Moscow, Nauka Publishing House. 1970. 295 pp. The print run is 2500. Price 1 rub. 28 kopecks.

Recently, a number of works have been published on the national liberation movement, domestic and foreign policy of Indonesia , the largest country in Southeast Asia .1 The peer-reviewed collective work is the first monograph published in Soviet literature.-

1 See A. B. Belenky. National Awakening of Indonesia, M. 1965; V. A. Tsyganov National Revolutionary Parties of Indonesia, M. 1969; A. Yu. Drugov and A. B. Reznikov. Indonesia in the period of Guided democracy, Moscow, 1969.

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An academic study of the history of the national liberation movement in Indonesia from World War II to the events of September 30, 1965.2

The introductory chapter, written by Academician A. A. Huber, contains a description of the main results and features of the Indonesian national liberation movement at the beginning of World War II. Considering its most important features, the author writes that in both the pre-imperialist and imperialist periods, not only a large but also somewhat influential middle Indonesian commercial and industrial bourgeoisie could not have emerged in the country, since foreign monopolies and the Chinese bourgeoisie, which had gained a strong position, stood in the way of its formation (p. 18). Under these conditions, the main ideological and political exponent of bourgeois nationalism was not the bourgeoisie, but the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia. This circumstance explains the radicalism of Indonesian bourgeois nationalism (p. 26). Although until the end of Dutch rule, a single Indonesian nation did not have time to form and the formation of any separate nation did not end, as A. A. Huber notes, the dominant trend was towards a pan-Indonesian national liberation struggle (p.22).

The first chapter examines the national liberation movement during the years of Japanese occupation (1942-1945). Here, with good reason, it is emphasized that the change of colonizers that took place in 1942 as a result of the Japanese occupation of Indonesia brought new hardships to the people. The economic policy of the Japanese occupiers is described in the book as a policy of unrestrained plunder and exploitation of the country. But neither brutal terror nor individual concessions on the part of the occupiers, the book emphasizes, could stop the national liberation movement, which reached a significant scale by the summer of 1945.

In the next chapter, it is noted that in August 1945, a revolutionary situation developed in Indonesia. The defeat of Japan, in which the USSR played a decisive role, led to the disorganization of the Japanese occupation regime and demoralization of the occupation forces. The book reveals the contradictions among the leaders of the national liberation movement on the methods of gaining independence, shows the complex internal political struggle in the country after the declaration of independence in August 1945 in an environment of constant threat, primarily from the Netherlands. This struggle first of all found its expression in a different approach to the assessment of the Lingajat (March 1947) Agreement with the Netherlands. As emphasized in the peer-reviewed work, this agreement created conditions for the struggle for full independence, made it difficult for Dutch aggression against Indonesia. That is why the Dutch colonialists disrupted its implementation and launched a colonial war in the summer of 1947, which ended with the signing of the Renville Agreement in January 1948, which is rightly regarded as the conquest of a peaceful respite by the young Indonesian Republic. The book provides a critical analysis of the resolution adopted in August 1948. at the extraordinary conference of the Communist Party of Indonesia, the resolution "A New Path for the Republic of Indonesia", it is noted that along with the correct provisions, it also contained leftist ones: a sharp condemnation of the Lingajat and Renville agreements and a demand for complete rejection of them. The book considers the recognition of the political sovereignty of Indonesia by the Dutch colonialists in 1949 at the Round table conference in The Hague as a victory of the Indonesian people, which was made possible by the new balance of power in the world created as a result of the defeat of Hitler's Germany and militaristic Japan, the formation of the world socialist system, and the rise of the international workers ' and national liberation movement.

A separate chapter is devoted to the period of consolidation of Indonesia's national independence in 1949-1956. As a concrete manifestation of neocolonialism, the federal system imposed on the country by the Netherlands is characterized here. The author notes the decisive role of the Republic of Indonesia in the unification of the country and the creation of a unitary state in August 1950, and emphasizes the role of the united National front in the struggle for the complete elimination of Dutch influence in August 1956. By this time, Indonesia, which was the venue for the historic Bandung Conference, had entered a wide international arena and was being supported by the United States.-

2 The authors of individual chapters of the book are: A. B. Belenky, L. M. Demin, A. Yu. Drugov, V. A. Zharov, A. B. Reznikov, N. A. Simonia.

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it has gained a well-deserved reputation among peace-loving states.

An analysis of the national liberation movement in Indonesia in 1957-1960 and the process of establishing a system of "guided democracy"in the country occupies a large place in the book. However, the desire to show that the latter was from the very beginning only Sukarno's path to the establishment of personal power, to some extent obscures his revolutionary-democratic ideals, which were never to be realized. The acute political crises and riots that took place in the country after the end of the struggle for the creation of a unitary republic, the book says, showed that "the Indonesian bourgeoisie, as a class, was unable to effectively use the instrument of parliamentarism. As a result, there was a growing disillusionment with bourgeois democracy among broad circles of Indonesian society and a growing desire to seek a way out in asserting the power of a "strong individual" (p.198). On the other hand, the success of the Communist Party in the elections of 1955 and 1957-1958. "objectively and inevitably, various circles of the Indonesian bourgeoisie and all anti-communist forces in the country should have been led to the idea that extra-parliamentary, anti-democratic means should be used to prevent further growth of the CPI's influence and its promotion to power by peaceful, parliamentary means" (p.190). These plans of the bourgeoisie coincided with the goals of the top army. The analysis of the political concepts of the Indonesian army as not only a military, but also a social force given in the monograph helps to understand its increasing influence on the life of the country, its desire to reorganize Indonesia according to its own plans, which was hindered by the parliamentary system. Therefore, the army became the main force that supported Sukarno in the fight against political parties, for the introduction of a system of"guided democracy". Developing this idea, it should, in our opinion, be noted that since the adoption of this system took place with the decisive support of the army, its introduction meant the actual establishment of a dual power in the country - Sukarno (in the center) and the army (in the field). Thus, in Indonesia, as the book notes, "a long period of confrontation between the two main political forces has begun" (p. 218). In this confrontation, the leadership of the Communist Party was on the side of Sukarno.

The question arises: how long did this contradiction between Sukarno and the army last? There is no clear answer to this question in the reviewed work, and the characterization of the internal political struggle is mainly reduced to the consideration of the clash between the army and the Communist Party, which somewhat violates the logical connection with the previous presentation, where it was about the confrontation between the president and the army. It should have been reinforced when, having consolidated his position and sought to weaken the military's influence, Sukarno began to support the Communist Party as the main counterweight to the army. Sukarno was a key figure in the opposition to the army, while the leadership of the Communist Party, as shown in the book, lost its independence and increasingly acted in Sukarno's direction.

Much attention is paid in the book to the analysis of Indonesia's foreign policy, which was the subject of a sharp internal political struggle in the country. The authors conclude that Sukarno's foreign policy in 1963-1965 underwent fundamental changes: nationalism was increasingly replaced by chauvinism, and the consistent struggle for strengthening the country's political and economic independence was replaced by foreign policy adventures and rapprochement with the Mao Tse-tung group on this basis. At the same time, the monograph does not sufficiently cover the issue of the impact of the new foreign policy course on the development of the political situation inside the country. It should be emphasized that this course has provoked strong opposition from the army, religious parties and other nationalist groups, which have opposed not only the Communist Party, but also Sukarno's policies in general. Since the plans of Sukarno and the army were polar, these contradictions became antagonistic by the summer of 1965, and, obviously, they need to look for the causes of the events of September 30. Some narrowing of the scope of this conflict in the book by the struggle only between the Communist Party and the army makes it difficult to clarify the question of who directly "put the fire to the fuse" and according to whose plans events developed. These issues are all the more relevant because they are largely linked to the future of the Indonesian Communist Party. The party was used through its leadership as a tool of Sukarno in the events of September 30 (which was a strategic mistake), rather than being the initiator of this movement, its "director". It is likely that these events did not develop according to Sukarno's plans,

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but they could not begin without his decisive influence. His position determined the initial steps to overcome the crisis that resulted in the September 30 event.

The book emphasizes that the objective socio-economic factors that caused the rise of the labor movement in Indonesia in the 50s continue to operate today. In this regard, it is important not only to develop a Marxist-Leninist program, strategy and tactics, theoretical and organizational principles of the revived party, as indicated by the authors, but also to fight against the falsification of the history of the Communist Party of Indonesia - a true defender of national interests.

The peer-reviewed monograph deeply reveals the turbulent events of almost 25 years of Indonesia's history and is a good basis for further study of its modern history.

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