class, its relative size, character, and ideological orientation should be the starting point for analyzing the possible institutionalization of political representation/democracy in non-Western societies, i.e. in "non-classical" conditions.

2

Non-Western societies, to a much greater extent than Western ones, are characterized by a variety of economic, ethno-national, socio-cultural and other conditions that ultimately determine the parameters of political development. Such complexity definitely makes it difficult not only to accelerate economic growth and political development, but also to manage social processes.

In non-Western societies, the economic process and political dynamics are still influenced by factors of pre-industrial origin: the specific social organization of society that synthesizes modern/industrial communities and "traditional" institutional associations (rural community, caste cluster, large family, etc.). The vicissitudes of political struggle are actively influenced by relations between ethnic groups and confessions, the number of ethnic groups and the number of ethnic groups in the country. which is sometimes not inferior to the population of European countries.

Modern non-Western societies focus on themselves the main contradictions of the world. First, there are contradictions between the higher forms of knowledge-intensive production and the stagnating structures of the traditional sector. Secondly, there are still tensions between the growing modern communities (primarily the middle class) and the still numerically predominant population, which occupies a peripheral position in society. Third, difficulties remain between the imperative of economic efficiency and the politically motivated principles of social justice.

The social and political processes in such societies continue to be significantly influenced by the dualism or "polarization" of their internal structure. This dualism manifests itself in several cross sections:

- economic: different efficiency of economic sectors;

- technological: the stratification of the economic space, the isolation of peculiar poles that represent, respectively, the natural-traditional and industrial systems of productive forces;

- territorial: unevenness of economic development in different regions, manifested in the presence of vast arrays of traditional and" non-traditional " economic relations;

- spiritual and intellectual: the degree of openness of access to information among the elite and mass strata of society;

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- political: awareness of political participation among various ethnic, professional and confessional groups.

The preservation and reproduction of the dualistic character of modern non-Western society directly follows from the socio-historical experience of most developing countries. This is often determined by the existence of the past in the present. The socio-political structure of non-Western society, which has not yet been systematically transformed by industrial-capitalist processes, retains (with the exception of a few countries) a depressing effect on the dynamics of interpersonal relations. Traditional socio-institutional ties, supported by the forces of religion, community-caste organization, and other pre-and early-industrial institutions, slow down the development of individualistic models of relations.

If Western Europe in the middle of the 18th century was characterized by an individualistic type of social consciousness, then even in "advanced" India (which also experienced a kind of cultural and political revolution during the movement for sovereignty), the formation of constructs identical to the Western mentality covered only the middle class and groups of the population gravitating towards it. The individualistic type of consciousness in Western Europe was formed in the cities that were the springboards and catalysts of the bourgeois spiritual and intellectual revolution. In India, the urban population will only reach 40% of the total by 2020 (currently this figure does not rise above 28%). Of course, not only economics, but also politics are involved in the formation of citizens as carriers of purposeful forms of consciousness and activity. However, qualitative changes across society are likely to require at least a decade of institutionalization.

In modern non-Western societies, the development of the middle class and the corresponding forms of consciousness and behaviors has been defined as a trend. On the contrary, the emerging civil society is, so to speak, a mirror image of the socio-economic structure, the classes, strata and groups that form it and interact on a daily basis. With a certain degree of convention, such a state could be called a polarized civil society. Within this integrity, the types of relations that implement stadially subsequent types of social organization and economic activity coexist. Civil relations themselves are multi-tiered in nature.

The formation of civil society as a "conceptual" context for the functioning of political democracy ultimately depends on the duration, intensity and sequence of the cumulative effect of several factors.

First of all, it depends on the existence of a capable state that covers all niches of society with its impulses and involves mass segments of the population in the cycle of national life. This state, represented by a professional administrative apparatus, is a significant force for the economic and political integration of the entire territorial space ^.11

In addition, it is important to institutionalize a developed and diversified communication system that creates favorable conditions for territorial mobility of the population - the consolidation of social contacts between residents of different parts of the country.

An important role is played by the creation and dissemination of a modern education system with a focus on ideological rationalism, professional training, decision optimization, and a clear sense of the value of time. Practice (especially in the societies of the Far East) shows that educational institutions of the Russian Far East are-

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It is one of the catalysts for both economic growth and the development of civic consciousness.

A significant factor is the establishment of political parties as "educators" of the modern rationalist elite, stimulators of organic perception by the people of the samples of political culture and consciousness characteristic of industrial societies (with an obvious correction for the peculiar socio-historical experience). In fact, we are dealing with a kind of inversion, that is, with the advance of the formation of the political foundations of civil life, while the economic aspects of its vital activity were established with a certain lag, resulting from the natural inertia of economic institutions.

The relationship between the political system and the social structure in non-Western society is still determined by the fact that the political consciousness, political culture and behavior patterns of the mass segments of the population were formed under the determining influence of primary, confessional forms of communication. On the contrary, needs-the result of being introduced to a certain area of economic activity-occupied a subordinate position in the activity "scheme" of the individual and the collective.

Finally, a comparison of Western and non-Western societies shows that there are two different models of institutional development. On the one hand, the result of the formation of the industrial-capitalist mode of production as a system-forming principle in Western Europe was the constitution of completely "self-determined" sub-spheres of social relations: economy, politics, science, culture and art, religion. Accordingly, laws were formed that regulated the activities of economic, political and other institutions with the prospect of their dense dialectical interaction. The improvement of vital institutions that took place in the course of such a process brought society to a new level of balance and self-development, and increased its viability/vitality. On the other hand, non-Western societies were forced to go through such a complex trajectory in a time frame sharply compacted by global processes.

Every modern (or modernizing) society is reproduced on the basis of the multiplicity of interests of its members. However, in the two types of societies under consideration, multiplicity is, so to speak, of different quality.

The developed societies of the West are rightly referred to as composite entities. In other words, the existing ethnic, denominational, historical and geographical differences are reflected in the general dynamics of the" Western " political process. Contradictions that arise on a non-economic basis definitely increase tension in the political system. However, the intensity, density, and regularity of horizontal connections in the economy is ultimately reproduced in the political system at an acceptable level of social conflict. This is how rather acute internal contradictions are regulated in multi-ethnic Western countries-Belgium, Canada, Spain, and even monolinguistic Italy.

Non-Western societies are another matter. Here, the variety of conflicts that are formed on a non-economic basis is not always balanced by a diversified economy, the interest in the development of which forces competing groups to jointly support the territorial integrity of society. Therefore, the concept of political stability in non-Western societies is being implemented with varying degrees of success. In our opinion, among the entire array of developing countries (excluding Taiwan and South Korea), it is advisable to distinguish three groups of societies in terms of the effectiveness of the stabilization function of their political systems.

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First, India and Malaysia are consistently implementing socio-economic reforms, the main goals of which are to mitigate property imbalances (in India, this development model is usually called growth with equity) and strengthen horizontal ties between economic units and regions/states. The ruling elites of these countries actively use the reform potential of the state, which ensures the political stability of the two societies for quite a long time. The reproduction of the political organization of society in India is also supported by the national and ethnic consensus, which is the subject of special concern of the ruling groups.

Secondly, these are the archipelago states-Indonesia and the Philippines. In them, political stability is a function not only of consistent modernization (based on a broad public consensus), but also depends on the successful implementation of the concept of states as the main force for maintaining the unity and territorial integrity of the country. It is appropriate to refer again to B. R. Nayyar, who believes that in Southeast Asia, the role of the state in socio-economic development varied: from "decisive" in Malaysia and Indonesia to " substantial "(ensuring macroeconomic stability) in Thailand and "weakest" in the Philippines ¹² . The weakening of statism as a guiding principle for preserving the territorial integrity of the country ⁱⁿ Indonesia13 in the late 1990s and early 2000s led to an increase in conservative-protective sentiments among the "grassroots", which emerged in the 2004 presidential elections.

Third, it is worth highlighting the "failed" nation-states in Tropical and Equatorial Africa. In these societies, there is a peculiar combination of at least two unfavorable circumstances for the internal stability of society. On the one hand, these countries are characterized by a weak articulation of the processes of nation formation due to the continued dominance of the laws of simple reproduction over the enclave "pulsating" industrial-capitalist impulses. On the other hand, the situation in these countries is determined by the relative short duration of the impact of modern factors on a multi-layered society, which is not least due to the late development of the main part of the continent's territories by the leaders of the world economy. The underdevelopment of modern / industrial-capitalist institutions (economic, legal, political) makes the societies of these countries "fragile", vulnerable to social conflicts of various origins (quickly transformed into powerful destabilizers of both the political system and society as such).

Globalization has deepened the development gap between the three main centers of the world economy, on the one hand, and the vast majority of transition societies, on the other. Many scientists believe that the highly likely result of economic polarization is the reproduction of political systems in many developing countries at an excessively high level of social tension. The rapid exhaustion of the resource of strength, as a rule, leads to the destruction of political systems and the "projection" of the entire complex of contradictions accompanying such a development trajectory to the outside (the Northern zone).

It is not surprising that forward-thinking public figures offer the West "safety belts "in the form of a project of"globalization from below". Its main semantic elements are the following initiatives. First, the unification of working conditions, environmental protection, and ensuring the economic and civil rights of the population in transition societies through the introduction of international standards of social relations in the practice of TNCs ' activities

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in developing countries. Secondly, the democratization of political and other institutions at all levels of their functioning - from local to global. Third, bringing the decision-making process closer to the interests of those affected by them. Fourth, reducing the property disparity between the leaders and outsiders of globalization in the process of a new redistributive policy and debt relief to the most needy members of the world community. Fifth, developing an effective mechanism to protect the most vulnerable societies from the consequences of financial and economic crises in the global economy (introducing the Tobin Tax)¹⁴ . The global alignment of socio-political forces hinders the implementation of this project, which delays the prospect of institutionalization of democracy in most of the world.

3

As the British historian and sociologist E. Hobsbawm noted, despite the" winds of change", the objective conditions for the constitution of "truly lasting democracies" in non-Western countries have not yet been formed ^.15 The transition to democracy is like any deep social transformation, according to the American political scientist F. A. Kolesnikov. Zakaria, has obvious shady sides. "What if democracy paves the way for an Islamic theocracy or a regime similar to it?.. There are democratically elected regimes all over the world... they systematically ignore the constitutional restrictions imposed on the authorities and deprive their citizens of their fundamental rights and freedoms. " ¹⁶

The concept of " illiberal democracy "is associated with the concept of" authoritarian parliamentarism " by the prominent Russian theorist N. A. Simonia, with the difference that the latter contains a set of features that form the framework of a modernizing society at the stage of transition from the traditional state to developed forms of social and political organization. ¹⁷

The inter-stage political transition has two important aspects that are directly relevant to the institutionalization of democracy in developing countries. The first aspect related to the assessment of the political effectiveness of modernization models18 should be associated with the internal ability of society (both the government and the people) to independently transform the patrimonial state and radically update social organizations of the traditional type. In this methodological space, the comparison of models of the evolution of "polar" nation-states - Taiwan and the Philippines-has a significant heuristic potential.

Sometimes Taiwan (like Japan and South Korea) is called a "development state" by economists, and this is logical. So, in 1962, according to UN statistics, this island ranked 85th in the world in terms of GDP per capita. By 1986, it had jumped to 38th place, and by 2001 it was ranked 23rd between Spain and New Zealand. For the period 1966 - 1995, the weighted average economic growth rate in Taiwan was, according to the World Bank statistics report, 8.66% year-on-year. The results achieved were not the result of spontaneous market development, but were determined by the relations between the state and society (represented by its entrepreneurial class), the plan and the market, interventionism and spontaneity.

Emphasizing the" organized " nature of Taiwan's economic development, the researchers identify five fundamental phases of the movement from an agrarian society to an industrial society - a movement that ultimately made possible (or rather inevitable) profound political changes collectively called democratization ^. 19

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The first stage (1945-1952) covers the period of post - war reconstruction of the economy and laying the foundation for subsequent economic growth. The situation was complicated by the relocation of more than two million de facto refugees from mainland China to the island after the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949. However, at this time, a deep and effective land reform was carried out, which ensured calm in the countryside and prepared the conditions for solving the food problem.

The second stage (1952-1960) covers the transition to a policy of import substitution based on the obvious success of the agricultural sector. During these years, the high profitability of peasant farms became the "first step" for the rapid development of national industry (although for industries with a low share of added value).

The third stage (1961-1970) was marked by a change in the model of economic growth, a rather rapid conversion of import substitution into export orientation. In the 1960s, industry (primarily light industry) became the backbone of the economy, and Taiwanese society itself was transformed from an agrarian society to an industrial-agrarian one.

The fourth stage (1971-1980) was a phase of structural adaptation, a change in the very nature of the economy. "Commanding heights" are occupied by enterprises and branches of technologically intensive production. The economy is gradually acquiring the features of a scientific and technical one, although with a certain time lag in comparison with the United States, Western Europe and Japan.

The fifth stage (1980s-early 1990s) was a period of adaptation of the Taiwanese economy to the innovative trends emerging in the leading countries of the world economy. In this decade, the Taiwanese economic system - not without the influence of qualified state interventionism-is acquiring the features of plasticity and flexibility necessary for successful competition in foreign markets in the context of the accelerating globalization of the world economic space ^.20

Apparently, it is advisable to identify the sixth stage (1990s-early 2000s). Its meaning and content is the adaptation of the economy to the neoliberal model of globalization, which is politically motivated by the destabilization of world markets and the inevitable financial and economic crises.

Taiwan's rapid economic growth over almost five decades has led to economic diversification and, as a result, has made it impossible for strong-willed (even highly skilled) management of economic and social processes. High rates of economic growth, coupled with relatively moderate social and property disparities, create favorable conditions for the gradual liberalization of society, for the evolutionary establishment of democratic institutions, practices and norms among the mass segments of the population. Taiwan faces a situation somewhat similar to that in post-Franco Spain: the transition from authoritarianism to democracy can only rely on the support of the middle class, which is interested precisely in the evolutionary modernization of the political system, excluding, in particular, the emergence of radical trends of both the right and the left.

Thus, the " illiberal democracy "in Taiwan has good reasons to transform itself into an institutionalized (liberal) democracy, primarily because this process is" based " on solid political and economic grounds.

Taiwan's social dynamism contrasts with the sluggish social dynamics of the stationary development model that the Philippines embodies in Southeast Asia (SE).

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Perhaps the genetic origin of stationarity stems from the geographical periphery of the Philippines in relation to two regions of accelerated growth-the Far East and Southeast Asia. Remoteness often became the reason for the model of "national identity" cultivated by the ruling groups, which implied their monopoly on interpreting foreign cultural influences, determining the pace, nature and intensity of modernization transformations.

Many experts consider the South-East Asian development model as secondary and peripheral to the modernizing economies of the Far East. One of the reasons for the periphery is the lack of a "development state" in Southeast Asia that can program and direct a long-term transformation strategy. The relationship between government and society in the Philippines is characterized as "state plunder" in the context of the determining influence of intra-elite relations on the development of ^the country21 . The inevitable consequence of the peculiarities of the socio-political organization of Philippine society is the growing marginalization of this country in the Southeast Asian region. Thus, foreign direct investment in the Philippine economy in 1971-2000 amounted to only $ 16 billion (Malaysia - $ 53 billion, Thailand - $ 41 billion, Indonesia - $ 21 billion). In 1971-1995, the Philippine economy grew by about 3.5% year - on-year, that is, half as much as its neighbors - Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. The lack of dynamism in the economy resulted in a slowdown in political processes.

The most important reality of Philippine society and its development trajectory is the consolidation of "the neo-patrimonial system as a kind of compromise between the imperatives of modernization and the traditional principles of Philippine life, a compromise that allowed for partial renewal, but not a decisive reorganization of the social order, in which the inequality of the upper and lower classes was combined with the widespread spread of patron-client relations"²² .

The success of the" liberal project " directly depends on the ability of society and the mass strata of the people to use the political institutions of democracy to deploy - both in depth and in breadth - socio-economic transformations. However, the weakness of horizontal ties in society, accentuated by the peculiarities of the territorial organization of the Philippine state, suggests the presence of a steadily reproducing "Philippine system", which extinguishes any impulses for internal modernization of society in the early stages of maturation. The preoccupation of the elite with intra-group relations and the lack of formation of a person in society as a sovereign personality type - these two macrosocial factors still prevent the expansion of real political participation.

This phenomenon was called "low-intensity democracy"in the early 1990s. Its genetic traits are recognized as the inability of society in the presence of "formal" institutions of democracy (1) to implement urgent social reforms in its own interests, (2) to at least partially redistribute the land fund in favor of the mass strata of the peasantry, and thereby (3) lay the foundation for the institutionalization of genuine participatory democracy ^.23 In short, the stationary nature of " illiberal democracy "in the Philippines manifests itself in the steady reproduction of the neo-patrimonial system and in the indefinite "hanging" of society between reform and revolution. ²⁴

* * *

Complex societies are disintegrating under the influence of the economic crisis.-

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political efficiency, political legitimacy, and national and ethnic tensions. Institutionalized democracy, which organically incorporates a complete national reproduction complex, a developed civil society, and a well-functioning system of political representation, is the most effective means of preventing social destruction. Democratization in the world continues to spread in one way or another. The movement of countries towards the most developed forms of political organization is a contradictory process, sometimes "removing" the interaction of opposite trends. The problem is that the modern reality of democratization is significantly ahead of the theory and, more importantly, surpasses it in complexity. It is not surprising that in the social science discourse there is a difference of opinion, bordering on confusion, about the optimal form of political organization of non-Western societies, to which Russia is typologically close in many respects.

Notes

¹ The term illiberal democracy was coined by American Orientalists to refer to the specific regimes of the newly industrialized countries of Southeast Asia, which (like Taiwan and South Korea later) were characterized by a combination of elements of formal procedural democracy and rigid authoritarianism. This term was perceived cautiously by foreign political scientists, since it indirectly carried the" heresy "of doubts about the universal significance of" classical models " of democracy, which in foreign science were interpreted as the only democratic ones and worthy of being considered as such. A well-known American political scientist, Fr. Zakaria in 2003 "rediscovered" the term "illiberal democracies", giving it wide popularity and stimulating a corresponding discussion. See Fareed Zakaria. The Future of Freedom. Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. New York - London: W. W. Norton & Co., 2003. For a review of this work, see: International Processes. 2004. N 2. pp. 145-150.

² President Bush Delivers State of the Union Address (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060131-10.html). Reflecting on the democratic processes in Iraq, Egypt, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia, Bush noted:: "Democratic states in the Middle East will not be like ours, because they will express the traditions of their citizens. Yet freedom is the future of every nation in the Middle East, because freedom is the right and hope of all humanity."

³ The term of the American researcher Robert Scalapino.

⁴" Shoots " of democracy and civil relations are easily found already in classical Antiquity, i.e. in Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome. However, politics as the most widespread social phenomenon (without which the system of political representation is impossible) has found adequate conceptual expression only in the north-west of the European continent.

⁵ By" games of exchange " F. Braudel understands what has developed in Europe in the XVII-XIX centuries. the persistent notion that exchange itself plays a decisive, balancing role, that through competition it smooths out irregularities, reconciles supply and demand, that the market is a hidden and benevolent deity " (http://www.philosophy.ru/library/misc/brodel/lekts2.htm).

⁶ S. Bowles, H. Gintis. Democracy and Capitalism. Property, Community and the Contradictions of Modern Social Thought. London: Routledge & KeganPaul, 1987. P. 37.

⁷ I'll note along the way: The" splitting " of the individual in civil society is thoroughly investigated by Karl Marx. However, a completely correct statement of the duality of the inner nature of a person (the interaction of egoistic and altruistic principles), the alienation of the individual from society, did not result in the search for spontaneous mechanisms for regulating social processes. Apparently, here are the methodological origins of the concepts of class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat, which have found limited effectiveness, and not only in Western Europe.

^{Giskard d'Estaing V.} 8 Vlast i zhizn [Power and Life], Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1990, p. 167.

⁹ The Reform Bill of 1832. New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1967. P. 10.

¹⁰ Governing Globalization: Issues and Institutions / Deepak Nayyar (ed.). New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002. P. 17.

¹¹ Development and improvement of horizontal links in the economy through the implementation of-

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As a result of systemic transformation, the political foundations of society are strengthened, as, for example, the experience of India in the 1990s shows.

^{B. R. Nayar.} 12 The Geopolitics of Globalization: the Consequences for Development. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005. P. 175.

¹³ In the case of Indonesia, the concept of statism was justified as the strengthening of democratic principles in the life of society and the consistent implementation of the principles of federalism.

^{M. B. Steger.} 14 Globalization: The New Market Ideology. Lanham, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002. P. 146-147. In 1970, Professor James Tobin proposed a tax on international capital movements (primarily foreign exchange transactions). He argued that these sums will be sufficient to solve the most acute development problems of the world's poorest countries (http://www.businessvoc.ru/bv/Term.asp?word_id=26426).

¹⁵ See: E. Hobsbawm. Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century, 1914 - 1991. London: Viking, 1994. P. 442 - 443.

^F. Zakaria. 16 The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. New York -London: W. W. Norton, 2003. P. 16.

¹⁷ In his time, N. A. Simonia, trying to clearly distinguish these two societies from their Western counterparts, on the one hand, and the main array of developing countries, on the other, introduced the concept of "authoritarian parliamentarism", which is debatable for some Orientalists, into scientific discourse. In our opinion, it retains to this day heuristic possibilities, in particular, for understanding the content of the political process in the East. See: Evolution of Eastern Societies: synthesis of traditional and modern / Ed. by L. I. Reisner, N. A. Simonia. Moscow: GRVL, 1984. pp. 296-381.

¹⁸ See: Volodin A. The Eastern Model of Development: an assessment of political efficiency. 2005. N 7. C. 29 - 47.

¹⁹ См.: The Role of the State in Development Process. London: Frank Cass, 1992. P. 135 - 1 54.

²⁰ It is important to note that this chronological periodization of economic growth regimes is very tightly tied to the most important decisions of the Taiwanese authorities in the field of economic development.

²¹ See: B. R. Nayar. Op. cit. P. 175.

^{22 Authoritarian regime in developing} society: Philippines in the last third of the XX century. Abstract of the dissertation Doctor of Historical Sciences, Moscow: IMEMO RAS, 2006, p. 34.

²³ См.: Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order. London - Boulder: Pluto Press, 1993. P. 195 - 225.

²⁴ See: Sumsky V. V. Filipin's Fiesta. Reforms, revolutions, and active nonviolence in a developing society. Book 1 -2. Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura Publ., 2003.

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