On October 1, 2014, the Pakistan Branch of the Center for Near and Middle Eastern Studies of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences held an expert meeting on this topic, during which employees of the Institute, other research centers and educational institutions expressed their opinion on the situation in this country.

In his opening speech, S. N. Kamenev, Head of the Pakistan Sector (IB RAS), identified a range of issues that should be analyzed during the meeting. He noted that the internal political crisis that began in mid-August 2014 in Pakistan made experts think about what Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his government did (or did not do) during their tenure (since May 2013) and what are the prospects for the country's development in the coming years.

Touching upon the current economic situation, S. N. Kamenev noted that following the results of the fiscal year ended in June 2014, it can be concluded that the country's economy is slowly but steadily increasing its potential, and even the energy crisis that has been going on for many years has not been able to negatively affect the growth of the national economy. This is confirmed by official statistics from the Pakistan Economic Survey 2013/14, which shows that the economic growth rate was 4.1%, compared with 3.7% in the previous fiscal year. The growth rate of industry was relatively stable, reaching 5.8% compared to 1.4% in 2012/13 (Pakistani statistics include mining, energy and construction in the "Industry" category in addition to large and small-scale industries). However, the increase in agricultural output slowed down slightly - to 2.1% in 2013/14 compared to the previous year. 2.9% in 2013, due to unfavorable weather conditions (flooding in autumn).

However, the speaker made two reservations here. The first is that statistical indicators are calculated from year to year on ^the basis of only nine months of a given fiscal year1, including the growth rate of all sectors of the national economy of Pakistan. This means that three months (April, May, and June) fall out of the statistical calculation process, whether it is a favorable or unfavorable economic period. And the calculation of value added for these three months is carried out by the simplest extrapolation of previous data for nine months.

And the second factor of potential statistical error (or, better to say, incorrectness) is the embellishment of the real economic situation in the country by the Pakistani official bodies. This is evidenced by the data on fixed assets corrected in most cases in subsequent years (after a particular financial year).

¹ Fiscal year in Pakistan begins on July 1 of the current calendar year and ends on June 30 of the following year.

macroeconomic indicators. A similar point of view is shared by experts of leading international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, ADB), which regularly monitor the state of the national economy of Pakistan in terms of providing it with loans and credits. In particular, they believe that the real economic growth rate of Pakistan in 2013/14 barely exceeded 3%, and did not reach 4%, as it is declared in official documents of the Pakistani government.

For comparison, it was noted that China is again the leader in terms of economic growth - 7.5% in 2014 and about the same is projected in 2015. In India, this figure reached 5.5% in the fiscal year ended March 31, 2013/14 and may exceed 6% in the current year.

The speaker emphasized that three main factors negatively affect the current state and future development of the national economy of Pakistan: the energy crisis that has been going on for many years, weak tax collection (and, as a result, a high budget deficit) and the growing unemployment rate.

The energy crisis affects not only the production process itself in ^the real sectors2 and services, but also the daily life of the population of Pakistan. First of all, this applies to the upper and middle groups of income recipients, which ultimately exacerbates social tensions in the country. Rolling power outages (from four to twelve hours a day) in cities and rural areas do not make it possible to use refrigerators, air conditioners, coolers, electric pumps, and other household electrical appliances, which causes acute dissatisfaction among more or less affluent segments of the population who can afford to have such relatively expensive household items. At the same time, tariffs for electricity consumption are rising, although not to the same extent as international financial institutions (in particular, the IMF) insist on it; at the same time, government subsidies for electricity consumption are being reduced.

S. N. Kamenev and I. E. Fedorova (IB RAS) noted that projects designed to reduce the severity of the energy problem (a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and with a potential extension to India, as well as the CASA-1000 power transmission line designed to ensure the supply of electricity from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan through Afghanistan to Pakistan, They are unlikely to be implemented in the medium term due to the difficult internal political situation in Afghanistan, primarily due to the threats of militants to stop any attempts to build these facilities by means of terrorist attacks, if Western financial institutions are involved in them in one way or another. This was stated in 2005 by the official representative of the Taliban Mufti Latifullah Hakimi.

Another persistent socio-economic problem that is constantly present in the national economy and social life of Pakistan is unemployment and underemployment. According to the results of the fiscal year ended in June 2013/14, the economically active population of Pakistan is, according to official data, 61 million people, of which 3.8 million are unemployed (6.2%). Rural unemployment increased from 4.7% to 5.5% in 2013-2014 alone, while urban unemployment is stable at 8%. It is not surprising that this serious social problem causes extreme discontent among various groups of the population and is actively used for its own purposes by the opposition, which took to the protest stage in the second half of 2014 demanding the resignation of the government of Nawaz Sharif. But it is impossible to solve the problem of unemployment in a revolutionary way, i.e. to create several hundred thousand additional jobs in a few months or a year, as the opposition demands.

However, the participants of the protest movement in Pakistan did not charge the government with the unresolved issue of improving the tax system in the country, despite the fact that it affects the interests of almost all segments of the population of Pakistan (primarily middle-and high-income recipients), due to massive tax evasion. As a result, the country's budget has been losing about 1 trillion rupees ($10 billion) in recent years. This leads to a chronic shortage of money in the treasury. Leading international financial organizations represented by the IMF and the World Bank have repeatedly drawn the attention of the country's leadership to

² In Pakistan's main industry, the textile industry, a rolling power outage occurred for 4 hours daily in 2011, 6 hours in 2012 and 2013, and 8 hours in 2014, resulting in a reduction in production in this sector by approximately 40%. This, in turn, reduced textile exports and led to an increase in unemployment.

this serious problem and demanded its prompt solution. Otherwise, they threatened to significantly reduce the provision of economic assistance.

Here, the main indicator is the ratio of the amount of taxes collected to GDP; in Pakistan, in recent years, it has fluctuated at the level of 9%. At the same time, almost 2/3 of the total amount of taxes are indirect and only about 1/3 are direct taxes, i.e. Pakistan has a tax system typical of underdeveloped states. Even officials in the country (at the level of the Finance Minister) admit that this indicator is the lowest in the South Asian region. In general, only 1% of the population pays taxes in Pakistan.

It is interesting that the participants of the protest movement did not press charges of corruption against the government, although the report on the corruption perception index published in early December 2014 by Transparency International noted that Pakistan remained almost unchanged among 175 countries of the world in 2014 - 125th place (in 2013). - 127th place). For comparison, India and Sri Lanka now share 86th place in this parameter, Iran and Russia share 136th place, and Afghanistan (as in previous years) closes the list along with North Korea and Somalia.

V. N. Moskalenko, N. A. Zamaraeva (both from the Institute of International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences) and P. V. Topychkanov (IMEMO RAS) focused on the internal political problems of Pakistan. The acute crisis that broke out in Pakistan in the second half of 2014 was caused by the events of the previous year, which seemed very favorable for the future development of the political process in the country. With the coming to power of the former opposition party Pakistan Muslim League (PML/N/), headed by a major political figure and businessman Nawaz Sharif, the process of state and political renewal of Pakistan was initiated and passed in a short time.

Parliamentary and provincial elections were held on May 11, 2013. The PML (N) won 184 of the 342 seats in the lower house (53.8%). The party was represented in all provincial assemblies (to varying degrees). But in the largest province of Punjab, its success was fantastic: 82% of seats in the chamber. In June of the same year, the country's president Mamnoon Hussein, also a representative of the PML(N), was elected.

In November 2013, on the recommendation of Nawaz Sharif, who became Prime Minister, the Chief of the Army Staff (the highest official in the armed forces) was replaced. This was followed by similar reshuffles, appointments already within the state structures themselves. As a result, in less than a year, the administrative apparatus was almost completely renovated in accordance with the party-political and personal preferences of the elite. At the same time, the government's actions formally corresponded to the constitutional provisions, which was actively used by official propaganda. In fact, this process was accompanied by a coincidence of various events: the holding of parliamentary and provincial assemblies, the end of service terms or age restrictions of the highest state officials, etc. - all of which together gave the leadership the legal right to replace them within the same "victory wave".

Experts who spoke at the meeting recalled that in 2010, the 18th amendment to the Constitution was adopted, which transformed the Pakistani state into a parliamentary-type republic and concentrated supreme power in the hands of the Prime Minister. However, Nawaz Sharif failed to use the favorable situation wisely, either in the public interest or in his own. As in the period of his second premiership (1997-1999), having a strong position in power, he acted rudely, straightforwardly, swept away one obstacle after another and even tried to overcome the main obstacle that the army represented, but it turned out to be too much for him. The Prime Minister's" gravedigger " was then the chief of the army Staff, General P. Musharraf, who was appointed to this post at the insistence of N. Sharif, bypassing military rules and traditions.

The short term of Sharif's current government has shown that the past has not been a lesson to him. He was just as rude and arrogant as before, cut off from real life (even moved from the capital to the main city of Punjab-Lahore), insisted on his proposed candidacy for the post of chief of staff of the army in violation of existing rules, which caused dissatisfaction with the top command staff. The command staff received some satisfaction quite soon during the political storm that arose in Pakistan in August 2014, when the army's position strengthened and forced the political leadership to be more tolerant of army requests.

During the expert meeting, it was noted that the analysis of the political crisis in 2014 should take into account its specific features. First of all, it is worth paying attention to the short period of preparation for the opposition campaign. Usually, major outbursts of discontent occur after the first five years of the winning party's term in power, and sometimes even after the second term (as, for example, happened in India in the general elections in 2014). In Pakistan, the reason for the political action of the opposition was not very significant. 1.5 years after their implementation. But the demands of the opposition were very serious - the resignation of the government, the revision of the results of the 2013 election campaign, the reorganization of the electoral system, etc. While advocating a broad democratization of the country, the opposition demanded that the most important state problems be solved by methods directly opposed to democratic procedures (for example, the immediate removal of a legally elected government). These demands were accompanied by threats to hold large-scale popular actions.

At the same time, the initiators and leaders of the campaign were the little - known Popular Movement of Pakistan (PDP) and the Justice Party (PS), which is already operating and claiming to be the "third force" in Pakistan, whose leader was Imran Khan-in the past an idol of cricket fans, and then a not very successful politician. Only in the last elections did he achieve some success - his party won 27 seats in parliament (out of 342), becoming the third in terms of the number of parliamentary seats, although in the northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the PS formed a local government.

The implementation of Protestant threats began with the"Freedom March" on August 14 ("Pakistan's Independence Day") - a mass march on Islamabad. Since then, the capital of Pakistan has become a place of constant demonstrations, rallies, sit-ins, clashes with the police, especially in the so-called red zone of the city, where such actions are prohibited, since government offices are located in this area. These events took place in a 40-degree heat wave, and in late August and early September, the monsoon began, causing severe flooding in many parts of the country. The leaders of the action managed to minimize the difficulties associated with providing the protesters with food, overnight accommodation, holding constant rotations of participants in these public actions, etc.

The widespread mass movement had a negative impact on the" upper floors " of power. The struggle between various political groups has sharply escalated. Some of them supported the government (among them the former ruling Pakistan People's Party), others, taking advantage of the situation, tried to strengthen their position at the expense of the ruling structure (a sharp anti-government position was taken up by P. Musharraf in 2002. Pakistan Muslim League im. Djinn). Many parties hesitated in determining their course, adapting it to the changing situation, which further complicated and confused the situation. An important means of fighting has become the prosecution of any, even not so significant case or statement. Lawsuits literally overwhelmed the country, effectively paralyzing the work of the justice system.

Opposition lawmakers made an attempt to resign from their posts, but it was rejected because the ruling group saw it as a desire to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the 2013 general elections and weaken the legitimacy of representative bodies. The problem became protracted, and new political groups were drawn into it.

N. Sharif and members of his Government, after some confusion, took an active part in the struggle that unfolded. They met with representatives of other parties, put forward various proposals and projects; numerous commissions were created, which demonstrated enviable but useless activities. For some time, the activities of the highest authorities, including the Parliament, were paralyzed. All this was accompanied by outright PR and populism, all sorts of promises.

The Government tried to use the Supreme Court to resolve the situation. But he took an openly neutral position, saying that the appeal of the Cabinet of Ministers is "a political matter, and the highest judicial authority does not deal with it." Approximately the same line was followed by the military leadership. But it has firmly declared its support for democracy and a peaceful political solution to the crisis, opposed the use of force, and suggested that

your services as an intermediary. Thus, other branches of government did not provide immediate and necessary assistance to the executive branch.

The acute political crisis in Pakistan lasted a month and a half and was the longest in the country's history. Since the end of September, the tension began to subside, the strikers ' fatigue, the deterioration of weather conditions, and the futility of further struggle were affected. Nevertheless, some protests continued for a long time (for example, in October there was a large sit-in in the center of Islamabad).

Many features and peculiarities of the political situation in Pakistan in 2014 indicate the strengthening of the protest component of the general opposition movement. In 2007, this was clearly reflected in the sudden and rapid fall of the regime of General President P. Musharraf. This factor was also widespread and decisive in 2014.

The protest movement is, as almost all experts have pointed out, a concentration of people's dissatisfaction with the failure of the authorities to fulfill their promises and the desire for change. Very soon after the change of government, it becomes clear that the new government does not fix anything (and is not able to do so, as happened with the government of N. Sharif).

The country has not seen any positive changes in reducing unemployment, curbing inflation and rising prices, reducing corruption, fighting crime, and easing the energy crisis that affects all segments of society. Numerous generous promises that were easily distributed during the election campaign were not fulfilled. With this in mind, it can be assumed that the current socio-economic difficulties will remain in the country for a long time, discontent will grow and Pakistan will experience frequent periods of acute political instability in the future.

S. N. Kamenev stressed that due to the political crisis, business circles are increasingly showing serious concern about the growth of losses and a decrease in investment activity, which is a natural consequence of political instability. Finance Minister Isaac Dar stated that they were at least $ 6 billion at the end of September 2014, but according to Trade Minister Khurram Dastgir Khan, this amount is at least $ 8 billion. Finally, the president of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Pakistan, Zubair Ahmed Malik, said that the losses from the political confrontation exceeded $ 10 billion. These figures are probably overstated, but there is no doubt that the private sector of Pakistan's national economy has been increasingly affected by the political crisis.

In parallel with political problems, the situation in the country was affected by a severe flood that took on the scale of a national tragedy and was similar to that in 2010, when the damage from the disaster exceeded $ 10 billion (S. N. Kamenev, E. A. Pakhomov, RIA Novosti). As of the end of September, according to preliminary data, more than 500 people were killed, 300 thousand were injured and almost 2.5 million people were injured (having lost their homes and property), but these official data are extremely approximate. Significant damage was caused to the country's economy, primarily in Punjab. In this regard, the planned economic growth rate of 4.1% for the 2014/15 financial year (and the IMF increased it to 4.3% in August 2014) will be revised downwards. This was the case in 2010, when the economic growth rate planned for 2010/11 at 4.5% was actually only 2.6%.

Here the speakers drew attention to the fact that if we assess the potential impact of this tragedy on political life in the country, then this rampant disaster to some extent played into the hands of the authorities, since from a moral and ethical point of view, it is immoral to engage in political confrontation instead of throwing all your strength and financial resources to help millions of victims, and not to engage in politicking.

A number of speakers at the meeting (N. V. Melekhina, MGIMO, B. M. Volkonsky, RISI, S. N. Kamenev and V. I. Sotnikov, Institute of International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, etc.) noted some of Sharif's achievements in foreign policy. First of all, experts emphasized the stability of Pakistan-US relations, which was reflected in Washington's full support for the legitimately elected government of Nawaz Sharif. The US State Department expressed its firm belief that the May 2013 elections were not rigged. The US House of Representatives overwhelmingly rejected the proposal of a number of congressmen to reduce military and economic assistance to Pakistan and called for its expansion. Confirmation of this position of American parliamentarians later became

longer than expected (7 days instead of 5), negotiations between the head of the army, General R. Sharif, and American partners during his official visit to the United States in November 2014.

Speakers retaliated against the expansion of Pakistan's political and economic relations with China. Although President Xi Jinping's planned visit to Pakistan in mid-September 2014 was postponed due to the political crisis in Pakistan, the Chinese side did not abandon its earlier promises to continue the" construction of an economic corridor " to Pakistan at a total cost of $ 32 billion (later, in November 2014, Beijing kept its promise, When N. Sharif paid an official visit to China and investment agreements worth $ 45 billion were signed, mainly in the energy sector.)

From the very beginning of his tenure as Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif paid special attention to improving relations with India, in which the Chief Minister of Punjab, Shahbaz Sharif (the younger brother of the Prime Minister), gave him maximum support. Immediately after the elections in Pakistan in May 2013, the Prime Minister made an official statement about his intention to normalize relations with India in the first place, to consider controversial issues about the ownership of the Siachin Glacier, the division of the waters of the r. The Indus River and its tributaries and try to come closer to solving the main problem of bilateral relations - Kashmir. At the same time, negotiations were held on expanding bilateral trade (from $ 3 billion to $ 6 billion). However, both the periodic skirmishes on the line of control and the meeting of the Pakistani Ambassador to India in mid-August 2014 with Kashmiri separatists interrupted this process. At the same time, the participants of the meeting believe that the process of normalization of bilateral relations is unlikely to be seriously disrupted, and in the future we can expect a resumption of the negotiation dialogue.

Finally, the meeting highlighted the significant expansion of Russian-Pakistani relations in 2014. First of all, this is due to Russia's readiness to start military-technical cooperation with Pakistan, which Islamabad has been persistently seeking for many years and which Moscow has always previously avoided. It was originally about the supply of Russian Mi-35 attack helicopters, which was announced in April 2014.

The reasons for this decision by Russia were quite understandable, given the situation in Ukraine, the changing geopolitical situation in the region after the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan, and the real possibility of increasing terrorist activities there. As expected, it caused a very negative reaction from the Indian side. However, it is not surprising that based on their own interests, the United States, Israel, and France supply weapons to India, while Russia is ready to supply weapons to Pakistan.

For the first time in the history of Russian-Pakistani relations, joint exercises were held in April 2014 to practice the fight against terrorism at sea, when the Russian large anti-submarine ship Marshal Shaposhnikov and the Pakistani frigate Aswat carried out joint actions in this direction. And in mid-October 2014, Russian warships, including the Yaroslav Mudry frigate, again conducted similar exercises together with the Pakistani Navy.

After a number of countries imposed sanctions against Russia, the Pakistani trade and industry circles considered these events from the point of view of the possibility of expanding bilateral trade and economic relations. Farooq Afzal, Chairman of the Pakistan-Russia Business Council, which operates under the auspices of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Pakistan, said that the sanctions imposed by the European Union, Australia, Canada and other countries against Moscow are a great opportunity for Pakistani exporters to gain a foothold in the Russian food market. In this regard, Rosselkhoznadzor representatives have regular contacts with their Pakistani counterparts.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Vladimir Putin, speaking on June 27 at the ceremony of presenting his credentials from Pakistani Ambassador Zahir Jinjua, remarked that "we attach great importance to the development of cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Russian companies are ready to implement promising projects, including in the energy and metallurgical industries." Among other important areas of cooperation with Pakistan, Vladimir Putin mentioned the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking.

After the meeting, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Pakistan on November 20, 2014 (for the first time in 45 years after the visit of the then Soviet Defense Minister Alexander Grechko in 1969). During the visit, a framework agreement was signed. There is reason to believe that this growing interaction may lead to a new era in bilateral relations between Russia and Pakistan.

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