The process of strengthening the political and economic significance of the Asia-Pacific region within the framework of the existing system of international relations is accompanied by an increase in competition between its key players. A number of countries interpret the norms of international maritime law in their own way, trying to ensure a priority level of their own security - not only military, but also resource and even environmental. Attempts by some States to extend their sovereignty and jurisdiction over islands, sea areas, their living resources, as well as the mineral resources of the seabed and its subsoil face opposition from others to prevent restrictions on their rights and freedoms enshrined in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The main purpose of this article is to analyze the validity of certain legal claims and their role in strengthening regional conflicts.

Keywords: World Ocean, Asia-Pacific Region, China, USA, South China Sea, UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, maritime delimitation, historical waters.

Speaking about the problem of ensuring maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region and the settlement of existing and potential maritime conflicts, it is important to take into account the attitude of the APR states to the international legal framework, primarily the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which is supposed to be one of the universal legal regulators of all types of relations participants of marine economic activity. There is no doubt that an analysis of the implementation of the provisions and norms of this universal international agreement by key players in the region is extremely important. So, for example, it is the position of Beijing and Washington on the interpretation of certain conventional norms that is the basis of tension in their relations. At the same time, the South China Sea (SCM) continues to be one of the most turbulent areas of the World Ocean, where the interests of a number of states collide. A special place from this point of view is occupied by the People's Republic of China, whose request position on many issues is clearly overstated and only very conditionally correlates with the provisions of modern international maritime law.

Problems of implementation of convention norms by the Asia-Pacific states. The vast majority of Asia-Pacific countries are full parties to the 1982 Convention. Only a few States are exempt from this rule: Cambodia and North Korea have signed but not ratified the Convention; Colombia and El Salvador have done the same, and another South American State, Peru, whose coasts are also affected.

Pavel A. Gudev, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Senior Researcher at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. E-mail: gudev@imemo.ru.

They are washed by the waters of the Pacific Ocean, have not signed or ratified this international agreement, as well as the largest naval and naval power-the United States.

Non-ratification of the Convention by Cambodia and North Korea allows them not to comply with certain convention norms. Cambodia is demanding a permissive procedure for the passage of foreign warships through its 12-mile territorial sea, thus violating the Convention's right of peaceful passage, and also insists on expanding its powers to ensure its own security in the 24-mile contiguous zone, which also has a permissive passage of foreign warships.¹

North Korea established a 50-mile security zone around its coast as early as 1977, which is measured from the outer border of the territorial sea2, although Pyongyang has never published the geographical coordinates of the baselines for its reference. The legal regime of this zone is actually equivalent to the legal regime of internal waters: any passage of foreign warships is prohibited here, the passage of civilian vessels requires prior permission; any types of marine fishing and flights over this zone are prohibited; sanctions are imposed for violating the zone regime, including shelling and seizure of ^a ship3.

A special place in this case is occupied by the United States as one of the main players with large-scale strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

The United States adheres to most of the provisions of the 1982 Convention, considering that it codified established customary law. Even Reagan, who refused to join this agreement, stated that " the United States is ready to act in accordance with those provisions of the Convention that do not contradict the already established norms of customary international law."⁴

Customary law rules are formed by combining two elements: established, widespread and consistent State practice; and a subjective element known as opinio juris. The latter means that a State considers a particular customary rule as a rule of international law, usually legally binding in international terms. This is an expression of the will of a State, and when other States also express their will in the same direction, a tacit agreement is formed to recognize a customary rule as an international rule of law.⁵

The 1982 Convention did indeed codify the already established rules of customary law. But to assume that this was all-fundamentally wrong! Even the Chairman of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973-1982), Tomi Ko, warned against such a simplified consideration: "This Convention is not a convention that codifies legal norms. The claim that, with the exception of Part XI, the Convention is a codification of customary law or reflects existing international practice is factually incorrect and legally unfounded. " ⁶

New standards were proposed under the Convention. For example, a special regime for developing the resources of the International Seabed Area was introduced. However, in order to become a full-fledged norm of customary law, it requires compliance by all States, including those not party to the Convention.⁷ In addition, it should be borne in mind that during the negotiations within the framework of the III UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, it was not possible to reach a consensus on the application of the principle of the Common Heritage of mankind (PLH), and many States opposed the regime being introduced. According to M. Lodge, Under-Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority, attempts to consider the concept of VLF as a norm of customary international law are nothing more than ordinary speculation.⁸ The same applies to the provisions of article 76 on the continental

on the shelf beyond the 200-mile zone, which have not yet become customary international law.⁹

Thus, the United States, which adheres to the position of implementing only the norms of customary law, has the potential to ignore certain provisions of the 1982 Convention.

In addition, there are areas where the United States allows itself a different, often broad interpretation of the convention's rules. For example, they consider that military surveys (the collection of oceanographic, geophysical, chemical, biological and acoustic information for military purposes) do not fall under the category of marine scientific ^research10 and, accordingly, can be freely implemented in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of a coastal state11. By marine scientific research, they are prepared to understand activities carried out in marine spaces to enhance knowledge of the marine environment for peaceful purposes, i.e. oceanographic, biological, geological, geophysical and other research.¹² Given that the 1982 Convention provides for the need to obtain approval from a coastal State to conduct scientific research in its EEZ, many States do not agree with such expanded wording, which is followed by the United States. It is not surprising that Washington's questionable position on this issue is the reason for their long-standing conflict with the PRC, which seeks to stop the implementation of American intelligence activities in the adjacent sea areas.

At the same time, the United States is actually the only state that challenges all legal claims to the spaces and resources of the World's oceans, both by submitting notes of diplomatic protest, and by demonstrating the flag or conducting naval maneuvers. For the United States, although not a party to the Convention, freedom of navigation has traditionally been of paramount importance. However, the" moral teachings " of the United States about the need to strictly follow the convention norms in conditions when they not only do not participate in it themselves, but also find themselves in a very strange company ⁱⁿ this respect13, at least look quite paradoxical.

Although, indeed, the Asia-Pacific region is a kind of" storehouse " of conventional disobedience. Quite widespread (Vietnam, Cambodia, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea, Japan) is to some extent incorrect establishment of straight baselines ¹⁴ (for example, at too far a distance from the coast, with a deviation from the general direction of the coastline) for counting the internal borders of the territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf. China went even further in this regard: as early as 1958 and again in 1996, at the level of national legislation, it declared the establishment of straight baselines around the Paracel Islands15, despite the fact that their State ownership is disputed by Vietnam. In 2012, straight baselines were drawn around the Senkaku Islands16 ⁱⁿ the East China Sea, which are the subject of a territorial dispute between China and Japan.

Restrictions on the right of peaceful passage for civilian vessels and warships of third countries through the 12-mile territorial sea (Cambodia, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam)are widespread¹⁷.The Government of the People's Republic of China, when ratifying the 1982 Convention, stated that the provisions concerning peaceful passage through the territorial sea do not call into question the right of a coastal State to request permission or prior notification from a foreign State for the passage of its warships. Some countries (Vietnam) have imposed restrictions on the maximum number of warships that can be present in their territorial waters. In addition, restrictions are imposed on the passage of ships with a nuclear power plant, carrying nuclear or other weapons.-

gie hazardous waste (Malaysia). And if the notification procedure for such passage somehow correlates with the norms of the 1982 Convention, then the introduction of a permissive procedure is a direct violation of the convention's norms.¹⁸

Some States (Cambodia, China, Myanmar, Vietnam) claim to expand their security powers in the 24-mile contiguous zone ¹⁹. At the same time, the Convention can only monitor compliance with customs, fiscal, immigration and health laws in the contiguous zone.

In a 200-mile EEZ, riparian countries have predominantly resource-based jurisdiction. At the same time, 3 of the 6 open sea freedoms that are not related to resource development - freedom of navigation, freedom of flight, and freedom to lay cables and pipelines - apply to EEZ ²⁰. However, a number of Asia-Pacific States restrict freedom of navigation, and sometimes even flights, within their EEZs. First of all, this concerns the passage of warships, the passage of military aircraft, the implementation of naval maneuvers and exercises, and the collection of intelligence information. Thus, the PRC not only restricts military navigation within its EEZ, but also does not recognize the airspace over the EEZ as international in order to restrict the flights of American reconnaissance aircraft.²¹ The establishment of the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) by the PRC in 2013 over the East China Sea is quite legitimate, but the identification procedure cannot be applied to all aircraft, as Beijing believes, but only to those that are going to cross the border of the national airspace (coincides with the external one). border of the 12-mile territorial sea).

Environmentally motivated rhetoric is actively used to justify their claims to expand their rights in the field of security. For example, it is emphasized that the modern broad interpretation of the concept of "security" implies the existence of such types of security as economic, food, and environmental. Accordingly, their provision is also gradually beginning to be seen as economically deterministic, and therefore meeting the rights of the coastal State in the EEZ. The most significant example is that of the PRC: Beijing claims that the use of sonar by foreign warships has a negative impact on marine mammals and the state of fish resources in the Chinese EEZ, which gives China a completely legal reason to insist on banning this type of activity.²²

Violations of the convention regime occur within the waters of international straits. For example, Australia introduced mandatory pilotage in the Torres Strait in 2006 to protect the vulnerable marine environment. For the first time, a precedent was set when the right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation was restricted in the interests of environmental protection.²³ Although Australia subsequently agreed to extend this regime only to vessels intending to call at Australian ports, rather than those in transit, other States are already ready to follow suit. Indonesia stated in 2008 that it was also considering the possibility of introducing a similar regime in the Strait of Malacca.²⁴

Some archipelagic States (Philippines ²⁵, Indonesia ²⁶) have for many years insisted on extending the regime of internal waters under their full State sovereignty to all the waters around their archipelagos. They also opposed the application of the right of archipelagic passage to these waters, agreeing only with the application of the right of peaceful passage, a much more strictly regulated norm. They did not fully establish, as required by the 1982 Convention, maritime corridor schemes within the framework of the International Maritime Organization.

China and the problem of resolving the situation in the South China Sea. A special place in terms of compliance with the convention norms is occupied by the PRC. On the one hand, Beijing is not only a full party to the 1982 Convention, but also to both additional Agreements-1994 and 1995 - to it. On the other hand, it is difficult to find an example of any other country that ignores the requirements of the Convention on this scale.

This attitude of Beijing to the norms of international maritime law is largely due to several reasons, often of a purely historical nature. Thus, China is characterized by a rather skeptical attitude towards the norms of international law as a product of Western civilization, which, from this point of view, is primarily aimed at serving the interests of the most powerful and influential states in this part of the globe.²⁷ There is no doubt that this position was only further strengthened in the minds of the Chinese political elite and expert community during the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973-1982). Within its framework, Beijing has repeatedly expressed a different point of view on various issues, but few people took it into account, and most often it was simply ignored. For example, China initially insisted on the need to restrict the right of peaceful passage through the territorial sea for warships of foreign countries, but this approach did not meet the interests of the largest naval powers of that time-the USSR and the United States.

Beijing's claims regarding the islands and waters of the South China Sea are based on an appeal to the so-called 9(11) dotted sea line, which was drawn up by the Kuomintang government back in 1947. Within this line were several groups of islands, ocean shoals, cans and reefs:

- Pratas Island (Dongsha), occupied by Taiwan, but disputed by the PRC;

- The Paracel Islands (Xisha), actually occupied by the PRC, but disputed by Vietnam and Taiwan;

- Scarborough Reef (Panatag) and Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha), which are not yet occupied by anyone, but are claimed by China and Taiwan, while the Philippines claims only Scarborough Reef;

- The Spratly Islands (Nansha) are occupied by China (7 islands), Vietnam (27 islands), Malaysia (8 islands), the Philippines (9 islands) and Taiwan (1 island). At the same time, China, Taiwan and Vietnam claim to extend their sovereignty to all the islands without exception, and Malaysia (11 islands), the Philippines (53 islands) and Brunei (without specifying specific islands) claim some of the islands.

Despite the fact that the legal status of the water area within this line was not indicated anywhere, and it itself was drawn without specifying specific geographical coordinates, Beijing's position was based on the fact that for almost 40 years there have been no protests from other states in relation to it, which allows us to consider the waters within this line as "historical".

The status of" historical waters " implies the possibility of extending to them the convention regime of either internal waters or territorial seas, depending on the previous practice of the coastal State in using these spaces.²⁸ Given that Beijing strongly restricted the conduct of certain types of marine economic activities on the part of other States within this line, it can be assumed that it proceeded from their interpretation precisely as internal historical waters.²⁹ This means that not only all the islands within this line, but also the entire water area (which is about 80% of the entire area of the South China Sea, or 2.8 million ^km2), living and non-living resources of the adjacent waters, bottom and subsoil should have been extended full sovereignty of the PRC. Along with claims to the shelf and water areas around Antarctica, this is one of the most ambitious claims for managing the space and resources of the World's oceans.

In 2009 Beijing sent a map showing this line to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in response to a joint application by Malaysia and Vietnam. The text accompanying this map stated: "China has undisputed sovereignty over all the islands and adjacent waters of the South China Sea, as well as sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the waters, the bottom and its subsoil that relate to this sea region. This position is consistently held by the Chinese Government, and it is widely known to the international community. " ³⁰

Other countries in the region disagreed with such legal claims. From their point of view, this line could be drawn solely to indicate claims to certain groups of islands, but not as proof that the entire water area of the South China Sea has long and a priori been under the sovereignty of Beijing. It should also be taken into account that this line originally contained 11 dotted lines, but then 2 of them, drawn in the Tonkin Strait, were removed in 1953, which indicated its inconclusive nature. Moreover, in 2013 and 2014, Sinomaps already published official maps, where an additional - tenth - line was drawn around Taiwan, indicating additional claims by Beijing. At the same time, overlapping maps of 1947, 2009, and 2013-2014 showed that the geographical coordinates of these lines did not match, as well as their passage at an extremely small distance from the coasts of other South China Sea states.³¹

The status of "historical waters" required a large evidence base from the PRC. It assumed that the coastal State had consistently, over a long period of time and clearly demonstrated that it exercised its sovereignty over the given sea areas adjacent to its coast, which it considered vital for ensuring its security and economic development. The absence of such a practice and the controversial nature of its implementation are good reasons to disagree with such legal claims.

Indeed, China has pointed out that it has traditionally emphasized the special economic and defense importance of the South China Sea waters. Here Beijing has and will continue to have irrefutable evidence. In particular, it is precisely this meaning that all recent Chinese governments have insisted on. However, the weakness of this position lies in the fact that for other states of the South China Sea, which is semi-enclosed under Article 123 of the 1982 Convention, its importance is also extremely high, moreover, they also have their own history of development and exploitation of its spaces and resources.

Realizing that this situation required an expansion of the evidence base, Chinese experts made references to historical legal grounds.³² In particular, they claimed that most of the South China Sea islands were discovered during the Han Dynasty in the second century. In the third century AD, the Chinese mission to Cambodia mentions the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands; between the tenth and fourteenth centuries, the South China Sea was traditionally considered a zone of Chinese national interest; between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries, these islands were recorded on numerous Chinese maps; finally, Chinese fishermen traditionally fished in these areas. water areas.

However, references to historical legal grounds, even supported by maps and documents, could not form a universal evidence base for Beijing.³³ This is due to the fact that the central government for many centuries, and especially in the XIX and XX centuries, was rather weak and could not effectively control the waters of the South China Sea and the islands located there. That is why the reference to their historical status was quite speculative.³⁴

Therefore, it is not surprising that the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague in the case of the Philippines v. the People's Republic of China of July 12, 2016 declared the historical claims of the People's Republic of China illegal ³⁵. Arbitration came to you-

It is obvious that their illegitimacy is related not to the fact that such claims do not comply with the norms and provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, but to the fact that the status of historical waters can be applied mainly to bays and other marine areas adjacent to the coast. The 1982 Convention contains a reference to "historical bays" (Article 10 [6]), but the waters of the South China Sea, where a number of states that have their own maritime zones and protest against the "maritime imperialism" of the Middle Kingdom are located, cannot be identified with them in any way. The historical rights of the People's Republic of China to the resources of the South China Sea were also found to be unjustified due to the fact that the 200-mile EEZ institute introduced by the Convention gave coastal countries jurisdiction in the field of exploration and development of living and non-living resources.

The line of 9 dotted lines drawn by Beijing could also be interpreted as a claim to certain" formations " of the South China Sea (islands, rocks, drying hills, reefs, atolls, banks, etc.).

In accordance with the 1982 Convention, the first category of "entities" that are equated with land areas and are granted full rights in relation to the marine areas around them is islands. Article 121 states that " an island is a naturally formed expanse of land surrounded by water that is above the water level at high tide." This criterion is central to determining whether a territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ and continental shelf can be established around an island.

The second category includes those "entities" that are granted an incomplete set of rights. Thus, "rocks that are not suitable for supporting human life or for independent economic activity have neither an exclusive economic zone nor a continental shelf" (Article 123 [3]), that is, only a 12-mile territorial sea of a coastal state can be formed around them.

The third category includes "entities" that are not granted any rights in relation to the marine areas around them. This may include drying elevations, reefs, and atolls. Conditionally, this category also includes artificial islands, around which only security zones can be formed (Article 60).

Accordingly, almost all States of the South China Sea region tried to prove that they were suitable for life and economic activity by "effectively occupying" certain rocks, reefs, banks and shoals, with the aim of legally qualifying them as full-fledged islands. In recent years, the PRC has stepped up its policy of creating artificial islands by pouring soil, mainly around elevations that dry out at low tide.

However, one of the problems is that the 1982 Convention does not contain an exhaustive classification of all possible island territories, which would remove the contradictions regarding what can be considered a full-fledged island. It does not specify the rights of States in relation to reefs (including drying and fringing reefs), atolls, underwater banks, underwater elevations, uplifts, swells, spurs, shoals, embankments, etc. For example, in relation to atolls as naturally formed land areas due to the gradual accumulation of coral deposits that reach a large size and are suitable for life There is no consensus on the possibility of equating their status to islands/rocks. The Convention does not clearly distinguish between the following concepts: island chain - islands - islets - small islands - islands and island-like islets ³⁶.

Certain contradictions are introduced by the practice of court decisions, in which certain islands were restricted in their rights to sea spaces (the so - called reducing effect), or vice versa-rocks were equated with islands, and a territorial sea was formed around drying elevations. So, for example, by the solution

Although Zmeinyi Island was recognized as an island, not a rock, as the Romanian side insisted, but neither the EEZ nor the continental shelf of Ukraine were formed around it, but only a 12-mile territorial sea.³⁷ The island was recognized by the International Court of Justice on the delimitation between Romania and Ukraine in the Black Sea. This decision did not go unnoticed in Beijing: The PRC sent a notification to the UN indicating that not only the territorial sea, but also the 200-mile EEZ and the corresponding continental shelf may be formed around all the Spratly Islands, ³⁸ which can be considered a kind of reproach for the decision regarding the Serpentine ³⁹.

In this regard, the decision of the PCA on the claim of the Philippines against the PRC was important.

First, it was noted that the status of "formations" in the South China Sea can be determined solely by their original state, that is, without taking into account any modifications or earthworks made. The practice of the People's Republic of China to build islands was recognized as not leading to a change in their legal status, moreover, the negative impact on the marine environment and its biodiversity during such work was identified.

Second, it was confirmed that the Convention's wording on the maintenance of human life and the ability to conduct economic activities implies the complete independence of "islands" from resources beyond their borders. Accordingly, all attempts to supply (for example, fresh water) such "formations" from the mainland, the arrangement of infrastructure facilities there for the purpose of their legal classification as islands were recognized as illegitimate.

Finally, the Arbitration determined that all Spratly Islands, without exception, either individually or together, cannot form extended sea zones around them, that is, they are not islands. All the Spratly Islands located above the water level at high tide (including such large ones as Itu Aba, Thitu, West York Island, Spratly Island, North-East Cay, South-West Cay) were classified as "rocks" with the possibility of establishing only the territorial sea regime around them.

Scarborough Shoal, Gaven Reef, McKennan Reef, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef were qualified as initially remaining above water at high tide formations (high tide features) that can claim to establish a 12-mile territorial sea. Such "formations" as Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, Subi Reef, Hughes Reef, in their natural state, should be submerged at high tide, thus being dry elevations at low tide without the right to any marine zones around them ⁴⁰.

The decision of the PCA has led to a strengthening of the US legal position, since the PRC will no longer be able to fully insist on the illegal nature of US actions in the sea spaces adjacent to these "formations", considering that they are subject to its sovereignty (within the territorial sea) or jurisdiction (as in the case of an EEZ). In particular, in October 2015. The USS Lassen made a passage within 12 nautical miles of the coastline of Subi Reef, which was turned into an artificial island by the PRC ⁴¹. According to the Arbitration decision, Subi Reef is recognized as drying up at low tide elevation, which means that all previous protests of the People's Republic of China on the ban on the passage of American ships near it become unfounded.

Beijing, both during the consideration of the Philippine claim and as a result of it, has repeatedly stated that it not only does not recognize the jurisdiction of this Arbitration, but also has the right to use its appeal to the provisions of article 298 of the 1982 Convention. It allows any State to declare its non-acceptance of one or more of the dispute settlement mechanisms prescribed by the Convention (the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Arbitration, Special Arbitration) in relation to a number of issues, namely, disputes related to the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating to delimitation maritime borders; disputes related to-

disputes related to historical interests or legal grounds; disputes relating to military activities, including military activities of State vessels and aircraft in non-commercial service; disputes relating to law enforcement activities in relation to the exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction; disputes in respect of which the UN Security Council exercises the functions assigned to it by the Charter.

In voicing its position for the PCA, Beijing emphasized that it not only does not recognize the jurisdiction of Arbitration and calls for respect for the provisions of article 298, ^but also believes that the most effective way to resolve all maritime disputes with neighboring countries is through bilateral negotiations, and the Philippines ' actions only discredit and devalue the essence of article 298.42 In an official statement issued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry following the adoption of its decision by the PCA, it was stated that this dispute directly concerns issues of sovereignty and maritime delimitation, and, accordingly, could not be the subject of arbitration under Article 298.43^.

However, the international arbitral tribunal found that article 298 did not preclude the dispute from being considered. ⁴⁴ His argument ran as follows. First, the question of the possibility of establishing maritime zones prescribed by the convention around certain "formations" of the South China Sea cannot be equated with the problem of maritime delimitation. Especially given the fact that none of the South China Sea islands and reefs claimed by Beijing can generate an EEZ around them. Secondly, the historical legal grounds listed in article 298 can only apply to bays and other marine areas located close to the coast. The very practice of the People's Republic of China within the so-called 9-dashed line was more indicative of the desire to extend the "historical status" not to the waters of the South China Sea, but only to its resources. Third, the reference to the provisions of article 298 regarding "disputes concerning law enforcement activities in relation to the exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction" cannot be applied, since the Philippine claim does not relate to activities within the PRC's EEZ. Fourth, since the Chinese leadership has repeatedly insisted on the non-military nature of any activity on the South China Sea islands, this provision of article 298 cannot be used by the Chinese side either.

It should be noted that about 20 States have made declarations under Article 298, including: Angola, Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Canada, Chile, France, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation. The United States, although not a party to the Convention, has also formulated its position in case of its ratification. They stated that they did not agree to apply the mandatory dispute settlement procedures provided for in the Convention for all categories of disputes listed in article 298. For other categories of disputes, they chose special arbitration, if it could be applied to them, and arbitration for all other disputes. Separately, it was emphasized that the United States itself will determine whether a particular type of activity can be classified as "military activity" or" military actions", and such a definition is not subject to revision. It was also agreed that the conduct of all types of intelligence activities at sea is a military activity, which means that the Convention's dispute settlement mechanisms cannot be applied to them either.⁴⁵

In general, the decision of the international arbitration court, which ignored Beijing's appeals to the provisions of Article 298, while taking into account the very peculiar position of Washington on this issue, raises the question of the effectiveness of this article. The logic used by international arbitrators, on the one hand, shows gaps in Beijing's argument, especially in terms of pointing out historical legal grounds,

which were then skillfully used by Arbitration. On the other hand, the large-scale disregard of references to Article 298 was undertaken solely to justify the legitimacy of the consideration of the Philippine claim, in the successful outcome of which many countries of the Asia-Pacific region, including the United States, were interested. Time will tell what legal consequences this precedent will have, but we must not forget that for our country, the provisions of Article 298 are an important argument for protecting its national interests in relation to various maritime regions, including the Arctic.

The PCA decision is formally binding, and the PRC cannot be an exception, but today there are no institutional mechanisms that can force Beijing to fully comply with the requirements of international arbitration. Especially in light of the fact that the PRC initially did not recognize the jurisdiction of the PCA in this dispute. Moreover, no UN mechanisms - neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council - are involved in this process, as well as in monitoring the implementation of the norms and provisions of the Convention. And given the fact that many countries were quick to smooth out their positions on Beijing's policy following the decision, we can assume that the settlement process will develop exclusively within the framework of a bilateral format, without involving non-regional players. The PRC initially insisted on this, and this position, I must say, is shared by the Russian Federation, which opposes any internationalization of the South China Sea issue. ⁴⁶

* * *

Summing up, it should be noted that a significant part of maritime conflicts and contradictions between the countries of the Asia-Pacific region is due to the fact that there is no unity between them regarding the understanding and implementation of certain norms of the 1982 Convention. Non-participation in this international agreement of the largest maritime and naval power-the United States-if not discredits the regime established by the Convention, then At a minimum, it provokes other States to selectively fulfill certain convention obligations.

It should also be recognized that the system of international relations itself has undergone significant changes in the two decades since the Convention entered into force in 1994. New regional and global leaders have emerged at the forefront of world politics, seeking to firmly defend their national interests. The legal gaps contained in the Convention (regarding the regime of historical waters; naval activities and scientific research in the EEZ; classification of "island territories") have become the basis for putting forward extensive legal claims.

The maximum concentration of convention violations falls on the South China Sea region. The request position of the People's Republic of China is particularly prominent, which often does not correlate well with the norms of international maritime law. At the same time, Beijing's policy of consistently promoting its claims at various levels leads to the fact that it finds its supporters: ratified in 2011. However, Thailand also insists on its right to restrict naval activities within the EEZ. All this creates a danger of changing the perception of certain convention norms on the part of other States. The erosion of the convention regime on the scale of the entire World Ocean does not meet the interests of Russia or other major maritime Powers. That is why Beijing's violations of the norms and provisions of international maritime law, a kind of legal warfare ⁴⁷, should certainly be limited.

It seems that at the current stage, such a model of behavior of the PRC is due to priority attention to the problem of ensuring its own security in the adjacent marine areas. However, as China transforms from a regional power to a country with global interests, there may be a change in the perception of the world.-

rules and regulations of international maritime law. The creation of a real ocean fleet capable of solving the tasks set on the scale of the entire World Ocean will lead to a more responsible attitude of the PRC to the existing convention regime. This is due to the fact that article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ⁴⁸ allows other countries not to comply with the norms of an international agreement in relation to the State that violates them. That is why it can be assumed that in the future China may become more interested in applying and protecting universal norms concerning the peaceful passage of warships through the territorial sea and the freedom of military navigation within the EEZ. It was along this path - from complete / partial non-recognition to recognition-that all the major naval powers, including the USSR and the United States, developed. Hopefully, Beijing will not be an exception in this regard.

1. Roach J. Ashley, Smith W. Robert. Excessive Maritime Claims. 3^rd ed. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012. P. 157, 250-251.

2. Maritime Claims Reference Manual. North Korea. URL: http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/mcrm/KoreaNorth2016.pdf

3. Mikhailov V. S. The problem of concluding a peace treaty with Japan from the point of view of international law // Bulletin of the Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2005, No. 4, pp. 29-38.

4. Statement on United States Oceans Policy. March 10, 1983. URL: http://www.reagan.utexas.edU/archives/speeches/1983/31083c.htm

5. Vylegzhanin A. N., Kalamkaryan R. A. Mezhdunarodnyi usluzhay kak osnovnoi istochnik mezhdunarodnogo prava [International custom as the main source of international law]. 2012. N 6. pp. 81-83.

6. Constitution for the oceans. Remarks by the President of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Tomi T. B. Ko. URL: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_russian.pdf

7. Harrison J. Making the Law of the Sea: a study in the development of international Law. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2011. P. 51-59.

8. Lodge W. Michael. The Common Heritage of Mankind // The Law of the Sea Convention at 30: Success, Challenges and New Agendas / Ed. by D. Freestone. Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013. P. 60.

9. Tanaka Y. The International Law of the Sea. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2012. P. 140-141.

10. Executive Report. 11 Oth Congress. 1st Session. Exec. Rpt. 110-9 (December 19, 2007). P. 13, 21. URL: http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/LTNCLOS-Sen-Exec-Rpt-110-9.pdf

11. Kraska J. Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea. Expeditionary operations in World Politics. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2011. P. 271-276.

12. Svininykh E. Prospects of the USA joining the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie [Foreign Military Review]. 2011. N 1. P. 78.

13. The United States ' non-participation in the Convention places it on a par with Afghanistan, Andorra, Bhutan, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Liechtenstein, Peru, Rwanda, North Korea, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela, Central African Republic, Eritrea, South Sudan.

14. Bateman S. State Practice Regarding Straight Baselines in East Asia - Legal, Technical And Political Issues. URL: https://www.iho.int/mtg_docs/com_wg/ABLOS/ABLOS_Conf5/Papers/Session7-Paperl-Bateman.pdf

15. Limits in the Seas. N 43. Straight Baselines. China. 1972. URL: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58832.pdf; N 117. 1996. URL: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/57692.pdf

16. Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the baselines of the territorial Sea of Diaoyu Dao. URL: http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/DEPOSIT/chn_mzn89_2012_e.pdf; The Chart of Baselines of Diayou Dao. URL: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/MAPS/chn_mzn89_2012.jpg

17. Roach J. Ashley, Smith W. Robert. Op. cit. P. 250-251.

18. Klein N. Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2011. P. 35-40, 43.

19. Roach J. Ashley, Smith W. Robert. Op. cit. P. 157.

20. Rothwell D.R., Stephens T. The International Law of the Sea. Oxford-Portland: Hart Publishing, 2010. P. 168.

21. Maritime Claims Reference Manual. China. URL: http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/mcrm/China2016.pdf

22. Raine S., Miere Le Christian. Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes. Routledge, 2013. P. 47-48.

23. Tanaka Y. Op. cit. P. 105.

24. Kraska J., Pedrozo R. International Maritime Security. Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013. P. 269.

25. Limits in the Seas. N 142. Philippines. URL: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/231914.pdf

26. Ibid. N 141. Indonesia. URL: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/231912.pdf

27. Nong Hong. UNCLOS and Ocean Dispute Settlement: Law and Politics in the South China Sea. Routledge, 2012. P. 109-153.

28. Mezhdunarodno-pravovaya kvalifikatsiya morskoy rayonov v kak istoricheskikh vod (teoriya i praktika gosudarstv) [International legal qualification of marine areas as historical waters (theory and practice of States)].

29. Storey I. China's Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy in the South China Sea / Cooperation from Strength. The United States, China and the South China Sea. P. 54. URL: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNASCooperationFromStrength_Cronin_l.pdf

30. Communications received with regard to the joint submission made by Malaysia and Vietnam to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. China. URL: http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf

31. Limits in the Seas. N 143. China. Maritime Claims in the South China Sea. URL: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf

32. Cronin P.M.. Kaplan R.D. US Strategy and the South China Sea // Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea. P. 14. URL: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_CooperationFromStrength_Cronin_1.pdf

33. Storey I. China's Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy in the South China Sea // Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea. P. 54. URL: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_CooperationFromStrength_Storey_1.pdf

34. Dutton P. An Analysis of China's Claim to Historic Rights in the South China Sea // Major Law and Policy Issues in the South China Sea / Ed. By Yann-huei, Keyuan Zou. Ashgate, 2014. P. 69-70.

35. The South China Sea Arbitration. The Republic of the Philippines v. the People's Republic of China). The Hague, 12 July 2016. The Tribunal Renders Its Award. URL: https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1801

36. Tikhomin K. V. The role of island territories in the delimitation of marine spaces. Moskovskiy zhurnal mezhdunarodnogo prava [Moscow Journal of International Law]. 2008. N 3. pp. 151-171.

37. Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine). No. 2009/9. 3 February 2009. URL: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/132/14985.pdf

38. CML/8/2011. 14 April 2011. URL: http://www.un.org/depts/los/cles_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf

39. Dutton P. A. Cracks in the Global Foundation: International Law and Instability in the South China Sea // Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea. P. 78. URL: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_CooperationFromStrength_Dutton_1.pdf

40. The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. the People's Republic OF China) The Hague, 12 July 2016. The Tribunal Renders Its Award. URL: https://pcacases.eom/web/sendAttach/1801

41. Lynn Kuok. The U.S. FON Program in the South China Sea a lawful and necessary response to China's strategic ambiguity. URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/The-US-FON-Program-in-the-South-China-Sea.pdf

42. Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines. 2014/12/07. URL: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml

43. Full text of statement of China's Foreign Ministry on award of South China Sea arbitration initiated by Philippines. URL: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/12/c_135507744.htm

44. The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. the People's Republic of China) The Hague, 12 July 2016. The Tribunal Renders Its Award. URL: https://pcacases.eom/web/sendAttach/1801

45. Roach J. Ashley, Smith W. Robert. Op. cit. P. 794-795.

46. URL: http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/spokesman/briefings/-/asset_publisher/D2wHaWMCU60d/content/id/2354135.

47. Kraska J. Op. cit. P. 320.

48. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. URL: http://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/law_treaties.shtml

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