It is possible to argue for a long time about which world order will ensure strategic stability and security in East Asia more reliably-unipolar, bipolar or multipolar, but one thing remains indisputable-after the tragic events of September 11, 2001. In New York and Washington, for the first time since the end of World War II, humanity has come close to dangerously destabilizing the system of international relations. The world is on the verge of a new type of confrontation, in which the concepts of front and rear disappear, and the enemy does not have pronounced national borders. Today, the attention of politicians, military personnel, and analysts of the world's leading powers is focused on the region of Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Middle East, where the United States of America began to put into practice its step-by-step strategy of forming a new world order of the XXI century, but where it met resistance from the Islamic world. This time, for this purpose, the Americans used as an excuse the fight against a new enemy (which replaced the fight against communism in the XX century) - international terrorism in Muslim clothes. Tomorrow, perhaps, the necessary excuse will be found in the region of East Asia, where at the turn of the XX and XXI centuries. new centers of power were being dynamically formed that could actually counteract the United States in the implementation of its hegemonic ambitions.

This review is devoted to a critical analysis of the assessments of the development of the situation in the East Asian region at the beginning of the XXI century, made by representatives of three main scientific schools in strategic studies - realistic, liberal and constructivist.

THE REALIST VIEW: GROUNDS FOR PESSIMISM

The realistic direction in strategic studies conceptually proceeds from the fact that the conflict between nations is an integral part of the system of international relations and it can be contained only by relying on the strength and power of the great powers that maintain a strategic balance among themselves. Therefore, according to the "realists", the state must constantly take care of building up its military power, which is a crucial means of protecting national security and maintaining global and regional stability. "Realist" scientists are convinced that any changes in the world order system are based not on the good wishes of politicians or moral and ethical considerations of the struggle between" good and evil", but on purely pragmatic national interests, which should be considered as the driving motive of foreign policy. According to the realistic approach, the system of international relations is an arena of "struggle of all against all", it is the sphere of application of national military power, economic and scientific and technical potentials, a field of competition, interaction and adaptation. "Realists" believe that power has potentials not only to destroy,but also to create, and therefore it plays an important stabilizing role.

Assessing the development of the strategic situation in East Asia in the medium term, many followers of the realistic direction proceed from a pessimistic scenario. They see this region as extremely unstable due to the growing contradictions in the economic sphere, which can provoke the emergence of a military conflict. So, the Americans Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal note that " no growth in mutual trade and economic cooperation in the region is not capable of sa-

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By itself, we can eliminate conflicts and ease tensions between regional Powers." 1 Another realist scholar, A. Acharya, developing the thesis of Buzan and Segal, writes that "conflicts in the region are possible primarily due to the uneven distribution of income from economic exchange and differences in economic growth rates" 2 . Stief Chen is convinced that "the liberal concept, according to which conflicts are basically excluded between developed democracies, does not work in East Asian countries for the simple reason that democratic institutions are still quite weak here, and the influence of the military in shaping foreign policy is much stronger than in European countries or in the United States." 3 Aron Freidberg, studying the factors of instability in the region, notes, in particular, that " active military construction and increased military spending, so characteristic of many East Asian countries, contribute to conflicts, since war for many regional leaders has not yet lost its attractiveness." 4 . Denny Roy shares the same view. He believes that "multilateral cooperation of East Asian countries can play the role of a stabilizer of the strategic situation only if any great power assumes responsibility for compliance by all members of the regional community with the rules of international behavior." 5

How reasonable are the pessimistic assessments of "realist" scientists regarding the future development of the strategic situation in the region, and what factors can become the main detonators of the existing status quo here? It seems that first of all it is the presence of two "divided states" - North and South Korea, as well as China and Taiwan. East Asia is a region with a large number of unresolved territorial disputes concerning the demarcation of both land and sea borders. The importance of these border issues can only increase as economic disputes between neighboring States over fisheries and access to natural resources become more acute, as well as the establishment of a 200 - mile economic zone. A number of states in the region have created quite serious power potential. The relentless process of building up weapons is primarily due to the legitimate concern of the ruling elites of many countries about the increased military preparations of their neighbors in East Asia. This factor can also be considered as a potential threat to national security, which can cause an intraregional power conflict.

In our opinion, the high level of trade and economic ties between the East Asian states should not be overestimated and considered as a reliable guarantee of security and stability of the regional strategic field. History knows a lot of facts confirming the validity of such assumptions. Thus, Japan's fairly developed economic relations with the United States in the 1930s, i.e. on the eve of the war in the Pacific, quickly developed into a tough military confrontation between them during World War II. The large volume of German trade with the Soviet Union in the late 1930s did not prevent Hitler from committing an armed aggression against our country. Moreover, a high level of economic interdependence can itself become the basis for maturing conflicts, especially if economic relations between countries are asymmetric, which is typical for relations between States at different stages of industrial and technological development. Economic growth in any country in the region cannot be considered as a guarantee of strengthening its internal political stability, and therefore as a guarantee of security for its neighbors. The fact is that economic growth is often accompanied by an increase in the unemployment rate, an increase in social tensions (as was the case in South Korea, Indonesia, and Taiwan), and an increase in the development gap in certain areas of the same country, which causes internal political instability and can become an additional security threat to neighbors.

The growing inter-country political dialogue in East Asia since the 1990s is also not necessarily a guarantee of stability and security in the region. Multilateral security regimes generally do little to maintain the status quo in a region where the balance of power is disrupted and the influence of international organizations that monitor compliance with these regimes is weakened. Multilateral cooperation of the countries of the region does not fulfill its stabilizing role either due to the low level of institutionalization of its mechanisms and the lack of a solid legal basis for such cooperation. The establishment of a balance of power in the region can play a much more constructive role in strengthening security regimes compared to the insignificant multilateral negotiations on "self-determination".-

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measures". At the same time, the establishment of a new balance of power in East Asia at the beginning of the twenty-first century in the context of the emerging multipolar world will prove to be a much more complex and contradictory process than it was in the context of a bipolar world.

Finally, destabilization in the region, in our opinion, can easily be provoked by the US abandonment of its security obligations, which implies the withdrawal of its troops from East Asia. Of course, they are unlikely to do so at the very beginning of the twenty-first century, especially given the instability on the Korean peninsula and the continuing tensions between China and Taiwan. However, by 2010-2015, the United States may start blackmailing its allies with the withdrawal of troops, using the growing contradictions in bilateral relations with many regional powers, including China, North Korea and ending with Japan.

Assessing the prospects for the development of the strategic situation in East Asia in the first decade of the twenty-first century from the standpoint of a realistic approach suggests that the United States of America can really take advantage of the continuing uncertainty in solving the problem of reunification of North and South Korea, as well as the tense relations between China and Taiwan, In fact, the ruling circles of the leading East Asian states already in the 1990s began to prepare for a possible complication in the system of international relations in the region and take additional measures to strengthen security in case of unforeseen developments. Japan, for example, under the pretext of preparing to repel a preemptive missile attack by an unknown enemy on the military bases of its ally, the United States, on its territory, rapidly increased its national missile defense potential. At the same time, its military preparations provoked accelerated military construction in China, South Korea, and Russia, i.e., in countries that, due to historical experience, traditionally did not trust the military policy of the ruling circles of this country.

In the medium term, in our opinion, it is also impossible to exclude the growing contradictions in the strategic area between the United States and Russia in the East Asian region. This may be primarily due to the persistent attempts of the United States to deploy theater of operations missile defense in the region and involve Japan in this. The US ruling circles, on the one hand, virtually ignore Russia's position on the 1972 ABM Treaty, and, on the other, sharply criticize the Russian leadership for developing military - technical cooperation with China, Iran and the DPRK. Moscow, in turn, cannot tolerate America's attempts to assume gendarme functions in the East Asian region and allow it to punish "rogue states"independently, without taking into account the opinion of the world community. In this regard, attention is drawn to a characteristic bill put forward by a Republican senator in February 2001, according to which the United States intends to assign itself the right to physically eliminate political leaders of sovereign states whose foreign policy does not meet American strategic interests. It is obvious that after the terrorist attacks in US cities in September 2001, American lawmakers intend to finally untie their hands in the development and adoption of such laws.

In the medium term, Russia will find it difficult to take adequate measures to strengthen its own security in East Asia, as its economic, political and strategic positions in the region are unlikely to recover quickly after the collapse of the USSR and the defeat of the Cold War. Therefore, the Russian side primarily seeks to accelerate the formation of strategic partnership relations with the leading powers of the region. As part of this course, in February 2001, the Russian President paid an official visit to Seoul to bring the two countries ' strategic positions closer together. In March of the same year, a high-level meeting of the leaders of Russia and Japan was held in Irkutsk to expand and deepen the inter-country dialogue. In July 2001. Russia has signed a treaty on good Neighborliness, friendship and cooperation with China. I would like to believe that these constructive strategic initiatives of Russia will not be interpreted in the United States as an attempt to disrupt the post-Cold War balance of power or as a desire to limit American dominance in the region. An active Russian foreign policy in East Asia is precisely aimed at restoring the disturbed balance of power here and does not infringe on anyone's strategic interests.

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Paradoxically, such actors in the system of international relations in East Asia as Japan, Taiwan, and Russia are interested in maintaining the US military presence in the region. This is due to the understandable desire to shift the burden of responsibility and financial costs to the United States to maintain stability and the status quo here. In fact, however, this may lead to a de facto recognition of America's dominant role in the region. However, China and the DPRK strongly disagree with this formulation of the issue.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the region developed a balance of power in which the most significant strategic reality was the military power of the United States. This does not mean that Americans can easily impose their interests on other participants in the system. However, in terms of strategic realities, none of the East Asian countries can compare with America in both conventional and nuclear weapons. This means that the United States can effectively exploit the power imbalance in order to strengthen its position here, even if it does not have its equal military power.

During the bipolar world, Russia maintained a balance of power with the United States in East Asia and thereby ensured the stability of the strategic field in the region. However, in the 1990s, the level of its political influence here significantly decreased due to economic weakness and a serious reduction in the potential of conventional and nuclear weapons. In addition, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's strategic interests, as predicted in the American and NATO plans, will for a long time be focused on stabilizing difficult relations with the countries of the "near abroad", from the territory of which Russia can expect real threats to its security. As for its relations with the "far abroad" countries in East Asia, Gilbert Rozman, an American expert on Russian problems, rightly believes that Russia will not have enough financial resources in the near future to compete with the United States and significantly influence the development of the situation 6

There is no doubt that by 2010, China will also not have emerged as a second superpower. Its military capabilities will still be noticeably inferior to those of the United States, and it will not be ready to engage on an equal footing with the United States at both the regional and global levels. This means that the so-called Chinese threat to the security of the countries of the region, artificially inflated by the military circles of the United States and a number of East Asian countries in order to justify increasing budget allocations for defense purposes, is nothing more than a deliberate exaggeration. 7 At the beginning of the XXI century. China will retain many more features of a relatively weak military state. "On paper," the size of the armed forces of the People's Republic of China looks very impressive: according to 1997 data, it was 2.8 million people, but the PLA is experiencing serious difficulties in implementing its power potential beyond national borders, having a low level of military equipment and insufficient experience in conducting maneuvers abroad. The Chinese army is mainly armed with equipment of the 1950s-1960s model, which is outdated morally and physically, which gives rise to some experts to call the PLA's weapons - the world's largest "open-air defense museum" 8 . The Chinese military-industrial complex also has old equipment, and therefore the country's authorities are actively purchasing advanced imported military technology and modern samples of military equipment 9 The PLA's mobilization readiness remains low, and the ability to carry out military operations with the combined forces of different branches of the armed forces is very limited. According to one Japanese military analyst, the PLA will reach the level of mobilization readiness according to the standards of NATO countries no earlier than by 2020-2025. 10

At the beginning of the XXI century, the gap in the size of the nuclear potential between the United States and China remained quite noticeable : if the former had 581 intercontinental missiles in service, then China had only 17 of them, the Americans had 8654 nuclear warheads at their disposal, while the Chinese - 99. But the most significant weakness of China's nuclear capabilities is that it does not yet have the technical capabilities to launch a second retaliatory nuclear missile strike on US territory after the first nuclear attack is completed. Therefore, we can say with good reason that the United States will retain overwhelming nuclear superiority over China until 2015-2020. The latter's leaders will try to avoid, at least for this period, seriously provoking the United States into armed conflict in East Asia. At the same time, China itself appears to be struggling for the time being.

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it cannot act as a real balancing force in the region, precisely because of its insufficient military power as a new superpower of the XXI century.

Japan's deterrent role in the period up to 2010 also looks very problematic. On the one hand, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the country was in the deepest economic and political crisis in the entire post-war history, caused by a prolonged structural adjustment of production and an unstable political system that was unable to put the country on the path of dynamic development. On the other hand, Japan has been unable since the Cold War to neutralize two of the most vulnerable areas in its security system, which seriously weaken its role as a leading regional Power. First, the country has remained completely dependent on the United States for security issues and, above all, for ensuring the security of maritime communications in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, through which it receives strategic raw materials from the Middle East 11 And secondly, Japan has not provided either internal or external conditions under which it could fully realize its defense potential. This means that even if it wanted to use its military to protect national security, regardless of US interests, it would immediately provoke its neighbors in the region to form an anti-Japanese coalition based on a lingering sense of distrust of it from the Second World War. With such a coalition of neighboring countries in the region, Tokyo will never be able to talk on equal terms, even if it has its own nuclear weapons 12

The United States, if it considers it profitable for itself, will be able to skillfully play the "North Korean card" in its strategic interests under the pretext of "fighting international terrorism." The fact is that the DPRK is the only country in East Asia that, with its independent policy, really poses a serious challenge to America in the region. Throughout the 1990s, the North Korean leadership successfully practiced a policy of blackmail against the United States. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, when the DPRK was essentially abandoned to its fate by the new Russian government, it began to rapidly lose its military and economic potential. In order not to finally turn into a strategic outsider, the country's leadership openly embarked on the path of imitating the strategic initiative of the first strike, ostensibly for the sake of uniting Korea in a military scenario. At the same time, the North Korean authorities calculated that neither the United States, nor Japan, nor China or Russia, having estimated first of all their possible losses in manpower, would want to interfere in the conflict, but would prefer a policy of appeasing the "potential aggressor" by providing the DPRK with economic and financial assistance. So, in fact, relations with North Korea were built throughout the 90s XX century At the same time, the North Korean leadership was clearly aware that the balance of power on the Korean peninsula in terms of conventional weapons was not in favor of the DPRK, and the question of seizing Seoul, not to mention occupying and holding by force most of the territory of South Korea, was always very problematic 13

The United States has two scenarios of relations with the DPRK. The first involves the use of force against a " rogue state." The second is to provide Pyongyang with economic assistance, loans, and new technologies 14 However, in both cases, the risk of a violent conflict in the region remains. This is primarily due to the possibility of a political miscalculation on the part of the DPRK leadership regarding the benefits derived from the policy of blackmailing America by threatening to use force against South Korea. After all, the Americans cannot lose face and abandon their security guarantee obligations towards Seoul as their strategic ally in East Asia. If the North Korean leadership overestimates its ability to continue forceful pressure on South Korea, the Americans will simply "punish Pyongyang for its bad behavior." The United States has repeatedly demonstrated to the world in the 1990s the ease of making such a forceful decision, when NATO aircraft bombed military and civilian targets in Iraq and Yugoslavia, states whose leaders did not want to submit to the political will of America. In this case, the conflict on the Korean Peninsula will become inevitable. It can easily turn into a detonator for a serious explosion of the strategic situation in East Asia as a whole.

In our opinion, the uncertainty of the position of the US ruling circles regarding their future presence in the region cannot meet the interests of strengthening strategic stability in the region. The democratic administration of President Clinton in the 1990s is not Toro-

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The United States has met with the withdrawal of American troops from a number of East Asian countries, and each time it has reaffirmed its security guarantee obligations to its allies in Asia. Moreover, during this period, America consistently strengthened its strategic footholds in the region. For example, the United States strengthened its presence on the territory of the Japanese Islands by signing a "New Course of Bilateral Security Cooperation"with Tokyo. According to it, the United States kept all its military bases in Japan, and the latter, in turn, was supposed to provide America with logistical support in the event of a regional crisis and transmit intelligence information at its disposal. In the 1990s. The United States maintained some form of military presence in other East Asian countries and openly demonstrated military support for its allies 15 So, in 1995, during a large-scale naval exercise of the Chinese Navy off the coast of Taiwan, the United States immediately transferred two of its aircraft carriers from the US Pacific Fleet to this area.

At the same time, the issue of the withdrawal of American troops from the region in 2010-2015, i.e. after the expected unification of Korea and the annexation of Taiwan to China, is still being discussed in the ruling circles of America. The lack of clear US statements on this important strategic issue in 2001 gives rise to many fears among the leaders of East Asian countries and concerns about maintaining stability and the status quo here.

In general, assessing the prospects for the development of the strategic situation in East Asia from the standpoint of a realistic approach, we can really admit that there are plenty of conditions for the emergence of a military conflict here, and the question of the timing of the withdrawal of American troops from the region will remain in limbo for a long time. Its final decision will be determined by the choice of methods for strengthening American influence in East Asia, as well as the possibilities for further financing the US military presence abroad in the context of the economic downturn at the beginning of the XXI century, on the one hand, and the need to increase the cost of fighting international terrorism, deploying national missile defense and theater The level of stability in the region will also be determined by the strategic consequences of Korean unification, as the new Korea may require the United States to withdraw all military bases from its territory. Americans will be required to respond to the process of Taiwan's annexation to China. If China uses the military option to solve the Taiwan problem, the United States can intervene in the conflict and "fulfill to the end" its obligations to protect Taipei.

At the same time, the accelerated withdrawal of American troops from the region and, as a consequence, the possible weakening of American influence in East Asia may also lead to an aggravation of the struggle for leadership in the region between China, Japan, Russia and a united Korea. However, in this case, the presence of nuclear weapons in China, Russia and the United States and their objective interest in avoiding a military confrontation with each other will be a deterrent to the development of a regional conflict. At the same time, there may be a risk of nuclear proliferation in the region due to the inclusion of new countries, especially the DPRK and Japan, in the nuclear club. In the face of continuing uncertainty about the withdrawal of American troops, Japan, for example, already in the 1990s tried to probe the country's public opinion and determine the reaction of its neighbors in East Asia regarding its possible production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. It is obvious that Tokyo wants to be prepared for any changes in the development of the strategic situation in East Asia.

A "LIBERAL" VIEW OF THE SITUATION: REASONS FOR OPTIMISM

The liberal trend in strategic situations, which has absorbed the concepts of classical liberalism, transfers the principles of free trade ("laissez-faire") to the sphere of international relations. Hence the exaggeration of the role of self-adjustment of the system of international relations for stable, conflict-free development through the expansion of foreign trade and economic cooperation. "Liberals" are supporters of cosmopolitanism (D. Hobson, T. Green, L. Hobhouse) and minimizing the role of the state in foreign policy.

Political scientists who take the position of the liberal school in strategic studies give a generally optimistic forecast of the development of the situation in East Asia by 2010.-

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There are no serious security threats to the countries of the region during this period. "Liberals" identify three main groups of factors that, in their opinion, can be considered as guarantees of stability and security of the region as a whole. First, it is the national interests of all the leading actors in East Asia, which will continue to focus on economic growth and scientific and technological progress. On the one hand, according to the "liberals", this is due to the already achieved high level of their economic interdependence, while on the other hand, these countries do not want to suffer huge losses from the destabilization of the strategic situation in the region. According to Jonathan Pollack, "states that depend on the global market and the influx of foreign investment to maintain political and social stability at home are extremely reluctant to participate in international conflicts and wars." 16 He is echoed by Professor Robert Scalapino, who is also convinced that " the growth of intraregional trade, capital inflows and labor migration to East Asian countries will help stabilize the system of interstate relations in the region, and not increase tensions and conflicts." 17 .

According to the logic of the "liberals", neither South Korea, nor Taiwan, nor Japan are objectively interested in provoking a conflict and creating security threats to their neighbors. These countries are 80% dependent on energy supplies from the global market, and any destabilization of the strategic field in the region immediately negatively affects their economic growth. However, Kent Calder, a well-known American expert in the field of strategic studies and a representative of the realist school, does not agree with this. On the contrary, he believes that the high level of dependence of a state on external energy supplies is in itself a threat to national security, since the violation of stable supplies of raw materials and energy carriers leads to a violation of reproduction processes, and a state dependent on the import of raw materials will strive to protect its security with all the means at its disposal 18

The "liberals" believe that China, although less dependent on external energy supplies, is also interested in strategic stability compared to other countries in the region. 19 They explain this by saying that the Chinese economy can be seriously undermined if the stability of foreign trade relations with East Asian states is disrupted, as well as if the flow of foreign investment and technology to modernize the national industry is disrupted. Therefore, the foreign policy interests of the Chinese leadership in the future should be focused on maintaining strategic stability in the region, expanding economic cooperation, and not on implementing a foreign policy that provokes destabilization, liberal scientists believe."

Meanwhile, the overwhelming majority of Western and Japanese sinologists, who hold the positions of the realistic school, are convinced of the opposite, namely that Chinese leaders will carefully monitor any unfriendly actions of the United States and Japan towards the PRC and pre-empt the appearance of threats to their security in advance. China will not allow them to interfere in its internal affairs, including the Taiwan issue. Therefore,"realist" scientists do not consider the claims of "liberals" that China's behavior in the medium term will be primarily determined by the interests of economic growth and only then by the interests of national security to be fully justified 20

In the opinion of "realists", the estimates of those "liberal" analysts who focus on the factor of growing economic interdependence look unjustifiably overstated, seeing this as a guarantee of stability in East Asia in the medium term. Thus, Kwan is very positive about this factor and notes that if in 1985 the intraregional trade turnover accounted for only 33% of the total foreign trade turnover of East Asian countries, in 1992 it reached 45%, and in the late 1990s it exceeded 60% 21 . The American researcher V. Hatch draws attention to the fact that in the 1990s the intraregional flow of direct investment significantly increased, especially from Japan, which, in his opinion, can be considered as the basis for maintaining a high level of strategic stability in the future 22 According to A. Nathan and R. Ross, China alone received more than $ 95.6 billion in foreign direct investment from the region in the period 1978-1994, and therefore its leaders will never refuse to take "golden eggs from this basket" 23 .

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According to the liberals, the deepening of intraregional trade and economic ties in terms of ensuring strategic stability in the region has at least two positive aspects. On the one hand, it works to maintain the status quo in East Asia, since any destabilization seriously increases the material costs of neutralizing the crisis for East Asian countries: if only one financial and economic crisis in 1997-1998 caused such serious damage to the socio-political stability of Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, and even Japan, then the next one is the most dangerous one. here, the power conflict, economic and political damage will be disproportionately large. Therefore, as Patrick Morgan writes, " the most important domestic political task of most East Asian regimes is to maintain social stability and maintain power at all costs. The ruling circles of regional powers will strive at all costs to avoid involvement in conflicts that may negatively affect the domestic political situation." 24 On the other hand, according to the liberal point of view, in conditions of stability and security, moderate political forces in East Asian countries, relying on commercial and industrial circles, can use the factor of public support for their policies to the advantage of their interests, pushing the "hawks" to the sidelines of political life. R. Scalapino notes in this regard that "the growing desire of the general public of the countries of the region for democracy and pluralism, convincingly demonstrated in the 90s Twentieth-century developments in South Korea and Taiwan have confirmed the thesis that moderate politicians are more trusted by voters than aggressive leaders" 25 . However, the "liberals" do not rule out that the situation may change dramatically if a conflict arises in the region. Then aggressive nationalist forces may come to power, which will be forced to adapt the political system in their countries to the conditions of confrontation. It is very significant that in the context of strategic stability in East Asia during the 1990s In the 20th century, not a single PLA military leader was appointed to the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee 26

The liberals assign an important role as a stabilizer of the system of international relations in the region to the activities of various international institutions, expanding contacts at the highest level, and holding international forums, which really became widespread in the end XX-early XXI century. Desmond Ball bluntly calls this "a real explosion that can really change the entire previous history of relations between East Asian countries, deepen the trust of their leaders in each other." 27 Many East Asian States have become participants in the most politically and economically significant international forums and organizations. Thus, China, which was still a member of a very limited number of international organizations in the late 1970s, was already a member of more than 700 regional and global international organizations by the early 1990s 28 Moreover, many States in the region consider participation in the work of such organizations to be an important political task and see it as evidence of international recognition of their constructive role in the system of international relations. Japan, for example, was particularly persistent in seeking permanent membership in the UN Security Council during the 1980s and 1990s. In the 1990s, the Chinese leadership was just as insistent on joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) 29 The Russian leadership has also made similar efforts in this direction.

From our point of view, the involvement of East Asian countries in active activities in leading international organizations (ASEAN, APEC) can rightly be considered as an important stabilizing factor in strengthening security not only at the global but also at the regional level. This is due to the fact that initially created as organizations for promoting trade and industrial exchange in East Asian countries, these international organizations gradually began to cover other areas of relations, including arms control and security issues 30 In this context, the ASEAN Regional Forum, which represents all East Asian States, will play an important role in the near future. While it remains an open question to what extent the leadership of China and a number of other countries will comply with international law and norms in the framework of the Forum's work, and in particular, whether it will agree to comply with the requirements for establishing arms control, it is nevertheless possible to agree with

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The liberals ' assessment is that the activities of this international organization are an important stabilizing factor in the region after the Cold War 31

It is obvious that the participation of East Asian States in the work of international organizations also contributes to the deepening of democratic transformations in these countries 32 After the Cold war, a movement in favor of establishing democratic forms of government was gaining momentum in the countries of the region. The Philippines, where power was democratically transferred to a new president in January 2001, is considered the recognized leader, as are South Korea and Taiwan. The restoration of conservative and aggressive regimes in these countries is unlikely. China is on the path of democratization, where after the well-known bloody events in Tiananmen Square in 1989, processes of strengthening local self-government are developing and trends towards greater openness in the work of government bodies can be observed. Attempts to give greater publicity have recently been observed in the coverage of the state's foreign policy activities in the national media. In this regard, it is noteworthy that even the unofficial visit of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to China in January 2001, which was initially hidden from public attention, subsequently received quite detailed coverage in the Chinese press and on television 33

Thus, evaluating the arguments presented by the "liberals" to prove that the development of the situation in East Asia by 2010 will go along the path of strengthening stability and security, we can recognize that maintaining a high level of economic interdependence, intraregional trade and economic exchange, combined with the preservation of democratic regimes, is indeed a guarantee of the strategic status quo in the region. the region. At the same time, we can assume that the main economic and political contradictions that are currently characteristic of the system of international relations in WA will soften and it can become an area of peace and stability, similar to Western Europe and North America 34

At the same time, we should not ignore the fact that any optimistic approach to assessing the development of the situation here at the present time, unfortunately, does not fit well with reality. The Asian crisis of 1997-1998 has already seriously destabilized the socio-economic and political situation in many countries of the region, directed public discontent in them against the unfair international economic order, against the form of globalization of national economies imposed by the United States, the IMF and the World Bank. Even Japan, which is relatively stable both economically and politically, has been affected by the financial crisis that has erupted in East Asia. The consequences of this have had a negative impact on its economic growth, social and political stability. China, though to a lesser extent, has also been affected by the financial crisis and has been negatively affected by the policies of Western-controlled international financial institutions 35

Permanent threats to the internal stability of the countries of the region emanating from financial and economic crises consist in the fact that their destructive consequences not only undermine confidence in the activities of international organizations as guarantors of economic and socio-political stability, but also push the ruling elite of the countries of the region to find a way out of the crises by aggravating relations with military conflicts. A classic example of this kind of impact of the economic crisis on the state of international relations in the twentieth century was the events of the early 1930s in Europe, when a deep economic depression prompted the leaders of a number of European countries to prepare for and unleash World War II 36

Of course, it would be wrong to overestimate the negative consequences of financial and economic crises for maintaining the strategic stability of the region, because even after the crisis of 1997-1998, international cooperation developed here, direct investment increased, measures were taken to further liberalize domestic markets, and mutual trade grew. Many countries have shown a desire to deepen contacts with each other in various fields 37 However, one cannot help but see that at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the East Asian states still did not reach the level of stable development, cooperation and security similar to that achieved by the countries of Western Europe at that time. Therefore, the arguments of the "liberals" that there is a direct relationship between the development of trade and economic ties and broad cooperation of the countries of the region with each other-

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On the one hand, the possibilities of maintaining the strategic field in a state of stability and security, on the other hand, do not always look convincing.

CONSTRUCTIVIST VIEW OF SECURITY THREATS IN EAST ASIA

The constructivist school differs from the realistic and liberal ones primarily in that it evaluates policies aimed at strengthening stability and security in terms of their effectiveness, meaning the effectiveness of political technologies in this area, their economic profitability, and the most complete satisfaction of national needs. For "constructivists", the productivity of foreign policy is determined by the ratio of input costs and output results. Constructivists, among whom such American scientists as A. Barton, I. Linz and G. Linjey are most famous, believe that the level of political culture of a nation should be judged by how effectively, from the point of view of national interests, the government implements foreign policy tasks, ensures national security, and contributes to the stabilization of the system of international relations.

Representatives of the constructivist trend, unlike "realists" and "liberals", assess the prospects for the development of the strategic situation in East Asia by 2010 not through the prism of changes in the balance of power or the growth of economic interdependence of East Asian countries, but primarily based on the ability of the main actors in the regional system of international relations to realize their national interests in the changed external conditions. It is the national interests of individual States that change depending on the political situation that can be a source of new security threats and violations of strategic stability in the region.

"Constructivists", in particular Thomas Berger, Bruce Cumming, Peter Hayes, Lerritt Gong, identify four major areas of divergence of interests of leading actors in East Asia, which can provoke a regional conflict. First, there is a mismatch of interests in the issue of Korean unification, initiated by the DPRK and South Korea, but which does not correspond to the strategic interests of the United States and Japan. Secondly, there is the lack of a unified policy on the issue of China's unification with Taiwan, when Taipei, Washington and Tokyo cannot reach a consensus with Beijing on this issue. Third, it is the disagreement of China, Russia and a number of other leading East Asian powers with the approach of the Japanese authorities to the formation of a national security policy, when, on the one hand, Tokyo officially declares anti - militarism and pacifism, and on the other, it strengthens and deepens the military-political alliance with the United States and builds up the national power potential. Finally, and fourthly, the countries of the region disagree with the policy of the United States, which is ultimately aimed at changing the balance of power in its favor, at creating the most favorable conditions for consolidating its dominance in East Asia. The divergence of interests of the main actors of the regional system of international relations on these issues, according to the "constructivists", carries a great potential for instability and security threats for many years to come.

Let's try to understand how seriously the divergence of interests of the leading regional powers, which the "constructivists" talk about, can affect the destabilization of the strategic situation in East Asia by 2010 and why.

First of all, we will assess the specific policy of the leadership of both Korean states on the issue of unification in terms of its impact on the process of stabilizing the system of international relations in the region. It is striking that the reunification process is taking place in conditions when the DPRK and South Korea are spending huge amounts of money on military buildup, and both Korean states are doing this, even despite the difficult economic situation in their countries. Throughout the 1990s, the leadership of the DPRK consistently implemented programs to modernize the army and military-industrial complex and openly demonstrated success in the mobilization readiness of the branches of the armed forces, periodically organizing clashes with parts of the Southern army at sea, as well as leaking information about achievements in the development of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.

In the process of preparing for the unification of Korea, the leadership of the DPRK actively used the policy of blackmail towards the United States, South Korea and Japan in order to obtain additional information from the North Korean leadership.-

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They will also receive significant economic assistance from them. However, there is no reason to assume that by 2010 the DPRK leaders will consider it possible to launch a direct armed attack on South Korea, taking into account that (1)the balance of power in such a conflict will not be on the side of the North, (2) China and Russia will not come to the aid of the DPRK in the event of its first strike 3) the chances of the North's victory over the South are minimal, and the political risks for the DPRK leadership are extremely high, 4) the policy of blackmail brings the North Korean side much greater economic and political benefits than military actions against the South. In the 1990s, the DPRK received more than $ 5 billion in economic aid from the United States and its allies in East Asia, concluded a framework agreement with the United States-economic assistance in exchange for suspending nuclear and rocket development work, and strengthened its political position in relations with the United States, Japan, South Korea, and even the United States. with Russia.

However, from our point of view, the continuation of the DPRK leadership's policy of blackmailing America is fraught with considerable strategic risk. It can even be said that such a policy does not strengthen, but rather weakens, the national security of the country, because it helps to strengthen the anti-North Korean alliance, which may include the United States, Japan and South Korea. In addition, such a policy puts the DPRK's potential partners in the region - China and Russia-in a difficult position. The accelerated militarization of the North causes retaliatory actions to increase military preparations in South Korea, Japan and the United States, and, in particular, gives the latter many reasons to justify their actions in preparing for the deployment of theater missile defense systems in the region. 38 .

It seems that in the course of preparing for the unification of Korea, the North Korean side, in fact, does not show readiness for long-term cooperation with South Korea. Perhaps the DPRK leadership believes that it has more to gain by remaining committed to the old self - reliance course, i.e. Juche ideas, than by reforming the economy according to liberal recipes and pursuing an "open door" policy in relations with the West. The leaders of the DPRK, in our opinion, will not be interested in developing broad economic and political ties with the West in the future, since the implementation of a policy of autarky and self-reliance is much more preferable to preserve the existing model of governance than a course of self-destruction and increasing dependence on the West, following the example of Russia 39

The DPRK leadership's commitment to the policy of self-isolation, its policy of military buildup, and the continuation of US blackmail objectively create conditions in which North Korean leaders can make a political miscalculation and provoke destabilization of the situation in East Asia. Such a policy can be seen as a threat to the region's security in the future. A real alternative to this development, in our opinion, may be the implementation of the course of unification of Korea, because the new Korea will primarily be interested in preserving peace and stability in the region.

The real threat of destabilization of the situation in East Asia in the medium term, according to "constructivists", may be the consequences of the divergence of interests of the leaders of China and Taiwan on the issue of reunification. However, it seems to us that the danger of destabilization stems not so much from the differences in the interests of the two actors in the system of relations in the region, but from the strengthening of Chinese nationalism in its two guises - continental and Taiwanese. The Taiwanese leadership makes many statements about understanding the fact that the island is an integral part of China, but in fact it is hindering the reunification process in every possible way. Moreover, most Taiwanese believe that the island's incorporation into the PRC is a threat to national security and hard-won political independence. There are forces in Taiwan's ruling circles that are generally in favor of a complete break in relations with mainland China in order to preserve the existing regime. In society, especially among Taiwanese youth, the ideas of democracy have become widespread, which, according to Taiwan, can only be guaranteed by maintaining full political independence from the PRC 40

In mainland China, a growing movement of nationalist forces advocating the speedy annexation of the island. The secession of Taiwan is regarded by these forces as a blatant historical injustice, as an attempt by hostile forces in the West to humiliate and split the united Chinese people. 41 On the contrary, they see reunification as a con-

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a specific contribution to the fight against external forces that seek to weaken China, to tear away from it areas such as Tibet and Taiwan. In China, they do not forget about the policies of European countries and the United States in the XIX century and in the first half XX century, which aimed to divide a single state into separate provinces and actually subordinate it to its influence. Given the sensitivity of Chinese nationalists to the issue of Taiwan's annexation, the Chinese leaders may take a military action to restore historical justice and stop the national humiliation of the country by those circles in the United States that support Taiwanese separatism. In addition, Beijing is convinced that the United States will not interfere in the reunification process in order to avoid a large and bloody war with China. At the same time, the Chinese leadership does not rule out another reaction from the United States, involving the use of force to prevent the reunification of the two parts of the country. In other words, the discrepancy between the interests of the leadership of mainland China and Taiwan on the issue of reunification and the use of this factor by the ruling circles of the United States and Japan for their political purposes is the real basis for destabilizing the strategic situation in the region in the medium term.

The split political interests of Japan in determining its place and role in the future world order in East Asia can also become one of the factors of destabilization in the region. The fact is that after the end of the cold war, Tokyo's foreign policy interests in the field of national security were rather vague and fluctuated in a wide range. On the one hand, Japanese leaders have shown interest in expanding cooperation and strategic partnership with all major regional powers, including Russia. On the other hand, Japan clearly preferred to strengthen the military - political alliance with the United States of America and even officially announced, after the well - known events of September 11, 2001 in the United States, its readiness to send armed forces abroad to support Americans in the fight against international terrorism. Such statements are in principle contrary to the spirit and letter of the country's Constitution. Throughout the second half of the XX century. Japan has avoided direct involvement in power conflicts in East Asia by invoking the 1947 Peace Constitution, which prohibits national armed forces from taking part in combat operations outside the territory of the Japanese Islands. In the past, the Japanese authorities have always managed to get off with financial and technical assistance from the United States in carrying out their military actions in the region (the Korean War in 1950-1953, the Vietnam War in 1964-1975). Japan, being a strategic ally of the United States, also did not directly participate in America's military actions in the Gulf War in 1991, then by providing her with financial assistance. At the same time, Tokyo has always counted on maintaining American security guarantees in the framework of the 1960 Japan-US Treaty on Mutual Cooperation and Security Guarantees, avoiding direct participation in US military operations in East Asia and beyond. 42

In the future, however, in the event of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait, Japan will be faced with a choice - either direct participation in military actions on the side of America in the region, or breaking the Security Treaty and relying on its own forces in the event of a real or potential threat to its national interests. In other words, it will be extremely difficult for Japan to avoid providing military support to the United States, South Korea or Taiwan, which the latter will expect from it. Japan will not be able to limit itself to providing financial assistance, and the United States will demand that it "pay with the blood of Japanese soldiers" for the security of Western interests in the region. Unlike the Gulf War in early 1991, when the United States dealt with demoralized Iraqi army soldiers who were essentially left to fight in the desert one-on-one with the combined forces of Western countries, Japan's participation in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait will mean entering into direct contact. with the well-trained armies of the DPRK or China. Japan will not be able to avoid heavy losses in these conflicts, and the fighting may spread to its territory. The military and political circles of Japan, fully aware of the possible consequences of the situation in the region, began to prepare in advance for such a turn of events.

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They are being actively pushed to do this by the United States of America, which does not want Japan's actions to be limited only to providing logistical support to the US army or providing intelligence, but demands that its strategic ally "pay with blood" for ensuring its own security and not expect that only American soldiers will give their lives for Japan's security. This is exactly what was discussed during the visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Kono to the United States in January 2001 and his conversations with US Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Thus, the interests of Japan and the United States in matters of participation in possible power conflicts in the East Asian region really do not coincide: if Washington insists on the direct participation of Japanese soldiers in combat operations, then Tokyo does everything possible to avoid this. Differences in the positions of the parties, from our point of view, can become one of the sources of destabilization of the situation, since if Japan categorically refuses to participate in hostilities on the side of the United States, the latter will be forced to terminate the Security Treaty, which is fraught with negative consequences for its national interests.

In our opinion, the constructivists rightly assume that a serious source of destabilization in East Asia in the medium term may be the deliberate policy of the United States to change the balance of power in its favor to the detriment of the interests of other regional powers 43 To be fair, even during the Cold War, America pursued an active policy of strategic containment of its rivals in the Asia-Pacific region, including the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the DPRK. To this end, the United States concluded security treaties with the countries of the region, primarily with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, providing them with security guarantees in exchange for US support in their policy towards the USSR and other socialist countries. However, after the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the new Russia's refusal to provide military support to its former allies in the region, parts of the US political establishment began to question the feasibility of maintaining their military presence and their obligations to guarantee security to East Asian countries. Moreover, after the Cold War, the American public clearly does not support the policy of those leaders who express their willingness to pay with the lives of American soldiers for the security interests of other countries, including East Asian countries.

At the same time, neither Japan, nor South Korea, nor Taiwan are interested in the United States abandoning its obligations to guarantee their national security and shifting full responsibility for ensuring it to these countries themselves, for which the latter are simply not ready. In other words, and this is important to emphasize, many East Asian countries agree to the strategic dominance of the United States in the region in the future. But it is also true that it is becoming increasingly difficult for Americans to justify maintaining their previous commitments to their allies in East Asia in the new post-Cold War environment, when the direct threat of all-out confrontation between the West and the East has disappeared, and the main enemy of the United States-today's Russia-is economically weak, and financially and technically highly dependent from the help of other countries. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the United States may eventually denounce the Security Treaty with Japan and abandon its obligations to protect South Korea and Taiwan in the event of an armed conflict in East Asia.

But a legitimate question arises: by what means and methods will America then be able to exercise its dominance in East Asia? In our opinion, the United States ' nuclear - armed strike naval forces, which it created back in the Cold War, remain the only means in the region for the United States. Any manifestation of" disobedience " on the part of the allies, as well as any demonstration of disagreement with American policy in East Asia by other regional states, will have to be suppressed by the superior military power of the United States. However, it is precisely this hegemonic approach that will disrupt the status quo here and encourage the leaders of China or a united Korea to try to restore the strategic balance using force.

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* * *

Let's sum up the results. After analyzing the assessments presented by scientists of the main scientific schools in strategic studies, we can draw at least two conclusions about the prospects for the development of the situation in East Asia by 2010.

First, during the first decade of the twenty-first century, there will be no radical disruption of the balance of power and the current status quo in the region. The United States will maintain its military presence. China's power potential will not reach the level comparable to the combined potential of the United States and Japan. The DPRK will not use force against South Korea to speed up the unification process. For many years to come, Russia will focus on solving its many internal problems, including resolving complex relations with the "near abroad"countries.

Secondly, the stabilizing role of economic cooperation and economic interdependence among the countries of the region as a crucial factor in strengthening security and confidence-building measures in East Asia should hardly be overestimated. The financial crises and instability of economic development in the region's countries in the 1990s demonstrated the opposite, namely that, despite the high level of intraregional trade, economic destabilization immediately leads to political destabilization. There has been a series of regime changes - in Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. Although the economic crises did not seriously disrupt the overall strategic balance of power in East Asia during this period, they also stimulated changes in public attitudes towards the economic policies of the United States and international financial organizations, and caused serious dissatisfaction with their globalization policies to the detriment of the national interests of the vast majority of countries in the region. Therefore, economic instability created real threats to the security and stability of the region, and the direct relationship between the growth of mutual trade and the preservation of internal stability, as practice has shown, simply does not exist.

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7 Clearly alarmist in nature is, for example, the study of two well-known American Sinologists Richard Burstein and Ross Munro, in which China is directly called the "instigator of the Third World War" // Bernstein R. and Munro R. The Coming Conflict with China. N.Y. 1997.

8 Nathan N. and Rossa R. The Great Wall and Empy Fortress: China's Search for Security. N.Y., 1997. P. 146.

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10 См. об этом: Berger Т. Set for Stability. Prospects for Conflict and Cooperation in East Asia // Review of International Studies. N 26, 2000. P. 412.

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20 О национальных интересах Китая в представлении руководства страны см.: Yong Deng. Chinese Conceptions of National Interests in International relations // China Quarterly. V. 154, June 1998.

21 Kwan C.H. Economic Interdependence in the Asia-Pacific Region: Towards a Yen Block. L., 1994. P. 4-5.

22 W. and Yamamura Kazo. Asia in Japan's Embrace: Building a Regional Production Alliance. N.Y., 1996. ^It should be noted, however, that a possible source of such an impressive influx of external investment was the Chinese enterprises themselves, which, in order to avoid high taxes when implementing internal financing, preferred to receive investments from external sources, mainly from Hong Kong and Taiwan, not taxable at all. As a result of these operations, 12 million jobs were created in China, which accounted for 13.9% of total industrial production and 37% of all foreign exchange earnings from exports of finished products. - Nathan, A and Rossa, R. The Great Wall and Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security. P. 170.

24 Morgan, P. Comparing European and East Asian Regional Security Systems-International Studies Association, Acapuico Mexico, March 1993. P. 33.

25 Scalapino, R. The United States and Asia: Future Prospects // Foreign Affairs. N 70, Winter 1991/1992. P. 25.

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27 Ball D. Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region // Security Studies. V. 3, N 1, Autumn. 1993. P. 44.

28 Kim S. China's International Organizational Behaviour // Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh. (eds.) Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. Oxford and N.Y., 1999. P. 406.

29 Подробнее о мотивах заинтересованности Китая во вступлении в международные организации - см.: Oksenberg Michael and Economy Elisabeth (eds.). China Joins the World: Progress and Perspects. N.Y., 1999.

30 Nack A. and Ravenhill J. (eds.) Pacific Cooperation: Building Economy and Security Regimes in the Asia - Pacific Regions. Boulder, 1995.

31 Bannin Garrett and Boney Galser, for example, make pessimistic predictions about China's position when discussing arms control issues at the ARF session ( Garret Banning N. and Galser Bonnie S. Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control / / International Security, 20, N 3, Winter 1995/1996); Ian Johnston predicts China's behavior from an optimistic perspective ( Johnston I. Culture Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. Princeton, 1998).

32 See about this: Leifer M. The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN's model of Regional Security. N.Y., 1996.

33 People's Daily. 20.01.2001.

34 Эти идеи развиты Минксином Пеем в коллективной монографии "Демократия в Восточной Азии" ( Pei M. The Fall and Rise of Democracy in East Asia) // Carry Diamond and Mark Planner (eds.) Democracy in East Asia. Baltimore, 1998; а также Виктором Ча ( Victor Cha. Alignment despite Antagonism. Stanford, 1999).

35 Анализ последствий финансового кризиса в странах Восточной Азии с реалистических позиций см.: Jackson, К. (ed.) Asian Contagion: The Causes and Consequences of a Financial Crisis. Boulder, 1999.

36 Diff P., Hale D. and Prince P. The Strategic Implications of Asia's Economic Crisis // Survival. V. 40, N 2, Summer 1998.

37 The New York Times. 12.07.1999.

38 О последних мероприятиях руководства КНДР по укреплению ВПК и особенно по реализации программ разработки ядерного оружия и средств доставки см.: Kihl Young Whan and Hayes Peter (eds.) Peace and Security in the Northeast Asia: the Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula. N.Y., 1997.

39 On the political benefits for the leadership of the DPRK to maintain the autarky regime and not allow the United States and Japan to pursue a policy of "building bridges" in order to destroy the socialist state from within, de-ideologize society and weaken the country's military potential, see: a fundamental study by American Korean scholar Bruce Cumming " Korea-a place in the sun. Modern History" ( Cummings in. Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modem History. N.Y., 1977).

40 Wachman A. Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization. N.Y., 1994; see also features of Taiwanese nationalism: Yun Han Chu. Taiwan's Unique Challenges // Journal of Democracy. V. 7, N 3, July

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1996. p. 70-81. It is noteworthy that while the democratic circles in Taiwan demand that the authorities prevent reunification with China by all means, the Democrats in South Korea, on the contrary, insist on an early reunification with the DPRK.

41 For details on the use of the "nationalist map" by the Taiwanese and Chinese leaders, see: Lician P. Memory, Imagination and National Myths // Lerrit Gong (ed.) Remembering and Forgetting: The Legacy of War and Peace in East Asia. Wash., 1996. P. 25-28.

42 T. Cultures ofAntimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan. Baltimore, 1998.

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