The article summarizes the results of five years of implementation of B. Obama's foreign policy course "Return to Asia". The article analyzes the reasons that prompted the American leadership to shift the center of gravity of its foreign policy to the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the specifics of the new Asian-Pacific course. Considerable attention is paid to the results achieved, as well as the problems that the United States faces in expanding its economic and military-political regional presence.

Keywords: "Return to Asia", B. Obama's policy in the Asia-Pacific region, "turn to Asia", Asia-Pacific region, USA, China, security in the Asia-Pacific Region, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Comprehensive Regional Economic Partnership( RCEP), US-China relations.

More than five years have passed since Barack Obama initiated the " Return to Asia "initiative, which allows us to draw certain conclusions and sum up some results of its implementation, highlighting the results achieved and indicating the problems that Washington faces in this regional direction of its foreign policy, as well as assess the impact of increased US involvement in the Asia-Pacific region on the regional situation.

New US foreign policy course in the Asia-Pacific region

The revival of interest in the Asia-Pacific region on the part of the United States can be attributed to the end of the first decade of the XXI century, when Washington fully formed ideas about the inevitability of increasing the role of the Asia-Pacific region in the US global foreign policy strategy and the urgent need for a full-scale "return" to the region. Due to the ongoing changes in the Asia-Pacific region, its entry into the forefront of the world economy and politics, the strategic importance of this region began to grow rapidly, and the main foreign policy task of preserving the global leadership of the United States began to be closely linked with maintaining its dominant positions in this part of the world. The updated American vision of the current role of the Asia-Pacific region in international processes could not have been better reflected in the words of Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs R. Blake: "Su-

Yana V. LEKSYUTINA-Doctor of Political Science, Associate Professor, Department of American Studies, Faculty of International Relations, Saint Petersburg State University. E-mail: lexyana@yandex.ru.

Much of the history of the twenty-first century will be written in the vast Asia-Pacific region "[24].

Washington's increased interest in the Asia-Pacific region is based on a number of circumstances and trends in the development of this part of Asia. Thus, for the United States, as the largest trading power, it is very important that in the XXI century the Asia-Pacific region has firmly occupied the niche of the most dynamically developing region in the world, where more than half of the global production volume is concentrated, more than half of the world's population (and, accordingly, a wide consumer market), and important sea trade routes pass. For Washington, the modern Asia-Pacific region brings both huge opportunities and serious challenges. Namely, the United States, which has assumed the role of a global superpower responsible for maintaining world order and international security, requires extremely close attention to the numerous traditional security challenges that come from the Asia-Pacific region. Not a complete list of threats includes: the North Korean nuclear issue; territorial conflicts between Russia and Japan over the Kuril Islands/Northern Territories, between South Korea and Japan relative to Dokdo Islands/Takeshima, between China, Japan and Taiwan around the Diaoyu Islands/Senkaku/Diaoyu-Tai, between China, Taiwan and the ASEAN Group of States regarding the Paracel and Spratly Islands; Sino-Indian territorial disputes; Indo-Pakistani contradictions; and finally, the Taiwan problem.

Washington has not gone unnoticed by the enormous changes that have taken place in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years, starting with epochal changes in political elites and shifts in the internal political life of countries, ending with the rapid growth of the economic power of such countries as China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, etc., as well as the unprecedented development of regional integration economic processes. Especially important from the point of view of possible influence on American positions is the fact that the entire regional landscape is currently being redrawn in the Asia-Pacific region, and attempts are being made to form "rules of the game"in the economic sphere. The ongoing formation of a new economic architecture in the region makes it necessary for the United States to join this process in order to direct it in a direction that meets American interests. As Barack Obama pointed out in November 2009, " as an Asian-Pacific power, the United States expects to participate in discussions that will shape the future of the region "[21].

Moreover, a direct consequence of the rise of a number of Asian states was a change in the configuration and balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, which causes extreme concern to the United States. As experts of the influential American Center for Strategic and International Studies note, " since the decline of British naval power in the Pacific at the end of the XIX century, the basic geostrategic goal of the United States in Asia and the Pacific is to maintain a balance of power that would prevent the emergence of a hegemon state in the region that threatens American interests by limiting or dominating in the sea space" [25, p. 13].

In this regard, Washington's strongest concerns are caused by the strengthening of the complex national power and influence of China, which is now almost completely destroyed.

It is unanimously assessed by American analysts as the most likely rival of Washington in the struggle for both regional and global leadership. The temporary withdrawal of the United States from active participation in Asia-Pacific affairs, following the end of the Cold War, allowed the PRC to strengthen its position without hindrance for more than a decade. The growing scale of China's economic, diplomatic and other ties with the Asia-Pacific countries and the overall high potential of this largest East Asian state made it possible to challenge US leadership in the region, which was one of the most important factors that determined Washington's decision to shift the strategic center of gravity of its foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region.

The realization of the need to restore some of its lost positions in this part of the world and prevent China from becoming a regional leader occurred in the last years of George W. Bush's tenure. As president, it was fully reflected in the foreign policy strategy of Barack Obama, by the time of his election to the highest state post, the conditions for a full-scale multi-vector "return" of the United States to the Asia-Pacific region were fully formed.

First, the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which had been distracting Washington's attention since the beginning of the twenty-first century, were nearing completion. The planned reduction of the US military presence there and the end of the acute phase of the fight against international terrorism allowed the Obama administration to focus its efforts on the Asia-Pacific region. Secondly, the global financial and economic crisis that broke out in 2008 has led to an increase in the importance of the Asia-Pacific region, which has experienced less negative consequences of the crisis and has become, in a certain sense, the "lifeline" of the world economy. Since 2000, the Asia-Pacific region has accounted for about a third of the total US foreign trade turnover with the world's countries.The region is the largest recipient of US imports and the second most important export market after North America. The development of trade with the booming East Asian countries was put at the forefront.

Asia has become the most important region for applying the National Export Initiative proposed by Barack Obama in 2010 as an anti-crisis strategy, which aims to double the volume of American exports by 2015 compared to 2010 and create 2 million new jobs. Expanding exports to Asia and implementing a highly ambitious project to create a new free trade area - the Trans-Pacific Partnership-were put forward as central tasks in the Asian-Pacific direction in order to overcome the economic recession.

An exceptionally favorable combination of the current international environment and the desire of the American leadership to increase the role of the Asia-Pacific region in foreign policy strategy made it possible for the Obama administration to initiate a course of "return to Asia"in 2009. A little later, in 2011, the shift of the US geopolitical focus to the Asia-Pacific region, known as the "pivot to Asia", was widely announced. The main areas of effort under the new US strategy were you-

They are aimed at strengthening the system of military and political alliances with the countries of the region (Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Australia), strengthening existing and forming new partnerships with other key states (primarily Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, India and Singapore), participating in multilateral formats of interaction and, in particular, intensifying cooperation between the two countries. cooperation with ASEAN, expanding trade and investment, and promoting the principles of democracy and human rights (with a focus on Myanmar and Vietnam) [9].

The new American foreign policy course in the Asia-Pacific region has a number of features.

First, a special place in it is given to the expansion of American involvement in the affairs of Southeast Asia, in relation to which Washington has maintained a certain distance for a long time since the end of the Vietnam War [3, p.79]. Today, the priority of Southeast Asia and the South China Sea region in the hierarchy of US regional interests is steadily increasing.

Secondly, there is a tendency to expand the interpretation of the geographical coverage of the Asia-Pacific region. Now the Asia-Pacific Region is considered to include not only Northeast and Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand, the Pacific Islands, India and Pakistan, but also the Indian Ocean region. According to experts of the Congressional Research Service, the rationale for such an expanded interpretation of the Asia-Pacific region is the high strategic importance of the sea routes for transporting energy resources and industrial goods passing through the Indian Ocean and then the Strait of Malacca to East Asia, as well as the growing strategic rivalry between China and India [15, p.5]. The United States has developed very close and multifaceted relations with the latter, and for a long time Washington has been making efforts to involve it more closely in the affairs of the Asia-Pacific region and East Asia. The fact that the US Pacific Command conducts the largest number of joint military exercises with India shows a lot. India, whose potential for conflict with China is very high due to unresolved territorial disputes, the factor of Pakistan and the growing rivalry in the Indian Ocean, is considered by Washington as an important partner in balancing Beijing's regional influence. It is very symptomatic that American officials are increasingly referring to the Asia-Pacific region as the Indo-Pacific region.

The third innovation in the American strategy in the Asia-Pacific region was the increased participation of the United States in multilateral regional mechanisms. In view of the rapidly developing processes of creating new institutions and integration associations in this region, the United States, which for a long time preferred developing relations with the countries of the region on a bilateral basis, found the need for a multilateral format of interaction. The potential marginalization of the United States in the emerging new economic and political architecture of the Asia-Pacific region has forced Washington to reevaluate its approaches to forms of engagement in the region.

First of all, this concerned ASEAN, which was previously considered in the United States as a hopeless association of small passive states that followed in the wake of the great powers and depended on maintaining the balance of power between them [8, p.191]. The modern realities of East Asia, which consist in the significantly strengthened role of ASEAN in regional affairs and the isolation of modern integration processes on it, have objectively made the task of strengthening ties with this organization one of the most important for strengthening the American position in the Asia-Pacific region. The Bush Administration has taken a series of initiatives to expand contacts with ASEAN: the first U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN was appointed in 2007, assistance was provided to strengthen the organization's Secretariat, and the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement was signed in 2006.

Proposed by J. R. R. Tolkien However, the idea of creating a mechanism for regular summits of leaders of the US-ASEAN dialogue partnership states, which he never realized, was already implemented by Barack Obama, who continued the pace of intensification of ties with this organization set by his predecessor. In February 2009, the first official visit of a Secretary of State to the ASEAN Secretariat in the history of US-ASEAN relations took place, and in July 2009, the United States signed the founding Bali Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of the ASEAN Countries of 1976, which Washington has long avoided joining. Joining this treaty has broadened the field of U.S. engagement with ASEAN and opened up the possibility for them to join the East Asia Summit established in 2005, which has become an important regional dialogue platform. Already on October 30, 2010, the United States became a full participant in the East Asia Summit and in November 2011, for the first time, took part in the meeting of leaders of associated states.

Новый американский внешнеполитический курс в АТР, нацеленный на укрепление роли США в регионе и расширение американского присутствия, стал развиваться по двум основным векторам: экономическому и военно-политическому.

US "Return" to Asia: Economic aspects

The priority task of the economic vector of strengthening the US influence in the Asia-Pacific region was to direct regional integration processes in a direction that is beneficial for Washington, to take a leading role in shaping the new economic architecture of the Asia-Pacific region and in creating a regional system of rules in the sphere of trade and investment activities. This formulation of the question was due to the dynamically developing processes of economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. Despite the fact that it was relatively late for Asian countries to use such agreements as a tool for their trade policy, the number of agreements increased sharply from three to a record 76 between 2000 and April 2013 [16]. Moreover, at the time of the activation of US policy in the Asia - Pacific region in 2008-2009, for a long time in the region, purposeful work was carried out on the conclusion on the development of the United States ' policy in the Asia-Pacific region.-

a broad regional trade agreement on the creation of a free trade area (FTA), similar to the EU common markets or NAFTA. At the same time, the most well-known and discussed projects at that time were the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 free trade zones, both of which excluded the participation of the United States.

In this regard, in order to avoid marginalization and loss of leadership in the emerging Asia-Pacific economic space, Washington has begun to form its own integration association based on the principles and rules dictated by it and fully contributing to the realization of American interests. Washington's attention was drawn to the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership established in 2005 by Brunei, New Zealand, Singapore and Chile, on the basis of which the United States intended to conclude a new comprehensive regional trade agreement involving the creation of a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) FTA. The start of negotiations on the TPP was laid by the statement of B. Obama in 2010 at the APEC leaders ' meeting in Yokohama. Supporting the US initiative, Australia, Malaysia, Peru and Vietnam then entered into negotiations to join this association. In November 2011, during the meetings of APEC leaders in Honolulu, Washington again raised this issue and strongly emphasized the prospects of a free trade zone [12]. Putting forward the idea of the TPP has become a symbol of the US diplomatic and economic return to the region and one of the central elements of the course of B. Obama's "pivot to Asia".

At the final stage of negotiations on the establishment of the TPP (December 2013), 12 States (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam) with a population of about 796 million people (approximately 11% of the world population) and a total GDP of The trade turnover of the United States with the TPP countries in 2013 reached $ 1.55 trillion, or 40.3% of the total trade turnover of the United States with the world [26].

The Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is positioned by Washington as the "gold standard" or "agreement of the XXI century", involves comprehensive and deep liberalization of trade and investment activities and sets very high standards in the functioning of state-owned enterprises, public procurement, legal standards of labor relations, environmental protection, protection of intellectual property rights, and investor rights. It seems that putting forward high demands on the countries participating in the partnership, which have not yet been implemented in a single functioning trade association, as well as too significant differences in the level of economic and social development of these 12 countries, call into question the success of this initiative of Washington. Even an advanced market economy like Japan has been hesitant to enter TPP negotiations for a long time. The decision announced on March 15, 2013 by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to join the negotiations was not dictated by the potential economic benefits of participating in POPS-

Rather, it is a desire to strengthen relations with the United States against the backdrop of escalating territorial disputes with China.

The articulation of such high requirements for CCI member countries is due to at least two reasons.

First, Washington was forced to demonstrate a fundamental difference between the regional integration initiatives (ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6) already being developed by the countries of the region and the new American integration association (TPP). Otherwise, the countries of the region would have quite a reasonable question about the expediency of creating a duplicate trade block and further promoting the so-called "spaghetti bowl" phenomenon, in which an increase in the number of free trade zones can lead to the effect of overlapping and, accordingly, chaotic regional trade [1, p.68].

Secondly, the US intended to either prevent China from joining this integration association as it did not meet the criteria for participation stated by Washington, which would put the PRC in a potentially disadvantageous position as a country excluded from the preferential trade zone, or force it to accept the traditional requirements imposed by the United States regarding the revaluation of the national Chinese currency and the protection of intellectual property rights. Washington's constant demonstration of the principle of openness of the TPP and the invitation of China to join the association being created seems to be nothing more than a trick or demagogy, since meeting all the conditions for joining the TPP for Beijing is equivalent to concessions on all the traditional US requirements in the trade and economic sphere.

The idea of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, promoted by Washington, is a competition for another model of regional integration that meets China's interests - the Comprehensive Regional Economic Partnership (RCEP), which involves the creation of a free trade zone in the ASEAN format+6. Negotiations on the organization of an Asean-centric integration association were conducted by the leaders of East Asian states for a long time, long before Washington's plans to create a TPP. At the official level, the intention to create the RCEP was announced in November 2011 during the 19th ASEAN Summit, and at the next summit in Phnom Penh on November 20, 2012, the start of negotiations was announced. The completion of negotiations on the creation of a new agreement is scheduled for the end of 2015 [10].

In terms of its scale and economic potential, the Comprehensive Regional Economic Partnership will not be inferior to the TPP. It includes 10 ASEAN countries and six ASEAN free Trade agreement partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan) with a population of over 3.4 billion people. more than 48% of the world's population) and a combined GDP of $ 21.23 trillion, which is equivalent to 29.5% of world GDP [26]. Meanwhile, the requirements imposed on the participating countries are significantly lower than in the case of the TPP, which makes the RCEP more economically attractive for a number of East Asian states that are not ready for deep trade liberalization.

Thus, two alternative models of regional economic integration have been developed in the Asia-Pacific region: the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Comprehensive Regional Economic Partnership. In theory, and in practice, these two associations can function in parallel, and the participation of any state in one of them does not in any way exclude the possibility of membership in the other. However, we cannot exclude the possibility of priority development of integration processes in the Asia-Pacific region only in one of these two scenarios, which will lead to a significant strengthening of the regional positions of one of the states to the detriment of the interests of the other - either the United States or China. Most experts do not doubt the dominant role of the United States in the TPP, where, despite the formal openness of this association, the world's second economy - China - is unlikely to enter due to the specifics of the criteria presented. The share of the United States in the total GDP of the 12 countries negotiating the TPP is about 57% [27].

On the contrary, despite the declared "centrality" of ASEAN in the Comprehensive Regional Economic Partnership, the dominant role in it will be played by China, which accounts for about 39% of the GDP of the 16 countries included in this association [27]. According to the authoritative opinion of the Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academician SM. Rogov, the members of the RCEP Japan and India "are unlikely to be able to balance the Chinese power" [7].

The potential danger that one of these two models will succeed in taking a priority position in the processes of regional economic integration forces Washington and Beijing to consider the two associations as competing, although from an economic point of view they are not. In fact, in the Asia-Pacific region, a quasi-battle has now unfolded between the United States and China for the right to formulate new rules of the game and create institutions on the basis of which the future regional economic system will be created. The development of integration under the auspices of China for Washington is fraught with the loss of leadership positions in the region.

At the same time, the creation of a new integration association, in addition to the task of consolidating its dominant role in the ongoing integration processes in the Asia-Pacific region, also covers the practical interests of the United States in stimulating bilateral trade with the countries of the region. This task is very important for the United States, as its position in this part of the world relative to other economic entities and, first of all, China, is noticeably weakened. By 2013, Beijing had already firmly established itself as the largest trading partner of ASEAN as a whole and of many Asia-Pacific countries separately, including Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Myanmar, Mongolia, and North Korea. The implementation of the TPP initiative will help strengthen US trade with the countries of the region, as well as solve Washington's immutable problem in general - restoring the American economy by expanding access of American goods to growing Asian markets, increasing American exports, and creating new jobs at export-oriented enterprises.

In order to promote trade and economic ties with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, in addition to the TPP B. Obama has proposed a number of other initiatives and related measures to implement them. So, in March 2012, the US-South Korea free trade agreement finally entered into force. In November 2012, the joint US-Asean "EZ" program - Expanded Economic Engagement-was launched, aimed at stimulating trade and investment, including by establishing common principles of market entry, transparency and business responsibility. In November 2012, the U.S. - Asia Pacific Comprehensive Partnership for a Sustainable Energy Future was also established to promote greater access to energy sources for countries in the region in order to overcome the energy deficit. Washington's involvement includes financing, insurance, and technical assistance for energy projects.

It is not superfluous to emphasize that the expansion of the American economic presence is considered in Washington as an important component of maintaining the dominant role of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, since it is in the economic plane that the challenge of the rising China is already beginning to transform into a very tangible threat to the regional leadership of the

Expanding the US presence in the Asia-Pacific Region: military and political aspects

While the" interception " of the initiative in the formation of a new economic architecture of the Asia-Pacific region occupies an important place in the American policy of "return to Asia", its central element is the expansion of the US military presence in the region. Despite the widespread concept of "soft power"in the twenty-first century, the military power of the State continues to play a decisive role in international relations. Maintaining a substantial military presence in the Asia-Pacific region is seen in Washington as a critically necessary measure to protect American national interests and maintain leadership positions in the region.

In this regard, an important application of US efforts in the framework of the new Asia-Pacific strategy was the development of military-political cooperation with the countries of the region, the acquisition or preservation of allies and close partners. Particular importance was attached to the expansion of the military presence in the southern part of the Asia-Pacific region and the strengthening of military-political cooperation with the countries of Southeast Asia, which until then had occupied an insignificant place in American foreign policy calculations. In the period following the end of the Vietnam War, a clear preference was given to Northeast Asia.

The first impulse to expand American involvement in Southeast Asian affairs was the events of September 11, 2001, which made international terrorism the main threat to the United States. Southeast Asia, on Terry-

Washington called the"second front" of the counterterrorism struggle in the country where two major terrorist organizations operated (Jama'a al-Islamiyya in Indonesia and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines), which had close contacts with al-Qaeda. In 2002, the United States and 10 ASEAN member countries signed a Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Fight against international Terrorism. In order to destroy the network of terrorist organizations and prevent Southeast Asia from becoming a hotbed of terrorist operations, the United States began to strengthen military cooperation and conduct joint military exercises with the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia.

To fully "return" to South-East Asia and go beyond the limits of the limited anti-terrorist struggle cooperation of George W. Bush. he started only in the last years of his tenure as president. Its course was continued and expanded by Barack Obama.

The second impulse to deepen cooperation with Southeast Asia and, in general, one of the motivating components of the US decision to "return to Asia" was the rise of China. Since China is considered a direct competitor for regional leadership in Washington, the Obama administration has made it a priority to" win over " key countries in the region, especially those that could not be clearly attributed to the spheres of American or Chinese influence. In particular, Vietnam and Myanmar, as well as Thailand and the Philippines, were at the center of US political and diplomatic efforts, with which it was necessary to revive allied relations. While Beijing has been able to win over China by financing infrastructure projects in the region, providing generous aid, and generally demonstrating the high economic benefits that developing relations with China promises, Washington has used such an important trump card as the region's extreme concern about the growing integrated power of its immediate neighbor.

In order to demonstrate the steadfastness of its leadership positions in the Asia-Pacific region and exert appropriate psychological pressure on the Chinese leadership, the United States has taken a number of symbolic steps. In November 2011, the United States and the Philippines jointly adopted the Manila Declaration on Strengthening Bilateral Defense Cooperation, designed to remind the world of the inviolability of the alliance between the two countries [4]. In November 2012, the United States and Thailand signed the "Joint Vision for a U.S.-Thai Defense Alliance" statement, which was the first such document in the half-century of allied relations between the two countries. In November 2010 and June 2012, the United States and New Zealand signed the Wellington and Washington Declarations, which opened a new page in the development of bilateral military cooperation, which was interrupted in the mid-1980s.

Meanwhile, the increased role of Southeast Asia in the US Asia-Pacific strategy did not reduce the importance of Northeast Asia. Great importance in maintaining a military presence in the region is attached to strengthening allied relations with Japan and South Korea, the only countries where permanent military bases are located.

American military bases. In addition, in order to increase the effectiveness of coalitions, Washington is trying to supplement the existing system of bilateral allied commitments with more extensive security mechanisms with the United States as the center of attraction. Namely, Washington is trying to make operational the US - Japan - Australia, US - Japan - India, and US - Japan - South Korea trilateral blocs, the latter of which remains the least successful example of this kind of interaction due to the continuing tension in Japan-South Korea relations.

Washington has also begun to directly build up its military presence in the region, primarily its naval forces. In June 2012, then US Secretary of Defense L. Panetta specified the measures under the "return to Asia" course, indicating that by 2020 the ratio of warships based in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans will change from equal to 40:60 (i.e., it will be 1.5 times more). Including in the Pacific Ocean, it was proposed to place six of the 10 active aircraft carriers, most of the cruisers, destroyers, coastal warships and submarines [19]. It was decided to increase the number of US warships in the Asia-Pacific region by 20% (from about 50 to 60 ships) [18]. At the same time, the Pentagon's plans include not only a quantitative increase in the armed forces in the region, but also an improvement in their quality and technical characteristics. It is in the Asia-Pacific region that the United States intends to deploy the most advanced weapons. According to the plans of the US military command, fourth-generation Virginia submarines will be sent to Guam, fifth-generation F-22 strike fighters andF-35-to American bases in Japan, by 2022, 11 coastal warships will be deployed in the Pacific Ocean (four ships - in Singapore, and seven-in Sasebo, Japan) [11].

The priority of expanding the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region in US foreign policy calculations is evidenced by the fact that even in the context of the federal budget sequester, which implies a significant reduction in defense spending*, Washington has not abandoned its grandiose plans. During the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2013, US Secretary of Defense Ch. Heigl stressed that financial difficulties will not affect the expansion of the US military presence in Asia [22].

The strengthening of the US armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, in addition to the presence of many security problems in the region, is also caused by the rapidly growing military potential of China. The defense budget of the potential rival of the United States shows a long and steady growth: according to Chinese official data (which, according to Western sources, is significantly underestimated), in 2013 it increased by 10.7% compared to the previous year, amounting to $ 114.3 billion, and in 2014 defense spending will increase by 12.2% from the previous year. It reached the level of 2013 and reached $ 132 billion. [5; 6].

* On March 1, 2013, the US Department of Defense's spending was cut by $ 37 billion overnight. In the current fiscal year, this figure is estimated at US$, or 8% more.

In military construction, Beijing focuses on strengthening the navy and increasing the scale of its military presence in nearby seas, which is associated both with the need to defend its territorial claims in the South and East China Seas, and with the desire to expand the ability to conduct operations on the high seas.

For the first time, the course of China's development as a strong maritime power was publicly announced in the fall of 2012 at the XVIII Congress of the CPC. Important initiatives are being implemented in this area: the construction of a large Chinese naval base Yulin on the southern coast of Hainan Island has been completed; the program for creating an aircraft carrier fleet by national industry is being implemented; the first aircraft carrier of China has been put into service (September 2012) and a new military port in Qingdao intended for the aircraft carrier fleet has been put into operation; the fleet.

The rapid strengthening of China's armed forces cannot but cause deep concern in Washington. If you do not take into account the United States, China already has the largest fleet of submarines, surface and amphibious ships in the Asia-Pacific region. According to the US Department of Defense, the PLA Navy includes 79 advanced surface warships, more than 55 submarines, 55 amphibious ships, and about 85 missile-equipped ships [17, p.6]. Due to China's escalating territorial disputes with the Philippines, Vietnam, and Japan, recent years have seen an increase in the number of Chinese ships patrolling the South China, East China, and Yellow Seas, as well as the expansion of China's field airfields and military fortifications on the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands. The expansion of China's military presence in the Asia-Pacific region is also achieved by gaining access to foreign Asian airports, runways, seaports, and radar bases.

In this regard, against the background of the expansion of the scale of China's military presence in East Asia, the task of gaining access to Asian military bases becomes of fundamental importance for the United States, as a state that is not geographically located in this region and is experiencing the so-called "tyranny of distance"*. At the same time, in the last decade, the US military strategy has gradually abandoned the practice of unilateral reliance on the maintenance of expensive large permanent military bases abroad that took place during the Cold War. The emphasis in expanding the military presence is now placed on the so-called "flexible basing", which implies the dispersal of a limited American military continent throughout the Asia-Pacific region on a rotational basis, as well as the periodic use of military bases of foreign countries for military (or rescue) operations and exercises.

Currently, the United States has permanent military bases in Japan and South Korea, and has a significant military contingent in the East Asian region.-

* For example, Singapore and the Korean Peninsula are 8,900 and 6,050 miles away from the US city of San Diego, respectively [25, p. 19].

Guam and Hawaii, enjoy access to the Thai Utapao Air Force Base, Singapore Paya-Lebar Air Force bases, Changi Navy, and Sembawang Port (according to the agreement of the two countries in 2012 on the deployment of four American coastal warships in Singapore at the Changi Naval Base, the first of which, the Freedom ship (Freedom), arrived in Singapore in April 2013).

No less important is the agreement between Washington and Canberra announced in November 2011 on the deployment of US Marines in Darwin in northern Australia and on expanding the use of US naval and air bases in Australia (Tyndall Air Force and Stirling Navy). Pursuant to the agreement, 200 US Marines arrived in Darwin in April 2012. By the end of 2014, their number will increase to 1,150 people, and by 2016 - to 2,500.

In addition to expanding the scale of the US military presence, the United States has significantly intensified joint military maneuvers with many countries in the region and, in particular, with India, which accounts for more than a third of the joint maneuvers conducted by the US Pacific Command, as well as with Japan, South Korea, Thailand and Malaysia. In 2013, at least seven joint exercises were conducted in East Asia between May and August alone, with a total duration of 64 days, which is the same as if the United States conducted exercises every other day, and the number of visits by American warships to ports in the Asia-Pacific region significantly increased. The geography of visits is very wide: Philippines, Australia, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, Hong Kong, Vietnam.

In turn, under the close attention of Washington are China's naval maneuvers, the scale and frequency of which are rapidly increasing, and the operational tasks being solved are becoming more complex. The immediate challenge for the United States was China's expansion of its maritime presence in the Western Pacific. In the summer of 2012, the largest PLA exercises for all the previous time were held outside the "first island chain" with access to the Pacific Ocean [23]. The increased ability of the Chinese Navy to cross the "first island chain" and enter the Pacific Ocean without hindrance was demonstrated in July 2013, when Chinese vessels sailed through the La Perouse Strait located between the islands of Sakhalin and Hokkaido for the first time in their history. Washington's anxiety is growing not only due to the growing operational capabilities of the Chinese Navy, but also due to changes in China's approaches to operations at sea. So, since 2012. China, in violation of the principle of a complete ban on the navigation of foreign warships in the exclusive economic zone of the coastal state, began to conduct military maneuvers within the exclusive economic zone of the United States, namely in the areas of the islands of Guam and Hawaii [17, p.39].

The measures taken by China to strengthen its naval forces and build up its military presence in the waters of the seas of East Asia and the Pacific Ocean are driven by the desire to realize two important tasks: to become a strong maritime power and protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State. The relevance of the second task has increased in recent years

A few years ago, a real battle broke out in the region over freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and territorial disputes over the Paracel, Spratly and Diaoyu Islands, which had been smoldering for a decade since the late 1990s, broke out with renewed vigor. The surge in tension was caused, on the one hand, by China's increasing assertiveness in asserting its rights to these disputed territories and water areas, dating back to 2007-2008, and, on the other hand, by the change in Washington's position on these issues from distancing to active mediation since mid - 2010 [2, pp. 36-40]. At the same time, the United States explains the increased interest in the South China Sea issue by the increased volume of cargo transportation with partner countries passing through the South China Sea. The South China Sea is also home to important U.S. naval communications linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans and leading to the Middle East. A certain role in the US strategic calculations is also played by the interest of major American energy companies (in particular, Chevron, ConocoPhilips, Esson-Mobile) in developing oil and gas on the shelf of the South China Sea.

Washington's intervention in China's territorial disputes with the ASEAN group in the South China Sea and with Japan in the East China Sea proved to be an effective method of implementing the US policy of "returning to Asia". Washington managed to find a "weak spot" in the Chinese strategy of "economic gingerbread" and "smiles" in relation to the East Asian states. By skilfully exploiting the territorial contradictions that exist between China and the East Asian states, the United States is solving a whole range of tasks: strengthening relations with the Philippines, Vietnam, and Japan involved in these disputes, expanding the field of interaction with ASEAN, and curbing China's growing regional influence by discrediting it. Due to the aggravation of territorial disputes, China's carefully constructed positive image of China collapsed in just a few months, and its "soft power", as well as its diplomatic influence in the region, fell dramatically. Some East Asian countries have reevaluated their approaches to developing military-political relations with the United States in favor of overcoming individual contradictions and establishing closer cooperation with a power that can act as a counterweight to the growing China.

At the same time, Washington's play on existing territorial contradictions between Asian countries or, as the Chinese researcher Liu Feitao called it, "advanced diplomacy" of the United States [14] also had such negative consequences as toughening the positions of the parties disputing the ownership of islands and water areas. As a result, the number of various incidents and incidents of confrontation between vessels of various States in the waters of the South and East China Seas and the air spaces above them has increased many times. Since 2011, the situation in East Asia has significantly destabilized. The aggravation of the situation in the South China and East China Seas has led to an increase in concern for the safety of almost all East Asians, without exception.-

This led them to increase their defense spending and engage in a forced strengthening of their armed forces.

In general, the military-political rivalry between the United States and China in the Asia-Pacific region, which has been clearly manifested since 2009, leads to the militarization of the region, a new round of the arms race, and an increase in regional tensions. The Asia-Pacific region, which has managed to maintain a relatively stable security situation over the past three decades, has become a place of concentration of several hotbeds of tension, each of which is now at the stage of aggravation. The seriousness of the current situation in the South and East China Seas is so high that when the countries of the region are looking for ways to defuse their territorial conflicts, they are no longer talking about resolving them, but at least about preserving the current state and preventing further deepening of disputes.

As the development of events over the five-year period from 2009 to 2014 shows, Washington's constantly declared desire to create a safer situation in the Asia-Pacific region as the main motivation for its regional presence comes into open discord with the results of its policy of "returning to Asia". The situation in the Asia-Pacific region has not only not become safer, but, on the contrary, it has escalated to unprecedented levels since the end of the Cold war. This puts the United States in a serious dilemma: continue to implement the policy of "returning to Asia" based on increasing its military and political presence, expanding its involvement in territorial disputes between China and its neighbors, and discrediting China among Asian states, which will lead to further complication of US-Chinese relations and increase tensions in the Asia-Pacific region; or abandon "aggressive "ways to increase its presence in the region, turning to" soft " economic methods, which could potentially lead to the loss of regional leadership positions of the United States.

It seems that relying on increasing its economic presence is unlikely to lead Washington to achieve the goal of maintaining its leadership position, since in the economic plane it is quite difficult for the United States to compete with China on a regional scale: trade and economic ties between the Asia-Pacific countries and China are already too close, China is the engine of economic growth and development in the region, and the region's countries are interested in developing trade and economic relations with China.-economic contacts with China are high, and many countries in the Asia-Pacific region have lost faith in the United States as a country that will come to the rescue in the event of a crisis. Moreover, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, promoted by Washington, still has very low chances of becoming a priority model for regional economic integration, while the prospects for a Comprehensive regional Economic Partnership can be called favorable. In particular, the Obama administration failed to meet the much-publicized goal of completing TPP negotiations by the end of 2013. The prospects of the TPP are called into question by a number of experts who point out that it is unlikely that the TPP treaty will be ratified not only by the parliaments of some Asian countries, but also by the US Congress itself.

The results of Obama's official tour to four East Asian countries (Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines) in the second half of April 2014 confirm the likelihood that the "return to Asia" will be achieved by increasing the military and political presence. So, during that visit, the American president failed to resolve differences with Tokyo regarding access to the Japanese market for agricultural and automotive products, which is an important condition for Japan's entry into the TPP and, in general, a serious step forward in concluding the "agreement of the XXI century". Against the background of the lack of progress in negotiations on the TPP, the statements and initiatives made by Barack Obama during the Asian tour are in sharp contrast, indicating the strengthening of the military component in Washington's regional strategy: for the first time at the presidential level, it was publicly stated that Article 5 of the 1960 US-Japan Security Treaty is valid.* Extends to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; support was expressed for Japan's intention to exercise the right to collective defense; a 10-year agreement was signed with Manila to expand the presence of the US military in the Philippines, including the deployment of US reconnaissance aircraft and warships there.

Building a forecast, we can also assume that in the foreseeable future, in the course of implementing the course of "returning to Asia", Washington will experience great difficulties in the practical implementation of the initiatives announced by Barack Obama and the goals set in the region. This is not so much due to the difficulties that the US economy continues to experience, but rather to the newly complicated situation in the Middle East and the next round of deterioration of relations with Russia in connection with the Ukrainian crisis. Systematic assurances of the US administration in its unwavering determination to develop the Asian-Pacific vector of foreign policy, such as, for example, the speech of the US President's security adviser S. Rice, who stated in November 2013 that the United States will deepen its involvement in this critical region, regardless of how many more "hot spots" appear on the planet [20], do not sound convincing enough against the background of the current situation. As the New York Times rightly pointed out, the problem with Barack Obama is his ability to transform ideas and ambitions into sustainable policies [13]. Made a reality in 2014 The strongest confrontation between the United States and Russia and the situation in Ukraine fundamentally change the geopolitical picture of the world, based on the analysis of which five years earlier Obama's foreign policy course "Return to Asia"was built. These changes will certainly force Washington to reduce its involvement in the Asia-Pacific region and abandon a number of previously announced initiatives in this region.

* Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty contains U.S. obligations to ensure the peace and security of the Territories under Japanese administration.

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