A. Y. DRUGOV



Past, unfortunate or cute,
No personalities ever before,
No nations got away with it for nothing.

A. K. Tolstoy. "Portrait"

The second decade of democratic reforms in Indonesia, which began in 1998 with the fall of the military regime of the "new order", which ruled the country for 32 years since 1966, is nearing its end. Much has been written about the results of these reforms, and in general they receive deservedly high marks, given that they were preceded by a number of decades of authoritarianism that imposed deep impact on the political culture and psychology of society. This concerns the institutional sphere, first of all the constitution, which for a long time was considered sacredly inviolable. In 1999-2002, four sets of amendments were adopted that significantly expanded the civil rights of Indonesians and the prerogatives of elected legislatures; a special chapter on human rights was introduced, the previously almost unlimited power of the president was limited, and the army was formally deprived of the political autonomy it enjoyed in the previous period. We can talk about a sufficient degree of freedom of speech and the press, which in Indonesia is called openness (similar to glasnost). There are virtually no individuals and institutions left in the country that enjoy immunity from media criticism.

Keywords: Indonesia, repression, army, Muslims, human rights defenders, government, democracy.

INDONESIAN DEMOCRACY: TEST FOR MATURITY

Dr. Alexey Drugov in his article "Indonesian Democracy: Test of Maturity" maintains that 50 years after September 30, 1965 tragedy in Indonesia that led to massacre of more than a million of innocent people its heritage proved unfadable. Human rights watchers in Indonesia and abroad demanded new investigation on 1965 events and rehabilitation of victims as well as disclosing of the real essence of the events. Their demands met strong opposition of the Indonesian military elite and conservative Moslem groups often supported by officials. But the very fact that this problem is being raised shows that this burden on the nation's consciousness has not diminished and desire to clean this stain off the nation's image is ripening.

Keywords: Indonesia, repressions, Army, Moslems, human rights watch, power, democracy.

Alexey DRUGOV-Doctor of Political Sciences, Chief Researcher of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, alexdrugov37@yandex.ru.

Alexey DRUGOV - Doctor of Political Sciences, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, Moscow; alexdrugov37@yandex.ru.

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Washington's proclamation of Indonesia as the third most populous democracy in the world (after India and the United States) and repeated statements from the highest Indonesian tribunes that this country is a model of pluralism and religious tolerance on a global scale seem premature, since the destruction of Christian churches, the persecution of Christians, Shiites and supporters of the Ahmadiyya sect in some provinces The introduction of sharia law in the province of Aceh and some other similar examples encourage a certain restraint in assessments and conclusions.

A real test of the strength of Indonesian democracy was 2015, which marked 50 years since the events that turned out to be the blackest period in the history of this country. On the night of September 30 to October 1, 1965, soldiers of the Presidential Guard Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Untunga arrested and shot six senior officers of the land Army, accusing them of plotting against the head of State, President Sukarno. This action, which was extremely poorly provided for in military, political and organizational relations, was suppressed within a day. The operation was led by the Commander of the Strategic Reserve of the Land Army, Major General Suharto. A year and a half later, he became president. Sukarno effectively distanced himself from the speech, and seizing the political initiative, army generals launched mass terror against the Indonesian Communist Party, accusing the Communists of being behind the "September 30 Movement". As a result of the campaign of terror, during which the military relied on Islamist detachments, in 1965-1966. without trial and investigation, according to various estimates, from 500 thousand to 3 million were physically destroyed. hundreds of thousands of people, including prominent representatives of the scientific and creative intelligentsia, passed through prisons and concentration camps. Untouchable, rejected for many years, were their family members.

The purpose of this article does not include a detailed analysis of the causes of the events of 1965.The version of the military elite that they were initiated and organized by the Communist Party of Indonesia was questioned from the very beginning by both foreign and domestic scientists. In the Soviet Union, the first fundamental refutation of this version was made by A. B. Reznikov. He was the author of the argumentation on this issue in our jointly published book "Indonesia in the Period of' Guided Democracy ' "in 1969. Later, A. B. Reznikov gave a more detailed analysis of these events in his work "The Conspiracy in Jakarta", published by the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1977. Currently, V. V. Sumsky is working fruitfully on this problem using new materials (see, in particular, his article "Gloomy September and Reznikov's Theory" (September Kelabu dan Teori Reznikov), published in the Indonesian magazine" Gatra " on October 7, 2015.

In a generalized form, the conclusions of A. B. Reznikov and V. V. Sumsky are that the events of September 30, 1965 were the result of internal struggle in the army elite and were used by the army as a pretext for attacking the Communist Party of Indonesia - the most organized and mass political organization in the country - and then seizing power.

I will also mention the testimony of the former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Subandrio, in 1965. In his memoirs published in 2001, he writes that when he was imprisoned in 1966, he was there together with Lieutenant Colonel Untung. The latter told him about his close relationship with Suharto, who was fully aware of the preparation of the speech and even assisted him [Soebandrio, 2001, Hal. 62].

During the 32 years when the army was in power in Indonesia (the era of the "new order"), discussion of the background of the events of 1965 was strictly prohibited (except for the official version), and the only legal source was materials of court trials staged by the authorities. Therefore, for most Indonesians, knowledge of this tragedy is reduced to an official interpretation. The fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 changed the political situation. In these circumstances, it is extremely important to analyze how approaches to national trage are formed in society-

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the 1965 tragedy that affected many millions of people, some of whom were victims of it, others created it with their own hands and were responsible for it. There are few direct participants in those events, but those who see themselves as their political and moral heirs are active. The attitude to everything that happened in 1965 and in subsequent years serves as an important indicator of the depth of democratization processes in Indonesia after the fall of the military dictatorship and allows us to judge how much the ideas of democracy have penetrated into various strata of Indonesian society, how much legal awareness, recognition of human rights, and ultimately the value of human life have developed.

Abdurrahman Wahid, leader of the mass Muslim organization Nahdatul Ulama (NU), was almost the first statesman, political and religious figure of the era of democratic reforms to address the tragedy of 1965-1966. Elected President of Indonesia in 1999, on behalf of the organization, he apologized to those who suffered during the years of terror (members of the NU and its youth wing played the most active role in this campaign). A. Wahid himself was outside Indonesia in those years. At the same time, there is no reason to believe that his action reflected the mood of the entire NU management. A. Vahid's attempt to get the decision of the People's Consultative Assembly (the highest body of state power), which banned the CPI and Marxist-Leninist ideology in 1966, was not successful. It is possible that, at least in part, the radical democratism of this hereditary Muslim figure, who during the brief period of his presidency limited the political role of the army and put an end to discrimination against the Chinese minority, caused rejection of influential layers in the elite and led to the impeachment of A. Wahida in 2001 (I note, however, that in recent years his achievements have been increasingly recognized among supporters of the country's consistent democratization.)

There are three approaches of the politically active part of Indonesian society to the assessment of the events of 1965.

First, democratically minded circles, especially human rights defenders, consider it necessary to thoroughly investigate the facts of mass violations of human rights, identify the perpetrators, apologize on behalf of the State to the victims, and, if possible, compensate for the damage they have suffered.

The second, directly opposite point of view is defended primarily by the military elite-generals and officers who are both on active duty and retired, in fact, not only denying the need to recognize the facts of human rights violations, but also justifying mass murder. They are joined by a significant conservative part of the Muslim elite. For the generals, recognizing the true nature of the events of 1965 as a provocation and a pretext for reprisals against political opponents and the subsequent coup d'etat would mean recognizing that the "new order" led by the army was illegitimate, and this, in turn, would mean a deep discredit of the army, which invariably positions itself as the carrier and guardian the main national values.

Finally, an intermediate point of view is that, without going into the essence of the events of 1965, national reconciliation should be achieved without identifying the perpetrators and without recognizing the responsibility of the authorities. Of course, this division is very general and there are many semitones, omissions, omissions and allegories.

In 2003, the Supreme Court of Indonesia decided to rehabilitate members of the CPI who were subjected to reprisals without due process. However, the practical implementation of this decision was never implemented. In 2004, the Parliament passed a law establishing a commission for establishing facts of violations of human rights and reconciliation by the former regime. Retired General S. B. Yudhoyono, who took office as President of Indonesia in the same year, sent this act to the Constitutional Court, which found it contrary to the Basic Law of the country. The fact that the President's father-in-law, Colonel, later General Sarvo Edi Vibovo, was one of the most important figures in the world.-

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the mediocre organizers and performers of many terrorist operations, of course, played a role, but the main factor was the position of the military elite, to which the head of state himself belonged.

In 2012, the independent National Human Rights Commission presented President S. B. Yudhoyono with the most detailed report on the repression at that time, which was the result of four years of research. The report concluded that these reprisals constituted grave violations of human rights and crimes against humanity. The Commission proposed to initiate prosecution of the perpetrators and apologize to the victims. Nothing is known about the fate of the report [The Straits Times, 22.09.2015]. But the reaction of the then Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security, retired General Joko Suyanto, is well known, who said: "Violations of rights? Whose ones? What would have happened otherwise? The country would be completely different now." He spoke out against the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission [The Jakarta Post, 01.10.2012].

We will not look for an answer to his question. Something else is important here. Less than 15 years after the start of democratic reforms, the general who held the third rung in the government and was responsible, in particular, for maintaining the rule of law, actually argued that mass terror can be justified as a means of political struggle, and this, in my opinion, reflects the latent way of thinking of a significant part of the military elite.

At the same time, it is not necessary to deny significant changes. Some prominent figures close to the Communists, in particular the leading Indonesian writer Pramudya Ananta Tur, were released and became public figures again. It became possible, for example, to publish in 2002 the above-mentioned notes of Subandrio and a book such as "I am proud to be the daughter of a communist", written by a young woman with the significant name Proletariati [Ribka Tjiptaning Proletaryati, 2002]. She is now a prominent figure in the Democratic Party of Indonesia (fighting). It is noteworthy that the preface to this book was written by A. Vahid. At the same time, thousands of copies of a school history textbook that did not link the events of 1965 to the Indonesian Communist Party were burned by order of Prosecutor General Prasetyo [Sinar Harapan, 28.09.2013].

The debate over the legacy of 1965 escalated with the release of the Danish-Norwegian-British documentary "Act of Killing" in 2012. The authors of the film are J. P. Morgan. Oppenheimer, Kristina Sinn and, significantly, an Indonesian who wished to remain anonymous interviewed participants in the events, including one of the executioners. The film was shown at 120 international festivals and won 85 awards. The Indonesian newspaper Jakarta Post wrote::

"How does the Indonesian government react? Silence. Officials undoubtedly saw the film, but there was no public reaction. Contrary to the film's basic idea that historical truth should be addressed in the interests of justice, the Indonesian government prefers to bury its head in the sand. This is a shame " [The Jakarta Post, 15.01.2014].

Only part of the silence can be explained by the fact that parliamentary and presidential elections were approaching. In addition, the silence was not complete - the authorities actually banned the demonstration of the "Act of Murder", and the film was distributed via Youtube [The International New York Times, 1-2. 02. 2014].

On January 15, 2014, the Jakarta Post wrote that Oppenheimer's film is a powerful medicine designed to heal the historical trauma of Indonesia. The country has many thoughtful, honest, far-sighted citizens who feel comfortable in the world around them and want to become part of the global community. "To suggest that they need to be protected from conflicting facts or from the truth is deeply humiliating. The Indonesian government should have more confidence in its na-

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rod". This passage of modern times refers to the presidency of the Security Council. Yudhoyono, but fully applicable to the situation under his successor Joko Widodo. There is no reason to question the newspaper's assessment of the state and legal awareness of the majority of Indonesians. But this does not fully apply to the Indonesian elite, especially those whose predecessors in 1965-1966 were directly involved in crimes against humanity or even initiated them.

Indonesian human rights activist Andreas Harsono (born 1965) wrote that the film "Act of Murder" broke through the veil of official silence on acts of violence and sparked a public discussion about the need to bring the perpetrators to justice:

"Oppenheimer's film and the government's response to it strongly remind us that Indonesia continues to have a culture of impunity and lack of law and order." In his opinion, impunity is manifested in its application to both law enforcement agencies and Islamist militants who commit crimes against religious minorities [The International New York Times, 12.02.2014].

I would like to point out this important link between the legacy of 1965 and the broader issues of the rule of law and respect for human rights. This factor was also highlighted in 2015, when, despite the ban of the authorities, the country began viewing Oppenheimer's new film "Silence" (Look of Silence), which became a continuation of the"Act of Murder". The reaction to this film exposed sharp contradictions in society, especially since it coincided with the 50th anniversary of the tragedy. In Jakarta, Islamic radicals tried to break into the campus to prevent the demonstration of the film. Students conducted the screening despite Islamist threats and pressure from the university's rector, Ahmad Minhaji. The National Human Rights Commission supported the screening of the film in Indonesia [The Jakarta Globe, 11.03.2015].

The authorities banned the screening of this film and the presentation of a number of books dedicated to the events of 50 years ago at the Festival of Authors and Readers in Ubud, Bali, held by the Herberth Feith Foundation. The local police chief argued that "this is done for the common good, since the spirit of the festival does not correspond to the discussion of those who open old wounds." The film was banned from being shown in public by the censors, saying that it aroused sympathy for the Communist Party and communism. Nevertheless, several non-governmental organizations organized viewing of "Silence" and distributed about 1,700 CDs with copies of it [The Jakarta Post, 21.10.2015 & 11.12.2015].

Descendants of victims of repression and generals killed on the night of October 1, 1965, founded the Forum Silaturahmi Anak Bangsa, which advocates overcoming feelings of hostility and revenge. As retired Lieutenant General Agus Wijoyo, the son of one of the generals killed on the night of October 1, 1965, noted, these events have divided the nation, and Indonesians feel a desire for revenge. However, he believes that it is necessary to distance ourselves from these events and look at them from a modern perspective in order to better understand the mistakes of the past. Amelie Yani, the daughter of another military commander who also died on September 30, 1965, agrees with him. At the same time, Ilham Aidit, the son of the chairman of the CPI Central Committee, D. N. Aidit, who was shot in the autumn of the same year without trial, believes that reconciliation can only be achieved by naming those responsible for the acts committed at that time [Sinar Harapan, 01.10.2012].

The relevance of the interpretation of the events of 1965 became more and more prominent as the 50th anniversary of the tragedy approached, and it is characteristic that critical attitude to the official point of view was manifested at different levels.

In December 2013, the leadership of the Nahdatul Ulama organization published the book "The Struggle between Nahdatul Ulama and the Communist Party of Indonesia in 1948-1965". In this regard, one of the leaders of the NU, Abdul Munin, stated:

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"It is worrying that many members of our organization, especially young people, no longer know our history and have adopted the way of thinking of other people, scientists and politicians who blame us for the tragedy of 1965. Not only do they not defend it, but they accept the blame and place it on our Ulama. " news.com, 09.12.2013].

Therefore, the positions of the elites of Muslim organizations or parties in connection with the events of 1965 should not be completely extrapolated to the position of ordinary members.

At the University named after him. Gadja Mada (UGM, Yogyakarta) formed a group of graduates studying the events of 1965. In November 2015 They called on the rector of UMM Dwikorm Karmavati to recognize the involvement of students and university staff in the repressions of that time and ask for forgiveness from the victims of those events and their families. However, the rector claimed that the university as a higher educational institution was not involved in them. It was pointed out to him that in December 1965 the university received a certificate of honor from the special forces of the Land Army {The Jakarta Post, 18.11.2015].

In Surabaya, the Muslim organization Front Nahdliyin published memoirs of participants in the massacre of supporters of leftist organizations in 1965-1966, many of whom said that the military, threatening them with death, forced them to kill defenseless people. Arya Wanda Wirayuda, a lecturer at Surabaya University, pointed out that the background of the massacres was primarily the confrontation between the Communist Party and the Indonesian Peasant Front, on the one hand, and Nahdatul Ulama and its youth organization Ansor, on the other [Antara news.com, 09.12.2013]. The mention of the Peasant Front directly implies recognition that the social motives of the repressions were the contradictions surrounding the implementation of the agrarian reform demanded by the KPP and its supporters.

During the 2014 election campaign, the presidential and vice-presidential candidates Joko Widodo and Yusuf Kalla, respectively, promised to address human rights violations without mentioning the events of 1965. But in November 2014, the newly appointed Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security, retired General Tejo Eddy Purgianto, indicated that problems should not be created around past human rights violations. In this regard, human rights activists from the Setar Institute said that the Minister does not have enough knowledge about these issues and the responsibility of the State for them. Purgianto's speech, according to the Jakarta newspaper, gives reason to believe that the new president will not fulfill his election promises to end impunity and bring cases of previously committed crimes to court [Suara Pembaruan, 05.12.2014].

In April 2015, President Joko Widodo formed a group consisting of representatives of law enforcement agencies, law enforcement agencies and the National Human Rights Commission, which, after much discussion, proposed the creation of a truth and reconciliation committee that would report directly to the Head of State. At the same time, it was pointed out that the path of national reconciliation is preferable to the establishment of a human rights court. Indonesian human rights activists, united in the Coalition for Justice and Truth, in turn, said that reconciliation alone is not enough to ensure justice for all, especially for the victims of terror and their loved ones. They called for the creation of special human rights courts in the interests of establishing the truth and restoring the reputation of victims, pointing out that this will have an important educational value - no one should escape punishment [The Jakarta Post, 22.08.2015]. Representatives of the authorities took exactly the opposite positions.

It is no coincidence that the commission appointed by the President called for an out-of-court reconciliation without a trial on the merits of the problem - its composition was dominated by representatives of those structures and departments that are responsible for all the arbitrariness of the "new order"regime.

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In this regard, the arguments of the Jakarta Globe newspaper seem worthy of attention. The editorial pointed out that attempts were being made to take advantage of the experience of South Africa, which for a long time was torn by racial contradictions, but achieved reconciliation between black and white citizens of the country. But in South Africa, there were sensible and authoritative politicians like Nelson Mandela, and " in Indonesia, where criminals continue to justify their crimes and even blame the victims, such a commission will not be able to function. We simply don't have moral leaders in our government to make it work" [The Jakarta Globe, 22.05.2015].

Perhaps the last statement is too categorical. But the fact remains that there is no unity in the Government's approach to this acute problem. Thus, at a press briefing on August 31, 2015, the Minister of Justice and Human Rights, Iason Laoli, said that the question is being decided on which form will be chosen: an official apology on behalf of the state to persons whose rights have been violated, or an official expression of regret. At the same time, he made a reservation that neither one nor the other would apply to the KPI, which was banned in 1966. However, the new Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security, retired General Luhut Panjaitan, who was present at the briefing, immediately said that he rejected the idea of the government apologizing to the victims. "We didn't even think about it," he said, just two weeks after President Widodo announced in a speech marking the 70th anniversary of independence that the government was developing a national reconciliation program [The Jakarta Post, 01.09.2015].

Nevertheless, in August-September 2015, rumors began to spread in Indonesia that in connection with the 50th anniversary of the events of September 30, 1965, the president would officially apologize to the victims and their families. This idea caused a sharp rejection among the military and Muslim elite and among radical Islamists. Deputy Speaker of the Parliament Fadli Sohn opposed the idea of apologizing for the events of 1965, arguing that this could cause an explosion of discontent in a society that has been implanted with hatred of communists for decades [Ibid., 22.08.2015].

Rizik Shihab, the leader of the ultra-radical Front of Defenders of Islam, expressed the most cynical opinion on this issue.Without going into the legal and moral aspects of the problem, he said that recognizing the illegality of the repression would mean paying huge compensation to the victims, returning property, including housing and land plots, to the Communists and their families. He reminded that if the Indonesian Communist Party is found innocent, the responsibility for everything that happened will fall on the youth wing of Nahdatul Ulam, the police and the army [Ibid., 01.10.2015]. He did not say whether this responsibility would be justified.

Indeed, on September 30, 2015, Joko Widodo, in a speech on the occasion of the anniversary of the events (this day has been celebrated annually since the "new order" as "The Day of the Sacredness of the Ideology of the state") I limited myself to calling to prevent a repeat of the events. It remains unclear whether the head of state had in mind the killing of generals or the extermination of millions of people [The Jakarta Globe, 19.10.2015]. The President used the traditional formula linking the events of September 30 with the Communist Party.

There are various explanations for the position of Widodo, who during the election campaign promised to "deal" with past human rights violations. One of them is provided by the Jakarta Globe, which suggested that Widodo, born in 1961, grew up in the "new order", was far from the dark inner sides of this regime, as well as from politics in general, and his memory of the military rule was imprinted mainly in connection with the firm order, economic growth, leadership in ASEAN and the Non-Aligned Movement. It's also possible that he didn't get rid of it

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from prejudices and distortions of history inherited from the "new order" [Ibid., 31.10.2015].

After all, this is obviously not about the personal beliefs of the seventh President of Indonesia. His biography suggests that he rather belongs to a new generation of political figures who are not genetically related to the military regime. Apparently, the reasons for the position he took on the problem of "reconciliation" lie elsewhere. In September 2015, when speculation was rife about the president's possible apology to the victims of the tragedy, he was visited by the leaders of the second largest Muslim organization, Muhammadya, and asked to clarify their position on this issue. The President replied that he had no such intention: if he had made such an apology, the largest Muslim organizations and the armed forces would have opposed him. Following this, Cabinet Secretary Pramono Agung issued a denial of these rumors [Suara Pembaruan, 22.09.2015; The Jakarta Globe, 23.09.2015]. That is, the head of state spoke not about justice, truth and the rule of law, but about the possible reaction of political forces, singling out the army separately.

Only on December 11, 2015, did the President express himself in a slightly different spirit, stating that achieving reconciliation requires courage and the ability to radically address human rights issues, both in court and out of court [Suara Pembaruan, 11.12.2015]. Joko Widodo, however, did not specify his words.

Regardless of his personal beliefs, which are probably fairly democratic, the president has become a hostage to the political thinking of a significant part of the military and Muslim elites, who in turn have become hostages to their own dark past. Nor could he count on any substantial support from political parties, not only Muslim but also secular. The largest of them, Golkar, which emerged in 1964, is the brainchild of the army and will never oppose the position of the military.

President Joko Widodo's freedom of action was significantly restricted. The Democratic Party of Indonesia (fighting), led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, sees (not quite justifiably) solely its own merit in Widodo's becoming president. The party leader does not tire of reminding about this, demanding full loyalty from him, which is not in harmony with the image of the national leader. The results of a survey conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in October 2015 are very significant in this regard. The survey showed that the armed forces enjoy the highest level of public confidence (90% of respondents), followed by the Anti-Corruption Commission (80.8%), the president (79.7%), the Vice-president (75.2The Constitutional Court (71.2%), the Court of Accounts (68.1%), and the State Police (63.5%). The last places were taken by the Houses of Parliament - the Council of Representatives of the Regions (60.1%) and the Council of People's Representatives (SNP, 53%) 1 [The Jakarta Post, 26.10.2015].

Hence the president's appointment of retired generals to key posts, and the actions of local authorities, which often coincide with the position of the military. The authorities of North Sumatra province, for example, detained, deported and banned a 77-year-old Swedish citizen of Indonesian origin from entering the country, who was trying to find the grave of his father, who was shot in 1966 [Ibid., 19.10.2015]. In October 2015, in Central Java, the authorities confiscated and destroyed a copy of the Sathya Vachana University student magazine. The magazine published materials about the events of 50 years ago. It is noteworthy that the students were supported by a number of Indonesian and foreign human rights organizations [Ibid., 20.10.2015].

1 The SNP is regularly rocked by corruption scandals, most recently in late 2015, when the Speaker of the House, Setia Novanto, was convicted of extorting a 20% stake in a major mining company. At the same time, he used the names of the president and Vice-president.

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The police banned the Jakarta Arts Council from discussing the text of a play dedicated to the 1965 tragedy at the annual theater festival. The ban was explained by the desire to avoid clashes between supporters and opponents of the discussion on this issue [Ibid., 09.12.2015]. Minister of State Improvement Yuddi Krisnandi banned teachers from celebrating the anniversary of the creation of the Teachers ' Association of Indonesia, which was once associated with the KPI [Antara news. com, 08.12.2015]. Amnesty International has appealed to the Indonesian Government not to interfere with discussions on this issue, as this is a clear violation of civil rights [The Jakarta Globe, 31.10.2015].

This appeal seems to have been ignored, as evidenced by the reaction of the political elite of Indonesia to the November 2015 meeting of the public tribunal in The Hague, which considered the case of human rights violations in Indonesia in 1965-1966. As witnesses, the meeting was attended by people who suffered from violence in those years. The court concluded that the Indonesian Government was responsible for the killings and repression. As stated in the conclusion, "there was a line from top to bottom along which orders were received from an unconstitutional institution." The Court noted that human rights violations included the killing of tens of thousands of people, illegal detention of people for a long time, inhumane treatment of prisoners, torture, slave labor, and sexual violence against women. All this had a political purpose-to remove the CPI from the political scene in Indonesia [The Jakarta Post, 14.11.2015].

In principle, these conclusions confirmed what objective analysts have long come to. We are also interested in the reaction of the Indonesian elite to them, which, with rare exceptions, showed confusion mixed with irritation and a sense of offended dignity. Vice-President Yu. Kalla, commenting on the work of the court in The Hague, found only two counterarguments. The first was that the West itself had sinned enough in the wars of the twentieth century. The second was worded as follows: "Well, okay, just don't forget about the death of our generals. Why should the government apologize if our generals were killed? " [Antaranews.com, 11.11.2015]. The fact that millions of the repressed had nothing to do with the murder of the generals was beyond speculation.

The aforementioned Luhut Panjaitan stated in an interview with the BBC: "Those who participated in this trial, apparently, have nothing else to do. We Indonesians know how to solve our own problems... " [The Jakarta Globe, 16.11.2015]. The Minister of Defense, General R. Ryakudu, declared the human rights defenders who organized the trial as enemies of the state and pointed out that human rights violations in 1965 were inevitable, as they were a response to the Communist Party's rebellion [Gatra News, 23.11.2015]. The arguments of both generals vividly recall the years of the military regime. Attorney General Prasetyo was more circumspect, saying that the issue should be resolved without foreign interference and that the Government was inclined to settle it out of court through reconciliation: "All this happened decades ago, and I think it will be difficult to find evidence and witnesses. And in general, I would not like to become hostages of the past, and everyone should understand this. " [Antaranews.com, 10.11.2013].

The representative of the parliamentary faction of the Muslim Justice and Prosperity Party, Abu Bakar Alhabshi, simply stated that the Indonesian citizens who took part in the Hague Tribunal are traitors to their homeland, and called for bringing them to criminal responsibility [Gatra News, 23.11.2015].

It seems that the speaker of the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly (the country's highest representative body)was the closest to the truth Zudkifli Hasan. Arguing that the creation of the tribunal was counterproductive, since the Netherlands had its own historical heritage linked to Indonesia, he acknowledged that the court had originated in

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In particular, because Indonesia itself has put off solving problems related to human rights violations for too long [Suara Pembaruan, 14.11.2015]. Tawfiq Basari, a prominent figure of the National Democratic Party, also spoke in the same spirit, recalling the promises made by Widodo and Kalla in this regard, noting that the human rights protection mechanism in Indonesia is not working properly and this is the impression that it has in the world: "We must show the ability to find a solution to the tragedy of 1965 inside the country... It is necessary to recognize the events of the past as part of our history in order to prevent their repetition in the future. " [http://www.gatra.com/politik174039-nasdem/penyele].

The last phrase, in my opinion, is a key one in the approach to the legacy of 1965 in Indonesia. The problem of a national scale lies in the fact that the opponents of its radical solution mostly belong to the generals. The fact that they are retired does not matter in principle, given the strong caste solidarity that binds all regular military personnel in Indonesia (especially in the land army), there are no former generals. It seems that the army is not ready to dissociate itself from the atrocities of that time, which means that in the event of a situation that they consider a crisis, the current generals will be ready to stand above the law, morality and public opinion.

In this regard, it is appropriate to draw attention to the conclusions of the Indonesian journalist Andy Bayuni, who wrote in the Singapore newspaper:

"The legacy of the political culture of violence that [the military regime] left behind is recognized much less often than the corruption inherited from it. There have been no serious attempts to address this issue, although Indonesia has embarked on political and economic reforms, adopting the path of democracy in 1999. Today, force and violence are still used to settle differences or to subdue people. Although the military has retired from politics and national security has been almost entirely taken over by the police, the political culture they left behind is still often felt everywhere and rears its ugly head from time to time. One of the problems remains the prevailing attitude towards mass murder - from complete denial to justification of it as inevitable and necessary" [The Straits Times, 22.09.2015].

And this is not limited to the approach to the events of 1965. The Government has actually evaded repeated calls to address other human rights violations in the era of the "new order", including the suppression of anti-government protests in the spring of 1998. This" evasiveness", according to human rights defenders, has a demonstrative effect, creating a sense of impunity, which is still evident in the actions of law enforcement agencies in problem regions of the country, in particular in Papua [The International New York Times, 1-2. 02. 2014].

I would like to mention another important aspect related to the events of 2015 in Indonesia's public opinion, which is reflected in the Jakarta Post commentary quite extensively:

"The U.S. government, which at that time (A.D. 1965) was waging a war against the Vietnamese Communists, was said to be quite pleased with the Communist defeat in Indonesia and viewed it as a success of its containment policy. Declassified CIA documents and investigative journalism... They showed that the United States assisted the Indonesian army in carrying out an anti-communist purge by providing it with a list of 5,000 people to be killed. Then the United States supported the Suharto regime, which organized mass killings " [The Jakarta Post, 16.02.2014].

In general, the reaction of the Indonesian authorities to the anniversary of the 1965 tragedy should be considered in connection with some general trends that have emerged recently. Representatives of the military elite and conservative Muslim leaders have repeatedly expressed the opinion that the changes made to the constitution in 1999-

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2002, do not correspond to the realities of the country and that decision-making by voting contradicts the principle of consultation and consensus, which is included as a component of the state ideology in the preamble of the Basic Law. There are claims that democratization has gone too far, creating growing contradictions in society. Even the former President of Indonesia, Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), who adopted a number of amendments, expressed that in the euphoria generated by the fall of the military regime, a certain haste was shown, and changes to the constitution were made insufficiently thoughtfully and the country was not ready for them [Suara Pembaruan, 07.12.2015]. Representatives of the Movement for the Salvation of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, including two retired generals and the sister of M. Sukarnoputri-Rahmawati, visited the Chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly Zulkifli Hassan on December 15, 2015 and handed over a petition demanding to abandon - in the name of saving the state-the amendments made to the Basic Law after 1998 [Gatra News, 15.12.2015]. This is a dangerous trend, especially since it is developing against the backdrop of numerous corruption and other scandals affecting individuals and institutions in the highest echelons of the state.

It is worrying that, on the occasion of the anniversary of the events of 1965, the military line is finally gaining the upper hand, denying not only the need for a radical solution to the problem, but also its very existence. This fact, which is important in itself, should be considered in the context of the growing positioning of the army as a self-sufficient national institution. One recent example: On December 3, 2015, the Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Nurmantio, held a meeting of army, air and navy commanders and government representatives up to the district level on the theme "The army is united with the people in the development of the village". At the meeting, it was stated that in rural areas, the army will develop infrastructure, implement programs in the field of education, health and legal education, including in the field of human rights and national identity [Suara Pembaruan, 03.12.2015]. And this is far from the only case when the army actually takes on functions that belong to civilian bodies under the constitution.

However, there is no reason to believe that Indonesia's democratically oriented circles and human rights defenders have failed to make any progress in overcoming the dark legacy of the past. The very fact that this issue has become the subject of intense debate and political struggle shows that the burden on national consciousness is not getting any easier, and that there is a growing desire in society to overcome the latent sense of shame for what happened half a century ago and wash away this stain on the national reputation.

list of literature

Reznikov A. B. Zagovor v Dzhakarta [The Conspiracy in Jakarta]. Moscow, IV LN SSSR, 1977. = Reznikov A.B. Zagovor v Djakarte: Moscow, 1977.

Antaranews.com (Jakarta).

Gatra News (Jakarta).

Ribka Tjiptaning Proletaryati. Aku Bangga Jadi Anak PKI. Jakarta, 2002.

Sinar Harapan (Jakarta).

Soebandrio H. Kesaksianku tentang G-30-S. Jakarta, 2001.

Suara Pembaruan (Jakarta).

The International New York Times.

The Jakarta Globe.

The Jakarta Post.

The Straits Times (Singapore).

http://www.gatra.com./politik174039-nasdem/penyeke.

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