The military thought of ancient China can rightly be considered an integral part of the global culture. Born in an autochthonous cultural and historical environment, it absorbed the best achievements of social thought of its time. In addition, this area of knowledge in Ancient China during the era of continuous wars, especially in the period of Chunqiu ("Spring and Autumn" of the VIII - V centuries BC) and Zhanguo ("Fighting Kingdoms") (V - III centuries BC), itself had a considerable influence on public thought. The military thought of Ancient China is characterized by: understanding the internal, hidden laws of war; considering war in all its manifestations in an indissoluble connection with nature and society; achieving political goals primarily by non-military means. The latter quality has not only not lost, but also increased its relevance in the era of weapons of mass destruction. Military thought, being an integral part of the culture of the ancient Chinese, reveals their spiritual nature and worldview in its own way. Its study makes it possible to better understand the modern military-political doctrines of China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, which, undoubtedly, were influenced by ancient Chinese military thought due to the continuity of traditions of these countries. The last two circumstances were particularly highlighted by Academician N. I. Konrad, whose work on this topic, unfortunately, is still largely misunderstood and not appreciated. This article attempts to fill this gap, argue with a number of authors about the value of Academician N. I. Konrad's contribution to this field of knowledge, and most importantly - to elaborate on the most important and relevant aspects of his research.

Interest in the military thought of ancient China was actualized in our country primarily due to the appearance of in-depth research by American scientists in this area, when after the defeat in the Vietnam War, they focused on achieving political goals by non-military means. In the future, with the disappearance of the dictates of Marxist-Leninist ideology in our country, it became possible to turn to the cultural world heritage, including ancient Chinese military thought, without any previous biases and restrictions, the study of which can make a very important contribution to military and political philosophy and to the formation of a new Russian geopolitics.

It is significant that academician N. I. Konrad turned to the study of the military thought of Ancient China much earlier, in the middle of the last century, in two of his works - in translations-studies of the treatises of Sun Tzu (1950) and Wu Tzu (1958). He began his work during the period of victory euphoria over Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan. What made N. I. Konrad turn to ancient Chinese military thought at this time? What can an ancient Chinese teach the victors of the World War of the twentieth century? Many of the provisions of the treatise that interested N. I. Konrad were incomprehensible to military specialists of that time, and some were simply ridiculous. Soviet readers were already familiar with Sun Tzu's treatise, which was translated into Russian by L. Giles [Giles, 1910] at the suggestion of the Department of the History of Military Art of the Voroshilov Higher Military Academy in 1943. It is unlikely that at that time it was dictated by a simple cognitive or scientific interest, rather it was one of the forms of implementation of the slogan " Everything for the front, everything for victory!".

What relevance and practical necessity did N. I. Konrad see in publishing his work after the victory in the Great Patriotic War? First of all, we note that in the Chinese tradition, the attitude to victory is very cautious: it is recommended to meet it with a "funeral march" ("Tao te Ching", ch. 31). If you win many times, you end up losing,

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because winning is very expensive. A victory is all the more devalued if it is paid for with too expensive material and human resources. It is no coincidence that N. I. Konrad pays special attention to the provisions of the treatise on "victory-defeat" and"benefit-harm". He refers to them as the most relevant at that time and, following the ancient Chinese authors, warns his readers against the ecstasy of victory - the winner becomes arrogant, causes envy in other states and thirst for revenge in the vanquished.

Approaching his work as an Orientalist, N. I. Konrad notes at the same time that he would not like to do "work of a highly specialized sinological nature... since he addresses first of all to a military specialist in general, to a historian of military-theoretical thought " [Konrad, 1995, p. 11]. He specifically emphasizes that the treatise of Sun Tzu was part of the military education system in most countries of the Confucian culture, and draws the attention of his readers - military specialists. Moreover, this is what led N. I. Konrad, as he admits, to undertake the study of this ancient monument [Konrad, 1995, p. 12]. In other words, the scientist saw the value and purpose of his work in its military-special aspect.

N. I. Konrad does not consider in his work the attitude of European military specialists to Sun Tzu and other Chinese military classic treatises; he tactfully avoids this side of the issue, not considering himself an authority in the military field. However, it was probably a number of their misconceptions and the limitations of their work in this area that prompted him to create his own research. N. I. Konrad, apparently, set out to convey the ancient Chinese military thought to the understanding of modern military specialists, to expand their horizons, to expand the scope of their worldview based on traditions and dogmas, which in their own way are necessary for them as a basis and core, but because of this, they are somewhat limited.

A military person is likely to find in his works many shortcomings, inaccuracies of a private nature, notice the author's lack of military education and recognize him as incompetent on many purely military issues. Although it is noticeable that N. I. Konrad to a certain extent studied the specialized literature and in his research freely operates in military terms, explaining the idea of Sun Tzu in a language that is understandable for the military. But unlike military researchers who look at Chinese military thought through the prism of European military (and only military) theory, he approaches such a complex topic differently - as a research scientist with a deep and comprehensive knowledge of traditional Chinese history, culture and philosophy. Because of this, some of the shortcomings of N. I. Konrad's work turn into its advantages, and one can only regret that, having translated and commented on the treatises of Sun Tzu and Wu Tzu, he could not or did not have time to conduct equally full-fledged studies of the works of other ancient Chinese military authors.

Speaking about the specifics of Sun Tzu's treatise, due to which it is quite widely known, N. I. Konrad emphasized: "Many of its general provisions have always been easily transferred from the field of war to the field of politics and diplomacy. Therefore, the treatise of Sun Tzu has a certain significance for understanding the actions of not only military figures, but also politicians of the mentioned countries of the Far East (China, Korea, Japan - R. Z.), and moreover not only in remote historical times" [Konrad, 1995, p. 9].

For military specialists, this treatise itself is not the goal of knowledge, it is for them only a means by which they judge the usefulness and correctness of the ancient author's understanding of military science, often biased, finding great shortcomings next to ingenious guesses.

N. I. Konrad calls his work on it" historical and philological", although he emphasizes that he addresses his research to specialists in the field of military theory [Konrad, 1995, pp. 12-13]. In this work, N. I. Konrad pursues two main goals: 1) to understand and evaluate the teaching contained in the extant text in the light of its epoch and environment (this task is mainly devoted to the analytical part of his work - "commentary") and 2) to see in the teaching set forth in the treatise a certain system of views, even if not always clearly stated, but behind which Nevertheless, a certain worldview is hidden [Konrad, 1995, p. 25].

A general description of this system is given by N. I. Konrad in the chapter "The Military Doctrine of Sun Tzu". In the same chapter, an attempt is made to find out some general philosophical foundations of the ancient Chinese doctrine of war. In his opinion, they were laid down in the canonical text of the Book of Changes ("I Ching") and their development takes place in accordance with the further development of the concept

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N. I. Konrad notes that such a task in the history of studying Sun Tzu before him was not set by anyone [Konrad, 1995, p. 12]. A huge historical and ideological barrier separates us from the treatise of Sun Tzu, hence the difficulties of understanding the treatise and ancient Chinese military thought in general by people of different eras and traditions. Therefore, N. I. Konrad also speaks about the special role of the commentator, so that readers can better understand this treatise or, as he puts it, "open the thought of Sun Tzu" [Konrad, 1995, p.9]. To comment on Sun Tzu, N. I. Konrad uses the works of the "Seven Books" ¹ (he puts it on a par with the Confucian "Pentateuch" and "Four Books"), which reveal in their own way some of the provisions of Sun Tzu, the works of other Chinese commentators and one Japanese-Ogyu Sorai. The task of the scholar was also to avoid falling under the influence of the concept of any one of the commentators of the treatise, since each such concept reflects the personality of the commentator himself and his era. He also sought to understand the thought of Sun Tzu adequately to his era and his social environment, whose interests and aspirations he represented [Konrad, 1995, p. I].

The first question that N. I. Konrad asks in the chapter "The Military Doctrine of Sun Tzu" is: what is war for Sun Tzu? War is a struggle. He believes that this is how Sun Tzu understands the nature of war, sees all its content in the struggle. The struggle in war is not inherently different from any struggle in general conducted by non-military means. Sun Tzu puts the struggle of war on the same level as the struggle of diplomacy and politics. This is not the case, according to Conrad, when it comes to preference and significance: "The best war is to defeat the enemy's plans; in the next place - to break his alliances; in the next place-to break his troops..."[Konrad, 1995, p. 246]. N. I. Konrad tries to explain what caused this classification of war in Sun Tzu. The struggle is for gain, and getting gain is winning [ibid.]. Sun Tzu considers the achievement of political goals by military action to be the "worst war", because victory is achieved at the cost of too many losses, and therefore such a war is unprofitable.

benefit

The further course of Conrad's reasoning revolves around the concept of "benefit" in the light of the teachings of Sun Tzu and in the interpretations of his commentators. For Sun Tzu, the goal of war is not victory; victory is not necessary in itself, it is only a means to gain benefits. Sun Tzu considers the very word "benefit" to be the most convenient, since it equally accurately defines the purpose of war in general, and the purpose of every action taken in war [Konrad, 1995, p.247].

N. I. Konrad, investigating the "multi-faceted nature of profit", also comes to the conclusion that in Sun Tzu, profit is not only an end, but also a means. The enemy also fights for profit, and profit is the goal of his actions. And if so, then by controlling its goal, you can also control its actions. This means that you need to be able to turn the goal of your enemy into a means for yourself. According to N. I. Konrad, Sun Tzu bases his teaching on luring, enticing the enemy, and forcing him to perform certain actions (Konrad, 1995, p. 247).

Thus, following the chain of logical constructions of Sun Tzu's treatise, N. I. Konrad comes close to the highest achievement of ancient Chinese strategy, and for us - in the era of weapons of mass destruction - and the most valuable position. We are talking about the achievement of political goals mainly by non-military means, which in the teachings of Sun Tzu, according to N. I. Konrad, is explained by purely utilitarian and rational, and not at all by humanistic considerations. War is the most difficult form of struggle, and therefore the least profitable and most dangerous. Here again, profit comes first: it is more profitable to capture the enemy's country without ruining it; it is better to subdue the enemy's army without destroying it.-

¹ The authors of the" Seven Books of the Military Canon " were finally selected under the Sung dynasty at the end of the XI century. According to the traditional chronology, starting from the oldest, these treatises are arranged as follows: "Sun Tzu "(Chunqiu, VI-V centuries BC); "Wu Tzu" (Zhanguo, IV century BC); "Sima fa" (Zhanguo, IV century BC); "Wei Liao-tzu" (Zhanguo, IV century BC); "Liu Tao" (Wei-Jin, III - IV centuries AD); "San lue" (Sui, VI - VII centuries AD); "Li Wei-gong wendui" (Tang, VII century AD). ad).

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Well, saving her. Because at the same time, you can get the opportunity to dispose of both its manpower and its material resources [Konrad, 1995, p.248].

N. I. Konrad identifies in the teachings of Sun Tzu two reasons why a ruler may or may not start a war. This is a benefit and a danger, in other words - a carrot and a stick. It is important to understand that this does not mean liberation or defensive wars (the motivations here are quite different!). We are talking about a rational guide to action: advice and wishes to the aggressor who wants to take over a foreign country, and warnings and advice on how to avoid such a war for the one against whom the aggression is directed. In this theory, there is simply no place for any idealistic considerations: the concepts of humane or, on the contrary, anti-humane motives are completely excluded (all only from the point of view of profit!).

In general, humanistic motives for starting a war are good (and necessary!) as a pretext and as an external consecration of this war in the minds of the masses. This refers to such a phenomenon of war, according to Sun Tzu's classification, as "The Way". ("The way is when they reach the point where the thoughts of the people are the same as the thoughts of the ruler, when the people are ready to die with him, ready to live with him, when they know neither fear nor doubt.") The commander cannot ignore this with a sober and cold mind, but all his actions must be strictly subordinated to considerations of profit.

Guided by the same preponderance of profit, Sun Tzu warns against a prolonged war. In addition to undermining the economic basis of the state and impoverishing the population, it can also lead to internal political complications, discontent in the state and in the army, and a weakening of the latter's combat power and morale. To avoid this, according to his teaching, it is possible to have a good comprehensive preparation for war, and in the course of it-through plunder- " to feed at the expense of the enemy." But the main thing is that the war should be carried out as quickly as possible. N. I. Konrad notes that Sun - tzu here thinks primarily as an economist [Konrad, 1995, pp. 250-251].

According to V. M. Stein, for Sun Tzu, profit is the same supreme principle as justice or humanity is for a Confucian. All Sun Tzu's constructions, in his opinion, contradict the main Confucian principle - to base everything on humanity. For him, war is a path of deception [Stein, 1961, p. 41]. V. M. Stein believes that Wu Tzu is much closer to Confucianism than Sun Tzu, since his Confucian ideas of moral duty and humanity are combined with typically legist calculations about the importance of the talent of a commander, military art, and organization for victory over the enemy [Stein, 1961, p. 44].

O. V. Zotov believes that under the category of benefits in the treatise under study is the very survival of society, and war, according to Sun Tzu, is the ultimo ratio of politics. As a means, it is the least profitable and most dangerous. In the absence of benefits, it is contraindicated, in the presence-its tightening is contraindicated [Zotov, 1986, p. 18].

In these assessments of Sun Tzu's teaching, the material aspect that prevails in it again comes to the fore. The author of the treatise is seen here as a dry pragmatist, the" romance " of war is absolutely alien to him, like other military classics and commentators. Their works can be roughly compared to textbooks, where reasoning and thoughts are extremely dry and rational and are presented mainly in the form of instructions; and everything else can be attributed to emotions, lyrics and poetry. Romance is generally unreliable, it disappears in the first hours when you meet with the necessary and inevitable routine in any business. Although at first it plays its role as an incentive, helping to take on any business at all. Sun Tzu gives extremely realistic and practical advice and recommendations to those who have taken up the task. Symbolically, they can be represented as a triad: schemes-scales - abacuses. A very important question: who schematizes, weighs, and counts? That is why Sun Tzu pays such attention to the personality of the commander.

If the romance of war can be attributed to the rage and greed inherent in warriors, then the commander is obliged to put these qualities on the scales with his cold mind. In addition, he must be strict, so that his orders are carried out without question. N. I. Konrad emphasizes that Sun Tzu always demands intelligence from the commander, and asks the question: what exactly means should the commander resort to to manipulate the army? According to Sun Tzu, such means are the instincts of rage and greed. The commander must play on these instincts: awaken in his soldiers the spirit of rage and the spirit of greed. Then they will fight and plunder.

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According to N. I. Konrad, the fact that Sun Tzu puts greed next to rage characterizes the aggressive nature of these wars, when the only possible incentive for soldiers was profit [Konrad, 1995, p. 71]. He further elaborates on the use of human qualities based on Zhang Yu's comments. They set out the rules for using people. It consists in the following: you need to use the greed of one, the stupidity of another, the intelligence of a third, the courage of a fourth. We need to assign everyone according to their natural properties and not demand from people what they can not give. N. I. Konrad notes that all these qualities - both positive and negative-when evaluated from the point of view of a commander are neither positive nor negative. He is interested and important only in the" power " that can be extracted from all these qualities [Konrad, 1995, p. 116].

Thus, the main essence of Sun Tzu's teaching about the art of war, as N. I. Konrad understands it, is efficiency with the dominance of profit. The scientist emphasizes that in Sun Tzu, all strategic calculations are subordinated to the concept of profit, and profit directs all tactics [Konrad, 1995, p. 247]. Sun Tzu's calculations, learned in accordance with the benefits, in his opinion, will create a power that will go far beyond the general provisions. These calculations will make it possible to find the necessary paths in all variants of the military situation, with all changes in the combat situation [Konrad, 1995, p. 57]. So, concluding the discussion about the concept of profit in Sun Tzu in the interpretation of N. I. Konrad, we can say that such an important combat component as the power of the army and its combat potential is built around it.

WARLORD

According to Sun Tzu's classification, there are five phenomena of war: the Way, the Sky, the Earth, the Commander, and the Law. As it was shown above, the course of reasoning about the benefits leads the researcher directly to the personality of the commander. It is not by chance that N. I. Konrad paid primary attention to him. After all, the treatise itself is primarily intended for him. To the commander, i.e., in other words, to the military specialist, the scientist addresses his research.

N. I. Konrad, quoting Sun Tzu, emphasizes that a good commander is "a treasure for the state", "the ruler of the destinies of the people", "the master of the security of the state". That is why Sun Tzu makes very high demands on the commander, and first of all regarding his personal qualities. First of all, he insists on the need to have five qualities: intelligence, impartiality, humanity, courage, and rigor [Konrad, 1995, p.252-253].

N. I. Konrad emphasizes that all these qualities are good when they exist together, complement and control each other. At the same time, he quotes the opinion of commentator Jia Lin: "If you have only intelligence, you will become a robber; if you are guided only by humanity, you will get stagnation; if you adhere only to truthfulness, you will get stupidity; if you rely only on courage and strength, you will get violence; if you are too strict, you will get cruelty. You need to have all five qualities... " [Konrad, 1995, p. 54].

N. I. Konrad believes that it is not by chance that of all the qualities of a commander, Sun Tzu puts intelligence in the first place, while humanity is only in the third place. He explains this clearly non-Confucian approach by saying that Sun Tzu does not bind himself to a stencil scheme, but rather freely handles concepts according to the specifics of his field. And if we follow these specifics, then we must admit that a commander first of all needs intelligence [Konrad, 1995, p. 53]. Indeed, without this quality, he will not be able to conduct training, make calculations, plan the course of the war, or use spies. But let's go back to the list of five qualities that Sun Tzu believed a general should have-intelligence, impartiality, humanity, courage, and rigor - and try to analyze them more closely.

The central place among these five qualities is occupied precisely by humanity, and the central one means that it is far from the last in the ancient Chinese worldview. This central quality of the commander seems to balance the rest, brings them to harmony. Especially those qualities that are on Sun Tzu's list at opposite poles, such as intelligence and rigor. The ancient Chinese worldview had its own logic, which was reflected in the "doctrine of symbols and numbers".

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Here, for example, is how N. I. Chuev argues, assessing the place of military affairs among eight other state affairs. In this list, military affairs takes the last place. But from the point of view of the" doctrine of symbols and numbers", the enumeration of eight points is a classification scheme similar to the eight trigrams. The classification scheme is a cognitive tool, a way of ordering objects and phenomena around a person, and in it the extreme does not mean the worst; the extreme is the ultimate expression of the entire sequence [Chuev, 1999, p.153]. Further, N. I. Chuev supports his idea with an argument that is impeccable from the point of view of European logic: "If we consider military affairs to be the worst, then we will have to recognize food as the best (it is in the first place in this list. - R. Z.). And food will be even more significant than sacrificing to our ancestors, which we can hardly agree with" [Chuev, 1999, p. 154].

In general, in our opinion, in such a harmonious and integral work as the treatise of Sun Tzu, every phrase, every phenomenon and character stand in their place and perform their specific role and function. This treatise has been researched and studied for many centuries, and it still puzzles researchers more than it answers.

Many authors who have studied the treatise of Sun Tzu note as a characteristic feature of the commander his independence and isolation from the ruler. The peculiarity of the ancient Chinese worldview is to see two principles in the state: civil and military. They are interconnected and separate, one is not substituted for the other. The commander assumes all powers in the military sphere and all responsibility for victory and defeat. Here the ruler will not appropriate the laurels of the commander, and the commander will not take it into his head to blame the ruler. After all, Sun Tzu explicitly states that if the commander considers it necessary, then the ruler's orders regarding the military sphere may not be carried out.

CIVIL AND MILITARY

N. I. Konrad, using the texts of the commentaries, reveals "a new and important aspect of the political philosophy of that time", namely, the distinction between the ancient Chinese civilization of the institute of the army and the institute of the state. To confuse them, according to Sun-tzu, means not to know what the army is. N. I. Konrad connects this position with the opposition of two principles in the life of human society - civil and military-characteristic of later Chinese thought. It was believed that only the combination and interaction of these two principles make society complete. But in order to ensure this full-fledged nature, it is necessary that they always remain opposites. N. I. Konrad notes that here the tendency characteristic of the entire worldview of the ancient Chinese to find opposite principles everywhere and see in their interaction the main content of the phenomena of the physical world and the social world appears [Konrad, 1995, p. 87]. He quotes from Wei Liao-tzu's commentary: "The civic principle is that by which one sees where there is benefit and where there is harm, and distinguishes between well-being and danger. The military principle is that by means of which they repel a strong enemy and make the offensive and defense powerful" [Konrad, 1995, p. 181].

З. G. Lapina, comparing the treatises of Li Gou and Sun Tzu, comes to the conclusion that the" main "(civil) and" secondary " (military) are so named in Li Gou not because the former is more important than the latter, but because the carrier of the former is higher in position than the carrier of the latter [Lapina, 1985, p. 64]. It seems to me that the hierarchy of civil and military media in the worldview of the ancient Chinese is a consequence of higher and objective laws, and not a cause. Otherwise, it turns out that these carriers should just mechanically switch places - and "the tail will turn the dog" (Military theorist A. Toporkov believes that only politics has the right to take the supreme position, from which the main lines directing the war should proceed. Therefore, the art of war becomes politics at its highest point (Toporkov, 1927, p. 24).) Each medium has its own function and clearly defined role. If the usurping commander seizes power, he will be forced to assume the functions of a civil carrier. Otherwise, he will ruin his state. This is clearly stated in the treatise of Wu Tzu.

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HEAVEN AND EARTH

N. I. Konrad considers the sky as a phenomenon in the treatise of Sun Tzu in the context of weather conditions, astrology and divination. He emphasizes that, according to Li Wei-gong's commentary, astrology exists for the ignorant, but the enlightened general does not consider it. It is characteristic that in the treatise of Wu-tzu, divination is allowed as a kind of propaganda tool and rejected as a guide for military leaders. Sun Tzu is also extremely negative about divination [Konrad, 1995, p. 49]. This is despite the fact that, according to the views of the ancient Chinese, the sky and human society are in a relationship of domination and subordination, and celestial phenomena and luminaries were called "heavenly officials"; they had their own hierarchy and their precisely defined functions, being the leaders of destinies [Konrad, 1995, p. 48]. N. I. Konrad pays even less attention to other phenomena of the universe: he reduces the phenomenon of "Earth" to geographical conditions [Konrad, 1995, p. 50], and the phenomenon of "Law" to a set of rules concerning three things: the military system, the command of the army, and its supply [Konrad, 1995, p. 54].

FULLNESS AND EMPTINESS

N. I. Konrad believes that the doctrine of fullness and emptiness as the two foundations of all strategy and tactics reveals the same picture as the doctrine of nature and life. The laws of war are their reflection. Consequently, for Sun Tzu, the art of war obeys the general laws of life [Konrad, 1995, p. 136]. N. I. Konrad quotes from the" Dialogues "of Li Wei-gong regarding their importance:" Tai-tsung said: "I've read all sorts of martial arts essays, and none of them go beyond Sun Tzu. In all the 13 chapters of Sun Tzu, nothing goes beyond the teaching of fullness and emptiness "[Konrad, 1995, p. 110].

N. I. Konrad notes that in Sun Tzu the concepts of fullness and emptiness are also in the relations of opposites, which can pass into each other. Fullness and emptiness in oneself, and they are also in the enemy, these are not absolute concepts, fullness can turn into emptiness and vice versa. Skilful use of correct combat and maneuver techniques makes it possible to turn an opponent's strong position into a weak one [Konrad, 1995, p. 111]. We are talking about a very important ability to control the enemy. Sun Tzu defines a proper battle as a frontal offensive according to all the rules, without tricks. A maneuver is a false offensive or retreat, a blow to the rear, to the flanks, ambushes, etc. N. I. Konrad believes that Sun Tzu considers these two techniques as elements that are mutually conjugated, flowing from each other and inexhaustible [Konrad, 1995, p. 106].

Every rule is oriented to something permanent, existing only in one or another of its modifications, in one or another change. The main task of the commander here, according to Sun Tzu, is to apply the rule accordingly to these changes [Konrad, 1995, p. 58]. Here we are talking about the ever-burning topic for the military about the relationship and interdependence of the adopted rules and the real situation. This topic was especially vividly discussed by European military authors in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Fullness and emptiness are closely related to strength and weakness, but they are not synonymous. Interpreting Sun Tzu, N. I. Konrad likens" fullness "to a stone, and" emptiness " to an egg, because ideally the latter characterizes a blow with his fullness to the emptiness of the opponent as a blow with a stone to an egg [Konrad, 1995, p. 109, 111].

shape

It is important not to let the opponent know where you have the right fight, and where the maneuver is, where the "fullness" is, and where the "emptiness"is. Sun Tzu defines war as a path of deception. The armed forces take on a very specific form. According to it, the enemy judges everything and makes decisions. N. I. Konrad pays great attention to the teachings of Sun Tzu on form. A false display of one's uniform has the main specific goal of distracting the enemy's attention from its weak, vulnerable points and directing it to strong points [Konrad, 1995, p. 132]. N. I. Konrad defines the concept of "form" in Sun Tzu as the state of the army corresponding to the conditions of war. This is the position of invincibility and the possibility of winning, the highest achievement of the organization of the army, its combat readiness-

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its adaptability to all changes in the combat situation [Konrad, 1995, p. 99-100, 133]. He especially emphasizes Sun Tzu's highest demand for a general-the most difficult and at the same time covering all his other requirements. The meaning of this requirement is that the highest limit in achieving a form is its absence [Konrad, 1995, p. 133]. N. I. Konrad specifically emphasizes that it is not the concealment of the form, but its absence. If the enemy can't see the shape by simple means, they will turn to intelligence. Even if she can't see anything, a clever and astute general will still recognize her by a number of subtle signs. Therefore, Conrad concludes, Sun Tzu does not mean concealing, but destroying the form (Conrad, 1995, pp. 133-134).

O. V. Zotov believes that neither N. I. Konrad nor his predecessors - the Chinese and Japanese medieval commentators Sun Tzu-managed to reveal the secret of form [Zotov, 1987, p. 15]. In his opinion, the commander hides the form of his troops from the enemy with the help of mobile detachments. They act as a "bamboo curtain" - mobile, not continuous, but also impenetrable. Then the actions of the troops are unpredictable for the enemy, faced with a fan of alternative threats [Zotov, 1988, p. 115-116]. This opinion seems to me controversial, and the disclosure of the concept of "form" in N. I. Konrad is one of the best and most successful in his research, he looks at this problem more broadly than O. V. Zotov, who also believes that N. I. Konrad does not see the difference between the words of Sun Tzu " burn people"and" burn detachments" [Zotov, 1994, p. 87]. I would like to object that, on the contrary, N. I. Konrad very clearly distinguishes between these concepts: "burning people" is the burning of the enemy's people in general, both soldiers and the population; "burning detachments" is a fire attack on the army, i.e. on the enemy's camp [Konrad, 1995, p. 224, 303]. Whether this interpretation is correct is another matter. You can argue about that. According to O. V. Zotov, we are talking here about "burning" the enemy not in the material sense, but in the spiritual sense [Zotov, 1994, p. 93].

THE LAW OF CHANGE AND TRANSFORMATION

N. I. Konrad considers the law of changes and transformations to be the central idea of Sun Tzu's entire strategy [Konrad, 1995, p. 267]. In his opinion, this is indicated by many provisions of the treatise and the course of reasoning of the Chinese classic. All phenomena in war, as in nature, turn into each other. It is very important, according to N. I. Konrad, to master the process of changes and transformations, to turn it to your service. The process of change and transformation was the content of all existence in the Chinese worldview. That is why Sun Tzu calls the person who mastered this process a "deity" (Konrad, 1995, p.271).

N. I. Konrad shows the course of Sun Tzu's reasoning and gives his argumentation, which is largely unexpected for a person of Western culture. N. I. Konrad notes that Sun Tzu, true to the course of his thinking, even here refuses to consider these three phenomena as certain self-sufficient quantities, but puts them in connection with their opposites - disorder, cowardice and weakness, thus emphasizing the importance of self-determination. It is shown that these categories, which are opposite in meaning, in fact come from one another: "disorder is born out of order, cowardice is born out of courage, weakness is born out of strength" (Konrad, 1995, p.113).

Drawing on the text of commentator August Sorai, N. I. Konrad explains why this is happening. The order can be pushed to its limit, to the highest degree. Naturally, this leads to an overestimation of the meaning of this order: it becomes a kind of absolute beginning. Such an attitude to order inevitably entails disregard for all other parties. But once there is a disregard for everything else, then the order is threatened and usually collapses, turns into a mess. So it is with strength and weakness. A force that has become a single value, an absolute, is no longer a strength, but a weakness. The same can be said about bravery and cowardice [Konrad, 1995, pp. 113-114].

N. I. Konrad does not stop there and continues to argue further. He believes that the connection of these opposite qualities in Sun Tzu finds its expression in a certain synthesis: "Order and disorder are numbers; bravery and cowardice are power; strength and weakness are form." N. I. Konrad understands the number as a part, i.e. a division - it is the basis of the order of battle. It is it that is the bearer of these two opposites, which are realized in the processes of-

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ce of the functioning of the divisions themselves as such. In the same vein, N. I. Konrad reveals the concepts of "power" and"form". Power contains both opposites-both courage and cowardice, which are realized - either one or the other - depending on the situation. Form is the state of the army, its ability to fully match the situation of war. But the degree of this ability determines the strength of the army and its weakness. Therefore, the form contains both [Konrad, 1995, p. 114].

In the course of his research, N. I. Konrad applies the conceptual and logical apparatus inherent in the authors of these ancient treatises and rooted, as he believes, in the "I Ching" ("Book of Changes"). He expresses the course of his thoughts and reasoning in an adapted form that is understandable for the modern European reader, in many ways breaking down his usual ideas, forcing him to rethink a lot and look at a lot with different eyes.

A characteristic feature of the most authoritative Sun Tzu commentators mentioned by N. I. Konrad is their lack of criticism in our understanding of the word. You will not find the assessments of ancient authors inherent in European thinking: "I misunderstood something", "I underestimated something". All of them only reveal, interpret and supplement the provisions of the treatise of Sun Tzu. The same can be said for the entire tradition of commentary in China.

Sun Tzu's treatise has survived all the dynastic changes, all the revaluations of values, all the upheavals and revolutions in China, including the "cultural"one. It is carefully studied and studied, and not only by military figures. In cases of failures and defeats, the blame is not on the classical treatise, but on themselves - "they did not finish learning", "they did not understand" and "they did not learn" something by descendants, and not by Sun Tzu, whose authority is unquestionable. It is hardly correct to explain this fact by the stagnation of Chinese thinking and their blind reverence for traditions, but rather by the fact that the level of the treatise is really very high.

Nor do we find a single word of criticism in N. I. Konrad's work about any of the provisions of Sun Tzu's treatise, and this, of course, is not due to his lack of critical thinking. Nor can it be said that the scientist "blindly" follows the commentators "called" to help him. N. I. Konrad highly appreciates the treatise of Sun Tzu. Paying tribute to other treatises of the "Seven Books", especially Wu Tzu, he believes that none of them has the fullness and integrity that is present in the teachings of Sun Tzu [Konrad, 1995, p.277]. It is noteworthy that N. I. Konrad in his research does not stand on either the Eurocentric, Marxist-Leninist, or sinocentric positions that have recently become fashionable.

* * *

Let us now ask the question: why did N. I. Konrad confine himself to translating only two treatises - Sun Tzu and Wu Tzu, and not translate all the treatises of the "Seven Books of the Military Canon"? Why didn't you translate the entire Seven Books in full, like Ralph Sawyer (Wu-ching, 1998)? The translation-study of Wu-tzu (1958) by N. I. Konrad largely repeats his work Sun-tzu (1950); all the main and significant things that he could say in the second book, he already said in the first. Moreover, the study of "Wu Tzu" itself is, in fact, nothing more than a continuation of the work on "Sun Tzu", and in some cases a repetition. In addition, the final chapter of the first book - "The Military Doctrine of Sun Tzu" -is not only the result of studying the treatise of Sun Tzu, but also, to a certain extent, the completion of N. I. Conrad's study of the entire "Seven Books" together with all the commentators known to him. Against this background, the translation-study of "Wu-tzu" looks like a certain artificially torn out fragment of the whole. Therefore, it is so much inferior in quality and volume to the first book, although it is united with it by the construction of the work, the presence of notes and extensive commentary. Further work on the translation and study of the remaining treatises of the Seven Books, it seems to me, would be at best something similar to Wu-tzu, since the main thing was already said by N. I. Konrad in Sun Tzu, and especially in the final chapter devoted to his military doctrine.

N. I. Konrad's research, in my deep conviction, cannot be placed in any definite classification framework. Therefore, the assessment given to his work by N. I. Chuev, who believes that N. I. Konrad limited himself to the philological side of the question, is extremely perplexing [Chuev, 1999, p. 8, 124]. Historical and philological analysis can include up to-

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freely voluminous notes by N. I. Konrad to the text of "Sun Tzu". But not the commentary, and certainly not the chapter on " Sun Tzu's Military Doctrine." I would call military-philosophical analysis the basis of his study of Sun Tzu's treatise, and that is very conditional, since this work of N. I. Konrad is not limited to this framework either.

Objecting to N. I. Chuev, I would like to remind you that N. I. Konrad makes a philological analysis of the text of "Sun Tzu" in his other work, published twenty years later, "Essay on Ancient Chinese Literature", in which he really approaches the treatise as a philologist in the narrow sense of the word, noting in particular It is shown that the most technical provisions are presented in the language of images, usually colorful, often unexpected, and this is how their meaning and significance are most fully revealed [Konrad, 1995, p.449]. N. I. Konrad considers the structure and construction of the treatise in this work from the same positions. He notes that the main method of constructing text is parallelism. This parallelism, which means not only an equal number of words, but also syllables (mor), creates an effect that is both structural and euphonic. Parallelism, writes N. I. Konrad, so defines the literary face of the treatise that he involuntarily has a desire to call it a poem like "Lao Tzu". There, in his opinion, a poem on a philosophical theme, here - on the theme of military art. There the poem is almost in verse, here - in prose. N. I. Konrad believes that these treatises are united by the presence of the main character in them: "And he is the same as in "Lao Tzu", invisible, but felt in everything. There is a sage, but a sage in the form of a mysterious, mysterious person. Here is a commander, but a commander in his ideal image... " [Konrad, 1995, p. 450].

In his Essay on Ancient Chinese Literature, N. I. Konrad also raises the problem of the authorship of other contemporary works by the mentioned authors. He believes that the concept of authorship in the modern sense of the word is not applicable to them. They were created not by one person and not at the same time: "A literary work of this era is not a one-time fact, but a long-term phenomenon" [Konrad, 1995, p. 440].

Sinologist V. V. Malyavin reproached N. I. Konrad for not paying enough attention to the key concepts and principles of Sun Tzu theory in his research [Malyavin, 2002, p. 114]. At the same time, he did not explain which "key concepts and principles" the scientist did not pay enough attention to. Perhaps we are talking about actual and global problems of our time, which V. V. Malyavin often raises in the context of his consideration of the military thought of Ancient China.

In this article, the author tried to show that it was in the study of ancient Chinese military thought that N. I. Konrad's versatility as a philologist, philosopher, and historian was particularly clearly manifested. It can be argued with good reason that at times he also thinks like a military analyst. N. I. Konrad believed that "a real philologist does not have the right to be only a linguist. Behind the phenomenon of language, he must see the language itself, and through it-thinking, mind... the creative genius of the people "[Konrad, 1996, p. 5].

The works of N. I. Konrad, his scientific analysis, generalizations, conclusions, his competence and argumentation have not lost their value for modern researchers. Thanks to N. I. Konrad, the military thought of Ancient China became the property of the scientific community and a wide range of readers, part of the intellectual wealth of the country. N. I. Konrad, the greatest Soviet (Russian) Japanese scholar, can rightly be considered the founder of the scientific study of the military thought of ancient China in Russia. It still remains an unsurpassed "peak" in the study of this topic in Russia.

list of literature

Zhukov E. M. Introductory article / / China. Japan. Istoriya i filologiya [History and Philology], Moscow: Publishing House of Eastern Literature, 1961.

Zotov O. V. Sun-tzu and Clausewitz: paradoxes of difference // XVII Scientific conference " Society and the State in China "(NC OGK), Moscow, 1986.

Zotov O. V. Sun-tzu's Teaching on the "Unusual" War of the XVIII NK OGK. Part 2. Moscow, 1987.

Zotov O. V. What was the reason for the "weak management of barbarians" (On the peculiarities of the foreign policy of Imperial China) IIXIX NK OGK. Moscow, 1988.

Zotov O. V. O logike i strukture traktata Sun-tzu IIXXV NK OGK [On the logic and structure of the treatise of Sun-tzu IIXXV NK OGK]. Moscow, 1994.

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Karaev G. N. Military Art of Ancient China, Moscow: Voenizdat Publ., 1959.

Konrad N. I. Sinologiya I Reprint s izd. 1977 g. Moscow: Ladomir, 1995.

Konrad N. I. Unpublished works. Letters. Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia, 1996.

Lapina Z. G. Uchenie ob upravleniyu gosudarstvennom v srednevekovom Kitae [The Doctrine of State Management in medieval China].

Malyavin V. V. Kitayskaya voennaya strategiya [Chinese Military Strategy], Moscow: Astrel Publishing House, ACT Publishing House, 2002.

Toporkov A. Metod voennykh znanii [Method of military knowledge].

U-ching. Seven military Canons of Ancient China / Translated from English by R. V. Kotenko; Prev. and a comment. Ralph D. Sawyer, St. Petersburg: Eurasia Publishing House, 1998.

Chuev N. I. Military thought in Ancient China. The history of the formation of military theories. M: Favorite book, 1999.

Stein V. M. Issledovanie akademika N. I. Konrad po istorii drevnekitaiskogo voennogo iskusstva [Research of Academician N. I. Konrad on the history of Ancient Chinese Military Art].

Giles L. Sun Tzu. On the Art of War. The Oldest Military Treatise in the World. L., 1910.

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