Is it possible to Islamize a national society where Muslims make up the absolute majority? The history of recent decades and most recently shows that this is being implemented in practice. However, the revival of religion ("God's revenge") has covered not only the Muslim world, but also other religious and civilizational areas, in particular the Orthodox and Hindu ones. However, Islamization in its scale and consequences cannot be compared with what is happening, for example, in Russia or India, and the question of the degree of typological similarity of these phenomena requires special study. The purpose of the article is to consider the main features and consequences for the state authorities of the process of Islamization, which began long ago in one of the largest countries of the Muslim East - Pakistan. Despite all the differences between the Pakistani version of Islamization and a similar phenomenon in other countries, they have a lot in common. First of all, I will mention only one thing - the protest nature of the movement for Islamization, and with its help, it repels the liberalism of the secularist Western model that has become established in most countries of the Muslim world, and at a certain historical stage, from the authoritarianism of the Soviet-socialist type.

How long is the trend of Islamization, which became noticeable almost half a century ago, historically lasting? Many famous foreign authors1 The end of Islamism, especially in its radical form, has long been predicted, but both phenomena continue to exist. At the same time, against the background and because of Islamization, there is a tightening of the political struggle and diffusion: the dispersion of control over the security situation, the weakening of the state's position as a legitimate institution for restoring order.

Keywords: Islamization policy, split among Muslims, Pakistan, non-state centers of power and influence, diffusion, weakening of state power.

The history of Pakistan from the point of view of the Islamization of society can be logically divided into five periods. The first of them - the initial, liberal-secularist one-covered a quarter-century of the country's existence, formed in 1947 on the wreckage of British India from two remote territories in the western and eastern parts of Hindustan. The second stage can be called a transitional one, which lasted from the formation of Pakistan in its current borders at the end of 1971.2 to the military coup in July 1977. At this stage, the administration of Z. A. Bhutto changed its originally left-wing populism to a right-wing, pro-Islamic one. The third period covers the time of Islamiz-

1 In particular, the French Fr. Roy and J. Kspsl.

2 The State of Bangladesh was established in the eastern Territory.

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the operation carried out by the military, led by the usurper General M. Zia ul-Haqom. The question of the deadline for its completion remains open. Some authors believe that it has not ended yet, despite the death of the initiator of Islamization in a terrorist attack in August 1988. There is more reason to believe that after the death of the general, new stages were outlined, connected not only with the internal political situation, but also with involvement in the conflict with India in 1989-2002 due to unrest in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and in the confrontation in Afghanistan. Pakistan's involvement in the Afghan conflict, which began at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s, increased markedly after the military intervention of the United States and its allies in late 2001. Thus, there are two more periods that coincide mainly with the last decade of the XX century and the first, as well as the beginning of the second decade of the XXI century.

SECULARLYA PROTO-ISLAMIC NATION

The Pakistani state emerged on a basis devoid of historical precedent and a unified ethno-genealogy. First, the idea of a new political entity appeared, which seemed artificial and unviable to many, and then its real implementation. It is important to note that Pakistani nationalism has developed as an ideology based on religious, territorial and supra-ethnic components.3
The plans of the "founding father" of Pakistan, M. A. Jinnah (1876-1948), included the creation of a country with a relative Muslim majority. Jinnah did not foresee the emergence of a state where Muslims would have absolute superiority and enjoy special rights. It is not without reason that on the eve of the partition of colonial India, on August 11, 1947, he uttered the oft-quoted words to the Constituent Assembly of the new Dominion of Pakistan that " ... in the course of time you will find that Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in a religious sense, because it is a matter of personal faith, but politically, as citizens of the state" [Quaid-i-Azam, 1948, p. 9; Wolpert, 1989, p. 340].

Jinnah's foresight was only partially fulfilled. The civil community was formally established, but citizens who profess different confessions were not completely equal. The first infringement of the rights of religious minorities is related to the adoption of the 1956 Constitution. The basic law, developed after much debate and behind-the-scenes struggle of opinions, proclaimed the establishment of the Islamic Republic.4 The Constitution contained a discriminatory provision stating that only a Muslim can be president of the country. It also contained some other provisions of an "Islamic" nature, which gave rise to claims about the transformation of Islam, in fact, into a state religion [Gankovsky and Moskalenko, 1975, p.30].

At the same time, during the first period, Pakistan retained the character of a completely secular State, where freedom of religion existed. It was provided by both the first and second constitution adopted in 1962. After the military coup of 1958, the country's President, General and then Field Marshal M. Ayub Khan, initiated a number of socio-economic transformations of a liberal-progressive nature. In addition to the agrarian reform, the adoption of new labor legislation, the reform of education and the administrative system, certain changes were made in such a sensitive area from the standpoint of Islam as family law. In 1961, the President signed a decree prohibiting polygamy and marriage for girls under the age of 16. Registration of marriages in local authorities was made mandatory. The reform of family law, as noted by V. N. Moskalenko, does not

3 On the theory of the question and the difference of concepts, see: [Nationalism, 2007, p. 5, 7-13].

4 It is necessary to take revenge, this name of the state appeared for the first time.

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It was a violation of traditional Muslim norms, as it was based on the principles and spirit of the Koran and tried not to go beyond the framework of ordinary law [Belokrenitsky and Moskalenko, 2008, pp. 192-194].

A liberal interpretation of Islamic principles was a characteristic feature of the entire policy of the authorities in the field of religion and ideology at the first stage of the country's existence. There are two things to keep in mind. First, the general situation in the world in the first post-war decades - the economic recovery, the almost universal increase in living standards, the obvious manifestations of scientific and technological progress, the spread of secularist and atheist ideas. E. Hobsbawm called these years "golden" (Hobsbawm, 2004, pp. 278-309). Secondly, the presence of a fairly significant non-Muslim minority in East Pakistan (about 20%). Representatives of the Hindu population at first took an active part in the work of the elected bodies of Pakistan, as well as the government, both central and East Bengal. Their voices and influence could not be ignored (Gankovsky and Gordon-Polonskaya, 1961, pp. 198-203).

Meanwhile, the value of the second factor has been falling over time. The share of the non-Muslim population, mainly Hindus of higher and lower castes, decreased from 22% to 18% in the decade between 1951 and 1961 [Pakistan..., 1966, pp. 42-43]. The exodus of non-Muslims, which began in 1946-1947, continued, then increasing, then weakening, throughout the country's quarter-century of existence in a" two-winged " form. Representatives of the political and economic elite of Hindus - rich merchants and bankers-emigrated from the eastern province to India, taking money and jewelry with them (literally "on their own").

At the same time, Muslims were moving to the country from India, including people of deep faith, representatives of the theological class, and religious politicians. A. A. Maududi, a prominent theorist of Islamic fundamentalism and author of the concept of "theodemocracy", who did not accept the idea of splitting India along confessional lines for a long time, moved to Pakistan in 1948. At the same time, some major theologians moved there from Deoband, a city in Northern India known as the center of the conservative, purist school of Sunni (Hanifi) Islam. Since 1948, the main religious parties in Pakistan - Jamaat-e Islami (DI)5, Jamiat-e-Ulama-e Islam (DUI) - have been counting down their existence6 and Jamiat-e-Ulama Pakistan (DUP)7 [Encyclopedia of Pakistan, 1998, pp. 102, 103].

The bell that announced the rise of militant Islam to the forefront of the country was the events of 1953. Two forces-DI and Majlis-e-Ahrar - organized pogroms against Ahmadis, representatives of a sect they accused of apostasy from Islam. The first religious riots were suppressed with the help of the army and ended with a high-profile trial that drew attention to the figure of Maududi. He was first sentenced to death, then pardoned, but spent several years in prison.9
The policy of Ayyub Khan's military regime can be called secular Proto-Islamism. On the one hand, the military pushed Islamists, as well as other representatives of political forces, to the sidelines of political life, on the other hand, they actively used Islam in order to consolidate a multi-ethnic society that was disintegrating-

5 The Society of Islam led by Maududi.

6 Society of Islamic Theologians-deobandi.

7 Pakistani Society of Theologians belonging to the less orthodox, more popular, "for the lower classes" Barelvi school.

8 Freedom Fighters ' Assembly, formed in 1931 in the self-governing principality of Jammu and Kashmir in the wake of protests against the rule of the Hindu Maharaja.

9 For more information, see [Pleshov, 2003, p. 73-75; Jamal, 2011, p. 15-16].

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the majority-East Bengalis 10-and the minority-residents of West Pakistan belonging to various ethnic groups: Punjabis, Pashtuns, Sindhis, Balochis, etc. Islam as a synthesis of religion and ideology and a core element of Pakistani nationalism was supported by the military, especially in the first stage after coming to power [Haqqani, 2005, Ch. 3; Cohen, 2004, p. 169; Talbot, 2012, p. 83-84]. Propaganda of Islam among the military, the first generations of which were brought up in Western traditions, was undertaken by Ayub Khan himself, who in 1959 wrote a pamphlet "The Islamic Ideology of Pakistan" specifically for distribution among the officers [Gauhar, 1995, p. 93].

During the first period in the country's history, Muslim religious parties expected to succeed through democratic procedures. Religious figures took part in the work of the Constituent Assembly to develop the foundations of the constitution, and it was under their influence that it acquired the above-mentioned Islamic coloring. The middle place in the Islamic ideological field since the mid-1950s has been occupied by the Muslim League of Pakistan (MLP), the successor of the All-India Muslim League of M. A. Jinnah. In the 1950s, it gradually became less secular in nature, being blocked with Islamist parties. Since 1956, the MLP has ceded the role of the ruling party in the center and in both provinces to parties of an emphatically secular type: Republican, National People's, etc. At the same time, in the context of the growing political crisis, a bloc of Islamic parties was created for the first time: Islam Mahaz 11, in which the Maududi party and ideologically close organizations played a leading role [Belokrenitsky and Moskalenko, 2008, pp. 131-134].

The ban on political parties following the military coup in 1958 and the resumption of political activities following the adoption of the Constitution in 1962 generally benefited pro-Islamic forces. They managed to get a fairly large number of their supporters into the parliament and provincial legislative assemblies, which were formed through indirect multi-stage elections. It is noteworthy that in the first amendment to the Constitution of 1962, the Parliament returned the name of the Islamic Republic to the country12. The results of the indirect 13 presidential elections in January 1965 reflected the gradually strengthening position of the communalist forces. At Maududi's initiative, the Islamists supported an alternative candidate in the election, although it was a woman, the sister of the "founding father" of the state, Fatima Jinnah, and won the support of more than a third of the voters [Talbot, 1998, p. 160].

Ayub Khan's unconvincing electoral victory demonstrated, among other things, the widening gap between the civil-military bureaucracy and the party-political structures that at that time were based on ethnolinguistic regionalism and communalist slogans. The popularity of the latter was reinforced in Pakistan by news of Hindu-Muslim clashes in India, which reached their post-partition peak in 1963 and 1964 (Brass, 1994, p.240).

In the Pakistani party-political spectrum of 1962-1969, the central position was occupied by two competing parties that claimed the inheritance: MLP - pro-government, which had the English prefix Convention 14, and opposition-Council 15. The first of the parties was more secular in its program, the second was more religious, tending to the right-wing confessional parties.

10 55% of the population.

11 Islamic Front.

12 According to the basic chacon developed by the Ayub Khan administration, Pakistan was declared a Republic.

13 Votes of the elected members of local self-government bodies, the so-called basic Democrats.

14 Established at the conference in 1962.

15 It was created by the League Council in 1963.

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During the period of massive opposition demonstrations in 1968 and early 1969, the right wing of the opposition was generally inferior to the left, which was strengthened by the creation of the Pakistan Peoples ' Party (PPP)in 1967 by Z. A. Bhutto, former Foreign Minister in the government of Ayyub Khan. 16 The fear of a victory for the center-left and left-wing forces apparently influenced Ayyub Khan's decision repeal its own constitution and transfer power to the military in March 1969. Relieving tensions with a temporary ban on political activity, the military had to agree to a long-delayed general election. In addition, they disbanded a single province of West Pakistan and recreated four ethno-regional ones: Punjab, Sindh, North-West Frontier and Balochistan. The decision to disband the unified province weakened the left-wing democratic forces due to their split along ethnic and national lines and strengthened the right-wing, Islam-based and traditionalist local elites.

Religious and political parties took an active part in the first general elections held in December 1970. However, they did not achieve much success: DUI and DUP each won 7 out of 300 seats in the National Assembly of United Pakistan, while DI won only 4 seats (Sherkovina, 1983, p. 148). The defeat of pro-Islamic parties in East Pakistan was particularly sensitive. In 1971, during the civil war that engulfed the province in connection with the declaration of independence from the center, the first military organizations of the DI were created. The origins of militant Islamism turned out to be connected with a factor that turned from internal to external for Pakistan. And in the future, external phenomena, especially foreign ones, will have a stimulating effect on radical Islamist trends.

The failure of the "legal Islamists" in the 1970 elections on the scale of a unified Pakistan seems to be relative. If we take the results only for the western part of the country, which was transformed into a new state a little over a year later, then the 18 seats (12%) won by three religious parties will be unattainable for them for a long time.17 Realizing the limitations of their electoral base, Islamic organizations, primarily the DI led by Maududi, resorted to "street" forms of political mobilization. In 1974, they took the opportunity to escalate the situation with the Ahmadiyya sect and took revenge for the defeat they had suffered 20 years earlier, in 1953. By a decision of the Parliament, the sect was declared non-Islamic, and its members were legally classified as religious minorities [Oxford Companion..., 2012, p. 13].

The parliamentary decision was framed as an amendment to the 1973 constitution, adopted after the split of the country, which followed immediately after the unconditional defeat of the Pakistani army from the Indian in the December 1971 war. After the surrender of the army group in East Pakistan, senior officers forced General AM Yahya Khan to resign as President, 18 handing over the presidential powers to Z. A. Bhutto, the leader of the party that won more than 80% of the seats in the western part of the country in the elections [Burki, 1980, p.69].

The current Constitution of 1973 proclaimed the existence of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as a democratic State with a parliamentary form of government. Islamic provisions were given a more significant place in the third Constitution than in the previous two. Islam was declared the state religion with freedom of religion for all citizens [Gankovsky and Moskalenko, 1975, p. 112].

16 Pakistan People's Party.

17 Only in 2002 did the proportion of mandates they received exceed this figure.

18 Occupied it for about three years.

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Under the influence of external factors related to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the transformation of the states of the Arabian Peninsula into owners of huge reserves of not only oil, but also dollars from its sale, the government of Z. A. Bhutto strengthened its foreign policy orientation towards the Islamic world. In February 1974, the second summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference was held in Lahore, the capital of the largest province of Punjab.19 Among the actual Islamic events, the first international congress dedicated to the life and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (sirat) was held in 1976, and a similar national conference was held in February of the following year (Wolpert, 1993, p.264, 282).

The last years of the reign of Z. A. Bhutto can be considered the beginning of the process of Islamization. The second general election held in March 1977 provoked an acute domestic political crisis. Opposition parties united in the electoral bloc Pakistan National Alliance, where the main ideological function was performed by Islamic organizations. After the announcement of the election results, the PNA accused the government of rigging them and called on the masses to resist. The national strike announced by the PNA paralyzed life in the country. Z. A. Bhutto, in an effort to deprive Islamists of popular slogans, announced the introduction of a number of new laws - a complete ban on alcohol consumption, gambling, nightclubs, bars and cinemas. Within six months, he promised to bring all laws into "full compliance with the Koran and Sunnah" [Wolpert, 1993, p.280].

THE POLITICS OF ISLAMIZATION AND BRUTALIZATION OF POLITICS

However, Z. A. Bhutto's frantic efforts to save the situation by relying on Islamization measures did not help. The military took advantage of the prolonged political crisis. After launching a coup on July 5, 1977, they used the growing popularity of Islamic ideas to legitimize their power.

There are several stages in the implementation of the policy of Islamization by the generals headed by the Chief of Staff of the Army M. Zia ul-Haq. The first of them, preliminary, refers to the time of the trials of Z. A. Bhutto, the promises of the military leadership to hold parliamentary elections and rely on the direct support of religious parties, primarily DI and DUI. The most active phase began in late 1979 after Zia ul-Haq's decision to suspend the Constitution temporarily (as it turned out, for a long period) and ban political activity. Using theoretical developments and slogans of Islamists, the military imposed Islamic norms and orders "from above". The main ones were as follows:

in politics-establishment of an advisory council, Majlis-e shura, under the president-ruler, taboo on the party-political system;

in the legal sphere-application of Islamic procedural norms (qisas, diyat, shahadat), punishments (hudud), establishment of Sharia courts;

in the economy - collection of Islamic taxes by the state (zakat and USR), prohibition of usurious interest (riba), creation of Islamic interest-free banks;

in education and culture-compulsory Islam courses in schools and higher educational institutions, allocation of places for prayer (namaz) in state institutions and public places, prohibition of non-Islamic entertainment and holidays 20.

DI and other religious and political organizations initially fully supported the military regime, but after the ban on political activity, they withdrew from it in order not to lose support in society. 21 By 1984, the relationship between

19 Now-The Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

20 For more information, see Zhmuida, 1988, pp. 171-186; Pleshov, 2003, pp. 116-119; Novossyolov, 1993, pp. 160-174; Talbot, 1998, pp. 275-279.

21 Note that in 1979, A. A. Maududi died in the United States after a long illness.

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former partners (military and clerics) have seriously deteriorated, as evidenced, in particular, by the government's ban on the activities of student unions, the strongest of which was then the youth structure of DI-Islami jamiat-e tulaba 22. However, Zia ul-Haq's ban was primarily directed against left-wing student organizations [Oxford Companion... , 2012, p. 500].

Most of the steps towards Islamization were taken between 1979 and 1986. One of the most recent measures was the tightening of the Blasphemy Law that has existed since colonial times, according to which insulting Allah and faith in him is punishable by death or life imprisonment [Talbot, 1998, p.282].

Most of the innovations of the military authorities survived the death of Zia and the associated replacement of the military-parliamentary form of government with a presidential-parliamentary one. In general, they had a profound impact on public and political life and significantly transformed the culture and way of life of the country. At first, it seemed to many observers that the imposed Islamization measures would not take root and change the way of life and mass psychology. However, later it became clear that the Islamic transformations found fertile ground and changed society.23 Important consequences of Islamization were "brutalization" (coarsening and tightening the forms and methods of struggle for power and influence) and increasing socio-political divisions and tensions. The political persecution launched by Zia ul-Haq's regime was mainly aimed at suppressing leftist and center-left forces. The main target of the attack was the party of Z. A. Bhutto, who was convicted and executed in April 1979. His wife and daughter were harassed and harassed, thousands of party officials were imprisoned, and many were publicly punished. In addition to the PNP, activists of other left - wing forces-communists, socialists, trade union and student movement activists-suffered. From the list compiled on the basis of newspaper reports, as well as official reports and data from human rights organizations, it follows that from 1978 to 1985, 19,804 people were punished. They went through prison, torture or "disappeared", i.e. they were secretly killed [Iqtidar, 2011, p. 180].

The entire left flank of Pakistani civic activism and politics was "purged", and in the most ruthless and bloody way. On the right flank, too, they experienced a certain fear, because some of its representatives were not immune from persecution and persecution by the military authorities. At the same time, in order to protect themselves and establish their identity and opposition to the ruling center, right-wing religious forces usually spoke out from extreme, radical positions.

A typical example of religious reprisals is the fate of the Ahmadis, which Zia ul-Haq went to under direct pressure from religious and orthodox forces. In 1985, the general issued a decree concerning the Ahmadiyya sect. According to it, members of the sect were forbidden to call themselves Muslims, their prayer houses - mosques, and use Islamic terminology. Violations of the decree were severely punished [Pleshov, 2003, p. 181-183; Talbot, 1998, p. 282-283]. After the decree was issued, the majority of Ahmadis left Pakistan, and the center of the community moved from the Punjab town of Rabwah to London.

Islamization according to Zia ul-Haq was carried out based on the canons of Sunnism and the Hanifi (Hanafi) madhhab. This naturally raised objections from the Shiite minority (15-20% of Pakistani Muslims). In 1980, hundreds of thousands of Shiites rallied in Islamabad, the capital, to protest the government's policy of Islamization. At the same time, the first influential Shiite Tehreek-e-nifaz-e-fiqh-e-jafariya 24 party emerged [Hussain, 2007, p. 92]. Previous activity

22 IDT, Islamic Society of Students.

23 See in particular: [Kurin, 1993, p. 175-189; Qadccr, 2006 Ch. 7].

24 Movement for the establishment of Ja'fari fiqh, i.e. the main Shia madhhab, later renamed Tshrik-s-ja'fariya Pakistan (TDP).

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This Islamization, along with the news of the Shiite revolution in neighboring Iran, contributed to the politicization and radicalization of Shiites, and the emergence of acute tensions between Shiite radicals and Sunni extremists. A deep rift in relations between the two communities was caused by the assassination in 1988 of the spiritual leader of the Pakistani Shiites, H. al-Husseini, a disciple and follower of Imam Khomeini [Jamil, 2011, p.21; Talbot, 2012, p. 129]. Shiites suspected the murder of the Sunni radical organization Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)26 and killed its leader, H. N. Jhangvi, in 1990. A splinter militant group called Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LD)27 has carried out a series of anti-Shiite terrorist attacks in Punjab.

Violent outbreaks of Sunni-Shiite struggle coincided with the aggravation of the party-political battle between the two main parties of the post-Ziyaul-Haq period-the Pakistan People's Party led by Z. A. Bhutto's daughter Benazir and the Pakistan Muslim League of N. Sharif. The most dramatic episode was the attack on a Shiite cemetery in Lahore in January 1998. As a result of the shooting of people gathered there on the spot, 22 people were killed and more than 50, including women and children, were seriously injured. After that, for several days, the central streets of the country's second-largest city came under the control of a protesting crowd angry at the helplessness of the authorities. In a number of places in Punjab, Shiites have responded with acts of retaliation, and they have been the victims of further attacks and pogroms. In 1990-1998, 623 people were killed in Sunni-Shiite clashes: 411 Shiites and 212 Sunnis [Jamil, 2011, p. 23-24].

The policy of Islamization imposed from above has also exacerbated the contradictions between Sunnis, adherents of the two main theological schools, Deobandi and Barelvi. The growing antagonism between theologians (ulama) of the two schools was linked to the struggle for control over mosques and educational institutions (madrasas). The conflict took its most acute form in the 2000s, primarily in Karachi. In October 2003, the head of the Sunni Tehreek, a Barelvi Sunni organization, S. Qadri, was killed there, and in May 2004, the Deoband spiritual leader, Sheikh ul-hadith (scholar of the holy tradition) of the Jamia Binoria mosque, M. Shamzai, was killed there. A month before the murder, the largest Deoband training center in Karachi, located in Binori Town, was attacked by an armed attack that killed 10 people and wounded 40 others. The subsequent riots in the city led to numerous victims [Belokrenitsky, 2005, p. 427].

External factors related to the policy of Islamization played a major role in the brutalization of the internal political struggle in Pakistan. In the 1980s, the main one among them was the Afghan one. As you know, the military authorities of the country supported the struggle of Islamist forces against the pro-Soviet government in Kabul by all means available to them. Their capabilities became especially significant after the Soviet invasion in late 1979, as the Western alliance led by the United States, the Muslim community, primarily Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and even communist post-Maoist China increased military and economic assistance to Islamabad and the Afghan Mujahideen.

The growing influence of Saudi Arabia is associated with the strengthening of a new pole of Pakistani radical Islamism-the Markazi Jamaat Dawat-Shirshad 28 organization, which has been known as Jamaat-ud-Dawa (DD) since the early 2000s. The direction that it represents goes back to the Indian neo-Wahhabis( Salafis), whose traditional self - designation is "people of tradition" (ahl-e hadith) [Miloslavsky, 2001, p. 79-80; Oxford Companion..., 2012, p.7-8]. Well documented fact about-

25 Their main organization is Sipah-s Muhammad (warriors of Muhammad).

26 Pakistani soldiers of the companions of the Prophet.

27 Army of them. Jangvi.

28 Central Society for the Call to Purification and Instruction.

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Training exercises in Saudi Arabia of the organization's leader H. M. Saed and his participation in the Afghan war as part of the Riyadh-sponsored group A. R. Sayyaf [Iqtedar, 2011, p.122-123]. DD serves as a "facade" for the terrorist group Lashkar-e-toiba (LT)29, which turned into one of the main active and audacious attacks of militant groups in the 2000s and 2010s. LT's "exploits" include, in particular, the attack on the largest Indian city of Mumbai (Bombay) in late November 2008, which killed more than 160 people.

India took the place of Afghanistan in the 1990s. Successive party-political administrations in Pakistan supported the insurgency in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, contributing to the fact that they took on the character of another jihad-against the "Hindus" who "illegally occupied" the originally Muslim lands.

Without delving into the rather well-known features of international conflicts related to the situation in Afghanistan and Kashmir, I would like to emphasize once again that the processes of Islamization that continued in Pakistan even after the active stage of its imposition from above by the military, were accompanied by a tightening of the norms and rules of political struggle, rampant terror and violence.

DIFFUSION OF POWER CONTROL

In parallel with the Islamization of society in Pakistan, throughout its existence, there was a proliferation and dispersion of control in the field of ensuring public and personal security. This process can be called the diffusion of power, which occurred simultaneously with attempts to consolidate it.

The strengthening of institutions and the effectiveness of state control went on increasing until the 1970s.The state became stronger than society, actively interfering in its more or less autonomous existence within rural and traditional urban communities.

The accumulation of state control began in the first years of Pakistan's existence, when the central authorities decisively subordinated the marginal territories of the west and the extreme northwest of the country - Balochistan and the mountainous belt of Pashtun tribes.30 A significant step in this regard was the administrative reform carried out in 1955, which united the four provinces of the western part of the country and almost all the self - governing princedoms (four Baloch principalities headed by Kalat, Sindh - Khairpur and Punjab-Bahawalpur) into a single province of West Pakistan. Attempts to break away from the center were made in the outlying territories in the future (in 1959, 1961, 1973-1977), but each time the center firmly and decisively suppressed separatist attempts.

Since the 1970s, the prevailing tendencies to strengthen the state as a body with legitimate rights and powers to restore order have been replaced by a different trend, which consists in weakening the state monopoly on power in its functions of control and power domination. Perhaps first of all, it is connected with the policy of Islamization. Examples of strengthening both official and protest Islam at the political level have already been mentioned above.

Islamization has had an equally profound impact on the middle and lower floors of the social pyramid. Since the 1970s and 1980s, various charitable and educational organizations have been actively operating in Pakistan at the public and civil level. Among them, it is worth noting the largest Deoband relief-

29 Army of the pure.

30 They make up 15.42% of the population. Administratively, the Pashtun territories in Pakistan are part of the North-Western Border Province and the Federal Tribal Territory, which is only slightly subject to the laws of Pakistan.

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religious and educational organization Tabligh-i Jamaat (TD)31. Over time, it has gained enormous popularity in Pakistan and in the surrounding Sunni area. The annual TD congregations in the town of Muridke near Lahore regularly gather and gather from one to two to three million people and are considered the second largest in the Islamic world after the Hajj. The activity of a proselytizing organization is suspected by the authorities in Central Asian states, as is the activity of a similar organization, Arab-Palestinian in origin, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami [Naumkin, 2011, p. 258-260; Rashid, 2002, p.115-136].

The combination of educational and political principles is also typical for other pro-Islamic organizations. No matter how one treats their activity, they are separate centers of power and influence, formally or actually independent of the state.

The diffusion of power in its function as an organizer of social action is facilitated by organizations of Islamized civil society ( CS) - independent in terms of funding sources, although registered by the state of din-i-Madaris (educational institutions - schools and seminaries), foundations of individual religious communities, such as the Aga Khan Foundation (Ismaili communities-Khoja), charitable organizations: S. Idhi et al. [Serenko, 2006, pp. 116-127; Iqtedar, 2011, pp. 127-132].

In addition, the diffusion of power is clearly reflected in the growth of corruption and nepotism, the spread of the practice of giving bribes and the culture of"connections". As M. A. Kadir notes, it is rare for anyone to get basic documents and make legal transactions without a bribe or using blackmail. With the help of money and dating, according to Pakistanis, you can achieve everything. If someone does not succeed in their plan, the failure is explained by the lack of "resources" involved. According to his observations, corruption and nepotism have spread to all parts and stages of the state system [Qadeer, 2006, Ch. 7].

It is not surprising that Pakistan occupies one of the highest places in the world corruption report card [Kamenev, 2012, p.60]. The country's shadow economy has long been a byword. As far back as the late 1980s, it was considered to be equal to half or more than half of official GDP. Massive tax evasion has become the norm for a large number of wealthy individuals and leading companies. It is estimated that direct taxes (on profits and excess profits, real estate, inheritance, gifts, etc.) are paid by approximately one-third of legal and physical recipients of taxable income. Low tax collection is one of the chronic weaknesses of the Pakistani economy. However, among the middle class, the attitude to this problem is far from unambiguous. The author of these lines, while in Karachi, was recently able to hear the opinion that an increase in direct tax collection would be an even greater disaster for the country, since public funds would inevitably be plundered and squandered by officials.

Such judgments indicate a lack of trust in the state and the diffusion and dispersion of economic control. There is no doubt that it was promoted by the measures taken in the early 1980s to islamize the economy. Having initially increased the share of private income redistributed with the help of the state through Islamic taxes, they "pushed" profits and incomes into the "gray" economy after some time. The interest-free banking system contributed to the spread of the practice of hiding profits through various tricks and arrangements, and the most reliable and widespread form of lending was the practice of trust loan hawala that existed for centuries [Ballard, 2006, p. 8-9].

31 Conscription Society.

32 Islamic Renaissance Parties.

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Simultaneously with the establishment of institutions to expand control over the Territory and its population, the ruling regimes of Pakistan strengthened institutions for monitoring the implementation of the rule of law and expanded the prison system. The network of State prisons was inherited by Pakistan from the colonial regime. Along with it, there were private prisons-they were owned by hereditary rulers of semi-independent principalities, leaders of large tribes in the desert areas of Balochistan, traditional land nobility in the protected areas of Sindh and southern Punjab. The number of private prisons seems to have declined over time, although the age-old practice has not completely disappeared. It is known, for example, that the leaders of large Baloch tribes kept prisons until the beginning of the present century (Pleshov, 2003, p.48).

Meanwhile, the cost of maintaining State prisons run by provincial authorities has been chronically lagging behind their needs. According to fragmentary data appearing in the press, the situation with places of detention in Pakistan as a whole is depressing and does not differ much from province to province. At the end of 2012, there were 14,000 prisoners in 26 prisons in Sindh, with a capacity of 12,000. [Sindh Jails...]. Prison staff received low salaries, and the premises needed major repairs.

Escapes from poorly guarded prisons are not uncommon in Pakistan. The rules within prisons are usually regulated by the prisoners themselves, who resort to reprisals and violence against their cellmates. Only rare cases of this kind are made public.

The crisis of the correctional system became especially noticeable in the 1970s and 1980s, when there was an explosion of violence in society, largely related to the consequences of Islamization. According to M. A. Kadir's calculations, the number of violent incidents in the 1950s was relatively small and grew slowly. It declined over the next decade, then increased in the 1970s and rose steeply between 1985 and 1996. Violence peaked in 1986, 1988, 1990, and 1995. The average number of homicides in Pakistan in 1948-1970 was 2,848 per year, in 1971-1977 this figure increased by 63% to 4,633 per year, in 1978-1983 it fell 33 to 4,381, but then again sharply increased to 7,321 in 1984-1996. If we take into account the population growth, then in the first of the selected periods, one murder accounted for 16,700 people, in the second-for 13,007 people, in the third - for 17,970 people, and in the fourth, this figure again reached its maximum, as in the second period: one murder for 13,235 people [Qadeer, 2006, p. 243-244].

Although there is no comparable data for a later period, there are several indications that the level of violence has increased significantly in the future. This is largely due to Pakistan's participation in the global war on terrorism, in other words, its involvement in the Afghan conflict at its last stage of the struggle of the US and NATO coalition forces with the Taliban. Pakistan has been the main casualty of a protracted crisis linked to the rise of militant radical Islamism in Afghanistan and the Pakistani borderlands. According to data provided to the Supreme Court by the secret services of Pakistan in March 2013, 49,000 people were killed in terrorist operations in 2001-2013, of which 24,000 were killed in the period up to 2008, and 25,000 more later. Almost 16,000 people were killed in combat operations against groups of Islamic radicals, primarily from the Pakistani Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) movement in 2009-2013. military personnel. Losses among their opponents were much lower - only more than 3 thousand killed. Almost 6 thousand civilians have lost their lives in the past four years as a result of bomb blasts and suicide attacks. The peak of losses occurred in 2009, when

33 Due, obviously, to the fear of reprisals by the military regime and incomplete information in the media.

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The Pakistani army managed to break the resistance of the Taliban and their allies, depriving them of control over the high-altitude political agencies of the tribal belt (primarily North and South Waziristan) and adjacent districts of the then North-West Border Province and Balochistan province [The Express Tribune].

According to the leading Pakistani newspaper UNV, an authoritative Indian portal dedicated to terrorism in South Asia, 2,178 civilians and 493 members of the counter-terrorism forces were killed in terrorist attacks in Pakistan between May 2010 and April 2011. Losses among terrorist fighters are estimated at 4,200 people. During the subsequent period up to April 2013, almost 6 thousand victims were killed. civilians, about 2 thousand. employees of the army and paramilitary units, including the police, and 5.5 thousand militants. The total number of victims in three years exceeded 20 thousand people [Haider].

In the first four months of 2013 alone, 3,000 people were killed. The continuation of this trend would lead to losses for the year, twice the level of the last three years. According to this data compiled by the Pakistan Security Analysis Center, fatal violence continued to increase in Karachi, the largest city of almost 20 million, in Balochistan and the Pashtun area: the Federal Government Tribal Area and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. The main victims of violence were civilians, with the losses of counterterrorism forces in second place and militants and terrorists in third place only (Wasim, 2013).

Karachi in recent years has become the most turbulent and unsafe area of the country. The number of people killed in the city increased from 1,083 in 2010 to 2,192 in 2012. Every day, an average of 6 people die as a result of ethnic, political and mafia - related crimes, and on some days up to 15. The number of other crimes, such as robberies, thefts, and kidnappings, has also increased dramatically [Rafique, 2013].

The number of crimes related to the struggle for urban real estate, receiving compensation for abductees, selling into slavery, prostitution among minors, increased in Pakistan by leaps and bounds at the beginning of this century. In 2000-2008, the total number of registered crimes increased from 400,000 to 600,000, kidnappings more than doubled, and attacks by gang groups (more than 5 people) increased by three and a half times [Waheed, p.139]. The growing trend in organized crime continues, calling into question the State's ability to ensure law and order. The profession of a police officer and other law enforcement officers has become one of the most dangerous. "Payment for fear" in the context of budget deficits is provided by various kinds of corruption schemes.

conclusion

Identifying the most significant historical trends, it can be argued that the consolidation of power, which naturally occurs after the emergence of a new state body, reached its maximum in the 1970s. Then, after the collapse of the "first Pakistan" as a result of the separation of Bangladesh, a truncated, but geographically compact and fairly homogeneous in ethno-cultural terms "second Pakistan"emerged. The central government, relying on the army and external support (from the Shah's Iran and the United States), resolutely suppressed attempts to rebel on the outskirts, primarily in Balochistan, pursuing an Islamist-modernist, socially-oriented domestic policy. Since the end of the decade, Islamic modernization under social slogans has given way to fundamentalist Islamization, and the process of dispersion and diffusion of power has begun due to the fragmentation of the socio-political environment, the strengthening of non-state institutions and agents of influence and control.

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Sunni Islamization contributed to the isolation of Shiites and the deterioration of their situation, the displacement and marginalization of religious minorities - Ahmadis, Christians, Hindus, and also led to legalized discrimination against women. The response in the form of active and passive resistance (flight of minority representatives abroad, protests by women's and human rights organizations) weakened the state and its socio-economic foundation. In other words, the order introduced by the military under Zia ul-Haq became exceptionally rigid, gave rise to leaks, deepened cracks and splits, and caused the diffusion of both compulsion (hard power) and persuasion (soft power).

The example of Pakistan clearly shows how the Islamization of Muslim society, i.e. the strengthening of the ideology based on Islam, the appeal of the mass of people to a more strict and zealous implementation of the norms and requirements of religion, the expansion of the network of Islamic centers of education and education, etc., changes the cultural appearance of people and historical areas inhabited by them, affects

In particular, civil society (CS), consisting of non-governmental and non-profit organizations, as well as associations of like-minded people and volunteers, is acquiring pro-Islamic features. Islamized GO in Pakistan appears simultaneously with similar hybrid (Islam-civil) phenomena in other areas of the Muslim East. Their entrenchment is probably caused by the crisis of the liberal model of modernization and the search for ways to more adequately formalize the recipes for social progress.

The Islamization of Pakistan, therefore, can by no means be considered an exception - such phenomena have long gripped Turkey, and recently many Arab states. Iran has moved very far on this path, where, as a result of the revolution of 1978-1979, Islamic rule was established, which wrapped a dense religious veil around all political and social life. Under the rule of the Taliban, Afghanistan was moving along the most extreme path of Islamization. Separate attempts to expand the axis of evolution in this direction were made in the republics of Central Asia, Malaysia and Indonesia.

Islamization in all these cases appears mainly as a means of protection, the search for a new, correlated with historical identity. The revival of religion in the Muslim world (and not only in it) strengthens a special national (local) self-sufficiency. In the complex multiethnic societies of central and southern Asia, it provides the basis for the nationalism of a supra-ethnic territorial community like Pakistan. Although Islamization is accompanied by the diffusion of power, splitting the Muslim community and exacerbating conflicts within it, it simultaneously contributes to the strengthening of social (horizontal) ties and forms a largely new, highly contradictory and complex social fabric.

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