(GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF SOCIO - ECONOMIC AND IDEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL DOCTRINES OF MODERN TIMES)

The objective production and economic process of capitalist concentration, as well as the conscious adaptation of the bourgeois superstructure to this process, pushed by the urgent need to develop an alternative to the socialist perspective, which became especially acute with the advent of real socialism, led to the emergence of state - monopoly tendencies that have become a defining feature of modern capitalism. State - monopoly capitalism is capitalism at that stage of its history when objectively and subjectively developing tendencies and elements of socialization in the economic and social spheres take on the scale of nationalization, understood in the broadest sense of the word, when social forces interested in preserving the bourgeois social system try to adapt to the objective process of this socialization, trying to subordinate it to the state. your interests. Nationalization, being basically an economic category, a consequence and result of the development of capital from individual to collective capitalist ownership, 1 represents the highest stage and form of concentration of production. V. I. Lenin drew attention to "steps towards greater monopolization and greater nationalization of production"2 . At the same time, the process of nationalization covers all other spheres of social relations, because in the conditions of large-scale production, the scale of social problems radically increases, which sharply reduces the scope of applicability of the private capitalist individual method of solving them.

The most profound internal contradiction between state - monopoly tendencies and state-monopoly capitalism as a system and essence of the modern bourgeois system is rooted in the fact that objectively economic and social nationalization accelerates the process of eliminating a society based on private property principles, although capitalism itself is objectively and subjectively directed in its development along state - monopoly lines precisely in order to avoid the socialist revolution. Therefore, the principles of nationalization are consciously introduced by the bourgeoisie on the one hand, and on the other hand, they are considered dangerous "steps towards socialism". These two sides of the antagonistic process can be represented either by rival political groupings of the bourgeoisie, or by the same circles of the bourgeoisie, at different times and in different contexts.

1 "Political Economy of modern monopolistic capitalism", Vol. I. Moscow, 1970, p. 229.

2 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 31, p. 449.

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different circumstances that do not look at the content and forms of state-monopoly policy in the same way. But on the whole, the state-monopoly course defeats traditional liberalism and conservatism with their voluntaristic, individualistic concepts.

In the United States, the genesis of socio-economic and ideological-political doctrines of state-monopoly content has a long history, which began in the 80s-90s of the last century. It was during this period that the origins of the modern bourgeois ideology of the United States3 were born . From the end of the 19th century until the First World War, classical liberalism was already significantly transformed into the new liberalism of the era when monopoly capitalism developed into state - monopoly capitalism. The reorientation took place mainly around one issue - assessing the role of the state in the socio - economic and ideological-political life of society. The liberalism of the "laissez faire" era is gradually giving way to a new liberalism aimed at bourgeois reformism and the expansion of the role of the state.

As early as the end of the 19th century, certain measures were adopted that were in the nature of state-monopoly regulation, which, in particular ,was reflected in the antitrust legislation. 4 They were further developed during the period that began with the active activity of bourgeois reformers led by T. Roosevelt and ended with the rapid strengthening of trends towards the development of monopoly capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism during the years of "new freedom" by W. Wilson and the First World War. This was the time of the first flourishing of bourgeois reformism in the history of American monopoly capitalism .5 At that time, a number of theoretical and journalistic works appeared that justified statist views, among which a prominent place was occupied by the work of the largest bourgeois sociologist and political scientist of the beginning of the XX century, G. Crowley, "Prospects for American Life"6 .

American bourgeois literature, while not accepting or rejecting Lenin's theory of state-monopoly capitalism, nevertheless reflected new, statist phenomena in the evolution of US capitalism at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, 7 and some authors were clearly influenced by Marxism - Leninism8 . Bourgeois authors also recorded the emergence of a new liberalism at the turn of the century .9 Neoliberalism has not yet become a complete and complete system of ideology, politics and everyday practice in modern times, because it is adequate to realize the need for the full dissemination of the principles of statism (that is, statalism).-

3 V. V. Sogrin. Istoki sovremennoi bourgeoisnoy ideologii v SSHA [The Origins of modern bourgeois ideology in the USA]. Moscow, 1975.

4 O. A. Zhidkov. USA: Antitrust legislation in the service of monopolies, Moscow, 1976.

5 I. A. Belyavskaya. Bourgeois Reformism in the USA (1900-1914). Moscow, 1968; A. A. Kislova. Social Christianity in the United States. From the history of social thought. 90-e gody XIX v.-30-e gody XX V. M. 1974; A.V. Valyuzhenich. American liberalism. Illusions and Realities, Moscow, 1976.

6 H. Croly. The Promise of American Life. N. Y. 1909.

7 R. Wiebe. The Search for Order. 1877 - 1920. N. Y. 1967; S. Fine. Laissez- Faire and General-Welfare State. A Study of Conflict in American Thought. 1865 - 1901. Ann Arbor. 1969; H. Girvetz. The Evolution of Liberalism. L. 1969.

8 The American historian M. Rothbard even uses such terms as" state-corporate capitalism "and" the system of state - monopoly capitalism " (M. Rothbard. War Collectivism in World War I. "A New History of Leviathan". Ed. by R. Radosh and M. Rothbard. N. Y. 1972, pp. 66 - 67; см. также: J. Weinstein. The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State: 1900 - 1918. Boston, 1968).

9 A. Hamby. Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism. N. Y. 1973, p. XIV.

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It was only with the onset of the general crisis of capitalism that the bourgeoisie was given a new, bourgeois-collectivist approach to solving socio - economic problems.

Considering the main stages of socio-economic and political development of the United States in the era of modern history, we will focus first of all on the period of 1918 - 1929, which probably presents the greatest difficulties in terms of analyzing state-monopoly capitalism. In modern American bourgeois historiography, the question of the "historical connection" of the 1920s is sharply debated: was this time a rejection of the ideology and practice of the "progressive era" and the antipode of the subsequent "new deal", or, conversely, the specified decade should be considered in the spirit of continuity as a natural continuation of Wilsonism and a launching pad for Roosevelt's reforms?- x years? The first point of view is held in the works of D. Hicks, R. Hofstedter, and A. Schlesinger (Jr.)10 , the second one is defended by A. Link 11 and especially actively by a group of" new left " historians of the 60s-70s 12 .

In fact, how to fit the 20s into the overall concept of the historical development of the United States in the era of state-monopoly capitalism? Was the American capitalism of the 20s state-monopolistic? Did not the dismantling of state-monopoly capitalism take place in the context of the "normality"that came at the beginning of this decade? Solving economic and socio-political problems with an emphasis on their nationalization or on their private nature-this is the main dilemma of the historical development of the United States at that time, which was not given a clear, definite answer in the 20s, unlike the entire subsequent development of the United States, when a statist, nationalized approach to solving them became the prevailing line despite the confrontation with her.

From the very beginning of the 1920s, Woodrow Wilson's liberal statism was contrasted with the Republican doctrine of limited state participation in the socio-economic process, which became predominant in the conditions of temporary, partial stabilization of capitalism, which, as is known, was overly exaggerated by ideologists of individualism. H. Hoover, who became Secretary of Commerce in 1921, believed that "the most important question of all was to determine whether governments should continue to own and manage the means of production and exchange after the war."13
The model of socio-economic and ideological-political development of the USA in the 20s from the point of view of analyzing the genesis and evolution of state - monopoly doctrines and principles turns out to be very peculiar and complex. The "dismantling" of state-monopoly capitalism did not take place, because only military regulatory mechanisms were dismantled, the rejection of which, quite natural in peacetime, is not an absolute indicator of the weakening of the process of state-monopoly development, although the war undoubtedly forced it at one time, and the situation of the 20s is all too obvious forcing factors were decisively weakened.

Many facts speak about the irreversibility of the nationalization of the industrial and economic process in the USA in the 1920s. Continued

10 R. Hofstadter. The Age of Reform. From Bryan to FDR. N. Y. 1956; A. Schlesinger, Jr. Age of Roosevelt. The Crisis of the Old Order. 1919 - 1933. Cambridge. 1957; J. Hicks. Republican Ascendancy 1921 - 1933. N. Y. 1960.

11 A. Link. What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920's? "Twentieth-Century America: Recent Interpretations". Ed. by B. Bernstein and A. Matusow. N. Y. 1969.

12 M. Rothbard. Herbert Hoover and the Myth of Laissez-Faire. "A New History of Leviathan".

13 J. Hicks. Op. cit., p. IX.

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increased concentration and monopolization, which is the basis of state-monopolistic development. The economic organization of business has increased. The creation of business associations was strongly supported by the government itself. G. Hoover was most actively engaged in their cultivation. These associations centrally collected and disseminated information on prices, credit, markets, standardization, production methods, insurance, labor relations, etc. They also served as an important link between the relevant business sectors and the federal and state governments. Their activities often ran counter to antitrust laws, but in 1925 the U.S. Supreme Court, which consisted mainly of traditional individualists, supported by the same individualist G. Hoover, recognized it as completely legal.

The objective needs of production continued to drive forward the processes of nationalization. Fundamental state-monopoly measures adopted before and during the First World War, such as the XVI Constitutional Amendment, which came into force in 1913 and authorized the introduction of a Federal Income Tax, the Federal Reserve System Act of 1913, which is still the main institution for the nationalization of banking activities14 , the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1914. d. The Federal Trade Commission, which regulates the functioning of corporations engaged in interstate commerce-all this turned out to be a long-term statistic tool, an organic part of the structure of modern American capitalism. 15 Moreover, Republican leaders who called the country "back to normalcy" made their own additions to the emerging structure of state-monopoly regulation of the economy, establishing in 1921 the positions of comptroller general and budget director16, which indicated the complication of the country's financial economy and the need for federal intervention in this area.

The laws of development of the capitalist economy are such that even in the conditions of the rise in production, characteristic of most of the 1920s, a number of sectors of the economy dragged out a miserable existence and required state support. These included railway transport, coal industry, agriculture, etc. The history of the decade under review is filled with state actions to "cure" these chronically ill sectors of the economy. Congress and the executive branch were particularly concerned with the farming problem. In the agricultural sector, the state-monopoly principles of regulation were not only not weakened in comparison with the pre-war period, but even strengthened 17.

Along with the" sick " industries, the state also paid attention to some thriving, including new and very promising, business areas. It is enough to point out state participation in the construction of highways, without which the all-powerful automobile industry would simply be impossible, as well as measures for state regulation of radio broadcasting .18 In the 1920s, increasingly wide circles of state-political figures and businessmen recognized the need for a publicized solution to the problem of hydropower. Even though Presidents Coolidge and Hoover vetoed it

14 Yu. I. Bobrakov. USA: Federal Reserve System and Economic Regulation, Moscow, 1971.

15 " USA: State and Economy. The mechanism of state-monopolistic regulation of the economy", Moscow, 1976.

16 J. Hicks. Op. cit., p. 51.

17 E. F. Yazkov. Farm movement in the USA (1918-1929). Moscow, 1974.

18 "A New History of Leviathan", p. 124.

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Despite the two-time congressional approval of the Tennessee Valley Hydro Bill, the monopolies, most notably Ford, were unable to get their hands on it. The fight ended in a draw at that stage.

"Finally," writes D. Hicks, "businesses sought government help in disciplining the unions, whose growing power they feared and which they wanted to curtail." 19 In the decade of the heyday of private monopoly individualism, the state also dealt with the problem of unemployment (as evidenced by the convening of a special presidential conference by W. Harding in 1925) and the regulation of labor relations in the railway transport, coal and steel industries20, not to mention the traditional repressive activities of the judicial corps 21 .

Nevertheless, the 1920s are significant not only for the fact that state-monopoly processes objectively continued to develop and even to some extent subjectively pushed, but also for the clear predominance of not state-but private monopoly principles in all spheres of public life. This is the specific feature of this decade. In the 1920s, US capitalism demonstrated the power of private ownership for the last time in its history. This was precisely the meaning of the return to" normalcy " proclaimed in 1920 by Republican leaders and largely achieved.

Marxism-Leninism has long debunked the pretentious claims of bourgeois ideologues in the United States about the" exclusivity " of the American way, convincingly proving that the United States is basically the same capitalist country as the bourgeois states of the Old World. But American capitalism, of course, has important specific features, which are clearly evident before 1929. Without going into details, we will point out that its most important feature is that in the United States the main cell of capitalism - private property-functioned much longer and more reliably in a cleaner form, with a minimum of state intervention, which, despite the bourgeois nature of the state, carries a collectivist principle, which was considered by private owners as something if not something else. alien, then, in any case, not very desirable, as an anomaly.

There was such a situation when the objective processes of nationalization did not find subjective forcing, they developed mainly spontaneously, implicitly. The predominant part of the US bourgeoisie, as long as its affairs were going well, as long as it did not take seriously and did not fully realize the socio-economic challenge posed by the socialist state, as long as the problem of the collapse of the world order created by the imperialist Versailles-Washington system did not share statism, strenuously promoting the private-property virtues of "solid individualism". In the 1920s, this was the real method of activity and thinking of the bourgeoisie and the prevailing part of society. It is no accident that the ideological and political banner of that time was the doctrines set forth in Hoover's rather banal pamphlet "American Individualism." 22
During the period of" prosperity", neither Republicans nor Democrats developed state-monopoly methods for solving socio-economic problems. The need for this is due to the conditions specified in-

19 J. Hicks. Op. cit., p. 50.

20 R. Zieger. Republicans and Labor. 1919 - 1929. Lexington. 1969.

21 N. V. Sivachev, Legal regulation of labor relations in the USA, Moscow, 1972, pp. 22-25.

22 H. Hoover. American Individualism. Garden City. 1923.

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chin was not yet realized. The Republican Platform of 1924 stated: "The prosperity of the American nation rests on the power of private initiative, which has fostered a spirit of independence and self-reliance. The Republican Party, as always, opposes all attempts to involve the government in business affairs. " 23 Among the leaders of the business world, of course, there were also opponents of individualistic extremes. Swope, A. Sloane, E. Filene, O. Young, et al. 24 . But there were not many of them, and their "enlightened individualism" also did not go beyond the establishment of ethical standards of "fair competition" and more socially oriented management (corporate management). "Even the bolder supporters of liberalism," A. Schlesinger concludes, "began to feel disillusioned by the end of the decade." 25
It took the U.S. bourgeoisie through the crash of 1929 to realize that the time had come when private monopoly principles were losing ground. "The discrepancy between the intensive deepening of the internal contradictions of capitalist reproduction, which develops on a private monopoly basis, and the weakening of state-monopoly regulatory elements takes revenge for itself by the special force of the explosion of these contradictions in the crisis of 1929-1933." 26
The period of 1929-1945 came. V. I. Lenin pointed out that wars and upheavals accelerate the process of state-monopoly development. The crisis of 1929-1933 was just such a decisive accelerator for the United States in the development of monopoly capitalism into state - monopoly capitalism. It laid bare a host of economic, social, political, and ideological problems that required either a bourgeois-state solution or, what the bourgeoisie most feared, a socialist alternative. During the years of the crisis, a deep contradiction emerged between the urgent need for nationalization and the tenacity of the traditional private monopoly, individualistic ideology. The active role of the ideological and political superstructure has had a very clear impact-in a negative way for capitalism. This is again explained not by the mythical features of the "American soul", but by purely material factors - the US bourgeoisie has achieved too much under the banner of a modernized "laissez faire", under the slogans of"solid individualism". Some consciously clung to the ideology and psychological images of yesterday, while others did not know what to do, overcome by panic. The official circles headed by President Hoover, while remaining essentially on the basis of the principles of traditional individualism, still hoped for the magic power of the business enterprise of the American businessman. They expected that "prosperity "was about to appear" around the corner "again, and then hasty" socialist", that is, state-monopoly, innovations would only turn out to be an excessively large and unnecessary price to pay for fear.

American bourgeois historians are still engaged in a lively discussion about the extent of Hoover's statisticization during the crisis .27 Among them, the most clear and critical position on statism is taken

23 "National Party Platforms, 1840 - 1972". Compiled by D. Johnson and K. Porter Urbana. 1973, p. 263.

24 "The 1920's. Problems and Paradoxes". Ed. by M. Plesur. Boston 1969 pp. 117 - 119.

25 A. Schlesinger, Jr. Op. cit., p. 142.

26 " State-monopoly capitalism. General features and features " M. 1975, pp. 21-22.

27 P. DegIer. Ordeal of Herbert Hoover. "Twentieth-Century America: Recent Interpretations"; ejusd. The Third American Revolution. Ibid.; A. Romasco. Poverty of Abundance. Hoover. The Nation. The Depression. N. Y. 1965; H. Warren. Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression. N. Y. 1967.

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Hoover is mentioned in the works of R. Hofstedter, A. Schlesinger, and A. Romasco. The latter insists that the worldview of the Hooverists did not meet the needs of the time. "Most of them," he quips, " when they were appointed to either the cabinet or the head of some government agency, they looked as if they had just been interrupted from reading American Individualism. "28
The decisive factors that influenced the course of American history in the 1930s were the severe economic crisis and prolonged depression; the socio-economic and ideological-political successes of building socialism in the USSR, which for the first time showed with such a high degree of convincing the advantages of socialism over capitalism on the entire front; the revolutionary-democratic upsurge all over the world, including and the rise of democratic, radical-progressive movements in the United States; the threat of fascism, which tried to direct the social discontent of the masses and entire nations along the ultra-reactionary path; the collapse of the pacifist illusions of the previous decade and the intensified imperialist struggle for the redivision of the world.

All these circumstances posed new challenges for the American bourgeoisie. Hoover and his entourage were clearly not suitable for bold experimentation based on expanding the functions of the state. This is how Hoover defined his credo in his last State of the Union address to Congress at the height of the crisis, on December 6, 1932, that is, after his defeat, when pre-election politicking did not significantly affect the course of thought and least distorted the true views of Hooverism: "Our state It has a unique history and consciously devotes itself to specific ideals of freedom and faith in the inviolable sanctity of the individual human spirit. Moreover, the existence and proper functioning of our State, aimed at preserving orderly freedom and stimulating progress, depends on the preservation of a sense of responsibility by States, municipalities, institutions and individuals. We have created our own special system of individualism, which should not be dissolved in any state actions, because it has brought more achievements than those of any other country. Socially and economically, the principles of our American system and the springs of progress are such that we must allow the free play of social and economic forces within the limits of equal opportunity, and at the same time encourage the initiative and enterprise of our people. By maintaining this balance, the Federal Government does not grant privileges to any individual or group. It should act as a regulator, not as a participant in social and economic life. " 29
With such traditionalist views on the role of the state, it was impossible to stay in power in those conditions, as the 1932 elections proved. With the change of groups of bourgeois leaders at the helm of the state, which took place in 1932-1933, the objective processes of nationalization, which were urgently put on the agenda by the crisis of 1929-1933, gained wide scope for development in the activities of a new galaxy of ideologists and politicians of the American bourgeoisie, who began to institutionalize state - monopoly capitalism. Soviet American studies has sufficiently covered the socio-economic and political development of the United States in recent years.

28 A. Romasco. Op. cit., p. 146.

29 "State of the Union Messages of the President. 1790 - 1966". Ed. by F. Israel. Vol. 3. N. Y. 1967, p. 2803.

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F. Roosevelt's "new deal" period 30 . This allows us to focus only on the general problems of the development of state-monopoly doctrines and practices at the specified time.

In a historically short period of time, the New Deal significantly changed the socio - political structure of the United States in a state-monopolistic direction. Almost all measures of the "new deal" felt extreme, there was an afterburner. Fear for the safety of their class positions proved to be a great teacher for individualistic capitalists, who, under the blows of harsh reality, converted to the bourgeois-collectivist faith. F. Roosevelt's" New Deal " was most characterized by two interrelated features. The first was the forced intervention of the state in the process of economic development. It has found its expression in the creation of an extensive mechanism of state regulation of banking, financial and stock exchange activities, industry and agriculture, and in the giant hydroelectric power industry. Government of the Russian Federation Roosevelt did not resort to nationalization, as many bankers and industrialists feared, and this had a calming effect on the business world.

The introduction of broad state regulation of the economy was only one side of the"new deal". The strengthening of statism as a direct consequence of the economic crisis of 1929-1933 turned out to be a phenomenon inherent in the entire capitalist world. This process was most active and ugly in the fascist states. Fascism, like the New deal, was based on a state-monopoly platform, pushing the course of state-monopoly development even more decisively with the help of total regulation and militarization of the economy and an attack on the vital interests of the working people. Therefore, it is impossible to characterize state - monopolistic development by production and economic indicators alone. Although, guided by this one-sided criterion, some contemporaries initially equated fascism in Germany and Italy with the "new deal" in the United States, misunderstood both phenomena .31 The spread of this misconception was facilitated by the fact that fascism in 1933-1934 had not yet had time to properly demonstrate its reactionary - chauvinist, militaristic essence in state practice, and the "new deal" at its first stage emphasized economic, rather than social aspects, because its creators initially believed that the rapid development of the New deal would soon be achieved. economic recovery will automatically resolve the most pressing social problems.

Meanwhile, in the United States, a completely different version of the state-monopoly model developed from fascism, despite the fact that the sprouts of real fascism appeared in this country, which, due to many circumstances, did not receive much development. The "New Deal" was not only an economic regulation, although the latter may not necessarily have a fascist appearance. Another integral feature of the" new deal " was deep and broad social maneuvering, which resulted in the adoption of a number of important reforms that took into account

30 See V. P. Zolotukhin. Farmers and Washington, Moscow, 1968; V. L. Malkov. "The New Course" in the USA, Moscow, 1973; V. L. Malkov, D. G. Najafov. America is at a crossroads. Essays on the socio-political history of the "new course" in the USA, Moscow, 1967; S. B. Marinin. USA: politika i upravlenie [Politics and Management], Moscow, 1967; N. V. Sivachev. Political struggle in the USA in the mid-30s of the XX century. Moscow, 1966; N. N. Yakovlev. Franklin Roosevelt-a Man and a Politician, Moscow, 1965.

31 For example, the editor of Current History, E. Brown, in his article "The American Way to Fascism", published at the beginning of the "new Deal", characterized the program of the American Revolution. Roosevelt as "economic fascism" (E. Fransis Brown. The American Road to Fascism. "Current History", July 1933, pp. 397 - 398).

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some demands of the working masses. The formation of this aspect of the New Deal was directly influenced by the class struggle of the proletariat and the demands of broad progressive democratic forces. In the struggle for social progress in the 1930s, the Communist Party of the United States played an important role, thus gaining quite influential positions in society.

The social doctrine of the "new deal" was embodied in measures to help the unemployed, for which the state spent more than $ 16 billion in 1932-1941.32 in the creation of a social security system that operates in an expanded and modified form at the present time; in recognition of the right of trade unions to legitimate existence and collective - contractual activities; in setting the minimum hourly wage and the maximum duration of the working week 33 .

The "New Deal" should be considered precisely in the unity of these two sides. This helps us see both the temporary and permanent impulses of state-monopoly development set by the critical decade of the 1930s. Social reforms were suspended by the beginning of the Second World War. But the principles of statisticization, on the contrary, strengthened their effect and further developed, in essence, in an ascending line. This makes the question of the end of the "new deal" ambiguous.

If we take the interwar period as a whole, it is not difficult to see that the organic unity of monopolies and the state as the two main principles in the process of state-monopoly evolution of American capitalism at each stage had its own accents. In 1919-1929, nationalization was mainly carried out through monopolization and concentration, with the peripheral participation of the state in this process, and therefore relatively slowly and secretly. In 1933 - 1939, the state became more active and open, coming to the fore, and since it was immeasurably stronger and more concentrated in its actions than individual corporations, state-monopoly development sharply increased, approaching in a short time the completion of the institutionalization of the foundations of state-monopoly capitalism.

All this took place in a sharp ideological and political struggle between the bearers of traditional individualism and the creators of bourgeois-collectivist, state-monopoly innovations. The reorientation of state institutions, especially the all-powerful judicial corps, political parties, primarily Republicans, the academic world and journalism to state-monopoly tracks was painful, accompanied by deep conflicts, aggravated by the fact that statist recipes were introduced very dynamically.

The creators and ideologists of the "new deal" created a structure of ideological and political views and principles of concrete, practical activities, relying on those sprouts of neoliberalism that appeared in the "progressive era", turning them into a fairly complete system. As the bourgeois-radical historian G. Kolko notes, it was after and as a result of the crisis of 1929-1933 that the political foundations of modern American capitalism were erected .34 The neoliberalism that took shape in those years 35 was characterized by the active use of information technologies-

32 "Labor and the New Deal". Ed. by M. Derber and E. Young. Madison. 1957, p. 246.

33 See for more information: V. L. Malkov. F.'s work policy Roosevelt (1933-1940). Voprosy Istorii, 1965, No. 9; N. V. Sivachev. Labor legislation in the USA in the 30s of the XX century. Bulletin of the Moscow State University. Istoriya Publ., 1969, No. 1.

34 G. Kolko. Main Currents in Modern American History. N. Y. 1976, p. 8.

35 On neoliberalism, see: V. L. Malkov. "The New Deal" in the USA, pp. 166, 167, 176, 187; "USA: political thought and History", Moscow, 1976, pp. 362, 374, 387.

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state institutions in solving economic problems and social maneuvering through concessions to the working people, thanks to which it was planned to erect a reliable and permanent barrier against socialism, to subordinate the workers ' and democratic movement to the ideological and political influence of the bourgeoisie. The New Deal was the epitome of neoliberalism, which the main circles of the Democratic Party switched to the platform of. The political economy of neoliberalism is Keynesianism, which found widespread use in the United States as early as 1933 - 1939 and an experimental social laboratory. 36 E. Hansen, who received the title of "American Keynes", played the most prominent role in introducing American economists to Keynesian state-monopoly doctrines. Both the economic and social dogmas of neoliberalism were characterized by an accentuated eclecticism, which bourgeois ideologists passed off as supposedly all-powerful pluralism.

Neoliberalism is essentially directed against socialism, which was fully reflected after the Second World War. But it also has real opponents on the right, and in 1933-1945 it was here that the main opposing forces were located. We are talking about all sorts of homegrown reactionary-individualist and conservative forces and about fascism as an international bourgeois phenomenon. Opponents of the" new deal "initially fought neoliberal state-monopoly reforms, armed only with individualistic slogans of the 1920s, as can be seen in Hoover's pamphlet "Challenge to Freedom", which appeared in 1934.37 "Meanwhile," writes the neoliberal economist B. Seligman, "the New Deal dragged loudly protesting and resisting businesses into the twentieth century." 38
The futility of the reactionary-individualistic alternative to the "new deal" was not immediately apparent, but by the end of the 1930s a new trend was emerging in the Republican Party and in Congress .39 Some Republicans and conservative Democrats shake off the dust of "solid individualism" and try to oppose neoliberalism with a more conservative version of state-monopoly views and methods. The bridge from traditional, anti-etatist conservatism to a new one that adapted to state-monopoly realities began to be thrown in 1937-1940, as evidenced by recent trends in court decisions that sanctioned the social doctrine of the "new deal"; the success of Republicans in the midterm elections of 1938; the search for a positive view of the expansion of the role of the state in the socio-economic the result recorded in the Republican platform for the 1940,404 election, and even more so in the speech of their candidate, W. Wilkie, delivered in connection with his nomination for president. 41
The formation of neoconservatism as a state-monopoly doctrine was greatly facilitated by the Second World War. Its main economic impact was that, thanks to the military conjuncture, business, after ten years of being in a state of crisis and depression, was once again and quite firmly on its feet.

36 On June 10, 1934, the New York Times published an article by J. Keynes on the New Deal. Notes on the New Deal. "Annals of America". Vol. 15. Chicago. 1968, pp. 268 - 271).

37 H. Hoover. Challenge to Liberty. "New Deal. Revolution or Evolution". Ed. by E. Rozwenc. Boston. 1959, pp. 62 - 71.

38 B. Seligman. The Powerful: Business and Businessmen in American History, Moscow, 1976, p. 355.

39 J. Patterson. Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal. Lexington. 1967.

40 "National Party Platforms. 1840 - 1972", pp. 389 - 394.

41 W. Willkie. Acceptance Speech. "Annals of America". Vol. 16. Chicago. 1968, pp. 27 - 31.

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1940-1945 corporations, according to official data, received $ 62 billion in net profit, and excluding taxes - $ 125 billion .42 If the crisis of 1929-1933, as business leaders publicly complained, put business in a "doghouse" 43, then the war led the US monopolies to economic, social, moral and political rehabilitation, especially in the eyes of the middle strata of society.

The war moved forward the state-monopoly development of the United States, which, however, proceeded with two important differences from the similar process during the "new deal" period: first, the role of monopolies increased to a relatively greater extent than the role of the state, and there was a frontal subordination of the cumbersome military regulatory apparatus created in an emergency time, the interests of monopolies 44; secondly, the state's activity in the social sphere was sharply slowed down, because the ruling circles believed that the main task was to create a military economy, and all social problems would be solved by newly successful businesses, taking into account the liberal legislation adopted during the "new deal" period.

Under these conditions, traditionally individualistic views were revived, the breeding ground for which was the business that grew stronger on the basis of the military situation. The widespread use of the reactionary-individualistic rhetoric of "free enterprise" is evidenced by the popularity of the book by the Austrian economist F. A. Schulz. Hayek's The Road to Slavery, which was published in England, but found its true audience in the United States, where its author moved at the very end of the war .45 However, extreme individualism went into the realm of social folklore. Business was firmly assimilating the basics of state-monopoly ideology. Its leaders realized that the state can provide tremendous services to the business world, and this was demonstrated during the war years. Many of them also realized that they had once exaggerated the degree of commitment to F. in their fear. Roosevelt's approach to "socialism". Another extremely important factor contributed to the statistic education of US monopolies and the transformation of the slogan of "free enterprise" into a defensive rhetoric on duty. Even before entering World War II, the ideologues of American imperialism made a vociferous bid to establish world domination, which did not fit in with a negative view of the role of the state.

Therefore, neoconservatism, not Hoover's individualism, becomes a real counterweight to the neoliberalism of the" new deal " and all the Roosevelt and post-Roosevelt policies of the Democrats. In contrast to extreme individualism, neoconservatism adapted to state-monopoly conditions and became one of the most important ways of developing the socio-economic policy of state-monopoly capitalism. Unlike the neoliberals of the New Deal, the Neoconservatives who had a strong foothold in organized business (the National Association of Industrialists, Chambers of Commerce, bankers 'associations, industry associations of business, etc.) were somewhat less statistician, never ceasing to emphasize the sanctity of "free enterprise" in economic policy, and advocates of using the state not so much for liberal development. social maneuvering, so much in the name of "public" or "national" interests, to stop the growth and strengthening of trade unions and to restore "law and order".

42 "Historical Statistics of the United States". Washington. 1962, p. 580.

43 E. Johnston. America Unlimited. Garden City. 1944, p. 179.

44 For more information, see N. V. Sivachev. Labor policy of the US government during the Second World War, Moscow, 1974.

45 E. Hayek. The Road to Serfdom. Chicago. 1944.

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Thus, 1929-1945 can be considered the period of formation of state-monopoly capitalism in the United States. If the crisis of 1929-1933 showed the need to accelerate the previously outlined objective processes of nationalization, and the "new deal" created the skeleton and mechanism of state-monopolistic regulation, then the Second World War gave flesh and blood to this organism, making it more resilient and immune to all sorts of liberal trends, which the American monopolies fought so hard under the slogan of "New deal". protection from "socialism". The process of transformation of American monopoly capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism has basically been completed.

The period 1929-1945 was perceived in the United States as an extraordinary time of crisis and war. Therefore, the intrusion of the state into the sphere of economic and social relations by broad circles of society was considered as something extraordinary, temporary, and tolerable only until "better times". However, in the years 1945-1960, this state intervention became a permanent element of the structure of American capitalism. The dialectic of the ratio of temporary and permanent proved itself convincingly in the course of the state - monopoly development of the USA in the 1930s and 1950s. The foundation that was built in 1933-1945 has been preserved and further developed. First it was sanctioned by the Democrats, and in the 1950s by the Republicans, a party in which individualistic, anti-etatist views and attitudes have always found a safe haven. This suggests that American capitalism did not have" normal "or" better times " after 1929.

The edifice of post-war state-monopoly capitalism46 was improved to a much greater extent jointly by neoliberal Democrats and neoconservative Republicans than it was when its foundation and framework were built, when the construction site was dominated by Democrats-supporters of the "new deal", who found it difficult to find companions among the confused, wary and embittered individualists from the opposition and political parties. even your own party. The economic policy of the Democrats led by Truman was by no means a departure from the state-monopoly principles of the New deal and the war period. The social plans of the leaders of the Democratic party then generally went in the same direction as in the Years of the "new deal", in some cases moving forward, in others retreating under the onslaught of neoconservatives and reactionary individualists.

The most important shift of post-war neoliberalism, which deepened its internal contradictions and weakened it politically, was the transfer of anti-communism to the forefront of practical and political activity. Anti-communism, both internationally and domestically, blurred the distinction between neoliberals and the more right - wing neoconservatives and extreme individualists. The anti-communism of all these three trends knew practically no difference, with the exception of certain loud and extravagant phrases that are most characteristic of the last of them. This undermined the potential of neoliberalism in terms of social reform: it was one thing to advocate progress, with reaction, racism, fascism and militarism as the main enemy, as it was in 1933-1945, and another to claim to be a progressive force, directing the main blow against the most consistent carrier of progress - the commune-

46 S. A. Dalin. USA: Post-war state-monopoly capitalism, Moscow, 1972; see also V. Perlo. Unstable Economy (Booms and busts in the US economy after 1945). Moscow, 1975.

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and the real embodiment of this progress in the face of the socialist system. Together with the neoconservatives and ultra-reactionaries, the neoliberals created an anti-communist hysteria and a cold war that was elevated to the rank of official politics. Moreover, and this is one of the apparent paradoxes of post-war political history, the neoliberals-a force standing in the center and somewhat to the left of the center in the ideological and political spectrum of state-monopoly capitalism - became the most active creators of the Cold war and some anti-communist measures, since they were the ones who found themselves in the leadership of the main country of capitalism immediately after the Second World War.

At the same time, after the war, neoliberalism acquired a number of new features that strengthen it. First, its economic program has been significantly improved, and an important role was played by the adoption of the Employment Act in 1946, on the basis of which a significant part of modern state regulation of economic development is built through the Institute of the Council of Economic Consultants under the President and the relevant departments of the Congress. Keynesian analysis and forecasting have become integral elements of the state's economic policy .47 Secondly, the development of the principles of state social security and regulation of working conditions laid down by the "new deal" went up, which was dictated both by the growth of inflation and the increasing struggle of the working class for social legislation. Third, in the post-war years, neoliberalism made timid attempts to include in its program an element that was absent during the "new deal" period-state measures to overcome the extremes of racial discrimination.

The post-war socio-economic course of the American state, regardless of the party or political affiliation of a particular government, cannot be imagined without the factor of militarization48. This issue, along with many other aspects of state - monopoly capitalism, has become what in the United States is called the object of "bipartisan politics", which, in essence, is not disputed, recognizing it as something absolute, sacred. During the "new deal" period, its opponents failed to formulate a convincing positive alternative to neoliberal innovations, failing to go beyond the panicked cries of "invasion of socialism". After 1945, the situation was different. Having established themselves on a state-monopoly platform, occupying its center and right edge, the neoconservatives no longer limited themselves to negativist criticism. They participated in the positive construction of socio-economic models and their implementation in life through the institutions of State power. The right-wing camp torpedoed most of the list of reforms compiled by Truman and his advisers in 1945-1948, called the "fair course", although it failed to defeat the neoliberals in the 1948 elections. The right-wing forces, whose core and foundation is now neoconservatism, largely "made politics" themselves, especially in 1947-1948, after the Republicans, for the first time since 1928, won a majority in both houses of Congress in the 1946 elections .49
47 I. V. Likhachev. USA: Economic Science and Economic Policy, Moscow, 1975.

48 R. A. Faramazyan. USA: Militarism and Economics, Moscow, 1970.

49 Republicans lost their majority in the House of Representatives in the 1930 election and in the Senate in 1932, and have been in the minority in both Chambers ever since, with the exception of the 1946 and 1952 elections, when they defeated Democrats and won (in both cases for one term) majorities in both Chambers.

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The most important creation of post - war neoconservatism was the Taft-Hartley anti-labor law, passed in 1947 in defiance of a presidential veto and still remains the fundamental basis of the labor policy of state-monopoly capitalism in the United States50 . The Republican platform of 1948, which reflected the party's turn to neoconservatism, is indicative. By emphasizing that the American system is built on competition, the program added something very important and new to the McKinley - Hoover party: "The State, as the servant of such a system, should take all necessary steps to develop and strengthen public health, scientific research, pension provision for the elderly, and to create a stable economy so that people do not feel the fear of losing their jobs or facing economic adversity that comes through no fault of their own."51 This platform does not contain any hysterical statements about the state-monopoly innovations of the Democrats, which is explained both by the excessive confidence in the victory of T. Dewey in 1948 and by the fact that the Republicans, having a temporary majority in Congress, created a certain part of these innovations themselves, giving them a more conservative color.

More complex is the Republican platform of 1952, adopted at the height of the Cold War and McCarthyism, in which reactionary individualism was central to the ideological arsenal. If we discard the anti-communist phraseology used by the drafters of this document against the Democrats, then the essence of the Republican complaints about the socio - economic policy of F. P. Tolstoy. The Roosevelt-Truman formula boils down to this: "For 20 years, the government has been extolling free enterprise, but in reality it has been destroying it. A little here, a little there, year after year, it sought to curb, regulate, hinder, restrain and punish. Today, there is hardly any aspect of economic and social life in which the Government does not try to interfere. " 52
The essence of Eisenhower's neoconservatism, which was formed in the 1950s, was to recognize in principle the need for a state-based solution to socio-economic problems, but with a more moderate use of public power institutions, greater respect for private property prerogatives, and a turn of the state against the working class and all sorts of obstacles to business. It turned out that, contrary to lamentations about the "socialist" rebirth of the American system, the ruling party strengthened the state-monopoly development of the United States. Nationalization prevailed over the hysteria of extreme individualists and lost the liberal, social-democratic rhetoric of the "new" and "just" courses. The revision of the reformist concepts of the 1930s in the "neoconservative spirit" 53, that is, with the preservation and improvement of the state-monopoly core, has come to an end. A kind of classic of neoconservatism was created. State-monopoly principles, and this is especially important, were, so to speak, re - sanctioned and finally sanctioned-this time by a party more inclined to preserve traditional individualism. This became an indisputable fact and led to the fact that the extreme right, which did not adapt to statism, became disillusioned with Eisenhower conservatism.

The government of D. Eisenhower very soon realized that above the sacred Republican principle of a balanced budget, there are only a few problems.-

50 See for more information: A. A. Popov. USA: state and Trade Unions, Moscow, 1974, pp. 67-111; N. V. Sivachev. Legal regulation of labor relations in the United States pp. 40-54.

51 "National Party Platforms. 1840 - 1972", p. 450.

52 Ibid., p. 500.

53 "USA: Political Thought and History", p. 387.

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the interests of the monopolies and the bourgeoisie as a class, and that therefore public spending, previously treated as "socialism" and as a waste of money, is necessary to maintain expanded reproduction and "social peace." This was the main motivation for the largest economic activities of the US government during the presidency of D. Eisenhower - extensive highway and housing construction, reconstruction of the St. Lawrence Waterway. The expansion of public spending as one of the manifestations and directions of state-monopolistic development under the Republican president, around whom the aura of a prudent and economical owner was created, looked very impressive: from $ 68 billion in 1955 to $ 92 billion in 1960 (at constant prices)54 . The social doctrine of the Republicans was also comprehensively statisticized, as evidenced by the expansion of the social security system, the improvement of legislation on the minimum wage, the creation of a special ministry of health, education and welfare, and the expansion of public spending on education, which was given an impetus by the success of the USSR in space exploration.

The degree of evolution of socio-economic doctrines from Hooverism to Eisenhower's neoconservatism is revealed both when looking at the specific activities of the Republicans of the 50s, and when analyzing their official doctrines. "In creating a new economic resilience without inflation,"D. Eisenhower said in his last annual address to Congress on January 12, 1961," we have resorted to increased government spending to meet the needs of a growing population and address the associated problems, as well as our expanded international obligations. " 55 Of course, we must remember that this was said at a time when the US economy was at the lowest point of the crisis of 1960-1961, and the crises after 1929 proved to be the force that, along with the struggle of two systems on a global scale, class struggle at home, and wars, pushed forward the state-monopoly thinking of American bourgeois individualists. "It is clear," D. Eisenhower emphasized, " that the continuation of healthy and broad-based economic growth remains the main national goal, which we must strive to achieve by combining private and public efforts."56 In other words, as a well-known American political scientist put it, "Republican conservatism... I made a deal with the new exchange rate"57 . Another political scientist, neoconservative C. Rossiter, emphasized that "modern conservatism has moved away from the extreme anti-statism of Sumner and Sutherland", and among the factors that determined the transformation of conservatism from anti-Statism to statism, he named "the threat of communism" 58 . In the neoconservative-neoliberal consensus, the question was asked by neoconservatives. This has affected all social sciences, including historiography .59
Deputy Secretary of Labor A. Larson's book "A Republican Looks at His Party" was the most appropriate expression of Eisenhower's neoconservatism. The author focuses on the codification of the socio-political doctrines of the "new republicanism", contrasting it with the " opposition "consisting of " two ideologies".-

54 "New York Times", 13.X.1975.

55 "State of the Union Messages of the Presidents. 1790 - 1966" Vol. 3. p. 3108.

56 Ibid., p. 3113.

57 N. Graebner. Eisenhower's Popular Leadership. "Twentieth Century America: Recent Interpretations", p. 451.

58 C. Rossiter. Conservatism in America. N. Y. 1955, pp. 194, 200.

59 See I. P. Dementiev. The main directions and schools in American historiography of the post-war period. Voprosy Istorii, 1976, No. 11.

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Guillaume: one can be said to bear the stamp of 1896, and the other bears the stamp of 1936". This means that neoconservatism is opposed to the traditional Republican individualism "laissez faire", which flourished at the time of W. McKinley's coming to power in 1896 and prevailed until 1932, and the neoliberalism of the "new deal", which won the victory. A. Larson considered the "ideology of 1936 "more " dangerous", because he qualified the "ideology of 1896" as something already dead, and about the ideas of 1936 he said that they "constantly march in front of us as if on parade as a product of liberalism and advanced thought" 60 .

The codifier of the "new republicanism" sought out criteria for belonging to a particular ideology in relation to the role of the state, in the ratio of private and statist. "The ideology of 1896,"he writes," was characterized by distrust of the federal government; the ideology of 1936 was characterized by distrust of state governments; the present administration does not distrust either of them, but allows each to play its full role." According to the author, under the Eisenhower government, harmony was achieved in this issue: "Now we have state activity to the extent necessary, avoiding infringement of the normal initiative of private enterprise"61 .

In the 60s and 70s (1960-1976), American state-monopoly capitalism experienced the most acute socio-economic and political upheavals. In the 1960 election campaign, both parties put forward platforms that provided for the activation of all elements of the socio-economic structure. Republicans even declared that the country is "experiencing an era of profound revolution." They aimed to actively promote "economic growth". They put the role of private business first, but did not forget the state, promising to use "all state power to prevent the disasters of depression and inflation." 62 The Democrats paid even more attention to the problem of economic growth in their program. They looked more broadly than Republicans at the role of the state, promising to use all the levers to stimulate growth. "We Democrats," the platform read, " believe that our economy can and should achieve an average annual growth rate of 5% - almost twice the average annual growth rate since it began in 1953. We will pursue policies that will lead to achieving this goal without inflation. Economic growth is the means by which we will raise the American standard of living and create additional tax resources that support national security and the basic services provided by public authorities."63
The problem of economic growth as a state-monopoly recipe for managing the economy was thus raised by both parties to a kind of cult. This was more pronounced among Democrats, who hoped that economic growth would also solve many social problems. Democrats traditionally looked more active in using the state, in ensuring economic growth, and in regulating labor relations. "The basis for achieving stable labor relations," they pointed out, " is the leadership of the White House. The Republican Party failed to provide such leadership"64 . The leaders of both parties, and again, especially the Democrats, had high hopes for the use of the state budget.-

60 A. Larson, A Republican Looks at His Party. N. Y. 1956 pp. 1 - 2.

61 Ibid., p. 10.

62 "National Party Platforms. 1840 - 1972, pp. 604, 609.

63 Ibid., p. 582.

64 Ibid., p. 584.

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by monopolizing the results of the unfolding scientific and technological revolution, hoping to defeat socialism in this field and resolve social antagonisms within the country.

Still under J. R. R. Tolkien. Kennedy The Democratic government, while charting "new frontiers," put forward four important areas of socio-economic reforms - in the areas of civil rights, education, health insurance, and taxes. Under the influence of his Keynesian economic advisers, led by G. Geller, Kennedy formulated the program of the "new economic policy" in the second half of 1962, setting it out in a message to Congress on January 14, 1963. He proposed cutting taxes on businesses and consumers by $ 13.5 billion, 65 which was legalized in February 1964. This was indeed an important innovation in the evolution of the economic doctrine of American state-monopoly capitalism. For the first time, the US president declared himself a conscious Keynesian, having gone into a budget deficit in the context of an economic recovery and using this deficit as a positive economic tool.

The mid-60s were a time of active neoliberalism. One of its apologists wrote in 1963 that " the proponents of new liberalism do not base their philosophy on demonizing private enterprise or the state. They believe in the creative possibilities of modern capitalism, provided that it is supported by collective thought acting through effective State bodies. " 66 This was the time of the nationalization of bourgeois economics, which tirelessly supplied recipes that seemed destined to lead to magical growth. Johnson's annual address to Congress on January 8, 1964, marked the first time in postwar history that domestic policy issues were given priority. Pointing out that 20% of American families live in poverty, the president solemnly declared an "unconditional war on poverty in America." 68 A little later, on May 22, 1964, in a speech to graduates of the University of Michigan, he outlined a program for creating a "great society"in the United States69 .

In 1964 - 1966, the Congress legalized a number of reforms. Along with the tax cuts, federal funds have greatly contributed to the development of all levels of education, housing construction for low-income families, important civil rights laws have been passed, and the most significant addition to the Social Security Act of 1935 is the introduction of health insurance for the elderly, as well as federal subsidies to the states for providing medical assistance the poor and needy 70 . Speaking about the improvement of the socio-economic doctrine of neoliberalism in the 60s, it is necessary to note two points: first, a large increase in government spending on various social programs; second, the formation of a new component in the doctrine itself, namely, a state-monopoly structure for solving the racial issue, which the federal government has been dismissing since then. reconstruction times. The last reconstructive Civil Rights Act was passed in 1875, and Congress did not approve a single measure in this area until 1957. It was only in the 1960s, mainly after the 1964 law came into force, that the "political strategy of state - monopoly capitalism in this area" was developed.-

65 "State of the Union Messages of the Presidents. 1790 - 1966". Vol. 3, p. 3145.

66 H. Girvetz. The Evolution of Liberalism. Toronto. 1963, p. 386.

67 I. V. Likhachev. Op. ed., p. 10.

68 "State of the Union Messages of the Presidents. 1790 - 1966". Vol. 3, p. 3157.

69 E. Goldman. The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson. N. Y. "1969, pp. 165 - 166.

70 E. Ginzberg and R. Sоlоw. The Great Society. N. Y. 1974.

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coe" and a "state-monopolistic mechanism for regulating race relations"71 was formed .

Among the economic factors that determined the state-monopoly development of the 60s, the most important role was played by the economic recovery and gradually increasing inflation, which turned into one of the main disasters of the United States in the late 60s and 70s. Both of these factors spurred the growth of public spending, one creating an opportunity and the other a necessity, and at the same time a barrier to this growth, which became one of the main contradictions of the entire concept of economic growth .72
The social atmosphere of the United States in the 1960s was shaped by the explosion of democratic movements (youth, anti-war, anti-racist), new progressive phenomena in the labor movement, including the emergence of the Communist Party of the United States from a state of isolation, as well as the activation of ultra-right movements. All this has affected the evolution of state-monopoly ideology and politics. The Republican Party took a big step back in its social enlightenment in 1964. Relying on the growing ultra-individualist movements73 , a group headed by B. Goldwater came to the official leadership of the party for some time, which put forward a program of rabid anti-communism and militarism in the 1964 elections, and also proposed a platform for solving internal socio-economic problems that was sustained in the spirit of extreme individualism and went far to the right of Republican neoconservatism.

In the 60s and 70s, Soviet researchers paid great attention to the analysis of ideological and political trends in American society - from ultra-right movements to the direction of the "new left". Fully sharing the interpretation of the term "neoliberalism" given by N. S. Yulin, I would like to object to her interpretation of "neoconservatism", because this concept covers reactionary individualism. 74 If we reduce the spectrum of bourgeois social thought and politics in the United States to "neoliberalism" and "neoconservatism", that is, the extreme individualism represented by B. Goldwater, the Buckley brothers, R. Reagan, the Berserkers and other ultra movements, then one of the most important components falls out of it - state - monopoly neoconservatism, that is, the ideology and politics of the main political forces. the Republican Party circles led by W. Wilkie, T. Dewey, D. Eisenhower, R. Nixon, D. Ford, and the Southern Democrats who go along with them on many issues (of course, not the type of D. Wallace, who quite fits into the ultra-right direction). On the other hand, the understanding of neoliberalism proposed by A. P. Goleva seems illogical. The author quite rightly characterizes neoliberalism as a phenomenon of state-monopoly capitalism, but at the same time contrasts neoliberalism with Keynesianism. Such a juxtaposition of two organically related categories of state-monopoly capitalism is illegitimate. A. P. Goleva's book is written mainly on West German material. Referring to the United States, the author puts the Chicago school in the category of neoliberals75, which is just very far from the perception of principles

71 I. A. Geevsky. USA: the Negro problem. Washington's policy in the Negro question (1945-1972). Moscow, 1973, pp. 222, 230.

72 V. M. Shamberg, USA: Problems and Contradictions of state-monopolistic regulation of economic growth, Moscow, 1974.

73 See for more details: "USA: Problems of Domestic policy", Moscow, 1971, pp. 318-352; N. V. Sivachev, E. F. Yazkov. Modern history of the USA. 1917-1972. Moscow, 1972, pp. 271-277.

74 N. S. Yulina. Bourgeois ideological trends in the USA, Moscow, 1971, pp. 53-78.

75 A. P. Goleva. Critique of modern Neoliberalism, Moscow, 1976, pp. 34-38.

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bourgeois collectivism, statism, and other attributes of state-monopoly capitalism. While remaining extremely individualistic, the Chicago school provides a political and economic formula for reactionary statesmen like B. Goldwater and R. Reagan, who denounce not only the neoliberal course of the Democrats, but also the neoconservative policies implemented by the main circles of the Republican Party. Unlike A. P. Goleva, N. S. Yulina convincingly shows that neoliberalism is "one of the most influential systems of views in the United States", based precisely on Keynesianism. It approaches the problem not only from an economic point of view, but also from a social and ideological-political point of view. "It should be noted," writes N. S. Yulina, " that neoliberals are not limited to simply repeating Keynesian ideas. Ideologically, the focus of their statistic (state) concept is not so much on economic regulation as on social regulation. According to neoliberals, as economic power increases, the state gets real opportunities to invade the social sphere (education, social security, poverty reduction, urban improvement, regulation of relations between workers and entrepreneurs, etc.). All this, they say, implies the concentration of power in the hands of the federal government, expanding the scope of its activities, expanding the scope of its activities. responsibilities of the administration " 76 .

The democratic movements of the 1960s had a twofold impact on the evolution of the state-monopoly course of the ruling circles. First, for the first time since the New deal, an influential political and ideological trend of a radically progressive nature emerged to the left of neoliberalism, which often went far beyond the permissible limits of liberal state-monopoly reformism. The" new left " movement of 77 has made the Government's social policies noticeably democratize, especially in matters of racial equality, education, and welfare. Secondly, the radicalism of these movements carried a great charge of democratic anti-statism, which destroyed the belief in an all-powerful bourgeois state, demonstrating that progressive progress was not only beyond the power of the state-monopoly mechanism, but even fundamentally at odds with the interests of this complex. The consequences of democratic anti-statism were fully felt only in the 70s, when the presidential power was in the hands of Republicans.

In the 70s, the internal contradictions in the structure of state-monopoly capitalism in the United States that developed after 1929-1933 came to light. One of them is that the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism requires further nationalization, although, as experience shows, it does not make it possible to cope with the problems of economic growth, inflation, aggravated chronic unemployment, and the ratio of civil and military production. Another is reflected in the catastrophic decline in the authority of state institutions, without expanding the functions of which state-monopolistic development comes to a standstill. Under the influence of economic and political crises and mass anti-statism, the belief in a state-based solution to problems was undermined even among those who usually thought of solving public problems in ways of increasing statism.

The US economy went through two crises in a short period of time - 1969-1971 and 1973-1975. Already the first of them has revealed an important

76 N. S. Yulina. Op. ed., p. 37.

77 S. S. Salychev. "New Left": with whom and against whom, Moscow, 1972; A. A. Fursenko. America's critical decade. 60s. L. 1974.

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a peculiar feature, which consisted in the fact that the decline in production led not to a decrease, but to an increase in prices and an increase in inflation. This was also true of the crisis of 1973-1975, which was the most severe economic and social upheaval of capitalism since the Second World War. According to official data, consumer prices increased by 9% in 1973, by 12% in 1974, and by 7% in 1975. This happened when the total social product (at constant prices) fell by 1.8% in 1974, and by 2% in 1975. Unemployment, according to official estimates, was measured in 1974 at an average of 5.6% of the total labor force, and in 1975 at 8.5%, reaching 8.9% in April 1975, the highest level since 1941.78 This meant that over 8 million workers were unemployed. At the 11th Congress of the AFL-CPP in October 1975, it was noted that 13% of the labor force, or 12.4 million workers, are unemployed .79 The economic upheavals of 1973-1975, the consequences of which have not yet been overcome, were to a certain extent deepened by the energy crisis, which, however, should be understood not as a "technical" but as a socio-economic phenomenon, a direct and natural consequence of the dominance of monopolies in this vital branch of the modern economy.

Unlike the 1964 elections, the Republicans in 1968 put forward a program of state-monopolistic leadership of the country and, taking advantage of the failures of the Democrats in domestic and foreign policy, won the White House. R. Nixon's neoconservatism was a big step forward from the "new republicanism" of the 1950s. In January 1971, R. Nixon, with good reason, told reporters:: "I'm a Keynesian now!" 80 . In August 1971, he launched his own "new economic policy", with three main goals-reducing unemployment, improving the competitive position of the United States in world markets, and curbing inflation. It was implemented from August 15, 1971 until May 1, 1974, when the law on economic stabilization ceased to apply, and was mainly aimed at slowing down wage growth. Inflation could not be stopped. The Council of Economic Advisers in 1974 acknowledged this in terms not typical of the official vocabulary: "Many attempts were made to stop it - and all without significant success. Inflation has become a monster with the head of a hydra: instead of one severed head, two new ones grow every time. " 81
The Nixon government tried to reform the system of providing assistance to people in need that had developed conservatively since the 1930s .82 The reform also failed. On the contrary, R. Nixon, like D. Eisenhower, had to authorize the expansion of all possible social payments. Compared to 1965, federal spending on education, housing and public utilities, health care, and various forms of social assistance increased sixfold in nominal terms in 1972. Adjusted for inflation, this growth will appear to be moderated by four to five times, 83 but this figure also strongly demonstrates the deformation of the neoconservative doctrine under the influence of socio-economic necessity, the growing struggle of workers and the predominance of neoliberals in Congress.

78 "Economic Report of the President". Washington. 1976, pp. 3, 49, 79.

79 "Eleventh Constitutional Convention of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations. Proceedings", October 2, 1975, p. 21.

80 "New York Times", 18.I.1971.

81 "Economic Report of the President". Washington. 1974, p. 21.

82 J. Grossman. The Department of Labor. N. Y. 1973, p. 147.

83 E. Ginzberg and R. Solow. Op. cit., pp. 9 - 11.

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D. Ford, as the leader of the Republican minority in the House of Representatives, proved to be more conservative than R. Nixon, both in socio-economic and, especially, in financial matters, but in general he always remained within the state-monopoly neoconservative mode of action. Upon his arrival in the White House, the main ideologue of reactionary individualism, W. Buckley, published an article in which he claimed that R. Nixon had disappointed the hopes of "conservatives" (as far-right individualists prefer to call themselves), and called on his flock to "put pressure on Ford to understand the importance of conservative views." 84 However, D. Ford's government did not follow the advice of extreme individualists. After the announcement of the first State of the Union address delivered by the 38th President in January 1975, the New York Times, while endorsing his reneging on his promise to balance the budget, listed Ford as a "bold" Keynesian. "For those who have long been close to Ford," the newspaper continued, " his break with his former ideological doctrines is not sudden. Keynesian economic policy is no longer a new idea, even among Republican conservatives. " 85
Indeed, the two main ideas of Keynesianism-broad public spending without pathological fear of budget deficits and active state regulation of the entire socio - economic process - were firmly rooted in the United States in the form of neoliberalism and neoconservatism in the 1930s and 70s. The extreme individualists who form the basis of the motley ultra - right movements, whose strength those who seek to gain presidential power-D. McCarthy, B. Goldwater, D. Wallace, R. Reagan-from time to time try to rely on, cannot get used to this. Public spending on social needs under Republican presidents has grown against their wishes, which indicates that it is impossible to solve modern social problems using private entrepreneurship methods. In the budget year that began on October 1, 1976, federal appropriations for education amount to $ 7.6 billion, for health care - $ 34.4 billion, and for various types of maintaining citizens ' incomes (including $ 82.7 billion). for pension insurance) - $ 137.1 billion. As a result, the total amount of federal social spending alone is almost $ 170 billion .86 Yet social spending is falling far short of essential needs, which are growing due to continued inflation and high unemployment. In the autumn of 1976, food stamps, for example, had to be issued to more than 17 million people .87 Unemployment rose again at the end of 1976, reaching, according to official data, 7.8 million people, or 8.1% of the labor force .88
The state is forced to take on an increasingly large part of the costs necessary to create the social infrastructure, without which modern bourgeois society can no longer function .89 The ruling elites are trying to shift the entire burden of taxes, which form a cumbersome, bureaucratic, anti-democratic structure of social payments, to the working class and the middle strata of the population. Moreover, the more conservative circles of the ruling class lead the line to reduce social spending not in the name of the weakened state.-

84 W. Buckley. Ford and Fight for Conservatism. "International Herald Tribune", 2. IX. 1974.

85 "New York Times", 19.I.1975.

86 "The United States Budget in Brief. Fiscal Year 1977", pp. 36, 38, 39.

87 "New York Times", 22.XI.1976.

88 "New York Times", 4.XII.1976.

89 V. Lyubimov, L. Cherkasova. "Welfare State": Myths and Reality, "World Economy and International Relations", 1975, N 12, p. 49.

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to reduce the tax burden on working people, and to increase military spending and provide further fiscal benefits to large private capital.

D. Ford, because of his neoconservatism and because of the significant presence of reactionary individualists in the ranks of the Republican Party, on its right wing, advocated in 1976 for reducing social spending and creating a "healthy private sector". "My goal," he declared, "is to achieve the best combination of market competition and responsible government regulation." 90 The Republican election platform adopted in August 1976, which reflected the influence of Reagan, also paid too much tribute to the individualistic right wing of the party. Along with concessions to the militarists and other opponents of improving Soviet-American relations, this played a major role in the defeat of D. Ford on November 2, 1976.

In the United States in the 70s there was a general weakening of statism, which is primarily a consequence of the crisis of the system of state-monopoly regulation of the economy that has been piled up since the "new deal" .91 The Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXV Party Congress points to the growing instability of modern capitalism and emphasizes that the crisis " hit the highly developed state-monopoly economy that developed in the post-war period." Another reason for the decline in faith in state-monopoly recipes was the ideological and political crisis of bourgeois society: "It affects the institutions of power, bourgeois political parties, and undermines moral norms. Corruption is becoming more pronounced, even in the highest levels of the State machine. " 92 In the United States, this resulted in an acute moral and political crisis, which unfolded in 1973 with the beginning of the "Watergate case" and deeply shook the entire state legal system .93 For the first time in the country's history, the president was forced to resign, and before that, under the threat of an imminent trial, the second person in the state, Vice - President S. Agnew, lost his post.

The leadership of the Democratic Party plays an important role in the attempts to achieve socio-economic and moral-political stabilization of American state-monopoly capitalism. A special place in the annals of US political history in the post-war period is occupied by the behavior of this party in the 1972 elections. The defeat of D. McGovern that year was not difficult to predict, as was the failure of B. Goldwater in 1964. But if in 1964 the standard-bearers of one of the two parties deviated from the state-monopoly platform of neoconservatism to the right, now the official platform of the Democrats, and especially the statements of the presidential candidate himself, significantly deviated to the left from the established canons of neoliberalism. For the third time after the Civil War and Reconstruction, the Democratic party proved its ability to extinguish radical, anti-monopoly protest movements by including some of their slogans in its program and political installations and dissolving them into a bourgeois-respectable set of ideas and solutions acceptable within the system of monopoly and state-monopoly capitalism.-

90 "Economic Report of the President". Washington. 1976, pp. 4, 6.

91 See for more information: A. Anikin, V. Kuznetsov. State-monopoly capitalism of the 70s. "World Economy and International Relations", 1975, N 11; Yu. I. Bobrakov. Crisis of state-monopolistic regulation of the economy. "USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology", 1975, N 12.

92 L. I. Brezhnev. Lenin's Course, vol. 5, Moscow, 1976, pp. 479, 480.

93 "The State system of the USA", Moscow, 1976; A. A. Mishin. State Law of the USA, Moscow, 1976.

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zeptov. This was the case during the periods of populism and the New Deal. The same thing happened in 1972.

After the defeat and the decline of the mass movement, the Democratic leaders regrouped their ranks again, holding the first congress in the history of the two parties in December 1974, not in the year of presidential elections, and adjusted their program and organizational settings to traditional neoliberal standards. The party's leaders-Senators E. Kennedy, E. Muskey, W. Mondale, G. Humphrey, veteran Democrat A. Harriman and others-actively campaigned in defense of political institutions, emphasizing that only individual Republican figures were responsible for creating the crisis situation. Neoliberal theorists D. Galbraith, A. Schlesinger and other representatives of the intellectual elite have published scientific works designed to strengthen the people's faith in neoliberal state-monopoly principles. 94 All the official celebrations of the 200th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence served as an apology for American bourgeois democracy, which withstood the blows of Watergate and was supposedly capable of continuous improvement. In the 1976 election campaign, Democrats nominated a little - known political figure for president-former Georgia Governor J. E. Carter, who came to power under the slogan of restoring people's trust in the government. Their platform was called "Contract with the People" 95 . It is composed in high-flown terms designed to channel democratic anti-statism into the traditional state-monopoly channel.

Analysis of the genesis and evolution of state-monopoly capitalism in the United States shows that the processes of nationalization in the XX century were covered by the economy, politics, ideology, and science. State-monopoly development has manifested itself both as a trend or process that takes place in monopolistic capitalism and, from a certain historical point of view, as the basis of the bourgeois system .96 Considering the trends and the basis, the process and the system in an organic unity, we come to the conclusion that for the period up to 1929-1933 the most characteristic were the trends of state - monopoly development. As a result of the New Deal and World War II, they became the essence of American capitalism. At the same time, the degree of statisticization of modern state - monopoly capitalism in the United States is constantly growing 97 .

Monopolies and the bourgeois state are subjects of state-monopoly capitalism and modern imperialism-

94 J. Galbraith. Economics and the Public Purpose. Boston. 1973; ejusd. Money. Whence It Came. Where It; Went. Boston. 1975; A. Schlesinger, Jr. The Imperial Presidency. N. Y. 1974.

95 "The National Democratic Platform 1976", p. 1.

96 This problem is thoroughly analyzed in the works of a number of Soviet economists (see: Y. Borko. On the methodology of analysis of state-monopoly capitalism. "World Economy and International Relations", 1973, N 5, p. 108; S. Tulipov. Historical site of state-monopoly capitalism. "World Economy and International Relations", 1973, No. 10, p. 107; L. Leontiev, The role of the state in the economy of modern capitalism. "World Economy and International Relations", 1974, N 1, p. 106).

97 "State intervention," writes S. A. Dalin reasonably, " is a regularity of modern capitalism, especially in the era of its general crisis, and therefore the collapse of illusions about the omnipotence of the capitalist state does not mean the end of state regulation of the economy. It is possible to foresee that a new cyclical crisis or prolonged stagnation will cause a revival of the old theories of state intervention, although this will have to put them in new clothes " (S. Dalin. The collapse of theories and illusions. "World Economy and International Relations", 1976, N 12, p. 82),

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statistical integration 98 . This means that the presence or absence of a nationalized sector in the economy cannot be considered a determining indicator of state-monopolistic development. In the United States, for example, unlike in England, France, Italy, and Austria, nationalization was not carried out, although it is here that the center of modern state-monopoly capitalism is located. This only indicates the relative strength of private ownership foundations in the United States and the activity of monopolies in the processes of nationalization. At the same time, state management has reached a huge size in the United States, which is reflected in the constant growth of the budgets of the federal government, states and municipalities. This can be considered, with certain reservations, as an analogue of nationalization.

Nationalization has deeply covered the sphere of ideology and politics. Classical liberalism was transformed into neoliberalism, and traditional conservatism into neoconservatism. What is new in both cases is a positive view of the state, but with different degrees and goals of its activation. There are no too firm and even more absolute boundaries between these currents. The differences between them are no more than the differences between Democrats and Republicans, but they are real nonetheless. The bourgeois forces that have not adapted themselves to the state-monopoly course form the camp of reactionary individualism, which finds its refuge in independent organizations and movements, in the Republican Party and among Southern Democrats. The persistence of extreme individualism is explained both by the direct interests of individual owners and by the fact that the state - monopoly system does not exclude, but, on the contrary, emphasizes the virtues of "free enterprise"for propaganda purposes. Militarism, chauvinism, and racism operate in the same direction.

The Communist Party of the USA, the progressive trade unions, and the radical intelligentsia set out the task of creating an anti-monopoly coalition in order to direct the objective processes of nationalization along the revolutionary-democratic path. Left-wing forces have exerted a certain influence on state policy at certain stages of recent US history, but they have not yet been able to unite the broad masses of working people around anti-monopoly slogans. Neoliberalism and neoconservatism, while directing the objective processes of nationalization in a state-monopolistic direction, consider them as an alternative to socialism. The limitations of their economic and social progress are particularly evident in the context of the general crisis of capitalism that worsened in the 1970s.

State-monopoly capitalism, as the entire course of recent history has convincingly proved, has proved to be a historically untenable alternative to socialism. "The socialist organization of economic, political, and spiritual life has shown that only socialism opens the way to solving the most important and urgent problems of modern humanity." 99 As stated in the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution", the achievements of the motherland of October in six decades are clear evidence that socialism has provided unprecedented rates of progress in all areas of society's life.

98 M. M. Maksimova. Osnovnye problemy imperialisticheskoi integratsii [Basic problems of imperialist Integration], Moscow, 1971.

99 Pravda, 1. II. 1977.

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