The article examines China's relations with neighboring countries on the use of the waters of the Salween, Mekong, Brahmaputra, Amur, Ili and Irtysh rivers. Special attention is paid to the projects of the People's Republic of China on the development of hydropower and environmental problems.

Keywords: China, transboundary rivers, Mekong, Salween, Brahmaputra, Amur, Ili, Indus, Irtysh, hydropower.

China is rich in rivers. In terms of total river flow resources, the country ranks 5th in the world after Brazil, Russia, Canada and the United States. However, the river systems are unevenly distributed over its territory. If several great rivers of Asia flow in the east and south at once, then there are few rivers in the west. Moreover, in terms of water volume per capita (slightly more than 2,168 cubic meters). m per year) China is ranked 121st in the world. This figure is less than 30% of the world level, or 19% of the level of the United States, 8% of the level of Russia, 5% of the level of Brazil, and 2% of the level of Canada [ ... ]. Most Chinese rivers originate in the south and east of the Tibetan Plateau. There are the sources of the Yellow River, Yangtze, Mekong, Salween, Brahmaputra, Indus, flowing into the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Most of China's major rivers cross the borders of neighboring countries, but fortunately for the PRC, their sources are located on Chinese territory, which Beijing actively uses. Rivers starting in the mountains of China have large elevation differences in their upper reaches, which creates considerable opportunities for the development of hydropower. The republic's leadership tries to use this advantage to the maximum. Even now, China ranks first in the world in terms of developing the hydropower potential of its territory. Hydropower plays a crucial role in the country's renewable energy development plans. China's energy strategy, released in October 2012, states the potential of Chinese rivers to generate 542 GW of capacity [In China..., 2012]. The country's leadership has set a goal to increase total electricity production in China by almost half by 2020: from 1,060 GW (at the end of 2011) to 1,500 GW, while reducing coal consumption and importing expensive natural gas. The burden on the rivers in order to implement this task is huge. The Chinese government expects to increase its hydropower capacity to 380 GW by 2020 [Hydropower..., 2014].

However, hydrotechnical structures that have been actively built since the end of the 20th century are intended not only for generating electricity, but also for curbing the flow of unstable Chinese rivers, preventing floods and storing water for agricultural needs. Today, there are more than 25,000 large dams in China, including the world's largest hydroelectric facility, the Three Gorges Dam. All this affects the state of river systems. According to various sources, from 30 to 70% of China's rivers are seriously polluted, some rivers no longer flow into the sea, and their biodiversity has significantly decreased.

Naturally, active hydrotechnical activity in the upper reaches of transboundary rivers provokes discontent of neighboring countries, where rivers flow from China. They are seriously concerned about the quality of incoming water, its quantity and changes in the flow regime. Cross-border Chinese rivers include the Mekong, Salween, Indus, Brahmaputra, Amur, Irtysh, Ili and a number of smaller rivers.

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Salouin River

This is not to say that the Chinese government is not concerned about environmental issues. It consists of several structures involved in this area: the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources, the Ministry of Water Management, the Ministry of Agriculture, which exercises, in particular, the right of fish supervision and control over the implementation of government decisions on fisheries and fishing ports, and the State Environmental Protection Department. The State Committee for Development and Reform and the Ministry of Trade are responsible for environmental protection issues. In recent years, the Chinese government has been concerned about the creation of nature reserves for the restoration and preservation of natural territories, and has paid increased attention to wastewater treatment and lake restoration. However, the preservation of ecosystems contradicts the need to provide minimal benefits to the growing population of the country. China's natural resources are depleted and cannot meet all the needs of economic growth. As a result, the scope of environmental problems does not decrease.

Due to the growing environmental problems and related public protests, former State Council Chairman Wen Jiabao had to block several projects for the construction of new hydroelectric power plants in the country. In particular, in 2004 it was decided to reduce the number of proposed dams on the Salween River: the number of approved projects was reduced from thirteen to five. But even these five dams provoked protests from environmentalists and the public, and their construction was postponed for eight years. All five dams are located in one of the most seismically active and geologically unstable areas of China and involve the relocation of 30 thousand people. In addition, the Salouin River is included in the UNESCO World Heritage List.

However, after the resignation of Wen Jiabao, there is a forced return to plans for the construction of disputed facilities, otherwise the tasks set for the development of energy will not be fulfilled. In January 2013, the State Council of China announced a new energy development plan, which included many controversial and previously postponed projects. Guided by this plan, the Ministry of Environmental Protection of China gave permission, for example, for the construction of the Shuangjiangkou hydroelectric power station on the Dadu River (a tributary of the Yangtze) in the southwestern province of Sichuan, while recognizing that it would have a negative impact on plants and rare fish, as well as affect protected areas of local nature reserves [China gives... , 2013]. A few years earlier, the government had already agreed to reduce the Yangtze River conservation area necessary for the conservation of valuable and rare fish species. The reason for the reduction of this area was the desire to build another dam, Xiaonanhai (China's Government..., 2011). The new energy plan included a previously postponed project to build a cascade of dams on the Saluin River.

There are many sacrifices to be made for economic development. Major hydrotechnical projects implemented since the last century have already forced more than 23 million people to leave their homes and move to new territories, and dam breakthroughs have claimed the lives of about 300 thousand people; the species diversity of fish has decreased, and the catch has also decreased. Projects are implemented even when they contradict local environmental legislation.

In 2003, China adopted the Law on the Need for Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), which stipulates that all planned construction projects must first pass an environmental assessment. Practice shows that this law works poorly and is simply ignored. For example, despite the fact that the projects have not yet passed an environmental assessment, preparations for the construction of two dams on the Salween River - Songta and Maji - continue. In addition, according to the aforementioned law on environmental impact assessment

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The public should be allowed to enter the environment, but in reality this does not happen. For another hydroelectric power station on the same Salween River, Liuku, the EIA has already been completed, but only a short version of it has become available to public organizations, because its full version has been recognized as a" state secret " [Yan, 2013]. This is generally the only completed environmental assessment for hydropower projects on this river.

The Salween River (Nag Chu, Nam Kong, Nujiang) originates in the Tibet Autonomous Region of China at an altitude of about 4547 m, flows through the Chinese province of Yunnan, Myanmar (Burma) and Thailand. Its length is 2,400 km, and the basin area is 325 thousand square kilometers. The river flows into the Moutama Bay of the Andaman Sea (part of the Indian Ocean).

Community groups in Myanmar and Thailand have expressed concern about Chinese plans for the potential negative cumulative impact of the neighboring country's planned dams. So far, there are no aggregate estimates of the impact of dams on the economy and ecological status of not only China, but also the countries located downstream. As for the Governments of these countries, they have not yet had a fruitful dialogue with the Chinese side on cross-border rivers.

Mekong River

The headwaters of the Mekong (Chinese for Lancangjiang) are also found in the Tibetan Plateau. Its length is about 4,500 km, and the basin area is 810 thousand square kilometers. It is the largest river of the Indochina Peninsula. It flows through China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam.

The lower Mekong countries (Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam), with the help of international donors, established the Mekong Commission in 1995. This is not a supranational, but an interstate structure that fulfills the instructions of the governments of the founding countries to regulate the issues of sharing the waters of the Mekong. Unfortunately, China and Myanmar still refuse to participate in the work of the Commission. Their participation would impose obligations on them to report and discuss all projects planned on this river. But the Chinese government does not need such restrictions. China has participated in the Commission's work only twice, providing hydrological data requested by the Commission.

The refusal of the PRC to enter as a full member of the Commission creates particular tension in the regulation of water use issues on the Mekong. China owns 13.5% of the runoff, and it actively exploits them. The main focus is on the construction of hydroelectric power plants. On its territory in the Upper Mekong basin, China initially planned to build 30 dams. To date, six of them have already been built. Some projects had to be abandoned or reduced in size due to public influence and other reasons. But there are few such dams. In early 2012, the construction of the Guonian dam was officially abandoned, as the reflection of the sun from the proposed water mirror of the reservoir would accelerate the melting of the local glacier. In the same year, the height of the upstream Gushui dam was lowered from 310 m to 220 m to avoid flooding the city of Yanjing on the border of Tibet and Yunnan Province. In 2010, China canceled the construction of the Mengsong dam to " prevent abnormal water level fluctuations in downstream countries caused by the operation of the power plant "[Yan, 2012]. However, other projects are developing rapidly.

China's construction of dams on the Mekong and their operation led to a critical drop in the river's water level in 2004 and 2010. The unwillingness of the Chinese authorities to release some of the water accumulated by hydroelectric dams during the dry season caused a catastrophic shallowing of the river and made navigation impossible, caused environmental damage and

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it threatened an economic catastrophe for the entire region. By 2010, China had built three hydroelectric power stations in the upper Mekong River, and a fourth was under construction. The current catastrophic situation has not changed the PRC's plans to build four more hydroelectric power stations on the Mekong River itself and nine on its tributaries. The Chinese government did not admit its fault for the shallowing of the river, stating that only 13% of the Mekong water comes from China, and the rest of the flow is formed due to rain collected by Mekong tributaries in the territories of countries located downstream of the river [Mekong..., 2010]. At the same time, the Chinese side did not mention that, unlike the rainy season, the basis for feeding the Lower Mekong in the dry season is precisely runoff from China.

However, according to the Chinese government, it is taking measures to reduce the impact of its own hydroelectric power stations on river flow in downstream countries. As one of the concessions from the Chinese side, the capacity of the Ganlanba hydroelectric power station - the seventh stage of the upper cascade of power plants located near the border of China and Myanmar - was reduced from the original 600 to 155 MW. In addition, the function of this station was changed: from a generating station, it turned into a reservoir designed to regulate the flow to stabilize the water level in the Mekong River outside the PRC [Shabalina, 2012, p.114].

The construction of a cascade of dams in the Chinese province of Yunnan has caused another surge of interest in the planned Lower Mekong dams, as the proposed change in the flow regime of the river due to upstream dams increases the relevance of downstream dams. It is believed that the cascade of dams in China will increase the average runoff in the dry season by 10-50%, affecting mainly the territories of northern Laos and Thailand, while the runoff in the rainy season will decrease by 3-15% [Hang, 2008].

It is interesting that China itself actively promotes the construction of hydroelectric power plants by the lower Mekong countries, offering its assistance in their construction. In general, Chinese corporations develop rivers not only in Indochina, but also in Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia. By 2020 they plan to have at least 30% of HPP capacity abroad, including for importing electricity to China from neighboring countries. Of the 11 planned dams on the Lower Mekong main channel, China is ready to finance four: Pak Bang (Rak Bang, Laos, installed capacity of 1,230 MW), Pak Lay (Rak Lay, Laos, installed capacity of 1,320 MW), Sanakham (Sanakham, Laos, installed capacity of 570 MW) and Sambor (Sambor, Cambodia, installed capacity of 2600 MW). These projects are designed for both domestic consumption and export to Thailand and Vietnam [Power and responsibility, 2009, p. 11, 13]. In 2009, the Thai government estimated that electricity demand would double by 2021. The Vietnamese government predicts that the electricity demand in Vietnam will increase 4-fold by 2015 [Power and Responsibility, 2009, p. 11]. Export to China is also not excluded.

Brahmaputra River

The Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo) is another great trans-border river of Asia, descending from the mountain ranges located in China. In its lower reaches, it crosses the territory of India and Bangladesh, joins the Ganges and flows into the Bay of Bengal. Its length is 2,896 km. The river basin is located on the territory of four countries-China (50.5%), India (33.6%), Bangladesh (8.1%) and Bhutan (7.8%) [Brahmaputra...]. In the upper and middle reaches, the river has large elevation differences, which allows the development of hydropower. All planned hydroelectric power stations on the main riverbed belong to China. In India and Bangladesh, the river is mainly used for agricultural purposes, although hydroelectric power stations already exist on its tributaries and new ones are being built not only in China, but also in India and Bhutan.

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At the moment, none of the planned hydroelectric power stations have been built on the main channel. Only the Zangmu hydroelectric power station is currently under construction. Its installed capacity is 510 MW. It is one of the five mid-Brahmaputra cascade stations proposed by the Chinese government. The construction of the remaining four dams was postponed indefinitely due to environmental concerns and public protests: the situation is very similar to what is happening on the Salween River. In 2013, the State Council of the People's Republic of China included three previously postponed stations of this cascade in the new energy development plan.:

- Dagu hydroelectric power station, with a capacity of 640 MW. It is located 18 km upstream from the Jiangmu Dam;

- Jiexu Hydroelectric Power Station (510 MW), located 11 km upstream from Jiangmu;

- Jiacha Dam, also located below Tsangmu, with a capacity of 320 MW [Brahmaputra/Yarlung Tsangpo; Yarlung Tsangpo].

India, which is located downstream of the Brahmaputra, has repeatedly expressed concern about Chinese plans to develop hydropower on cross-border rivers. Large dams not only strongly affect the flow regime, its volume, but also interfere with the transportation of bottom sediments, fish migration, reduce biodiversity, etc. In response, China only declares its "responsible attitude" to transboundary runoff. The lack of open access of China's neighboring countries to the projects it plans increases the tension in these issues. The Indian government only learned about the construction of the three aforementioned dams on the Brahmaputra from the Chinese media, and not through diplomatic channels, which caused a storm of indignation in India. The Government of India protested and stated that it was necessary to provide security guarantees to its interests. In response, a representative of the Chinese Foreign Ministry assured that the construction of the stations would not complicate the fight against floods or other disasters and would not affect the ecological environment of the lower reaches [Megadams..., 2014]. There was no information about further significant steps taken by China to ensure the interests of its neighbors.

China tries not to advertise its energy plans, so sometimes the information that appears is sparse and contradictory. In particular, the press provides various data on the capacity of planned hydroelectric power plants and on the stage of their construction. Not everything is clear, for example, with two of the world's largest derivational hydroelectric power plants planned by China at Brahmaputra: Moto (Motuo, 38 GW) and Daduqia (Daduqia, 42 GW). Their size and capacity will exceed several times even the largest to date dam "Three Gorges" (18 GW). A total of 11 hydroelectric power plants (Yarlung Tsangpo) in the Brahmaputra basin in China have been pre-prepared, but little is known about most of them.

Another issue of concern for India and Bangladesh concerns the Chinese plan to move rivers from South to North. At the moment, one of the points of the plan, which implies the transfer of water from the Brahmaputra to the arid regions of the Chinese north, has been postponed due to technical problems and difficult terrain. Although there is no guarantee that China, which is used to implementing the "projects of the century", will not return to this project later under the pressure of its own needs. As a kind of "response" to these plans, India developed its own project for the transfer of rivers: some of the waters of the Brahmaputra were planned to be sent to the Ganges, and canal routes were also developed to connect 16 rivers originating in Hindustan and 14 rivers originating in the Himalayas. So far, these projects have not been implemented.

For Bangladesh, a reduction in the volume of water coming from the Brahmaputra is fraught with the same consequences as a reduction in the flow of Mekong waters for Vietnam: seawater penetration into the delta, agricultural degradation, population migration, etc.

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Amur River Basin

The sources of the Amur River (Heilongjiang) are located in the north of China. If you count from the source of the Argun River, a tributary of the Amur River in the upper reaches, the total length of the river is 4440 km; from the confluence of the Shilka and Argun rivers, the length of the Amur River is 2824 km. The river flows into the Amur estuary of the Sea of Okhotsk. The area of its basin is 1855 thousand square kilometers. The Amur basin also includes a small territory of Mongolia. The Chinese part occupies 42% of the basin area, the Russian part-49%, the rest - the Mongolian share. The Amur River passes through China for 3101 km (counting the Argun River). The largest tributaries of the river are the Zeya, Bureya, Sungari, and Ussuri. The last two tributaries are located on Chinese territory. The average annual river runoff from the Chinese territory is significantly lower than from the Russian territory (102.1 and 268.5 cubic km, respectively) [Vodno-ekologicheskie..., 2003]. At the same time, the volume of annual water consumption in the Chinese part of the basin is up to 36 cubic meters. The volume of water used per capita per year, including at the expense of agriculture, is 734.5 cubic meters/person in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, in Jilin Province this figure is almost 2.1 times lower, in Heilongjiang Province - 712.9 cubic meters./person. For comparison, in the Russian part of the basin, this indicator averages only 216 cubic meters/person per year [Ecological risks, 2010, p. 88]. The main problems of transboundary water use in the Amur basin are pollution of the river system and increasing water intake. If in the first case it is necessary to consider the "contribution" of both China and Russia, then in the second case we are talking only about the role of the PRC.

Increased attention to the quality of river waters and their control in the Amur basin occurred after an environmental emergency in November 2005 on the Sungari River. Then, as a result of explosions at a chemical factory in the Chinese province of Jilin, about 100 tons of benzene and nitrobenzene spilled into the river, which reached the Amur River [Benzol..., 2005]. Even military units were involved in the elimination of the consequences of the accident. After this incident, joint work on regulating the situation on transboundary rivers was intensified.

There are few agreements between Russia and China concerning the use of transboundary rivers. Among the multilateral agreements, only the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands can be mentioned. The main bilateral agreements appeared after the events of 2005. In 2006, an Agreement was signed between the governments of the Russian Federation and the PRC on the regime of the Russian-Chinese state border, where a separate section is devoted to border waters. Article 8 of section IV states that " the competent authorities shall take measures to protect the environment, prevent soil erosion and other negative impacts in the floodplains of border waters; take measures to ensure the cleanliness of border waters and prevent their artificial pollution. In order to control the level of pollution of border waters, the Parties, by agreement, establish standards and methods for water quality control, based on the functional features of water use in different sections of rivers" [Agreement, 2006].

In January 2008, an Agreement was signed between Russia and China "On the rational use and protection of transboundary waters". Commenting on this document, the Minister of Natural Resources of the Russian Federation Yu. Trutnev noted that now the countries "have an official information exchange channel that is mandatory on both sides," and that recently environmental protection projects in China have become a priority. The funds invested by China made it possible to "reduce the content of pollutants in transboundary water bodies by half" [Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 02.02.2008].

In November of the same year, the two countries signed a memorandum between the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People's Republic of China on the creation of a mechanism for notification and information exchange in cross-border situations.

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environmental emergencies. According to article 1 of the Memorandum, when a transboundary environmental emergency occurs, " the parties must promptly notify each other of it in an agreed format, if the threat meets the established criteria and may spread to the neighboring state."

Thus, the main mechanisms for regulating the quality of transboundary waters between Russia and China were legislated.

Now environmentalists see the main threat to the waters of the Amur River in their intensive fence on Chinese territory. Since 2007, China has allocated extensive funding for river cleaning, but at the same time it is implementing a plan to transfer the waters of the Argun River (Hailar) to Lake Baikal. The Dalai. The constructed canal started operating in 2009 [Ecological risks, 2010, p. 36]. The Chinese side refuses to provide the Russian side with any objective information about the volume of water consumption in the Argun River basin, about the water management activities carried out and planned here, calling all economic activities on this river "an internal matter of the PRC". China prefers to consider the upper part of the Argun River in the territory of the People's Republic of China (where it is called Hailar) not the source of the Argun River, but its tributary. Thus, according to the Chinese side, the Hailar River is not a transboundary river, but an internal water body of the PRC. With the help of water drawn into the Hailar - Dalai Lake Canal, China promotes the development of manufacturing in Inner Mongolia.

In order to develop the industry of Jilin Province, plans were announced at the end of 2012 to build a 635-kilometer canal to the Liao River basin from the Sungari tributaries to transfer 5.3 million cubic km per year [Ecological Risks, 2010, p. 95]. It should be noted that even in the last century, China developed a project for the transfer of rivers from north to south, in which the above-mentioned canal was only one of the points of this large-scale project.

China has other plans for the main channels of the Amur and Ussuri rivers. Since the early 2000s, China has been building canals and pumping stations to irrigate the fields of the Sanjiang Plain.

A special topic in assessing the state of the Amur basin is the overregulation of its flow by reservoirs and dams of hydroelectric power plants, both Chinese and Russian. On the Amur River tributaries from the Russian side, only two, but the largest hydroelectric power stations have been built - Zeyskaya and Bureyskaya. On the Chinese side, more than ten large hydroelectric power stations have been built or are being completed. According to the report of the National Electrification Council on the prospects for the 12th five-year plan (2011-2015), 8 more hydroelectric power plants with a total installed capacity of 8.2 GW were to be built on the main trans-border channel of the Amur River. Fortunately, so far these projects exist only on paper.

But the flood of 2013 on the Amur River provoked yet another discussion in Russia about the need for joint construction of hydroelectric power stations on the Amur tributaries with China in order to regulate floods. Moreover, we are talking about the construction of stations on Russian tributaries. The second main task of these hydroelectric power plants is to provide electricity to the Chinese provinces. The agreement signed with the Chinese corporation Sanxia (owner of the hydroelectric power station "Three Gorges") in November 2013, said the head of JSC "Rus-Hydro" Evgeny Dod [Head of "RusHydro"..., 2013]. Among the most promising stations are the already under construction Nizhnebureyskaya HPP, as well as the long-planned Nizhnezeyskaya HPP, Selemdzhinsky, Gilyuysky, and Urgalsky hydroelectric complexes [HPP on Amur..., 2014].

China also plans to build new hydroelectric power stations on its own tributaries of the Amur River. According to Russian experts, further hydroelectric development of tributaries to the PRC is no longer able to significantly increase the overall pressure on the Amur ecosystem as a whole. "Neither the degree of over-regulation of runoff, nor the degree of fragmentation, nor the area of

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reservoirs will not undergo a radical increase in China, because there is nowhere to go, " Evgeny Simonov, coordinator of the Rivers Without Borders coalition, is sure [Ecological Risks, 2010, p. 101].

Irtysh and Or rivers

The Irtysh and Ili Rivers, which originate in the mountains of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of China, also cross the borders of neighboring states. The Irtysh (called the Black Irtysh in China) flows through Kazakhstan and Russia. Its total length is 4248 km, and in China - 525 km. Its longest segment is in Russia-2010 km. The Ili River is 1,439 km long, of which 815 km flows through the territory of Kazakhstan.

China plans to build only one new hydroelectric power station on the rivers bordering Central Asia by 2015 - the Qiaobate hydroelectric power station on the Black Irtysh. But a number of other large-scale Chinese water projects are also planned in this region. These projects are linked to the development strategy of Western China, which implies the development of various industries in this territory, the mass relocation of ethnic Chinese from other areas, the expansion of irrigated agriculture and the growth of livestock production. The implementation of these plans is impossible without using the resources of cross-border rivers of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, Kazakhstan and Russia. Xinjiang's water resources provide water to only 18 million people. But now the population of the district is about 20 million people, and this figure is growing. Beijing plans to build 13 new reservoirs in XUAR. In the upper reaches of the Irtysh River, large-scale construction of irrigation and water supply systems has begun. The water intake from this river within the borders of China is planned to be increased from the already used 1.5 cubic km (according to other sources, more than 2 cubic km is already used). up to 4.6 cubic km per year (Verkhoturov, 2009; Irtysh...]. But this is not the limit. On the territory of the People's Republic of China, 9 cubic km of this river's flow is formed annually. A 300 - kilometer 22-meter-wide canal has already been built from the Black Irtysh River to the industrial city of Karamay, as well as the Irtysh-Urumqi canal. The Irtysh-Urumqi canal is aimed at supplying water to the Tarim basin, where large oil and gas deposits have been discovered. Both channels can transfer 6.3 cubic km of water per year at maximum capacity. A from R. Or the construction of the canal continues in the direction of the western part of the Tarim Depression, which is rich in natural resources. The water intake from the Ili River, which provides 70-80% of the water inflow to Balkhash, is still 3.5 cubic kilometers per year within the PRC, but it will also be increased.

The implementation of planned large-scale hydro projects in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China is already leading to a decrease in the flow of transboundary rivers in Kazakhstan and Russia. As a result, agriculture in the north-east of Kazakhstan suffers; several large cities located on these rivers - Kazakhstan's Ust-Kamenogorsk, Semipalatinsk, Pavlodar, and Russia's Omsk - feel a decrease in water levels; the flow of water to the Irtysh-Karaganda canal has decreased; lake shallowing, salinization, and pollution occur. Balkhash, which feeds the Ili River, and oz. Zaisan, which feeds on the waters of the Irtysh. The flow of the Irtysh River in Russia today has decreased by 3 times compared to the data of the late 1990s, and the river has lost its ability to self-purify, and the water intakes of Omsk were already in critical condition in 2008 [Alova, 2008]. Shallowing affects both shipping and the agricultural sector of the Russian Federation. To date, they are trying to combat this problem by building the Krasnogorsk hydroelectric complex. It is designed to regulate the water level in the Irtysh River in Omsk.

In Kazakhstan, the situation is slightly better. The water that used to feed the regions of Kazakhstan and Russia is now being taken away by the Chinese side for the needs of industrial development in their north-western provinces. Reduced water intake has a negative impact on-

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It is also used in the hydroelectric power industry of Kazakhstan. After all, the Bukhtarma HPP, Ust-Kamenogorsk HPP and Shulba HPP are located on the Irtysh River, supplying energy to the largest industrial regions of Kazakhstan. On p. Or the Kapchagai hydroelectric power station is located, which supplies electricity to the south of Kazakhstan and to the largest city of the republic - Almaty (Dushebaev, 2009). Even now, when China's water intake from the Irtysh River is 15%, the cascade of Irtysh hydroelectric power plants in Kazakhstan cannot generate the necessary amount of electricity. At the same time, we must not forget that the hydroelectric power stations themselves have a negative impact on the state of the rivers downstream. Environmentalists have special complaints about the Kapchagai hydroelectric power station, which made a significant contribution to the shallowing of Balkhash. Chinese projects only make the situation worse.

The Chinese leadership simply does not want to hear protests from Kazakhstan and Russia. As an example, the Agreement on the Rational Use and Protection of Transboundary Waters, which the Governments of China and Russia concluded in 2008, is constantly violated by the Chinese side. Moreover, China's neighbors cannot influence it even from the standpoint of international water law, since China has not yet signed the Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes. Without signing this convention, which implies the adoption of clear obligations to minimize damage to water bodies, it is difficult to agree on a reasonable and equitable division of the waters of a transboundary river basin. And China prefers to talk less about the very possibility of such a division. The Chinese leadership also refuses to sign the International Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. Another factor that deprives Kazakhstan and Russia of leverage over their eastern neighbor is the fundamental unwillingness of the PRC to enter into multilateral negotiations on cross - border rivers. China does not allow the Russian side to participate in its negotiations with Kazakhstan on the Irtysh, explaining that the water from its territory crosses the Kazakh border, and not the Russian one. The Chinese leadership recognizes only the bilateral format, as this form of negotiations makes its position on water issues almost insurmountable.

Despite the fact that the Kazakh-Chinese negotiations on cross-border rivers have been going on for the second decade (since 1998), there are no significant successes of the Kazakh side. This problem is faced not only by Kazakhstan. China manages to ignore the interests of all its neighbors. Delaying negotiations at the same time does not mean suspending Chinese projects that are being systematically implemented.

The agreement reached in 2011 on the joint sharing of resources of the Ili and Irtysh transboundary rivers by the end of 2014 may be considered evidence of at least some progress in bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and China. It is expected that a binding agreement for all its participants on the sharing of these resources will finally be signed in 2015. But until this agreement is reached, Beijing is free to dispose of cross-border rivers with Kazakhstan at its own discretion. There is nothing the Kazakh leadership can do to counteract this. The intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation in the Use and Protection of Transboundary Rivers, signed in September 2001, does not contain any obligations other than the obligation to "take appropriate measures and make efforts to prevent or mitigate possible serious damage as a result of flood disasters and man-made accidents to the other Party" [Agreement..., 2001, Article 3]. registered. The issue of reducing runoff is not included in the agreement at all, and there are no mechanisms for compensation of damage, even in relation to the problems mentioned in this document. Moreover, the agreement contains a clause limiting the partner country's interference in the neighbor's water policy. Article 4 reads as follows: "Neither party restricts the other party to the rational use of the Internet, No. 2

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use and protect the water resources of transboundary rivers, taking into account mutual interests "[Agreement..., 2001]. So, bilateral agreements and international water law are not an argument that can be counted on in negotiations with China, if this argument is not supported by other levers of influence, in particular by force. In their absence, only the option of mutually beneficial exchange remains. But so far, even this tactic is not bearing fruit. In 2007, Kazakhstan offered China a preferential 10-year contract for food supplies to China in exchange for an increase in the flow of rivers to Balkhash, but Beijing rejected this deal (Bologoe, 2013). Objective reality shows that water withdrawal from China's cross-border rivers will only increase, and nothing can stop this process.

However, the Chinese side insists that not everything is so bad and that it respects the interests of its neighbors. According to Zhang Zhong, director of the Center for Research in Science and Technology under the XUAR Government of the People's Republic of China, in Xinjiang over the past years, all measures have been taken to eliminate the possibility of water pollution, water-polluting enterprises have been closed and construction of any residential or economic facilities in coastal zones has been prohibited. In addition, the flow of water containing mineral fertilizers from sown fields into the rivers was completely prevented. Thus, now in the territory of the XUAR, according to the Chinese side, there is not a single enterprise whose activities could pollute the rivers [Cross-border..., 2008]. The expert also explained that all water protection measures in Xinjiang include three areas: preserving and increasing the area of forest areas along rivers, restoring the density of grass cover, and solving the problem of pastoral settlements [Cross-border..., 2008]. Moreover, water-saving technologies in the field of irrigation are actively used in the XUAR: narrow concrete ditches, the use of drip irrigation under a film, irrigation of fields using a soft pipeline, sprinkling. All this allows you to save up to 50% of water compared to conventional methods of irrigation of fields. At the same time, the volume of agricultural crops increased by an average of 20% [Cross-border..., 2008]. According to the Chinese side, water intake from transboundary rivers for their own needs in Xinjiang does not exceed 12% of the flow [Transborder..., 2008].

As far as this corresponds to reality, it is necessary to judge the Kazakh and Russian sides on the fact of increasing water problems. There is a faint hope that the 2015 agreement on dividing the waters of transboundary rivers between Kazakhstan and China will contain strict obligations and a separate clause on ecological runoff that preserves the river ecosystem.

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