The history of relations between the United States and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) goes back more than a third of a century. When the association was founded in 1967, groups that united non-socialist countries of the region participated in it. The past decades have removed some problems (communist expansion, the "Vietnam threat"), but added others to the agenda of the dialogue between Washington and the Southeast Asian countries. Today, the ASEAN-US nexus faces new challenges, both generated by the era of globalization and the contradictions left behind by decades of rapid growth. Contradictions that sometimes become explosive - and this is against the background of another redistribution of forces and influence within the entire Asia - Pacific region, of which Southeast Asia is an integral part.

The terrorist attack against the United States on September 11, 2001, and Washington's response create a largely new context for the US - ASEAN dialogue. But the very concept of "challenge" includes more than just a threat. It forces the mobilization of foreign policy and other reserves, opens up new opportunities, including, by the way, for Russia.

Institutional framework and changing agenda

In the past period, cooperation between ASEAN as an organization and the United States has developed in many areas, covering all new areas. The parties communicate on a bilateral basis, within the framework of regional forums of the ASEAN countries (extended meetings of the leaders of the group's member states, their foreign ministers with colleagues representing countries with the status of ASEAN dialogue partners), through the US - ASEAN Business Council. The latter deserves special mention - as a private and non-profit organization that is trusted to hold meetings between the ministers of economy of the association's member countries and the American business community, create various structures and forums (one of the most high-profile actions of the council was to prepare a tour of the United States in May 2000 for the ASEAN delegation with the task of activating the investment activities of American corporations in Southeast Asia),

^{Eduard GREBENSHCHIKOV-Candidate of Historical Sciences, Senior Researcher at the Center for Asian and Pacific Studies of IMEMO RAS.} * Copyright (c) 2002.

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The traditional set of topics discussed by the United States and ASEAN includes economic, social, environmental and, of course, regional and international security issues. Recently, priority has been given to technological cooperation and the establishment of e-commerce. Judging by official documents and publications, it seems surprising that the attention that is paid to this area, as if there are no more relevant ones, seems to be worthy of surprise. Ernest Bowyer, President of the Business Council, stated in March 2001 that the use of Internet technologies is an essential component of the reform package, "opening up new opportunities for small and medium - sized businesses" in the association's member countries and leveling the "playing field". A very urgent task for the zone of predominance of "friendly" capitalism. Experts will confirm that e-commerce really allows you to make purchases and deliveries, bypassing expensive traditional supply and sales channels, which is especially important for small and medium-sized companies. We recognize the farsightedness of the above-mentioned question, taking into account the role of a social stabilizer that belongs to a viable small business.

Another growing aspect of cooperation is the development and improvement of the institutional environment and regulatory mechanisms. In recent years, ASEAN and the United States have signed a number of documents on cooperation in the field of compliance with trade standards and the application of conformity assessment procedures (testing of products and consumer goods, their certification and quality assurance). The implementation of the plan will avoid double certification of goods exchanged by partners, duplication in other areas. The task of coordinating all work to implement this agreement is assigned to the ASEAN Standards and Quality Advisory Board, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the United States Department of International Trade. It is expected that the introduction of common standards will significantly reduce the costs of processing trade transactions, increase the volume of mutual trade, primarily with products of the electronic and electrical industries.

First of all, the ASEAN countries that are most advanced in terms of information technology dissemination, and whose exports are dominated by high-value-added industrial products, will benefit. The "digital divide" within ASEAN is more sharply defined, which increases the gap between the members of the grouping.

Another joint initiative was the creation of the Center/A network for evaluating and promoting "environmentally friendly" technologies in the framework of implementing the provisions of the Hanoi ASEAN Action Plan, adopted in 1998. The most urgent task of dialogue partners is considered to be the fight against transboundary fires in South - East Asia. The US interest is obvious - it is taking care of its own lungs.

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Relationship to ASEAN-based integration plans

From the very beginning, the program of the Association was to ensure economic rapprochement of the member countries, create a free trade zone, and implement joint industrial and other multilateral projects. In addition to accelerating development and improving wealth, the goal was to reduce dependence on extra-regional Powers and markets. At the same time, the plans for sub-regional integration did not contradict the broader East Asian and Pan-Pacific schemes, due to the lack of a sufficient degree of economic complementarity of the ASEAN six (if we take into account the old, i.e. original members of the organization) ¹ . It was a paradox that the real integrators of the Asean zone are multinational corporations of the West and Japan, which are much more interested in dismantling intraregional barriers than national industrial circles. Both the US government and the private sector support the creation of a unified or enlarged ASEAN market. Within such a market, there will be a freer flow of goods produced by regional branches of American TNCs, capital and advanced technologies. Hence the willingness of the United States to allocate resources for the modernization of customs in the Association countries. The formation of such a market - and ASEAN is moving towards this goal by eliminating duties on intraregional trade or reducing them to a minimum level - should be accompanied, if we look ahead, by a whole series of other steps, including the development of communications, the liberalization of air traffic, which is especially expected in the United States. It is easy to imagine the resistance of local, protectionist entrepreneurs to such measures.

Due to the similar export structure and international specialization of the ASEAN member countries, intra - regional economic ties do not play such an important role in the total volume of foreign trade operations. This circumstance excludes such a topic as a closed trade bloc on the ASEAN platform from the US-ASEAN agenda. The expansion of the ASEAN countries to include Indochina and Burma makes this prospect even less likely. For a number of years, ASEAN has actually been pursuing a policy of two-speed integration, in which the old ASEAN members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Brunei) follow one schedule, and the newly joined ones (Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia) follow another. For the ASEAN countries, the American market is incomparably more important than the intra-regional one. For Vietnam, for example, today the task of fully normalizing trade and economic ties with the United States is much more urgent than participating in pan-Asean integration events ^** .

From time to time, such a topic as the introduction of duty-free trade between the ASEAN countries and the United States is raised, but in reality it has matured

¹ See: Grebenshchikov E. S. ASEAN: an Examination for Maturity. - "MEiMO" 1999, N 12.

^{* *} For more information, see: Parkansky A. B. Economic aspects of US relations with the New ASEAN Countries. - "USA & Canada", 2001, N 11. - Ed.

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only Singapore is required for this step. Bilateral and sub-regional negotiations on concluding a free trade agreement are also underway within the APEC (Organization for Economic Cooperation of the Asia-Pacific Countries), where, in particular, a group of supporters of trade liberalization has formed - Australia, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore and the United States.

One way or another, all regional differences on this issue will have to be brought to a common denominator, and these will be the conditions and requirements that are imposed on WTO members.

Economic relationships

The main explanation for the impressive achievements of the ASEAN countries so far lies in their active participation in international economic relations and in the global economy. In 1999 alone, foreign direct investment in the ASEAN area amounted to $ 16.9 billion, and in the previous year it was even more - $ 19.6 billion. (The decline was caused by the delayed effects of the 1997 financial turmoil). As for US capital investment, it jumped from $ 1.1 billion in 1998 to $ 9.4 billion in 1999 (data from the US Department of Commerce). This drop was attributed to both reinvestment of profits and, to an even greater extent, cross-border mergers and acquisitions. In other words, American corporations were buying up property in the ASEAN countries that had fallen in value after the 1997 crisis, i.e. they were acquiring existing businesses.

Other indicators are also impressive. ASEAN countries 'exports to the United States in 1999 ($70 billion) were almost equal to their intraregional exports ($74.4 billion), while a significant part of inter-Asean trade itself is accounted for by intra-corporate shipments, i.e. trade between TNCs' branches located in different ASEAN countries. The markets of Japan and the European Union were less important for the sale of goods produced in the ASEAN countries. However, the former purchased $ 37.6 billion worth of ASEAN products, while the latter purchased $ 55.7 billion worth of ASEAN products. At the same time, the Association countries had a positive trade balance with the United States, estimated at $ 12.2 billion in the first half of 1999. This balance overlapped the negative balance in ASEAN's trade with Japan ($5 billion in the first five months of 1999).

The growth of ASEAN's overseas exports was stimulated by the boom in the US economy, which placed growing demand on goods from Southeast Asian countries, as well as the deep devaluation of the currencies of a number of ASEAN countries as a result of the previous crisis. Another positive factor was that some features of the globalization process were more beneficial for the economies of the ASEAN countries than vice versa. As the London-based Economist magazine noted, the 1997 crisis was largely localized within Southeast Asia, while global markets remained open to ASEAN producers ^.2

² "The Economist", 21.08.1999, pp. 9-10.

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Foreign policy aspects

Major disagreements between the United States and the ASEAN countries that are fraught with a crisis rarely arise. There are no radical anti-Western regimes in the ASEAN area, and extremist movements (for example, Laskar Jihad in Indonesia and the Abu Sayyaffa group in the Philippines) are marginal. Myanmar's rulers are more isolationist than anti-American. Vietnam, formerly the main regional antagonist of the United States, seeks to establish more constructive relations with them, and seeks to normalize the trade regime.

Nevertheless, it is far from complete unanimity in the relations of the dialogue partners. At every step, there are significant nuances in the approaches. Thus, unlike the United States, Myanmar's partners in the association are not inclined to put the issue of human rights in this country at the forefront. Asean members are more than reserved about the role of the UN envoy to Myanmar and do not share Washington's view of it as a "source of regional instability."

The United States, like the Western community as a whole, has repeatedly expressed concern about the loss of life in East Timor, which it blamed on the country's law enforcement forces and central Government. For ASEAN as an inter-State organization, such a domestic political problem is not on the agenda.

Another example is North Korea. They distance themselves from Pyongyang, but believe that its nuclear missile program does not pose a threat to the ASEAN countries. The latter, however, readily agree with Seoul's approach to inter-Korean dialogue and work closely with it in the framework of the ASEAN + Three Forum (Japan, China, South Korea).

It is quite clear that the interests of the United States as a Power with global responsibility (due to either an international mandate or messianic motives) extend to a much broader range of problems. Someone has to perform the duties of a world policeman in one way or another, although the very statement of such a question can cause a storm of indignation. ASEAN countries often shift responsibility to the United States, retaining the ability to criticize Washington's actions in various regions of the world, without fear of reprisals from the latter. "Other countries would like the United States to bear the burden of confrontation with China, preferring to remain silent when China tests its missiles or strengthens its presence in the Spratly Archipelago, "³ Orbis magazine wrote.

What causes constant concern for the ASEAN countries is not so much interventionism, but rather a possible decrease in US interest in their region, a decrease in its geopolitical quotes.

A new issue of concern for the ASEAN countries is the tension in relations between China and the United States, which manifested itself with renewed vigor after the Republican administration led by George W. Bush came to power in January 2001, and in March 2001, Philippine President Gloria Arroyo openly expressed her support for China and the United States. -

³ "Orbis", Spring 1999, p. 240.

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There was concern about "signs of a resurgence of the cold war" in relations between Washington and Beijing.

ASEAN wants to avoid the uncomfortable situation of having to make a choice about who to support in a dispute between Washington and Beijing. Such policies as playing on the contradictions between major powers lose their appeal when there is a threat of a serious deterioration of the political and business climate in the entire Asia-Pacific region. Such a development is sure to lower all sorts of ratings - country and corporate, jeopardize the implementation of many projects, and perhaps even lead to a new polarization in Southeast Asia, intensifying China's efforts to find allies and mobilize all available anti-American forces. But such a scenario is still mostly hypothetical. For following the demonstration of toughness towards Beijing, the Washington administration, after the first hundred days in power, considered it good to soften its tone somewhat.

The following point is noteworthy. Trying out a new, tougher approach to China was accompanied by a slowdown in the process of normalizing relations with Vietnam, initiated by the Clinton administration. So, the team of J. Bush Jr. At one time, it slowed down the process of ratification of the trade agreement with Vietnam in Congress, abstained from voting on the issue of granting loans to Vietnam from the IMF and the World Bank4 . The confrontational component in Washington politics was, to a certain extent, a continuation of the pre-election debates, during which Republicans accused the Democrats of being soft. So, the most suitable object for demonstrating the strong-willed attitude of the United States was the three communist countries-China, North Korea and Vietnam.

The problems with China, however, are long-term. At the same time, US-China relations carry the burden of unresolved territorial disputes in Southeast Asia, primarily concerning the ownership of the Spratly Islands, which (along with oil-rich shoals) are claimed and partially occupied by China, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei. The United States 'official assessment of the situation in the South China Sea is that the area is a "potential conflict zone" and that it welcomes efforts to resolve differences peacefully and stabilize the situation in the area. The ASEAN countries, for their part, prefer to work together with China to develop a "Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea" and confidence-building measures through a series of working conferences. A sensitive situation may arise in connection with the participation of certain American corporations in exploration drilling in the disputed area.

Experts believe that the United States will not interfere in the conflict as long as "there is no shooting", and nothing threatens the freedom of navigation in the disputed waters. It is also unlikely that the parties to the dispute will escalate the situation. It is known, however, about cases when Beijing in the course of "development" they did not-

⁴ "The Far Eastern Economic Review", 7.06.2001, p. 7.

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some ASEAN countries were informed in advance of their actions on inhabited and unoccupied islands ^.5

Coming: Chinese challenge to US interests in Southeast Asia

The United States, as noted above, is the largest trade and economic partner for the ASEAN countries and a strategic guarantor of stability. At stake for the latter are huge commodity flows and investment resources (let's also recall the "nervous investors with a sensitive reaction"). In this scenario, why should the ASEAN countries join the banner of anti-American politics, no matter who they are attracted to? But the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region is changing, and the overall vector of movement is such that China is gradually becoming a more important and attractive partner with a booming consumer economy and a rising private sector capable of absorbing more and more ASEAN goods. In addition, China is not without the ability to pursue a flexible political line, especially on the issue of foreign Hua Qiao communities; it can, by methodically strengthening its own positions, postpone indefinitely the final clarification of territorial issues, at least in relations with individual countries. Although there are too many "ifs" in our assumption, over time, China-oriented economic and other interests may outweigh the continuing strategic distrust of it on the part of Southeast Asian countries.

Another scenario is also possible: the progressive strengthening of China forces the ASEAN countries to further strengthen their alliance with the United States, to accelerate the development of contacts with other non-regional powers and centers of power.

Today, China is already moving to openly play an anti-American game in the region, realizing what some observers believe is its "burning desire" for leadership in Asia. The whole question is how this leadership will be expressed and by what methods it will be achieved. In terms of development and economic growth, China is already the leader.

In the era of the Soviet-Chinese confrontation, Beijing was much more sympathetic to American policy in the Asia-Pacific region and Southeast Asia. At the current stage, the PRC disapproves of providing port facilities for the calls of the American fleet, and the Singapore airfield for landing American aircraft. During a visit to Thailand in 1999, Chinese leader Jiang Zemin talked about "gunboat diplomacy", "economic colonialism", and wondered "why the US is poking its nose into Asian affairs". Largely in defiance of the United States, Beijing supports the idea of a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia.

In 2001. Beijing is committed to buying rubber and rice from Thailand, which it does not particularly need, according to a reputable English newspaper. ⁶ Isn't it a demonstrative gesture of support for a country that was abandoned by the US administration "to the mercy of fate" in the midst of the 1997 crisis?

⁵ "The Far Eastern Economic Review", 10.06.1999, pp. 28-30.

⁶ "The Financial Times", 21.05.2001.

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One power rigidly demands that the ruling elites carry out urgently needed reforms, dismantle some structures of "capitalism for a narrow circle of friends", while the other shows a condescending understanding of national specifics, reaping political dividends.

China also provided loans and grants to Cambodian leader Hun Sen for 190 million yuan during his visit to Beijing in February 1999, although Cambodia is not one of the countries that Washington is particularly interested in today. In short, China has considerable opportunities to " buy " influence in the ASEAN countries.

What's next? China is changing, and the motivation for its actions will also change. WTO membership will have a strong deterrent effect on Beijing's Southeast Asia policy and approach to the United States.

Military-strategic component

Decades after the Nixon Doctrine was proclaimed, the United States still faces an urgent challenge-to increase the responsibility of regional countries for their security and encourage them to invest in improving regional defense infrastructure. American analysts in this regard draw attention to the fact that the operation "Desert Storm" in 1991 was so successful because Saudi Arabia upgraded its military facilities and brought them in line with NATO standards. In this context, for Southeast Asia, we can also talk about such a measure as the early placement of weapons and ammunition stocks in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, since the United States is unlikely to commit to large-scale participation (in Hour X) in land operations, the scale of such storage will be limited.

In Southeast Asia itself, Washington no longer requires permanent military bases - there are enough points of call that allow the US armed forces to be on the move, indicate their presence, and be "somewhere nearby". The latter meets both the political (as well as commercial) interests of the countries of the region, and Washington's desire to save money. One way or another, well-equipped docks and high-quality repair and maintenance services will be required.

The withdrawal of the US military from the Philippines in the first half of the 1990s at the request of the Philippine Senate, as it turned out, did not undermine the American position in Pacific Asia. It only made a dent in the national budget of this country. In May 1999, after a long pause, the Philippine Senate voted 18 to five in favor of the agreement, which, for the first time since 1996, authorized the conduct of large-scale military exercises in the Philippines, including joint exercises, as well as visits by US warships. But there was no return to a permanent presence.

With the evacuation of American bases, the system of military-political alliances and agreements in the Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asia region has become largely virtual. And it became virtual because it was not obvious or unrealized-

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external threats. The United States ' bilateral agreements with Thailand and the Philippines are still valid as legal documents that support American allied commitments.

But the very concepts of alliance are already being interpreted in a new way. The authoritative International Security magazine noted, for example, that "China views all alliances from a zero-sum perspective as designed to fight those who should be 'clearly identified as an enemy or foe'." This is the way Beijing views the Japan-US security treaty and, finally, such a (half-forgotten) structure as the ANZYUK five-party Agreement. The opposite approach is to look at things from the perspective of a "positive sum", when alliances are considered a tool for preventing aggression and preserving stability ^.7

In this regard, some American observers spoke in favor of joining the" virtual system of alliances "and Russia, since, from their point of view, China's territorial claims extend not only to the "South Sea region", but also, although to a lesser extent, to the territories adjacent, according to their descriptions, to " Manchuria"⁸ .

From our point of view, it is best for Russia to avoid participating in any combinations that have a pronounced anti-Chinese or, on the contrary, pro-Chinese orientation. Moscow should neither appear nor appear to be a quasi-ally of China in Southeast Asia, given our interest in increasing sales of Russian weapons and military equipment in this sub-region. Moreover, the very concept of a union is becoming a thing of the past. Small and medium-sized Southeast Asian countries will also completely ignore the construction of a trilateral alliance of Moscow, Beijing, and Delhi promoted by some romantically minded political scientists ^.9 (Note that there is no such" triangle "in nature, taking into account the reaction of the other two "angles" to triangular advances, the state of Sino-Indian relations, or, say, the following" any three countries taken at random one way or another, but some" triangle " yes will make up.) and in the idea of creating the "first integration center in the Asia-Pacific region" consisting of Russia, China and India. In the course of these large-scale constructions, such phenomena as the free trade zone within the ASEAN countries that has been being created for several decades, as well as the integration of Russia and the Central Asian members of the CIS, are overlooked.

However, most of the military-political and geostrategic layouts and estimates applied to Southeast Asia are purely hypothetical and very conditional. The economic problem is quite different. Financial and economic issues have gained such weight and urgency that rare reports of joint maneuvers and military exercises seem insignificant and routine. However, both military deglobalization (when military personnel from abroad are recalled to serve in their homeland) and economic internationalization did not stop what was once called "military preparations". So, in the summer of 2000 in

⁷ "International Security", Winter 1999/2000, p. 75.

⁸ "Orbis", Summer 1999, p. 252.

⁹ See: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20.11.2001.

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South-East Asia hosted the "Flying Fish" naval exercise with the participation of the United States, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. New threads are also being woven into the fabric of military cooperation. In December 2000, the military departments of the Philippines and the United States signed an agreement on cooperation on environmental issues, which provides for a program of measures to control the environment, neutralize toxic emissions. Of course, we are talking about nothing more than eliminating the harmful consequences of military activity itself.

Business environment-conflicts of interest and institutional maturity factor

Previously, there was a theory that the military presence of the United States and the West in general should protect the economic interests of multinational corporations in the developing world. Such a relationship is now difficult to see. Defending with weapons requires something alien and hostile, and the economic presence of cross-border businesses in Southeast Asia has become an integral part of the local landscape. An American Marine will not show up with a carbine to defend the rights of investors and shareholders-compatriots. Projecting military power to the region, so to speak, remotely influencing it, also does little to promote specific business interests.

The ASEAN countries have done much to create a favorable business environment and investment climate, attract investment, and are among the first countries in the developing world to learn the lessons of interdependence and the use of comparative advantages in the interregional division of labor. They have made great progress in this direction, but when the crisis of 1997 revealed the scale of unresolved problems, the institutional immaturity and lack of reform of economic mechanisms, it was a real discovery for many.

The analysis of the underlying causes of the 1997 shocks, conducted by a number of Western and domestic experts, drew attention to some specific features of the economic environment and business behavior in the ASEAN and Asia-Pacific countries.

The dominance of financial and industrial groups. The most disastrous consequences for the economies of the ASEAN countries were the monopoly dominance of financial and industrial groups and business conglomerates, whose participants, including banks, were bound by cross-ownership relations and mutual guarantees. This closed system redistributed - with the support of the ruling circles-all available economic resources in its favor. "Taikuns "(a local type of tycoon) often imposed their conditions on the foreign sector in the host country's economy, demanded and received "pay-offs".

Excessive investment inflows, easy money effect. The huge influx of financial resources to the ASEAN area has contributed to the development of unhealthy and economically harmful inclinations, inflated self-esteem,

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searchlight work. Somehow they came together with the idea, said the director of the Center for International and Strategic Studies (Jakarta) Yusuf Vanandi - one of the most respected analysts and politicians in the region - that annual 8% economic growth is "our birthright".

In the context of an oversupply of capital and cheap credit, both foreign and local banks did not properly assess borrowers, and lowered the bar of requirements in their desire to get any customers interested in borrowed resources.

Lack of a developed legal framework. The legislative framework of Indonesia, Thailand, and other ASEAN countries contains significant flaws that prevent the establishment of control over distressed financial institutions, the use of the institution of arbitration managers, and prevent the removal of management who have brought their enterprises to bankruptcy ^.10 Thanks to political connections and nationalist demagoguery, the former leadership often remains unsinkable. The shortcomings of the legislation did not allow declaring insolvency, promptly proceeding with the sale of assets (which were taken away) and debt collection.

"Herd instinct". Mistakes and miscalculations were made not only by the government circles and entrepreneurs of the Southeast Asian countries, not only by the receiving party, but also by the giving party. The peculiar effect of herd behavior, when banks and financial companies rush to new markets after their competitors, often acting blindly, was experienced by American and Western investors in general.

J. Sachs, director of the Harvard Institute for International Development, noted :" We experienced (initially) massive capital inflows (to Southeast Asia), which were based on highly optimistic estimates (of the potential of ASEAN member countries), and (subsequently) massive capital outflows, which were caused by nothing more than panic."

The ASEAN countries have fully experienced the "contagion effect", when foreign portfolio investors react to a crisis in one country by deciding to withdraw their capital from another, either located in the same region or having similar socio-economic characteristics. Latin American countries experienced something similar after the crisis in Mexico (the so-called "tequila effect").

Rapid diagnostics of economic development imbalances and defects in the ASEAN countries leads to a conclusion about the extent of the influence that the United States and other Western countries have had on the Eastern countries, the evolution and improvement of their institutional environment and legal framework, culture and ethics of doing business. However, the ASEAN countries had a rather limited historical period at their disposal, during which they could not break away from the not very good traditions of Eastern society and the state.

¹⁰ In Thailand, local senators (members of the upper house of Parliament) oppose the transfer of property of a bankrupt into the hands of foreigners and to this end reject amendments to the old law, which requires at least seven years for the transfer of property for debts to creditors. It is clear that the senators are protecting their own interests.

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ASEAN countries will have to rely on the United States and the West in the coming reconstruction of a badly under-reformed economy and social sphere, if they do not prefer autarky or populist policies laced with xenophobia, or a repeat of the 1997 crisis. Based on this, we should predict the future development of the entire complex of relations between the ASEAN countries and the United States.

In any case, it is possible to trace the success or failure of various models and approaches to economic reform in the ASEAN countries. For it can be assumed that there has never been a single, pan-Asean approach to overcoming the consequences of the crisis and entering the path of self-sustaining growth. It is difficult to expect that all tasks will be completed at 100%. But those countries that demonstrate the greatest commitment and the highest financial and economic discipline will be better off.

If the ASEAN countries do not re - adjust their political and economic mechanisms, they will simply turn away from them, turning to other regions-Eastern Europe or the CIS, for example. For strategic reasons alone, as was the case during the Cold War, regimes in crisis will not be helped.

TNCs suffer losses

In the post-crisis period, the period of economic recovery, the attractiveness index of the ASEAN area fluctuates depending on the situation in individual countries. Some of them, paradoxically enough, clearly infringe on the interests of Western corporations, including American multinational giants, which have huge levers of influence. For example, in January 1998, the Indonesian Government and the state-owned local power grid company PNN offered to pay off dollar-denominated loans owed to corporations such as Unocal, Atlantic Richfield, Edison Mission Energy of California,and others. Indonesian rupiahs at the exchange rate used in the preparation of the draft state budget for the 1997/1998 financial year, i.e. before the collapse of the national currency. Taking into account the value of the rupee at that time, it appeared that the Indonesian side was only going to repay a fourth of its debt. ¹¹ A similar notification was received by Arco Indonesia, which supplies gas to privately owned power plants in East Java.

American corporations have tried to challenge the proposed terms of the deal in local courts, but without much success.

Whatever defenses multinational corporations may have at home, they remain vulnerable to civil unrest. In northern Sumatra, separatist rebels damaged a pipeline and gas production facilities at Mestoro in the spring of 2001.-

¹¹ "The Far Eastern Economic Review", 19.03.1998, pp. 42-44.

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waiting for Arun, which caused a fire that raged for ten days. Exson Mobil was forced to stop gas production for several months. Total losses from the cessation of production and disruption of export supplies amounted to at least $ 300 million. Since July 2001, the Indonesian Government has had to deploy a significant commando force to protect the company's gas fields and personnel around the clock.

Problems arise not only at the provincial level, whose authorities have gained new powers. The central government also hinders foreign business by disrupting the implementation of the previously announced privatization program, risking losing World Bank loans. The sale of property to foreigners at its market price is opposed by a broad coalition of parliamentarians and governors who claim any property located in their territories, and even employees of the Bank Restructuring Agency actually sabotage the process ^.12 The disintegration of power in Indonesia creates huge difficulties for American corporations, when provincial leaders issue ultimatums to renegotiate mining contracts that provide for additional deductions in favor of provincial authorities. An interesting and revealing fact-in terms of illustrating the complexity of the world picture and the functioning of global institutions-is the following fact: when the IMF demanded that Indonesia freeze the implementation of 15 of the most expensive infrastructure projects in order to reduce budget expenditures, it was projects with the participation of American corporations that were hit.

In Burma, the Atlantic Richfield Oil Corporation was hit by anti-Government insurgency; security concerns forced it to first shut down its operations and then evacuate its staff altogether. It was replaced by Malaysia's Petronas ¹³ .

Multinational corporations are thus faced with huge political risks, not all of which can be fully insured even by a specialized federal OPIC agency .

ASEAN multilateral Diplomacy

ASEAN, as a collective organization that has long established itself on the world stage, conducts negotiations and maintains a dialogue with a number of international institutions, defending the interests of its members in them. The subject of negotiations with the G8 is international trade, the functioning of financial systems, and the coordination of macroeconomic policies. A separate problem is the reduction of the "digital section" already mentioned above.

In response to the concerns expressed by the ASEAN member States (as well as other developing and newly industrialized States) about the increase in the digital divide, the G8 has established a special Session of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

¹² "Business Week", 19.11.2001, p. 39.

¹³ "The Economist", 20.01.2001, pp. 62-63.

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a joint working group on digital technologies that develops relevant recommendations in the scientific and information fields. It turns out that Russia, as a member of the G8, is acting together with the United States on the side of developed industrial democracies, although its capabilities are not so great and Russia itself can also become a recipient of such assistance.

The Group of Eight is closely intertwined with WTO issues and efforts to integrate Southeast Asian countries more closely into the world trading system. ASEAN, as a regional grouping, petitioned the WTO to simplify and speed up the process of admission to the World Trade Organization of its new members-Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The subject of disagreements between ASEAN and the old industrial countries (primarily the United States) is the issue of labor legislation in Southeast Asia, and the latter oppose their inclusion in the agenda of WTO meetings.

Issues such as reform of the international financial architecture, regulation of hedge funds, movement of short-term capital (hot money), currency speculation, money laundering, and provision of adequate access to commodity markets for developing countries are also discussed with the WTO and the G8.

The five original founding members of ASEAN fully follow the WTO rules on the customs valuation of goods in mutual trade, which creates a uniform regime within this zone, other WTO procedures and standards, while the rest of the ASEAN members are gradually switching to them.

East Asian Dimension-an alternative to Pax Americana

When ASEAN as a group or its member countries go global, dealing with organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF, they have to reckon with the prevailing influence of the United States, the irritation about which regularly breaks out.

In addition to" family "cooperation on a sub - regional basis, i.e. on the basis of ASEAN, the association countries also have another" option " - in a sense, the East Asian antithesis of the American-centered world. The materialized product of East Asian diplomacy was such a forum as the ASEAN + three (Japan, China, South Korea), the initiative of which belonged to South Korea. The ASEAN + three initiative is in tune with Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's vision of an "East Asian Community". It provides for the cooperation of the peoples of the "yellow race" (although these words are not spoken out loud), who were able to create dynamic economies. Some see this as a manifestation of" cultural regionalism", referring to the general civilizational features of the East Asian states. The ASEAN + three scheme is already in operation: a series of meetings of the Association's Foreign, Economic and finance ministers and their counterparts from Japan, China and South Korea have taken place. The ASEAN platform also hosted a conference of the heads of Government of these States.

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The crisis of 1997 actualized the question of raising the level of financial and economic cooperation between the countries of Southeast Asia and the Asia - Pacific region and of creating in the future even the Asian Monetary Fund (AVF) - the East Asian equivalent of the IMF. However, such an ambitious task proved too much for the countries concerned. In 2000, at the ASEAN Summit in Brunei, the finance ministers of the Association's member countries, as well as the heads of the finance departments of Japan, China and South Korea, agreed to coordinate the activities of their central banks in terms of allocating part of their reserves to help countries in the region experiencing solvency problems.

Although, as we can see, the countries of the association are involved in the search for mechanisms and resources that can reduce their dependence on the United States and international financial institutions under the control of the latter, these plans do not pose a threat to partnership with the United States. In any case, Washington has expressed its public support for the plans to establish the AWF.

ASEAN, USA, Russia

As for the overall US approach to Russia's role in ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific region, according to the American researcher, Washington essentially "ignores Russia as a factor in Asian politics", which "undermines the hopes of some Russian analysts to overcome Russia's isolation in the Asia-Pacific region with the help of the United States." ¹⁴ In the truest sense of the word, there is no need to talk about isolation - this is too strong an expression. At the same time, the root of the problem is not someone else's machinations, but our own objective weakness. In addition, it is naive to rely on comprehensive support in Southeast Asia, especially since the ASEAN countries themselves are unlikely to allow others to block cooperation with the group15 .

Russia's success depends crucially on its economic potential, economic flexibility, creditworthiness, and the strength of the corporate sector, which is becoming transnational. Sometimes it seems that we could use a greater degree of realism in assessing both our own capabilities and the actual balance of power in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. Obsession with the idea of fighting individual hegemony has led to the proclamation of Southeast Asia as an independent center of power, opposing americanocentrism. Ironically, this concept was especially actively played out precisely at a time when the leaders of the region's crisis-stricken countries were completely absorbed in mundane economic concerns and "knocking out" stabilization loans from the IMF and the World Bank.

In our opinion, Southeast Asia is not a full-fledged power center and will not become one in the near or medium term. Anti-Americanism as a common denominator does not work here, and the formation of a unified approach to China is also not on the agenda. No Cohesive-

¹⁴ "The Journal of East Asian Affairs", Spring/Summer 1999, p. 89.

¹⁵ See more: Grebenshchikov E. S. ASEAN, the United States and Russia-New Pacific Partners? - "USA-EPI", 1992, N 12.

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This is reflected in the growing hostility between Indonesia and Singapore at the official level, the undercurrents between Malaysia and the Philippines, unresolved territorial disputes, the lack of a unified ASEAN platform on monetary and financial issues, and the lack of a coordinated approach to US actions in Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan. Under these conditions, who will form a center of power on the basis of ASEAN and whose patterns will it be designed according to?

However, the inadequate perception of existing realities is characteristic not only for some of the former and current Moscow politicians. Unfortunately, the United States also gave a distorted interpretation of some of the steps taken by Moscow during the presidency of Vladimir Putin. In the United States, for example, some observers took his visit to Vietnam in March 2001 almost as another proof of the "Sovietization" of Russian politics. In fact, Russia's relations with Vietnam have been relieved of the heavy burden of the Cambodian problem and have become more rational and consistent with economic realities.

A logical step in this direction was the intention announced by the President of the Russian Federation in October 2001 to leave the Cam Ranh base. Although officially referred to modestly as a "logistics point" and used only sporadically, Cam Ranh served as a broader symbol, the regalia of superpower. This fact was clearly captured by the adherents of the old thinking and old politics, focused on struggle and confrontation. Cam Ranh was dear to them, of course, precisely as an anti-American outpost, despite its proximity to China. Even the maintenance of this base, which was once leased free of charge to the Russian military, required considerable expenses. At the same time, the Vietnamese leadership raised the issue of switching to the paid use of Cam Ranh, which "pulled" several hundred million dollars a year. In this situation, both the head of the Russian Defense Ministry and the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister spoke in favor of Russia's withdrawal from Cam Ranh. This decision seemed both fair and logical, especially in light of the poor state of naval bases on Russian territory proper. Such a move absolutely does not mean that the Russian fleet will be cut off from the open sea. There is always an opportunity to be serviced on a commercial basis, which is also resorted to by the Americans themselves, who have so far managed without permanent bases. For Russia, it is more important to get contracts in Southeast Asia and add to the portfolio of orders for its leading corporations than to conduct expensive flag demonstrations in remote waters.

Preoccupied with pressing domestic problems, Russia has not built a system of developed and extensive ties with most of the Southeast Asian countries, but there are no special problems in these relations either. For the United States, the situation is radically different. The implementation of reforms and the state of the economic environment in the ASEAN countries is an important issue affecting the state of the US stock market. Worsening of the socio-economic crisis in some countries

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This can lead to their unwanted radicalization and bring losses to American corporations.

Today, the United States is facing a crisis of power and centrifugal tendencies in Indonesia, sliding the largest Southeast Asian country into chaos, which not only multiplies the number of victims of violence, but also leads to violations of the rights of foreign investors. And this is in the same country that in the mid-1960s Washington managed to turn from an ultra-nationalist and left-wing extremist line towards economic pragmatism and, by and large, rational politics.

Even when Washington seemed to have achieved the highest degree of influence in the ASEAN area, its position does not look so invincible and impregnable.

The growing challenge from China should encourage not only Washington, but also Tokyo to find new partners to maintain or prevent a sharp change in the balance of power in such a key and promising area as Southeast Asia. And the Association countries, for all the importance of their multi-channel and multi-level dialogue with the United States, have also always preferred the multilateral equation, which implies strengthening its weak links. And this is clearly the case with relations with Russia. To strengthen its position in the region, Russia will not need to either play along with the Americans in everything, or oppose them. At the same time, it can be argued that to the extent that the United States takes into account Russia's special interests in Central and Central Asia, which are normal and natural interests, and not those that destroyed the Soviet Empire at the time, Russia should also take into account similar interests as much as possible. the interests of the United States in other regions, while not forgetting the difference in potentials and capabilities of the two powers, only one of which remains a superpower in Southeast Asia.

For some time now, Russia, South-East Asia, and the United States seem to be in a single conceptual space. The ideologically motivated polarization of Southeast Asia has become a thing of the past. If earlier, in comparison with the ASEAN countries, the USSR was economically in the anti-worlds, in which it involved other countries, now both the Russian Federation and Southeast Asia, in principle, live and develop on the same market planet and struggle to solve surprisingly similar problems.

After September 11, 2001

Influenced by the events of autumn 2001, some analysts began to talk about a return in world politics to the times of the "big three", when the fate of the world was decided in Washington, Moscow and London. One can argue about this, but analyzing the problems of Southeast Asia, I would like to state the following. The role of Washington's partnership with Moscow is growing due to the multifaceted reaction of the public and political circles of Southeast Asian countries to attacks on terrorist bases in Afghanistan, a reaction that is largely (although certainly not to a decisive extent) dictated by a misinterpretation

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islamic solidarity and the fight against American hegemony. While generally supporting the fight against global terrorism, influential circles in a number of Southeast Asian countries considered it undesirable for the United States to participate directly in military operations; for many, this was a war with fellow Muslims. Others suggested that Washington should limit itself to providing military and financial assistance.

As for such a member of the aforementioned troika as the United Kingdom, it has long played a significant role in Southeast Asia, and some military-political mechanisms with its participation have been preserved here, which can be quickly reanimated. By the way, another significant member of the possible coalition for the defense of civilization, against extremism, will probably be Australia. However, it is easier to name the countries and regimes that will remain on the sidelines.

In order to strengthen its influence over the moderate circles of the ASEAN member states and strengthen the latter's position, Washington will obviously have to increase its assistance to some of them so that the deterioration of the socio-economic situation does not lead to radicalization and the rise of anti-American sentiment. The global struggle against extremist and separatist movements (which Beijing also faces) has so far somewhat mitigated the severity of Sino-American contradictions in Southeast Asia and Pacific Asia, although it does not eliminate the Chinese challenge to the US positions.

So, the September tragedy forced Washington strategists to pay closer attention to the Asean zone, which they have long sought. At the same time, the capitals of the association's member countries immediately began to complain that this attention was unenlightened, sudden, opportunistic and even militaristic. Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri has called on the United States to translate the war on terrorism into a war on poverty.

The President of the Philippines once stated that ASEAN itself should localize hotbeds of tension and conduct counterinsurgency operations in border areas. Later, however, Manila agreed to the participation of the US military contingent in actions to neutralize Islamic separatists directly on Philippine territory. Washington was also expected to restore damaged relations with the Indonesian military, which was accused of violating human rights.

At the same time, the ruling elites of the ASEAN countries quickly seized the opportunity to demand concessions in exchange for "verbal solidarity" in a number of areas that ranged from monetary and financial issues to human rights issues. It has become very convenient to put the fight against domestic opponents in the context of a global campaign against terrorism.

As always, the bar of demands on Washington was raised high, but in part these demands looked justified. But the US also had counter-claims.

The American side made several demarches in connection, as it was alleged, with Jakarta's unwillingness to seriously engage in the identification and use of weapons of mass destruction.

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blocking financial sources and channels that fuel the activities of international extremism. For example, advertisements of the "Islamic Youth Movement", which was looking for "heroes for the armed struggle in Afghanistan", were published completely unhindered in the Indonesian press, and all sympathizers of this struggle were invited to transfer money to the account indicated in the newspaper in a certain bank. Washington found that none of the Indonesian authorities (the Bank of Indonesia, the Ministry of Defense and Security, the Prosecutor's Office) reacted properly to such facts for a long time, and did nothing for a long time in response to the transfer to Indonesia of lists of organizations and persons suspected of aiding or preparing terrorist acts. ¹⁶ As a result, the maximum that the Indonesian side did with great delay was to send instructions to a number of banks to report all "suspicious transactions". In this case, however, it could be not so much about hidden sympathies for bin Laden, but about the inaction of the bureaucratic apparatus, which did not function well in the more prosperous years for Indonesia.

However, despite some rough edges and mutual claims, there can be little doubt that the dialogue and partnership between the United States and ASEAN will survive temporary difficulties, especially if they fit seamlessly into the context of broad and constructive regionalism and globalism, within which Russia, another Pacific power, has every chance to take its rightful place.

¹⁶ "Business Week", 26.11.2001, p. 68.

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